Brown and Others, Plaintiffs in Error, against The State of Maryland, Defendant in Error, 12 Wheat. 419

Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinión of the Court. This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, affirming a judgment of the City Court of Baltimore, on an indictment, found in that Court against the plaintiffs in error, for violating

an act of the legislature of Maryland. The indictment was founded on the second

section of that act, which is in these words : “ And he it enacted, that all importers of foreign articles or commodities, of dry goods, wares, or merchandise, by bale or package, or of wine, rum, brandy, whiskey and other distilled spiritous liquors, &c. and other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrel, or tierce, shall, before they are authorized to sell, take out a license, as by the original act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollárs ; and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, shall be subject to the same penalties and forfeitures as are prescribed, by the original act to which this isa supplement.” The indictment charges the plaimuTa hi error, with having imported and sold one package of foreign dry goods without haying license to do so.

A judgment was rendered against them on demurrer for the penalty which the act prescribes for the offence; and that judgment is how before this Court. The cause depends entirely on the question, whether the legislature of a State can constitutionally require the importer of foreign articles to take out a license from the State, before he shall be permitted to sell a bale or. package so imported. It has h.een truly said, that the presumption is in favour of-every legislative act, and that the whole burthen of proof lies on him who denies its constitutionality.

The plaintiffs m error take the burthen upon themselves, and insist that the act under consideration is repugnant to two provisions in the constitution of the United States. Question as u, Jhe law',^resPect t0 *®e clause prom-the fay^gimpost? ?r duties on 1. To that which declares that “ no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for.executing its inspection laws.”. 2.

To that which declares that Congress shall have power 1! to regulate commerce with foreign, nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” 1. The first inquiry is into the extent of the prohibition upon States “to lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports.” The counsel for the State of Maryland would con- * t J fine this prohibition to laws imposing duties on the act importation or exportation. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error give them a much wider scope.

In performing the delicate and important duty of ing clauses in the .constitution of our country, which involve conflicting powers of the government of the Union, ahd of the respective States, it is proper to take a view of the literal meaning of.the words to be expounded, of their connexion with other words, and of the general objects to be accomplished by the prohibitory clause,' or by the grant of power.

What, then, is the meaning of the words, “ imposts, or duties on ináports. or exports ?” An impost, dr duty on imports, is a custom or a tax levied on articles brought into a country, and is most usually secured before .the importer is allowed to exercise his rights of ownership over them, because evasions of the law can be prevented more certainly by executing it while the articles are in its custody. It would not, however, be less an impost or duty on the articles, if it were to be levied on them after they were landed.

The policy and consequent practice of levying or securing the duly before, or on entering the port; does not limit the power to that state of things, nor, consequently, the prohibition, unless the.true meaning of the clause so confines it. What,, then, are “ imports ?” The lexicons inform us, they are “ things imported.” If we appeal to usage for the meaning of the word, we shall receive the same answer. They are the articles themselves, which are brought into the country “ A duty on imports,” then,- is not merely a duty on the act of importation, but is a duty on the thing imported.

It is not, taken in its literal sense, confined to a duty levied while the

article is entering-the country, but extends to a-duty- levied after it has entered the country. The succeeding words of the'sentence vthich limit the prohibition, show the extent in which it was understood. The limitation is, “ except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.” Now, the inspection laws, so far as they act upon articles for exportation, are generally executed on land, before the

article is put on board the vessel ; so far as they act upon importations, they are generally executed upon articles which are landed. The tax or duty of inspection, then, is a tax which is frequently, if not always paid for service performed -on land, while the

article is in the bosom of the country. Yet this tax is an exception to the prohibition on the States to lay duties on imports or exports. The exception was made because the tax would otherwise have been within the prohibition. If it be a rule of

interpretation to which all assent, that the exception of a particular thing from general words, proves that, in the opinion of the lawgiver, the thing excepted would be within the general clause had the exception r * been made, we know no reason why this general rule shook, not be as applicable to the constitution as to other instru-. ments.

If it be applicable, then this exception in favour of duties for the supporrof inspection laws, goes far in proving that the framers of the constitution classed taxes of a similar character with those imposed for the purposes of inspection, with- duties on imports and. exports, and supposed them to be prohibited. If we quit this narrow view of the subject, and passing from the literal

interpretation pf the words, look to the objects of-1 the prohibition, we find no reason for withdrawing the act under consideration from its operation. From the vast inequality between the different States of the confederacy, as to commercial advantages, few subjects . were viewed with deeper interest, or excitéd more irritation, than the manner in which the several States exercised,, or seemed disposed to exercise, the power of laying duties on -imports.

From motives which were deemed sufficient by the statesmen of that day, the general power of taxation, indisp'ensably necessary as it was, and jealous as the Stateswere of any encroachment on it, was so far abridged as to forbad them to. touch imports or exports, with the single exception which .has' been noticed. Why are they restrained from imposing these duties ? Plainly, because, in the general opinion, the interest of all would be best promoted by placing that whole subject under the control of Congress.

Whether the prohibition to “ lay imposts, or duties on imports or exports,” proceeded from an apprehension that the power might be so exercised as to disturb that equality among the States which was.generally advantageous, or that harmony between them which it. was desirable to preserve, or to maintain unimpaired our commercial connexions with foreign nations, or to confer this source of revenue on the government of the Union, or whatever other motive might have induced the prohibition, it is plain, that the object would be as completely defeated by a power to tax the

article in the hands of the importer the instant it was landed, as by a power to tax it while entering the port. There is no difference, in effect, between a-power to prohibit the sale of an article, anda power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be a necessary consequence of the other. No goods would be imported if none could be sold. No object of any description can be accomplished by laying a duty on importation, which may not be accomplished with equal certainty by laying a duty on the thing imported in the hands of the importer.

It is obvious, that the same power which imposes a light duty, can impose a very heavy one, one which amounts to a prohibition; Questions of power do not depend on the degree to which it may be exercised. If it may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those in whose hands it is placed. If the tax may be levied in this form by a State, it may be levied to an extentWhich will defeat the revenue by impost, so far as it is drawn from importations into the particular State.

W.e are told, that such wild and irrational abuse of power is not to be apprehended, and is not to be taken into view when discussing its existence. All power r,'.alabe abused; and if the fear of its abuse is to constitute amargument against its existence, it might be urged against the existence of'that, which is universally acknowledged, and which is indispensable to the general safety. The States will never be so mad as to destroy their own commerce,'or even to lessen it. We do not dissent.from these general propositions. We do not suppose any State would act so unwisely.

JBut we do not place the question on that ground. These arguments apply with precisely the same force against the whole prohibition. It-might, with the same reason be said, that no State would he so blind to its own interests as to lay duties on importation which would either prohibit or diminish its trade. Yet the framers of our constitution have thought this a power which no State ought to exercise.

Conceding, to the full extent which is required, that every State would, in its legislation on this subject, providejudiciousiy for its own interests, it cannot be conceded, that each would respect the interests of others. A duty on imports is a tax on. the

article which is paid by the consumer. The great importing States would thus levy a tax on the noni importing States, which would not be less a tax because- their interest would afford ample security against its-ever being .so heavy as'to expel commerce from their ports. This would necessarily .produce countervailing measures on the part of those States whose situation was less favourable to importation. For this, among other reasons, the whole power of laying duties on imports was, with a single and slight exception, taken from the States.

When we are inquiring whether a particular act is within this prohibition, the question is not, whether the. State may so legislate as to Hurt itself, but whether the act is within the words and mischief of the prohibitory clause. It has already been shown, that a tax on the

article in the hands of the importer, is within its words; and we think it too dear for controversy, that the same tax is within its mischief.

We think it unquestionable, that such a tax has precisely the same tendency to enhance the price of the article, as if imposed •upon it y bile-entering .the port. • The counsel for the State of Maryland insist, with great reason, that if the words of the prohibition be taken in their utmost latitude they will abridge the power of taxation-which all admit to be essential to the States, to an extent which has never yet been suspected, and will deprive them of resources which are necessary to supply revenue, and which they have heretofore been admitted to possess.

These words must, therefore, be construed with some limitation; and, if this be admitted, they insist, that entering the country is the point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the State to tax commences. It may be conceded, that the words of the prohibition ought not to be pressed to their utmost extent; that in our complex system, the object of the powers conferred on the government of the Union, and the nature of the often conflicting powers which remain in the States, must always he taken into view, and may aid in expounding the words of any particular clause.

But, while we admit that sound principles of construction ought to restrain all Courts from carrying the words of the prohibition beyond the object the constitution is intended to secure: that there must be a point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the State to tax commences ; we cannot admit that this point of time is the instant that the articles enter the country. It is, we think, obvious, that this construction would defeat the prohibition.

The constitutional prohibition on the States to lay a duty on imports, a prohibition which a vast majority of them must feel an interest in preserving, may certainly come in conflict with their acknowledged power to tax persons and property within their territory. The power, and the restriction on it, though quite distinguishable when they do not approach each other, may yet, like the intervening co-lours between white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex>the understanding, as colours perplex the vision in marking the distinction between them.

Yet the distinction exists, and must be marked as the cases arise. Till they do arise, it might be premature to state any rule as being universal in its application.

It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become- incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has*, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, add has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or- package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution.

The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contend, that the importer purchases.' by payment of the duty to the United States, a right to dispose of his merchandise, as well as to bring it into the country; and certainly the argument is supported by strong reason, as well as by the practice of nations, including our own. The object of- importation is sale; it constitutes the motive for paying the duties ; and if the United States possess the power of conferring the right to sell, as the consideration for which the duty is paid, every principle of f3.ii’ dealing requires that they should be understood to confer it.

The practice of the most commercial nations conforms to this idea. Duties, according to that practice,. are charged on those articles only which are in--, tended for sale or consumption in the country. Thus, sea stores, goods imported and re-exported in the same vessel, goods landed and carried over land for the purpose of being re-exported from some other port, goods forced in by stress of weather, and landed, but not for sale, are exempted from the payment of duties.

The whole course of legislation on the subject shows, that, in the opinion of the legislature, the right to sell is connected with the payment of duties. -The counsel for the defendant in error have endeavoured to illustrate their proposition, that the constitutional prohibition ceases the instant the goods enter the country, by an array of the consequences which they suppose must follow the denial of it. If the importer acquires the right to sell by the payment of duties, he may, they say, exert that right when, where, and as he pleases, and the State cannot regu-. late it.

He may sell by retail, at auction, or as an itinerant pedlar. He may introduce articles, as gunpowder, which endanger a city, into' the midst of its population ; he may introduce articles which endanger the public health, and -the power of self-preservation is denied. An importer may. bring in goods, as plate, for his own use, and thus retain much valuable property exempt from taxation. These objections to the principle, if well founded, would certainly be entitled to serious consideration.

But, we. think, they will be found, on examination, not to belong necessarily to the principle, and, consequently, not to prove, that it may pot be resorted to with safety as a criterion by which to measure the extent of the prohibition. This indictment is against the importer, for selling a package of dry goods in the form in which it was imported, without a license. This state of things is changed if he sells . them, or otherwise mixes them with the general property of the State, by breaking up his packages, and travelling with them as an itinerant pedlar.

In the first case, the tax intercepts the import, as am import, in its way to become incorporated with the general mass of property, and denies it the privilege of becoming so incorporated until it shall have contributed to the revenue of the State. It denies to the importer the right of using the privilege which he has purchased from the United States, until he shall have also purchased it from the State. In the last cases, the tax finds the

article already incorporated with the mass of property by the act of the importer. He has used the privilege he had purchased, and has himself mixed them up with the common mass, and the law may treat them as it finds them. The same observations apply to plate, or other furniture used by the importer. So, if he sells by auction. Auctioneers, asre persons, licensed by the State, and if the importer chooses to employ them, he can as little object to paying for this service, as for any other for. which he may apply to an officer of the State.

The right of sale may very well, be annexed to importation, without annexing to it, also, the privilege of using the officers licensed by the State to'make sales in a peculiar way. The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States. If the possessor stores it himself out of town, the removal cannot be a duty ón imports, because it contributes nothing to the revenue. If be prefers placing it in a public magazine, it is because he stores it there, in his own opinion, more advantageously than else-1 where.

We áre not sure that this may not be classed among inspection laws. The removal or destruction of infectious or unsound articles is, undoubtedly, an exercise of that power, and forms an express exception to the prohibition we are Considering. Indeed, the laws of the United States expressly sanction the health laws of a State.

The principle, then,' for which the plaintiffs in error contend, that the importer acquires a right, not only to bring, the articles into the country, but to mix them with the common mass of property, does not interfere with the necessary power of taxation which is acknowledged to reside in the States, to that dangerous extent which the counsel for the defendants in error seem to apprehend. It carries thé prohibition in the constitution no farther than to prevent the States from doing that which it was the great object of the constitution to prevent. But if it should be proved, that a duty on the

article itself would be repugnant to the constitution, it is still argued, that this is not a tax upon the article, but on the person. jThe State, it is said, may tax occupations, and this is nothing more. It is.impossible to conceal from ourselves, that this is varying the form, without varying the substance. It is treat-i'óg a prohibition which is general, as if it were confined .to a particular mode of dojng the forbidden thing. All must perceive, that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only for sale, is a tax on the

article itself. It is true, the State may tax occupations generally, but this tax must be paid by those who employ the individual, or is a tax on his business. The lawyer, the physician, or the mechanic, must either charge more on the

article in which he deals, or the thing itself is taxed through his person. This the State has a right to do, because no constitutional prohibition extends to it. So, a tax on the occupation of ah importer is, in like manner, a tax on importation. It must add to the price of the article, and be paid by the consumer, or by the importer himself, in like manner as a direct duty on the

article itself would be made. This the State has not a right to do, because it is prohibited by the constitution. Question as to Jeauiating* commerce-. In support of the argument, that the prohibition ceases the instant the goods are brought into the country, a compa- . rison has been drawn between the opposite words export and import. As," to export, it is said, means only to carry goods out of the country; so, to import, means only to bring them into it. But, ■ suppose we extend this comparison to the two prohibitions.

The States are forbidden to lay a duty on exports, and the United States are forbidden, to lay a tax or duty on articles exported from any State There is some diversity in language, but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited. The United States have the same right to tax occupations which is possessed by the States.

Now, suppose the United States-should require every exporter to take out a license, for which he should pay shch tax as Congress might think proper to impose ; would government be permitted to shield itself from the just censure to. which this attempt to evade the prohibitions of the constitution would expose it, by saying, that this was a tax on the person, not on the article, and that the legislature had a right to-tax occupations ?

Or, suppose revenue cutters were to be stationed off the coast for the purpose of levying a duty on all merchandise found in vessels which were leaving the United States for foreign countries ; would it be received as an excuse for this , outrage, were the government to sayr that exportation meant no more than carrying goods out of the country, and as the prohibition to lay a tax on imports, or things imported, ceased the instant they were brought into the country, so the prohibition to tax articles exported ceased when they were carried out of the country ?

We’think, then, that the act under which the plaintiffs in error were indicted, is repugnant to that

article of the constitution which declares, that “ no State shall lay any impost or duties on imports or exports.” 2. Is it also repugnant to that clause in the constitution which empowers “ Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes?” The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous ■to the adoption of the constitution can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign nations .with a single view to their own interests.; and our disunited efforts to counteract their restrictions were rendered impotent by want of combination.

Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making treaties; but the inability of the federal government to enforce them had become so appárent as to render that power in a great degree useless. Those who felt the injury arising from this state of things, and those who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the prosperity of nations, perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important subject to a single government.

It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of the federal government, contributed more to that' great revolution which introduced the present system, than the deep and general conviction, that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress. It is not, therefore,' matter of surprise, that the grant should be as extensive as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce, and all c >mmerce among the States.

To construe the power so as to impair its efficacy, would tend to defeat an object, in the attainment of which the American public took, and justly took, that strong interest which arose from a full conviction of its necessity. What, then, is the just extent of a power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States? This question was considered in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, (9 Wheat. Rep. 1.) in which it was declared to be complete in itself, and to acknowledge no limitations other •than are prescribed by the constitution.

The power is coextensive with the subject on which it acts, and cannot be stopped at the external boundary of a State, but must enter its interior. Wé deem it unnecessary now to reason in support of these propositions. Their truth is proved, by facts continually before our eyes, and was, we think, demonstrated, if they could require demonstration, in the case already mentioned, If this power reaches the interior of. a Stale, and may be there exercised, it must be capable of authorizing the sale of those articles which it introduces. Commerce is inter course : one of its most ordinary ingredients is traffic.

Iris inconceivable, that the power to authorize this traffic, when given in the most comprehensive terms, with the intent that its efficacy should be complete, should cease at the point when its continuance is indispeusable-to its value. To what purpose should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the power to authorize a sale of the thing imported ? Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a. part.

It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right, not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell. If this be admitted, and we think it cannot be denied, what can the meaning of

an act of Congress which authorizes importation, and offers the privilege for sale at a fixed price to every person who chooses to become a purchaser ? How is it to be construed, if an intent to deal honestly and fairly, an intent as wise as it is moral, is to enter into the construction ? What can be the use of the contract, what does the importer purchase, if he does not purchase the privilege to sell ? What would be the language of a foreign government, which should be informed that its merchants, after importing according to law, were forbidden to sell the' merchandise imported ?

What answer would the United States give to the complaints and just reproaches to which such an extraordinary circumstance would expose them ? Ni apology could be received, or even offered. Such a state of things would break up commerce, it will not meet this argument, to say, that this state of things will never be produced; that the good sense of the States is a sufficient security against if The constitution has not confided this subject to that good sense. It is placed elsewhere.

The question is, where does the power reside ? not, how far will it be probably abused" The power claimed by the State is, in its nature, in conflict with that given to Congress; and the greater or less extent in which it may be exercised does not enter into (he inquiry concerning its existence. We think, then, that if the power to authorize a sale exists in Congress, the conclusion that the rigfit to sell is connect-e(j wjth the law permitting importation, as an inseparable incident, is inevitable.

Jf the principles we have stated be correct, the result to which they conduct us cannot be mistaken- Any penalty inflicted on the importer for selling the

article in his character of importer, must be in opposition to the act of Congress which authorizes importation. Any charge on the introduction and incorporation of the articles into and with the mass of property in the country, must be hostile to the power given to Congress to regulate commerce, since an essential part.of that regulation, and principal object of it, is to prescribe the regular means for accomplishing that introduction and incorporaron. The distinction between a tax on the thing imported, and on the person of the importer, can have no influence on this part of the subject.

It is loo obvious for controversy, that they interfere equally with'the power to regulate commerce. It has been contended, that this construction of the power to regulate commerce, as was contended in construing the prohibition-to Jay duties on imports, would abridge the acknowledged power of a State to tax its owrn citizens, or their property, within its territory. We admit this power to be sacred; but cannot admit that it may be used so as to obstruct the free course of a power given to Congress. We cannot admit, that it may be used so as to obstruct or defeat the power to regulate commerce.

It has beeri observed, that the powers remaining with the States may be so exercised as to come in conflict with those vested in Congress. When this happens, that which is not supreme must yield to that which is supreme, This great and universal truth is inseparable from the nature of things, and the constitution has applied it to the often interfering powers of the general and State governments, as a vital principle of perpetual operation.' It results, necessarily, from this principle, that the taxing power of the States must have some limits.

It cannot reach and restrain the action of the national government within its proper sphere, It cannot reach the administration of justice m the Courts of the. Union, or the collection ol the taxes of the United States, or restrain the-operation'of any law which Congress may constitutionally pftss. It cannot interfere with any regulation of commerce. If the States may tax all persons and property found on their territory, what shall restrain them from taxing goods in their transit through the State from one port to another, for the purpose of re-exportation'?

The laws of trade authorize this ope-ration, and general convenience requires it. Or what should restrain a State from taxing any

article passing through it from one State to another, for the purpose of traffic ? or from taxing the transportation of articles passing from the State itself to another State, for commercial pur-: poses ? These cases are all within the sovereign power of taxation, but would obviously derange the measures of Congress to regulate commerce, and affect materially the purpose for which that ppwer was given. Wo deem it unnecessary to press this argument farther, or to give additional illustrations of it, because the subject was taken up, and .considered with great attention, in M'Culloch, v.

The State of Maryland, (4 Wheat. Rep. 316.) the decision in which casé is, we think, entirely applicable to this. It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally to importations from a sister State. We do not mean to give any opinion on a tax discriminating between foreign and domestic articles.

We think there is error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland, in affirming the judgment of the Baltimore City Court, because the act of the legislature of Maryland, imposing the penalty for which the said judgment is rendered, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and, consequently, void. The judgment'is to be reversed, and the cause remanded to that Court, with instructions to enter judgment in favour of the appellants.