HIMELY v. ROSE, 5 Cranch 313

Marshals,, Ch. J. delivered'the opinion, of the court 43 follows : A decree having been tormerly rendered in this cause, the cojurt is, now! to determine whether that decree has been executed according to its true intent and meaning.

That decree directed “ the cargo of the Sarah to he -stored to the original owners, subject tp those charges of freight, insurance and' other expenses which would haye been incurred by'them, in bringing the cargo into the United States.” In carrying this decree into execution, an allowance has been made for freight,'and for expenses' incurred at the port of importation; but no allowance has been'made for* expenses at the port of lading, nor For insurance. The appellants, too, were charged with, interest on the money into which the cargo had been converted. ...

No exception having been taken to this report, it is now liable to those exceptions .only which appear on its face. So far as respects freight,, and the expenses at the port of entry and delivery, the report must be toiisidered as correct; but in those items of the claim which were disallowed, the error, if it be one, is apparent on the face of the proceedings, and may therefore be corrected. The court has not considered the appellants as infected by the marine trespass committed by the . captors.of the Sarah and her., cargo. Their operations commence with their purchase at St.

Jago de Cuba? and the decree designed, and is thought to have been so expressed as to charge the..owners with all the expenses waich they would have, incurred, had they made thfe purchase themselves. Hjid they done so, they must have incurred some expenses at the port of lading. Among these is certainly not to be estimated the price óf the cargo; but any expense necessarily attendant upon the transaction, such as putting the cargo on board, may'properly, under this decree, be charged to the owners.

It is obvious, too, that the owners, or the underwriters, if they represent the owners, had they been the purchasers, must have insured the Vessel and cargo from St. Jago de Cuba to the United States, or must themselves have stood insurers; in which latter case, the risk is deemed equal to the insurance. The decree, therefore, formerly rendered’ by this court,, is understood to have entitled the appellants o insurance. The question of interest is more doubtful; but this court is of opinion that the appellants/iughtnot to be charged with interest. Restitution of the cargo was awarded.

The pro-. perty having been sold, the mdnéy proceeding from the sales is substituted for the-specific articles. If this money remains in possession of the court, it carries no interest; if it be in the hands of an individual, it may bear interest, or otherwise, as the court shall direct. But it is not supposed that the party, to whom restitution is awarded, receives interest in such case, unless it be-decreed by the/court. This court.did not decree interest; nor would interest have been decreed, in this case, had the particular fact of the sale been brought before them.

The circumstances of the case were such as to restrain the court from inserting in its decree any thing which might increase its severity. The loss was heavy; and it fell unavoidably on one of two innocent parties. The court was notdnclined to add to its weight, by giving interest in the nature of damages. The allowance of interest, therefore, in the court below is overruled. The sentence of the circuit court is reversed.

Johnson, J, When the mandate of this court was received in the court below, auditors were nominated, by consent* to report what would be the usúal. mercantile allowance between th.e parties; and. to state an account accordingly. Those, auditors reported against the allowance of insurance, and in favour of interest. The supposition that the expense . of transportation was not allowed, I. am convinced, must be incorrect ; for insurance ..and interest were the subject of the only two exceptions taken .to their report.

Upon hearing argumenten these two exceptions, the c.óurt affirmed their report upon both these points, and I have since heard no reason to alter the opinion which I entertained, on the. argument below. It . is contended that the mandate of this court was peremptory as to the allowance of insuránce, and did not sanction the charge of interest.

The words of the' mandate só fár as relates to these Íjoints are the following'; “ subject to those charges or freight, insurance,, and other expenses, which, would háve been incurred by the owners in bringing the cargo into! the United States; which equitably deductions the defendants are at liberty to show to the.circuit court" &c. These words imperatively require two things ; viz. that the deductions, to be allowed to Himely, should be equitable in their nature, and should be shown to the court. Upon what ground could an allowance for insurance have been deemed just or equitable ?

It could only have been upon _ Himely’s having actually paid an insurance, .which he was at-liberty, to show, or upon his having himself incurred that risk which, would have, been covered by insurance. . The fact was admitted that-, he had not insured, and as to having incurred any risk himself, 1 cannot understand in what possible view he could have incurred a risk, when this court has decided that if the property had been Jost,. he would have lost nothing.

It was not the property of Himely, it was the property ■of Rose; had it been sunk in the ocean, it-would not have been die loss of Himely, it would have been the loss of Rose; there can be, no reason, then, why Rose, who ran all the risk, should be adjudged to pay an insurance to Himely, who incurred,no risk : bjat 'such is the effect of deducting it from the sum to be -paid to Rose.

After (leading that the property was np't changed, that it , still continued in Rose, and toas never vested in Hipiely, I feel confused by the inquiry on -what possible ground ,the allowance for insurance can be. •sanctioned; With regard- to interest, the question is not. so-clear, but the difficulty does hot arise -upon the ábstract equity of the charge. In equity, interest goes with the principal, as the fruit with the. tree. .Rose is now tp be considered as the rightful, ownyf of- the property, and ought to have had the possession and use of it, during the existence of this con-test.

But Himely, having given stipulation bonds, was, by. the order of the district court, admiftéd to the possession and use of it, added it tó his capital, traded upon it, and made such profits and advantages of it as his, skill or ingenuity suggested. Rose, in the mean time, was kept out of the use of it, and lost those emoluments and mercantile advantages which might have resulted from the use'of it.

It was not a case in which the property is locked up in a warehouse, or the proceeds thereof deposited in the hands of the register of this court, but a case in which the goods , weft;, in fact, converted into money by the effect of the stipulation bond, and' the use of it' given to Himely, to the prejudice of Rose: there could, therefore, be no radical objection to the charge, on the ground of equity.

Had the mandate issued to restore to the -party a flock of sheep, or stock, or bonds bearing interest, it is .presumed that it would have been construed to authorize the delivery, of their natural or artificial increase without any express, words to carry them. But it . is said that the mandate does not expressly authorize this allowance. This is true; but it must be recollected that the mandate of this court enjoins the allowance of equitable deductions.

Now a. variety of deduce tiom ttiay be, in the abstract, equitable, but. may ipse ■ that character by its being made, to' appear that ample compensation has been already made for them.

It was in this light that the court below sustained the charge of interest: because having liad the usufruct of the property concerning which those charges on his part, which merited the denomiñation - of equitable deductions,-were incurred, it appeared to, the court in fact that he had beed compensated in part for those advances by the use of the money. . .If this, court had not made use of the terms equitable deductions, that court probably would not have thought itself sanctioned in doing what appeared so equitable between the parties. March 15.

Martin and Jones, for the^ appellant, moved to open the principal- decree1; and1' stated that they were prepared to show that this court had been misinformed as to the law of St. Domingo. That they •had further arretes, or’ ordinances, of the French government explanatory of that upon which the, sentence was founded; and showing that the seizure of the. property, vi'as the exercise of‘a belligerent, •not of’ a municipal right.

They contended that while the property remained put' of the jurisdiction of the United States, it was,lost to the libellants, and that IJimely was entitled to a compensation for bringing it within their reach. That ‘ he ought to be reimbursed at. least what he paid,for the property.. (¿. Lee, contra. •The appeal as to the execution of .the mandate gives no right to open the original decree. No further order was taken in consequence of the motion.