Deborah PRISE and Heather Rady, Plaintiffs, v. ALDERWOODS GROUP, INC., Burton L. Hirsch Funeral Home, Inc., H.P. Brandt Funeral Home, Inc., and H. Samson, Inc., Defendants, 657 F. Supp. 2d 564

MEMORANDUM OPINION CONTI, District Judge. Introduction This case involves two former funeral home employees, plaintiffs Deborah Prise (“Prise”) and Heather Rady (“Rady,” and together with Prise “plaintiffs”), who allege that their employers, defendants Alderwoods Group, Inc. (“Alderwoods”), Burton L. Hirsch Funeral Home, Inc. (“Hirsch Funeral Home”), H.P. Brandt Funeral Home, Inc. (“Brandt Funeral Home”) and H.

Samson, Inc. (“Samson Funeral Home” and together with Alderwoods, Hirsch Funeral Home and Brandt Funeral Home, “defendants”), subjected them to various forms of illegal discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (“Equal Pay Act”). Pending before the court are motions for

summary judgment filed by defendants and a motion for partial

summary judgment filed by Prise. Background A. Prise Approximately six decades ago, Burton L. Hirsch (“Mr. Hirsch”) established Hirsch Funeral Home in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, community of Squirrel Hill, a predominantly Jewish neighborhood. (Joint Statement of Facts Relative to Defs.’ Mot. for Sum. J. as to the Claims of PI. Deborah Prise (“J.S.-Prise”) ¶ 1.) (Doc. No. 157.) In 1996, Mr.

Hirsch sold Hirsch Funeral Home to the entity that would later become Alderwoods. (Id. ¶ 3.) Between 2002 and 2006, Alderwoods was a corporation engaged in the business of providing mortuary services. (Id. ¶ 4.) Alderwoods operated funeral homes and cemeteries across North America, among which were Hirsch Funeral Home, Brandt Funeral Home and Samson Funeral Home. (Joint Statement of Facts Relative to Defs.’ Mot. For Sum. J. as to the Claims of PI. Heather Rady (“J.S.-Rady”) ¶ 1.) (Doc.

No. 158.) These three funeral homes were all located in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. (Id.) Alderwoods maintained an antidiscrimination policy designed to ensure that its services were available to all deceased customers, without regard to gender, race or religion. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 5.) In September 2002, Prise, who is Jewish, enrolled at the Pittsburgh Institute for Mortuary Science (“PIMS”). (Id. ¶ 8.) She applied for a student-level position at Alderwoods in October 2002. (Id.) Two months later, in December 2002, Aider-woods hired Prise for a part-time position at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id. ¶ 9.) She earned $5.15 per hour. (Id.) Prise received her funeral director’s license from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on November 12, 2004. (Id. ¶ 10.) Nine days later, Alderwoods promoted her to the position of funeral director. (Id.) In that capacity, she earned $18.00 per hour. (Id.) She reported to Michael Hilgefort (“Hilgefort”), who was the location manager at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Hilgefort expressed his intention to resign as the location manager in order to become a full-time funeral director. (Id. ¶ 14.) Pat McDermott (“McDermott”), the general manager for Alderwoods’ Pittsburgh market, suggested to recruiter Larry Newsom (“Newsom”) that Prise be considered as a possible replacement for Hilgefort. (Id.) Prise applied to succeed Hilgefort as the location manager at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id. ¶ 16.) Alderwoods typically required its location managers to have anywhere from three to five years of experience in the position of funeral director. (Id. ¶ 17.) Nevertheless, Prise was promoted to be Hirsch Funeral Home’s location manager in May 2005, at which point she had only seven months of experience as a funeral director. (Id.) After her promotion, Prise’s annual salary was $50,000.00. (Id. ¶ 18.) Hilgefort’s starting salary had been $48,000.00 per year. (Id.) Hilgefort had roughly five years of experience as a funeral director when he became a location manager. (Id.) His salary was increased to $50,000.00 per year after the conclusion of a three-month probationary period. (Id.) Prise was apparently never subject to such a probationary period. (Id.) Because Hirsch Funeral Home was located in Squirrel Hill, Alderwoods attempted to make it attractive to Jewish families. (Id. ¶ 21.) Particular Jewish congregations were offered special pricing packages. (Id.) During this same period of time, Aider-woods merged its Pittsburgh and West Virginia markets. (Id. ¶ 17 n. 4.) Randy Amos (“Amos”) became the general manager for the combined market. (Id.) Although McDermott remained the general manager for the Pittsburgh area, he was placed under Amos’ authority. (Id.) In October 2005, McDermott’s general manager position was eliminated. (Id.) He was demoted to the position of funeral director. (Id.) On August 15, 2005, Miriam Maizlech (“Maizlech”) arrived at Hirsch Funeral Home for her first day of work as a location assistant. (Id. ¶ 22.) Prise was in Chicago, Illinois, that day in order to attend a Jewish studies class. (Id.) Maizlech apparently sat alone throughout the day, with no one to train her. (Id.) Prise contended that it was not her responsibility to train new employees, and that she was not responsible for being at Hirsch Funeral Home on Maizlech’s first day of work. (Id.) McDermott reprimanded Prise the next day for not being present to acquaint Maizlech with her duties. (Id.) McDermott suggested that Prise exhaust her vacation days in order to attend classes in Chicago, which was apparently in conflict with Prise’s understanding of Alderwoods’ policies. (Id.) Prise called Amos later that day to complain about McDermott’s comments. (Id. ¶ 23.) During a conference call held on August 19, 2005, John Blute (“Blute”), Alderwoods’ manager for the northeast region, informed Prise that she did not have to exhaust her vacation days in order to further her education. (Id. ¶ 25.) Nancy Baum (“Baum”), a Christian, passed away in September 2005.

On September 21, 2005, Baum’s husband spoke with Hilgefort and requested that Hirsch Funeral Home

schedule a visitation for the afternoon of Saturday, September 24, 2005. (Id. ¶ 27.) Hilgefort was reluctant to

schedule the visitation for that day, because Hirsch Funeral Home had customarily refrained from having visitations on the Jewish Sabbath out of respect for the surrounding Jewish community. (Id.) Hilgefort discussed the matter with Amos, who subsequently conferred with Blute. (Id.) Katie Leahy (“Leahy”), Alderwoods’ director of operations, was also consulted. (Id.) Blute ultimately instructed Amos and Hilgefort to honor Baum’s husband’s request for a Saturday visitation. (Id.) When Prise learned that the visitation had been scheduled to take place on a Saturday, she instructed Hilgefort to reschedule it. (Id. ¶ 28.) Prise was apparently motivated by both a desire to avoid alienating the Squirrel Hill community and an intention to refrain from performing work on the Jewish Sabbath. (Id.) After learning about the situation, Amos again conferred with Blute and Leahy. (Id. ¶ 29.) Ron Collins (“Collins”), Alderwoods’ vice president, was also consulted. (Id.) Amos was apparently instructed to follow the wishes of Baum’s husband. (Id.) During a conference call with Prise, Hilgefort and Maizlech, Amos stated that Alderwoods would honor the request which had been made by Baum’s husband. (Id. ¶ 30.) Prise expressed her objection to the decision, claiming that it would cause Hirsch Funeral Home to lose credibility within Squirrel Hill’s Jewish community. (Id.) Maizlech suggested that Baum’s husband be asked to postpone the visitation to Saturday evening at sundown, at which point the Jewish Sabbath would be over. (Id. ¶ 31.) Amos was in favor of this idea. (Id.) After speaking with Hilgefort, Baum’s husband agreed to this arrangement. (Id.) Prise was still resistant to the idea of Hirsch Funeral Home conducting a visitation on a Saturday.

In an email to Leahy sent at 7:07 p.m. on September 21, 2005, Blute stated as follows: They decided to have the visitation (8:30-10:30) after the sabbath is over. Deborah had been unavailable to answer her phone at first, but now she found out and is livid. Randy is saying he can not control her at all. She says that randy [sicjhas disgraced her. (Defs.’ App. in Support of Mot. for Sum. J. on PL Deborah Prise’s Claims (“Defs App.-Prise”) at Tab 34.) (Docket No. 110).

On the morning of September 22, 2005, Amos reiterated that Alderwoods would conduct the visitation pursuant to the understanding between Baum’s husband and Hilgefort. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 32.) Amos told Prise that she would not have to worry about staffing concerns related to the visitation. (Id.) Prise apparently argued that it would constitute religion-based discrimination against her for Alderwoods to force her to perform work on the Jewish Sabbath.

Meanwhile, Alderwoods’ executives began to discuss the possibility of terminating Prise. (Id.) In an email to Leahy and Blute sent at 4:20 am. on September 22, 2005, Collins made the following observations: Deborah alleges discrimination against herself but doesn’t care to understand the potential of discrimination against others.

Be certain to document as we appear to be headed towards her departure. (Defs App.-Prise at Tab 35.) The documentary evidence indicates that a tentative decision to terminate Prise was made as early as the morning of September 23, 2005. (Id. at Tab 40.) That same day, Prise contacted Leahy to express her dissatisfaction with the decision to conduct the Baum visitation on a Saturday. (J.S.Prise ¶ 33.) On Saturday, September 24, 2005, Hilgefort handled the Baum visitation even though he was not scheduled to work on that day. (Id. ¶ 35.) Leahy and Collins had further discussions about Prise’s behavior. (Id.) They decided to give her a second chance. (Id.) A decision was apparently made to give Prise a letter informing her that further resistance to Alderwoods’ policies would result in the termination of her employment. (Id.) Prise continued to take issue with Aider-woods’ decision to host the Baum visitation on a Saturday.

On the morning of September 25, 2005, Prise made the following observations in an email to Amos: If you were to go to a Kosher restaurant, you would get ONLY a kosher meal regardless of your desire for any other meal. You would be served graciously and genourously [sic] but kosherly. That is what we at Burton L. Hirsch have been striving for as a JFDA member firm. We will serve anyone, but we will not violate sacred laws. And to ask a Jewess to break the laws of her religion is remarkably heinous.

Since I have always had issues with working on Shabbos, I have found a way to make it work whilst also being available for an at-need first call. This is a day that I usually attend communiity [sic] functions or make shabbos visits as aftercare. We need to be consistent and decide if we are going to be a Jewish Funeral Home. If that is the case, we must do it well and within halacha. If not, our preneed business has lots of room to complain and our credibility with the community will be greatly impaired.

Being a Jewish FH does not preclude serving other religions but it does mean operating at a standard consistent with the Jewish Religion and Halacha (Mosaic law). (Defs.’ App.-Prise at Tab 41.) On September 26, 2005, Amos met with Prise to discuss the situation. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 37.) Angie Sanders (“Sanders”), a market administrator, witnessed the meeting. (Id. ¶ 38.) Prise evidently expressed her unwillingness to work on the Jewish Sabbath, or on Jewish holidays. (Def.’s App.-Prise at Tab 42.) Amos gave Prise a letter warning that future instances of “insubordination” would lead to her discharge. (Id. at Tab 43.) Shortly thereafter, Amos received messages from three Jewish rabbis expressing support for Prise’s efforts to operate Hirsch Funeral Home as a Jewish funeral home and warning that they would discourage the members of their congregations from patronizing Hirsch Funeral Home if it were to engage in practices violative of Jewish law. (Id. at Tab 46.) In a letter dated September 27, 2005, Rabbi Alvin Berkun warned that Hirsch Funeral Home would “suffer grievous economic harm” if Prise were to be dismissed. (Id) In an email to Amos dated September 28, 2005, Rabbi Aaron Benjamin Bisno, the president of Pittsburgh’s Reform Rabbis Association and the rabbi of Rodef Shalom Congregation, of which both Prise and Mr.

Hirsch were members, stated that he would no longer “feel comfortable” recommending Hirsch Funeral Home to his congregants if it were to “turn[ ] its back on Jewish practice.” (Id) In an undated letter to Amos, Rabbi Shoshana Kaminskystated as follows: As the rabbi of a synagogue located in the Pittsburgh area, I am writing to share my thoughts on your insistence that the Burton Hirsch Funeral Home remain open on the Jewish sabbath and on our most sacred holidays. Quite frankly, your proposal runs entirely counter to the fundamental teachings I strive to pass on to the members of my congregation.

It is forbidden under Jewish law to hold funerals on the sabbath and on Jewish holidays, and I would never consider officiating under such conditions. What is more, by placing intolerable pressure on Deborah Prise, you threaten to do irreversible harm to your business. Ms. Prise is a gifted and dedicated professional who has revived the reputation of the Burton Hirsch Funeral Home in the Pittsburgh area.

Were you to fire her and force the Burton Hirsch Funeral Home to knowingly turn its back on accepted Jewish practice, I would personally and officially discourage the members of my congregation from considering this funeral home when it came time to do preplanning for funerals, and I would urge those who had already made arrangements through Burton Hirsch to consider switching to another funeral home. I believe your recommendation to be wrong-headed, intolerant of Jewish practices and teachings, and potentially disastrous for your business. I urge you to reconsider.

I am happy to be available to you or anyone else within the Alderwood Group for consultation or assistance. (Id.) These communications from rabbis evidently resulted from Prise’s consultations with her own rabbi. (Id. at Tab 48.) On the morning of September 29, 2005, Prise sent Leahy an email expressing an interest in discussing “damage control.” (Id. at Tab 47.) Prise and Leahy spoke later that day. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 41.) Leahy instructed Prise to take two weeks off. (Id.) Prise’s mother was ill. (Id.) Leahy told Prise not to return to work until October 14, 2005, which was the day after the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. (Def s App.-Prise at Tab 48.) During this two-week period, Prise continued to receive her salary and benefits. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 41.) She, however, was unable to earn commissions from the sale of pre-need insurance policies during this period of time. (Id.) Prise returned from leave in mid-October and resumed her duties.

On October 27, 2005, Prise filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), alleging violations of Title VII. (Pis.’ Joint App. in Response to Defs.’ Mot. for

Summary J. (“Pis.’ J.A.”) at Tab 18.) (Docket No. 137.) The charge was dual-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”) in order to exhaust administratively parallel claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. § 951 et seq.

The question whether Hirsch Funeral Home should accommodate requests for Saturday visitations was discussed at a staff meeting held on November 2, 2005. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 44.) Rady argued that if Hirsch Funeral Home were to close on Saturdays and Jewish holidays, Christian funeral directors should be permitted to miss work on Christmas. (Id.) Prise took issue with Rady’s assertion, contending that while Jews were forbidden to work on the Jewish Sabbath, Christians were not forbidden to work on Christmas. (Id.) Because of the ongoing tensions surrounding Prise’s resistance to Alderwoods’ determination that Hirsch Funeral Home should honor requests for Saturday visitations, Leahy and Collins decided to place Prise on a temporary paid leave after the staff meeting. (Id. ¶ 45.) During her paid leave, however, Prise was unable to earn commissions from the sale of pre-need insurance policies. (Id.) In an email to Collins dated November 2, 2005, Leahy stated as follows: • Pat is going over to meet with Deborah with Pete now [sic] • Explain [sic] her attorney has spoken to our attorney and that while they are talking it would be best that she stay at home with pay until it is resolved. • Pat will work with Pete and revise the

schedule but felt that the staff would be much happier and it would not be a problem. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 20.) Prise had filed her EEOC and PHRC charges six days earlier. With her status at Hirsch Funeral Home uncertain, Prise contacted Eugene C. Ogrodnik (“Ogrodnik”), the president and chief executive officer (“CEO”) of PIMS, about a vacancy at PIMS for a director of development position. (Def.’s App.-Prise at Tab 56.) PIMS extended an offer to Prise on November 11, 2005. (Id. at Tab 54.) Although it is clear that Prise accepted this offer, there is some dispute about when this acceptance occurred.

According to Ogrodnik, Prise formally accepted an offer of employment with PIMS on November 14, 2005. (Id. at Tab 56.) The record contains an email from Prise to Ogrodnik dated November 15, 2005, in which Prise stated as follows: Confidentially speaking (very confidentially), I am trying to figure out who my direct supervisor at Alderwoods is at this point and given my paid leave status the ramifications as to my responsibilities insofar as how much notice they will require. I should have an answer from them by day’s end.

They are aware that I am looking to wrap things up and seek other employment but I did not disclose details. (Id. at Tab 57.) That same day, Thomas J.

Harris (“Harris”), Alderwoods’ in-house attorney, claims to have received a voice-mail from Ann-Marie Mizel (“Mizel”), Prise’s attorney, indicating that Prise had accepted a position with PIMS. (Id. at Tab 58.) Mizel disputes Harris’ claim. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tabs 16, 36.) Prise contends that she never wanted to lose her position at Hirsch Funeral Home, and that her email to Ogrodnik was a stalling tactic designed to give her more time to inquire concerning whether Alderwoods was willing to let her continue with her job at Hirsch Funeral Home. (J.S.-Prise ¶¶ 47-48.) Leahy claims to have received an email from Harris dated November 15, 2005, indicating that Prise voluntarily resigned from her position at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Def s App.-Prise at Tab 6.) Leahy recorded Prise’s change in status as a voluntary resignation. (Id. at Tab 59.) Amos told the staff at Hirsch Funeral Home that Prise had tendered her resignation. (J.S.Prise ¶ 53.) Prise disputes Alderwoods’ contention that the termination of her employment was voluntary. (Id.) On November 21, 2005, Maizlech emailed the following message to Amos: #1 I learned over the weekend that the email about a resignation was about someone else in our community w/ Jewish political ties.

So this was NOT about Deborah as first thought. We were both speaking in code and assumed we were on the same page. OOPS ... # 2 FYI when I left work on Friday I called Deborah to tell her that under the circumstances I felt that she should have informed us of her decision to resign and that I was annoyed and disappointed etc and she said that she agreed that if and when a resignation would come about she would indeed let us know personally. That SHE DID NOT RESIGN!

So what’s going on? (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 21.) Prise worked for PIMS from December 2005 through October 19, 2007. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 74; Defs.’ App.-Prise at Tab 56.) Ogrodnik terminated Prise’s employment with PIMS on October 19, 2007, after she refused his request that she resign. (Id. at Tabs 56, 60.) Prise filed EEOC and PHRC charges against PIMS related to her discharge. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 18.) Those charges are currently pending. B. Rady Rady graduated from PIMS in 1997 and obtained her funeral director’s license in 1998. (PI. Rady’s Counter-Statements of Fact with Defs.’ Responses (“Rady Countersts.”) ¶ 1.) (Doc.

No. 158.) Hilgefort and Rady had been classmates at PIMS. (J.S.-Rady ¶ 14.) Rady had been away from the funeral business for awhile, but she told Hilgefort that she was interested in getting back into it. (Id.) Rady formally applied for a position with Alderwoods in May 2002. (Id. ¶ 15.) In her application, she apparently overstated her experience as a funeral director. (Id.) McDermott explained to Rady that the only position available at Alderwoods at the time was an entry-level intern position. (Id. ¶ 16.) Rady accepted this position in July 2002, hoping to reestablish herself within the funeral business. (Id.) Although McDermott told Rady that she might be promoted to the position of funeral director at a later date, he made no guarantee that a promotion would occur. (Id.) Rady began to work primarily at Samson Funeral Home. (Id.) She was expected to assist at Alderwoods’ other Pittsburgh-area funeral homes on an as-needed basis. (Id.) Her initial rate of pay was $10.00 per hour. (Id. ¶ 17.) In October 2002, at Alderwoods’ expense, Rady became licensed to sell pre-need insurance policies. (Id.) She was eligible to receive commissions associated with the sale of pre-need insurance policies. (Id.) On March 13, 2003, McDermott reprimanded Rady for spilling cremated human remains into a sink drain. (Id. ¶ 18.) This spillage was apparently unintentional. (Id.) In any event, Rady was promoted to the position of funeral director/embalmer on August 24, 2003. (Id. ¶ 19.) Her rate of pay, which had already been increased to $11.00 per hour, was further increased to $15.25 per hour due to the promotion. (Id.) Adlerwoods closed Samson Funeral Home’s physical location in February 2004. (Id. ¶ 20.) Samson Funeral Home’s funeral home license was hung at Brandt Funeral Home, and Alderwoods fulfilled Samson Funeral Home’s pre-need obligations there. (Id.) Rady was transferred to Hirsch Funeral Home, but she provided support services at Brandt Funeral Home when necessary. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Her rate of pay was increased to $16.00 per hour in May 2004. (Id.) During the fall of 2004, Rady was transferred to Brandt Funeral Home. (Id. at ¶ 22.) She reported to Peter Johnson (“Johnson”), who was the location manager at Brandt Funeral Home. (Id.) Although she was primarily assigned to work at Brandt Funeral Home, Rady was still expected to provide support services at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id.) In November 2004, Rady filed with the EEOC a charge of discrimination against Brandt Funeral Home, alleging that she had suffered discrimination because of her sex. (Rady Countersts. ¶24.) She indicated in her EEOC charge that Brandt Funeral Home was “a member of the Alderwoods Group.” (Defs.’ App. at Tab 40.) These claims were settled on March 29, 2005, when the parties signed a written settlement agreement. (Id. at Tab 41.) As a part of the settlement agreement, Alderwoods agreed to pay Rady an amount equal to the commissions that she would have made by selling pre-need insurance policies had she been allowed to make such sales. (Rady Countersts. ¶ 25.) Rady agreed to waive any claims that she may have had, at that time, under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. (J.S.-Rady ¶ 23.) Rady’s rate of pay was increased to $16.50 per hour in May 2005. (Id. ¶ 24.) During the spring of 2005, Amos became the general manager for the merged Pittsburgh and West Virginia markets. (Id. ¶ 25.) During this same period of time, Alderwoods had a location manager vacancy at Hirsch Funeral Home.

Rady applied for the position at Hirsch Funeral Home, but it was ultimately given to Prise. On May 9, 2005, McDermott emailed the following message to Amos: Has anyone discussed the hiring of Deborah as manager with Heather Rady, [sic] she was the other candidate for the job. She is quick to go to HR and/or the EEOC.

The decision to put Deborah in the position should have been or needs to be discussed with Heather. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 30.) In an email dated May 26, 2005, Johnson told Amos that employee morale was suffering because of Rady’s complaints about her need to perform more and more work to make up for the deficiencies of other employees. (Defs.’ App.-Rady at Tab 43.) Alderwoods’ personnel continued to discuss their concerns about Rady’s performance.

On July 6, 2005, McDermott informed Amos in an email that Prise received a complaint from a woman contending that Rady was “rude to her” during a funeral service at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id. at Tab 45.) He advised that the entire staff was “tired” of Rady’s “attitude” and “lack of concern” for the families served by Alderwoods. (Id.) The next day, Johnson sent Amos an email about Rady, claiming that Rady’s “poison attitude” was “affecting every employee.” (Id. at Tab 44.) He indicated that Rady would need to be dismissed if her poor behavior were to continue, despite the fact that she was known to be litigious. (Id.) He complained that the situation with Rady was “getting old.” (Id.) On July 21, 2005, Johnson issued a verbal warning to Rady. (Id. at Tab 46.) A written record described the reasons for the warning as follows: On, [sic] June 30, 2005, Heather left for vacation at 4:00 PM, when on duty/call until 8:00 AM the following morning.

She did not discuss any arrangements for coverage with other staff and did not notify the Mortuary School student that was also on call.. [sic] The Mortuary School student would have received the initial call and would have notified Heather is [sic] necessary.

At 4:45 PM, Pat McDermott call [sic] her cell phone and left a message for her to call him back to discuss if arrangements had been made with other staff [sic] she did not return the call. (Id.) Rady’s alleged failure to respond to telephone calls and pages was apparently an ongoing problem. (J.S.-Rady ¶ 28.) Alderwoods provided her with a special pager that was designed to overcome reception-related difficulties that she had been having with her previous pager. (Id.) In an email to Amos dated January 20, 2006, Johnson again complained about Rady’s performance. (Defs.’ app. at Tab 47.) In that email, Johnson made the following comments about Rady: I have never had to deal with someone like her.

She is a very difficult employee. I would appreciate your thoughts and ideas.

Something has to be done at some point and I think we both need to do it. (Id.) In February 2006, a family blamed Rady for a rabbi not being transported on time for a cemetery service. (J.S.-Rady ¶ 30.) The late arrival of the rabbi was evidently caused when John Fodor (“Fodor”), a part-time employee, went to the wrong address to pick up the rabbi. (Defs.’ App. at Tab 49.) Alderwoods gave the aggrieved family a discount to compensate for the mistake. (Id. at Tab 50.) Rady refused to provide documentation concerning the discount because she did not believe that the incident was her fault. (J.S.-Rady ¶ 31.) A few weeks later, the same rabbi was left at a cemetery without a ride after a service because of an error by an Alderwoods’ employee. (Defs.’ App. at Tab 51.) Although it is unclear what happened in this instance, Johnson told Amos that Rady was to blame. (Id.) On the evening of March 27, 2006, Johnson sent an email to Amos and Blute recommending that Rady be terminated. (Id. at Tab 52.) He claimed that Rady complained about having to report for certain duties at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id.) Johnson made the following observations: It has gotten to the point where nobody want [sic] to work with her, [sic] students, part-time, full time employees.

The staff all comes forward to ask when she will be held responsible for all the things she does. She will not get involved with the business or community. She cannot be trusted to complete all the details and follow thru [sic] with arrangements, [sic] we all have to pitch in and clean up her cases. She has poor prep skills. I know she is litigious and has zinged us with the EEOC case. But my goodness it is horrible. She has no redeeming quality for our business or our success.

Can HR look this over and can we move forward? (Id.) That same evening, Leahy emailed the following message to Blute: Talk with Chuck and see if we have cause, [sic] we should by now. I won’t be surprised if Heather does not join Deborah in her quest so I would like to ensure it is tight.

Having said that, Heather clearly is not living our values in teamwork, communication, or compassion and I am in agreement that the relationship is no longer a productive one and [sic] she is not serving families in their best interest during their greatest time of need. (Id. at Tab 54.) The “Chuck” referred to in Leahy’s email was Chuck Gibson (“Gibson”), who served as a human resources manager for Alderwoods. (J.S.-Rady ¶ 34.) Gibson recommended that Johnson meet with Rady in order to provide instructions about how she could improve her performance. (Id.) He also recommended that any future instances of “misconduct” by Rady be documented. (Defs.’ App. at Tab 55.) On April 6, 2006, Rady filed new charges of discrimination with the EEOC and the PHRC. (Id. at Tab 56.) She alleged sex-based discrimination under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act and the PHRA, as well as retaliation stemming from her 2004 charges of discrimination. (Id.) In the “particulars”

section of her EEOC charge form, she made the following statements: 1. I have been employed by the Respondent since July 15, 2002. Although I performed the duties of a Funeral Director immediately upon my hiring, they titled me as an Intern/Apprentice and paid me as such. Even after my title was changed to Intern/Funeral Director on or about December 30, 2002, my salary was not increased at that time. I have been repeatedly denied the opportunity to apply for promotions that were given to males who have not filed charges of discrimination.

I have been disciplined more strictly than similarly-situated males who have not filed charges of discrimination. I have consistently been paid less money and been awarded fewer benefits than similarly-situated, often less-qualified males who have not filed charges of discrimination. I have been treated in a demeaning fashion due to my sex, female, and have observed other females treated in a demeaning fashion without any corrective action taken by management [sic] I have been repeatedly subjected to offensive talk of a sexual nature in the office, of which Management was aware but took no corrective action. 2.

I have been subjected to discriminatory treatment since becoming employed by the Respondent.

However, since filing my prior charge of discrimination the scrutiny and treatment has become worse, as indicated above, in retaliation and in their effort to force me to leave my employment and/or terminate me from my employment. 3.I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my sex, female, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), and/or the Equal Pay Act of 1967, as amended (the EPA), in that male employees are permitted to sleep on the job and not disciplined as harshly as I have been for less serious matters, [sic] additionally, they are paid wages and benefits higher than the females in similar job classifications.

Additionally, since filing my original charge of discrimination, my treatment has become worse in that I am being scrutinized more closely, disciplined and denied other promotions. They were to post promotional positions, but have continued to deny opportunities because they refused to post the positions. (Id.) Rady’s responses to a general intake questionnaire were more specific.

She alleged that McDermott and Johnson were promoted to positions for which she was never given the opportunity to apply. (Id. at Tab 58.) She claimed that Prise was “harassed,” “retaliated against,” and “fired” for filing a charge of discrimination. (Id.) She contended that Claudine Young (“Young”), a female employee, resigned because of a “hostile work environment.” (Id.) She accused McDermott of both “sexual harassment” and religion-based discrimination. (Id.) She also claimed that McDermott made inappropriate interjections during her interview on March 23, 2005, for the position of location manager at Hirsch Funeral Home, thereby preventing her from being promoted. (Id.) That promotion was ultimately given to Prise.

In addition, Rady alleged that Larry Beck (“Beck”), a male employee, was not properly disciplined for serious instances of misconduct. (Id.) Rady did not tell anyone at Alderwoods that she filed new charges of discrimination. (J.S.-Rady ¶ 35.) On April 7, 2006, just one day after the filing of the charges, Johnson and Amos met with Rady to discuss her performance and their expectations for her in the future. (Id. ¶ 36.) Although Johnson and Amos viewed the meeting in a positive light, Rady contends that it was “harassing and demeaning.” (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) According to Rady, the meeting went on for approximately two and a half hours. (Id.) On the morning of April 28, 2006, Amos sent Johnson an email with the word “Justin” appearing in the subject line. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 25.) The word “Justin” appears to be a reference to Justin Huntsman (“Huntsman”), who was working for Alderwoods as a student-level intern at the time. (Rady Countersts. ¶ 15.) In the email, Amos indicated that he wanted to promote Huntsman, but that a decline in volume at Brandt Funeral Home was making such a promotion hard to justify. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 25.) This message also included the following statements: Replacement of Heather, how do we get that done?

A suggestion we might ask her to transfer to strictly preneed sales!

We need someone, it will get her out of day to day operations with Pat etc ....................continue to work on a paper trail for dismissal (Id.) Despite Amos and Johnson seeking to dismiss her, Rady’s rate of pay was raised to $17.00 per hour in May 2006. (J.S.Rady ¶ 38.) Throughout the month of June 2006, Johnson carefully documented a series of incidents in which Rady had allegedly failed to complete her assigned tasks. (Defs.’ App. at Tabs 62, 63.) On June 20, 2006, Johnson emailed the following message to Amos: Randy, we need to talk again about Heather. Everybody is fed up.

I have Justin and Michael documenting all their grievances and problems.

She needs to go, [sic] she is negatively affecting the staff and our business. (Id. at Tab 64.) Hilgefort forwarded a list of Rady’s alleged deficiencies to Johnson on June 23, 2006. (Id. at Tab 65.) On July 14, 2006, Sanford Robinowitz passed away. (Id. at Tab 66.) Rady apparently arranged the funeral. (Id.) The Robinowitz family was awarded a $250.00 discount by Alderwoods. (Id.) Aider-woods’ documentation of the discount indicated that the Robinowitz family was upset about Rady’s performance and that they asked that she be fired. (Id.) In a letter to Johnson dated July 19, 2006, Maizlech made the following comments: Just to reiterate our conversation from earlier today, I feel the need to remind you that I am neither a licensed funeral director nor a licensed funeral arranger.

Yet on Friday, July 14, 2006 when I asked Heather if I could “sit in and help” with making funeral arrangements for the Robinowitz family; [sic] Heather graciously agreed. However, I did not plan to “fly solo.” Heather was not an active participant having my [sic] calling the Rabbi, the cemetery, and the caretaker. If I seemed to be so actively involved it was really only because I saw the need and tried my best to serve the family- — -seamless service.

I feel that I am an asset to the company, [sic] when assisting in the Robinowitz case, the family was torn between going to where Rabbi Wasserman suggested (BLH) and Jennifer Jordan in White Oak where the family is from. They chose BLH because of the connection with ME. I cannot and will not accept the responsibility for incomplete or inappropriate arrangements. I do have concerns that so often Heather is upstairs either reading on the computer or on her cell phone during a visitation or service [sic] leaving me to make certain that everything is running smoothly.

I like the trust factor involved and love interacting with the community, yet I am not comfortable with the apathetic attitude and lack of teamwork. (Id. at Tab 67.) On July 31, 2006, Rady presented Johnson with a letter of resignation. (Id. at Tab 68.) In that letter, she stated that she could no longer tolerate the discrimination and harassment that she had experienced while employed by Alderwoods. (Id.) The record indicates that she accepted an offer of employment from the Meridian Mortuary Group (“Meridian”) five days earlier. (Id. at Tab 69.) Pursuant to the terms of her employment contract with Meridian, Rady was to work at the Farnsworth Funeral Home for an annual salary of $43,000.00. (Id. at Tab 70.) She also received a $500.00 signing bonus. (Id.) On August 2, 2006, Johnson emailed the following message to Amos concerning Rady’s resignation: Randy, Heather was telling Michael wwhile [sic] Kim and I were standing with her that she is leaving us and going to work with Meridian Mortuary Group at one of their Pittsburgh locations.

She said she had been offered the job and couldn’t turn it down. She went on to say that obviously she was going for less than she got here and that she was getting double the clothing allowance, two students as helpers and was in charge of the location. She also said that they had a much nicer working

schedule too. So, she had a better job and that is why she is leaving, despite what she put in her resignation letter. I guess that stuff was there to pad her EEOC complaint? Randy, she also wants to know if she can use her remaining vacation next week during her final work week. I told her I would speak to you about that before I would approve or decline it. What are your thoughts? (Id. at Tab 71.) Rady’s employment with Alderwoods apparently ended shortly thereafter. Procedural History The EEOC issued “right to sue” letters to Prise and Rady on August 22, 2006. (Compl. Ex. 1.) (Doc.

No. 1.) On November 6, 2006, Prise and Rady commenced this action against Alderwoods, Hirsch Funeral Home, Brandt Funeral Home, Samson Funeral Home, and the Neill Funeral Home (“Neill Funeral Home”). (Compl. ¶¶ 12-16.) Neill Funeral Home, which is also owned and operated by Alderwoods, is located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 16.) On January 8, 2007, defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Partial Mot.

Dismiss.) (Docket No. 12.) On February 28, 2007, Prise and Rady filed a first amended complaint, adding Service Corporation International (“SCI”) as a defendant. (First Am. Compl.) (Docket No. 23.) This action was apparently taken because of an alleged merger agreement between Alder-woods and SCI. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-26.) On March 13, 2007, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot upon the filing of the first amended complaint. (Order) (Doc. No. 26.) On April 17, 2007, the PHRC issued “right to sue” letters to Prise and Rady. (Mot. Second Am. Compl. Ex. 3 at 35-42.) (Doc.

No. 33.) On June 8, 2007, Prise and Rady sought leave to amend their complaint in order add claims under the PHRA, and to clarify the nature of their claims against SCI. (Mot. Second Am. Compl.) On October 25, 2007, at oral argument proceedings, the court permitted plaintiffs to add their PHRA claims, but denied plaintiffs’ request to add a successor liability claim against defendant SCI. On October 26, 2007, Prise and Rady filed a second amended complaint against Alderwoods, Hirsch Funeral Home, Brandt Funeral Home, Samson Funeral Home and Neill Funeral Home. (Second Am.

Compl.) (Docket No. 39.) SCI was not named as a defendant in the second amended complaint. (Id.) On November 9, 2007, defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Partial Mot. Dismiss.) (Docket No. 40.) On January 15, 2008, the motion was partially granted and partially denied. All claims against Neill Funeral Home were dismissed without prejudice. Some claims against Aider-woods, Hirsch Funeral Home, Brandt Funeral Home and Samson Funeral Home were dismissed.

In response to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir.2008), on May 15, 2008, Prise and Rady filed a motion for leave- to reinstate some of the claims which had previously been dismissed. (Doc. No. 76.) On June 23, 2008, the motion was partially granted and partially denied. On June 27, 2008, Prise and Rady filed a third amended complaint. (Third Am.

Compl.) (Docket No. 84.) • Prise asserted claims under Title VII and the PHRA for religion-based and sex-based discrimination, and for retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 66-81.) She also asserted claims under the Equal Pay Act for sex-based pay disparities. (Id. ¶¶ 82-86.) Prise named both Alderwoods and Hirsch Funeral Home as defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 66-86.) Rady asserted claims under Title VII and the PHRA for sex-based discrimination and retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 87-99.) She also asserted claims under the Equal Pay Act for unequal pay. (Id. ¶¶ 100-104.) She named Alderwoods, Hirsch Funeral Home, Brandt Funeral Home and Samson Funeral Home as defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 87-104.) On July 2, 2008, defendants filed a motion to strike Rady’s sex-based discrimination claims under Title VII and the PHRA. (Defs.’ Mot.

Strike) (Doc. No. 85.) On November 17, 2008, the court granted the motion, leaving Rady to pursue only her retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA and her unequal pay claims under the Equal Pay Act. On January 26, 2009, three motions for

summary judgment were filed. Defendants filed separate motions for

summary judgment against Prise and Rady, seeking the dismissal of all remaining claims. (Doc. Nos. 107, 111.) Plaintiffs moved for partial

summary judgment solely with respect to Prise’s retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA, conceding that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to all other claims. (Doc. No. 116.) These

summary judgment motions are the subject of this memorandum opinion. Standard of Review Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(

c) provides that

summary judgment may be granted if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A motion for

summary judgment will not be defeated by the mere existence of some disputed facts, but will be defeated only if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a dispute is genuine, the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Discussion A.

Prise’s claims In the third amended complaint, Prise alleges both religion-based and sex-based discrimination under Title VII and the PHRA. In Prise’s brief in response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgement, however, she indicated that she was withdrawing her sex-based discrimination claims concerning her “suspensions and termination.” (Prise’s Mem. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Sum. J. 1 n. 2.) (Docket No. 131.) For this reason, the court need only address her religion-based discrimination claims under Title VII and the PHRA, her retaliation claims under those statutes, and her Equal Pay Act claims.

Prise acknowledges that Alderwoods, rather than Hirsch Funeral Home, was her employer during the period of time at issue. (Id. at 18 n. 10.) Therefore, Prise no longer asserts claims against Hirsch Funeral Home. 1. Religion-Based Discrimination Prise’s substantive antidiscrimination claims arise under Title VII and the PHRA. Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides: § 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices (

a) Employer practices.

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

The applicable provision of the PHRA provides: § 955. Unlawful Discriminatory Practices It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or in the case of a fraternal corporation or association, unless based upon membership in such association or corporation, or except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: (

a) For any employer because of the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or non-job related handicap or disability or the use of a guide or support animal because of the blindness, deafness or physical handicap of any individual or independent contractor, to refuse to hire or employ or contract with, or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or independent contractor, or to otherwise discriminate against such individual or independent contractor with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or contract, if the individual or independent contractor is the best able and most competent to perform the services required. 43 Pa.

Stat. § 955(a). Generally speaking, the Pennsylvania courts construe the parallel provisions of the PHRA to be coextensive with their federal counterparts. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1996); Stultz v. Reese Bros., Inc., 835 A.2d 754, 759 (Pa.Super.Ct.2003). The PHRA should be interpreted “as identical to federal anti-discrimination laws except where there is something specifically different in its language” justifying a different construction. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir.2002). The term “religious creed” is not defined within the text of the PHRA. 43 Pa.

Stat. § 954. Consequently, the court will construe the term “religious creed” within the language of the PHRA to have the same meaning as the term “religion” within the language of Title VII. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to add the following statutory definition: The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Pub.L.

No. 92-260; 86 Stat. 103 (1972). This statutory definition was designed to codify a preexisting guideline promulgated by the EEOC. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977). As the plain language of the statute makes clear, a covered employer is required to “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s ... religious observance or practice” unless an accommodation would impose an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Prise claims that Alderwoods violated her rights under Title VII and the PHRA by issuing a final warning to her, suspending her twice, and terminating her “because of her religion.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67, 75.) She also claims that Aider-woods violated Title VII and the PHRA by failing to “reasonably accommodate” her observance of the Sabbath. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 76.) The first type of claim is commonly referred to as a “disparate treatment” claim, while the second type of claim is typically referred to as a “failure to accommodate” claim. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 281 (3d Cir.2001). a.

Disparate Treatment There are two basic ways in which an individual can pursue a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. Where no “direct evidence” of discrimination exists, the Supreme Court’s analyses in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), provide the applicable framework for allocating the requisite burdens of proof and production.

Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 5.Ct. 1817. If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the defendant must articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for treating the plaintiff in an adverse manner. Id. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the defendant overcomes this hurdle, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reasons given by the defendant to justify the treatment are merely a pretext for illegal employment discrimination. Id. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817.

Evidence that an employer’s stated reasons for an adverse employment action are unworthy of credence is one form of circumstantial evidence that a plaintiff can use to establish the existence of intentional discrimination. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework does not apply in employment discrimination cases in which the plaintiff presents “direct evidence” of discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).

Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that is so revealing of a discriminatory animus that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to rely on a presumption from his or her prima facie case to shift the burden of production to the defendant. Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1097-98 (3d Cir.1995). Where direct evidence of discrimination exists, there is no need for an inference of discrimination to be drawn, since the discrimination itself is readily transparent. Id.

Regardless how a plaintiff attempts to establish his or her case, the ultimate question is whether the employer engaged in unlawful discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). In determining whether Alderwoods’ conduct was unlawful, the court is mindful that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added the following language to Title VII: (

m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices. Except as otherwise provided in this sub-chapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107; 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991). In Desert Palace, Inc. v.

Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not present “direct evidence” of discrimination in order to obtain a “mixed-motive” instruction under this provision, and that a court may give such an instruction where the plaintiff has presented “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, Prise can defeat Alderwoods’ motion for

summary judgment by presenting sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that her religion was either a motivating or determinative factor behind Alderwoods’ adverse personnel decisions. Vereen v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., No. 06-462, 2008 WL 794451, at **17-19, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23075, at **48-53 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 24, 2008). Before proceeding to analyze Prise’s claims under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, the court must determine whether the record contains “direct evidence” of religion-based discrimination.

In two separate affidavits, Mizel asserted that Julie Herman (“Herman”), a corporate attorney for Alderwoods, stated on November 2, 2005, that Alderwoods wanted to negotiate a separation agreement with Prise because she had been “striving to adhere more to Jewish law than [wa]s necessary to appeal to the Jewish community.” (Pis.’ J.A. at Tabs 16 ¶ 6, 36 ¶ 6.) Prise contends that this statement by Herman, if believed, would constitute an admission that Alderwoods was “discriminating” against her because she was “too Jewish.” (Prise Mem. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Sum.

J. 13.) While the court assumes (as it must at this stage in the litigation) that Herman made this statement to Mizel, the statement does not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. The record is replete with evidence that Prise was striving to run Hirsch Funeral Home in strict accordance with Jewish law, and that her superiors at Alderwoods expressed an interest in accommodating the needs of non-Jewish customers even when doing so would contravene Jewish law.

This internal debate within Alderwoods manifested itself quite vividly in Prise’s September 25, 2005 email to Amos, in which she stated that while Hirsch Funeral Home’s status as a Jewish funeral home did not preclude Hirsch Funeral Home from serving non-Jewish customers, it did preclude Hirsch Funeral Home from operating in a manner that was inconsistent with Jewish law. (Defs.’ App.-Prise at Tab 41.) Herman’s statement to Mizel was made after Prise was informed that she was being placed on involuntary leave. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 16 ¶¶ 5-6.) In a declaration dated January 21, 2009, Leahy stated that Collins and she decided on November 2, 2005, to place Prise on leave because Prise continued to resist Alderwoods’ decision to accommodate requests from non-Jewish customers for Saturday visitations. (Defs.’ App.Prise at Tab 6 ¶¶ 22-23.) When the context of Herman’s alleged statement to Mizel is taken into account, the statement could plausibly be understood to mean (and is most logically understood to mean) not that Prise was herself “too Jewish,” but that she was striving to make Hirsch Funeral Home “too Jewish.” Prise cannot establish that Alderwoods was discriminating against her simply by showing that it wanted her to operate its funeral home in a manner that was contrary to Jewish customs.

Title VII prohibited Alderwoods from discriminating against Prise because of her religious beliefs and practices, but does not require Hirsch Funeral Home or Alderwoods to follow Prise’s beliefs and practices. Wilson v. U.S. West Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir.1995). Therefore, Herman’s alleged statement to Mizel does not qualify as direct evidence of discrimination. Since the record contains no direct evidence of discrimination, Prise’s religion-based discrimination claims must be analyzed under the McDonnell DouglasBurdine framework.

In order to shift the burden of production to Alderwoods, Prise must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The requirement that a plaintiff establish a prima facie case of discrimination “is not intended to be onerous.” Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir.1995). A prima facie showing raises an inference of discrimination because the court presumes that the challenged actions, if left unexplained, were “more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.” Id.

In determining the proper elements of Prise’s prima facie case, the court is mindful that the McDonnell DouglasBwrdine analysis “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). Since the precise elements of a prima facie case often depend on the nature of the particular factual dispute at issue, a “one-size-fits-all” approach cannot be used in this context. Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 411 (3d Cir.1999).

Instead, the elements of a prima facie ease must be tailored to fit the specific context in which they are applied. Sorullo v. U.S. Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789, 797-798 (3d Cir.2003). In order to establish a prima facie case of religion-based discrimination, Prise must show that: (1) she was a member of a statutorily protected class (i.e., she was Jewish);

(2) Alderwoods took an adverse employment action (or multiple adverse employment actions) against her (i.e., Alderwoods “discharged” her, or otherwise acted in a way which adversely affected her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); and

(3) Alderwoods’ actions were taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of religion-based discrimination (i.e., Alderwoods’ actions were taken under circumstances from which a finder of fact could reasonably infer that such actions were taken “because of’ Prise’s “religion” within the meaning of § 2000e-2(a)). Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2). While it is undisputed that Prise is Jewish and satisfies the first element, the second and third elements are contested in this case.

Alderwoods contends that it took no adverse employment actions against Prise, and that none of its actions with respect to Prise were taken under circumstances in which an inference of religion-based discrimination could be drawn. (Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Sum. J.-Prise 11-13.) Each of these contested issues will be separately addressed.

i) Whether Alderwoods Took an Adverse Employment Action against Prise Prise was placed on involuntary paid leave from September 29, 2005, through October 13, 2005. (J.S.-Prise ¶ 41.) She was again placed on involuntary paid leave on November 2, 2005, which continued until her employment with Alderwoods was terminated. (Id. at ¶ 45.) Relying on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Joseph v.

Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.2006), Alderwoods argues that its decisions placing Prise on involuntary paid leave did not constitute adverse employment decisions, since she continued to receive her salary during the relevant periods of time. (Defs.’ Mem.-Prise 12.) (Docket No. 108.) In Joseph, the court of appeals held that an employer’s decision placing an employee on paid administrative leave during the pendency of an investigation did not constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. Joseph, 465 F.3d at 90-91.

It was noted that “the terms and conditions of employment ordinarily include the possibility that an employee will be subject to an employer’s disciplinary policies in appropriate circumstances,” and that “an employee does not suffer a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment where the employer merely enforces its preexisting disciplinary policies in a reasonable manner.” Id. at 91. Prise counters Alderwoods’ argument by pointing out that she was unable to obtain commissions for selling pre-need insurance policies while on paid leave. (Prise Mem. Resp.

Defs.’ Mot. 6-7.) (Docket No. 131.) The court does not understand Alderwoods to dispute this contention.

Indeed, Aider-woods refutes Prise’s Equal Pay Act claim by asserting that, because of Prise’s commissions, her compensation was “significantly higher” than that of her fellow first-year location managers. (Defs.’ ReplyPrise Resp. 3.) According to Alderwoods, Prise earned commissions at the rate of roughly $4,350.19 per year. (Id.) Because Alderwoods does not deny that Prise was unable to earn commissions during her leave periods, the court cannot accept its argument that the decisions placing Prise on involuntary paid leave did not constitute adverse employment decisions.

Joseph, 465 F.3d at 92 (“We need not hold that suspensions during investigations will never rise to the level of an adverse employment action.”). Alderwoods contends that it never discharged Prise. (Defs.’ Mem.-Prise 12.) According to Alderwoods, Prise’s employment at Hirsch Funeral Home ended because she “voluntarily resigned” after accepting a new position at PIMS. (Id.) Prise argues that she never actually resigned, and that Alderwoods’ personnel essentially forced her out by leaking false reports of her resignation to its employees and to members of the media. (Prise Mem. Resp.

Defs.’ Mot. 17.) Because the parties vehemently dispute this issue, a detailed examination of the evidence is required.

In her declaration, Leahy stated that Collins and she tentatively approved Prise’s termination on September 23, 2005, due to Prise’s unwillingness to cooperate with Alderwoods’ decision to conduct the Baum visitation on a Saturday. (Defs.’ App.-Prise at Tab 6 ¶ 16.) This initial decision to terminate Prise was subsequently abandoned. (Id. ¶ 17.) Leahy declared that she did not authorize an “involuntary termination” of Prise after September 2005, and that she approved a change in Prise’s status only after learning from Harris that Prise submitted her resignation. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) In a declaration dated January 16, 2009, Harris stated that Mizel left him a voicemail message on the morning of November 15, 2005, informing him that Prise accepted a position at PIMS. (Id. at Tab 58 ¶ 5.) He declared that he proceeded to inform Collins, Leahy and Blute that Prise resigned from her position at Alderwoods. (Id. ¶ 6.) Harris claimed to have sent Mizel an email stating that Prise would soon receive her “final paycheck” from Aider-woods. (Id. ¶ 7.) On January 22, 2009, Ogrodnik executed a declaration in which he stated that Prise formally accepted a position with PIMS on November 14, 2005. (Id. at Tab 56 ¶ 6.) The declarations of Leahy, Harris and Ogrodnik are contradicted by other evidence contained in the record.

In her first affidavit, Mizel stated that she told both Herman and Harris that Prise wanted to keep her job at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 16 ¶ 7.) She declared that Alderwoods refused to allow Prise to return to her duties. Id.

In her supplemental affidavit, Mizel denied that she left Harris a voicemail message indicating that Prise accepted a position at PIMS. (Id. at Tab 36 ¶ 8.) Mizel stated that she told Harris that Prise could not afford to be out of work for a long period of time, and that Prise would have to accept a different job if Alderwoods was not going to retain her. (Id.) Mizel declared that Harris was nonresponsive to her inquiries about whether Alderwoods intended to return Prise to her position at Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id.) In a deposition conducted on April 16, 2008, Maizlech testified that Prise denied the accuracy of Alderwoods’ announcement concerning her alleged resignation. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 4; Maizlech Dep. 53, Apr. 16, 2008.) Maizlech’s deposition testimony is corroborated by the text of a November 21, 2005, email to Amos, indicating that Prise denied rumors of her resignation. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 21.) On March 31, 2008, Prise testified that she did not formally accept a position at PIMS until after learning that Alderwoods announced her resignation. (Id. at Tab 1; Prise Dep. 103-04, Apr. 2, 2008.) Prise described her November 15, 2005, email to Ogrodnik stating her intention to “wrap things up” at Hirsch Funeral Home as an attempt to stall for more time, hoping that Alderwoods would return her to Hirsch Funeral Home. (Id.) In light of this conflicting evidence, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Prise was “discharged” within the meaning of Title VII.

According to Mizel, Herman communicated Alderwoods’ desire to negotiate a separation agreement with Prise as early as November 2, 2005. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 16 ¶ 5.) When this assertion is coupled with Mizel’s subsequent claim that Harris was nonresponsive to her inquiries concerning Alderwoods’ intentions for Prise’s future at Hirsch Funeral Home, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Alderwoods had effectively decided to terminate Prise, and that Alderwoods’ personnel were seeking to use Prise’s pursuit of alternative employment options as a basis for claiming that she resigned.

In the constructive discharge context, the Supreme Court has recognized that an employee can be “discharged” within the meaning of Title VII even where no “official” action is taken by his or her employer. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). A jury would need to determine whether Prise was forced to resign because of a false announcement that she resigned, which arguably could be treated as a constructive discharge.

The court does not understand Alderwoods to argue that it would have returned Prise to her position at Hirsch Funeral Home if she had informed her superiors that she never intended to resign. Consequently, Prise produced sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable finder of fact to determine that Alderwoods “discharged” her and thereby satisfied the second element of the prima facie inquiry. ii) Whether the Alleged Discharge was under Circumstances Giving Rise to an Inference of Religion-based Discrimination. The prima facie inquiry does not end there.

In order to shift the burden of production to Alderwoods, Prise must show that the adverse employment actions taken against her (i.e., Alderwoods’ acts of placing her on involuntary paid leave and “discharging” her) were taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089.

Such a showing would shift the burden of production to Alderwoods to “clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons” behind its actions concerning Prise. (Id. at 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089.) Prise would then be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons given by Alderwoods for its actions were merely a pretext for religion-based discrimination. (Id. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089.) While these steps of the burden-shifting process are analytically distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. In Doe v. C.A.R.S.

Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir.2008), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed: Lastly, it is important to remember that the prima facie case and pretext inquiries often overlap. As our jurisprudence recognizes, evidence supporting the prima facie case is often helpful in the pretext stage, and nothing about the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between one stage or the other. Doe, 527 F.3d at 370.

Evidence used to establish an employee’s prima facie case may also serve to discredit explanations given by his or her employer for the adverse employment action at issue, and evidence introduced by an employer to explain the rationale for an adverse employment action may likewise serve to weaken or defang an employee’s prima facie case. Whether

summary judgment is appropriate in a particular case depends upon factors such as the strength (or weakness) of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the evidence put forth by the employer to explain the reasons behind the challenged employment action, and the probative value of the evidence presented by the plaintiff for the purpose of discrediting the explanations posited by his or her employer. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

In this case, there is a significant overlap between the evidence presented by Prise and the evidence presented by Alderwoods. The same evidence is sometimes relied upon by both parties in support of completely opposite propositions. Given the present state of the record, it is debatable whether Alderwoods’ adverse employment actions against Prise were taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of religion-based discrimination.

For purposes of this case, the court will assume arguendo that Prise can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, thereby shifting the burden of production to Alderwoods. iii) Alderwoods’ Nondiscriminatory Reason In Burdine, the Supreme Court made the following observations about the burden of production to show a nondiscriminatory reason: The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See [Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v.] Sweeney, [439 U.S. 24,] 25, 99 S.Ct. 295 [58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) ]. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant.

If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant’s evidence should be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (footnotes omitted). With that in mind, the court turns to Alderwoods’ proffered reasons for its actions against Prise. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Prise, the court proceeds on the assumption that Prise was “discharged” within the meaning of § 2000e-2(a). The adverse employment actions taken against Prise constituted the imposition of two involuntary paid leaves, the second of which continued until the date of her termination.

Because Prise did not return to work at Hirsch Funeral Home after the beginning of her second leave period, the court will treat her second paid suspension as the same event as her “discharge.” In her declaration, Leahy stated that Prise told Blute that Hirsch Funeral Home could not accommodate the Baum family’s request for a Saturday visitation because doing so would drive away Jewish business. (Defs.’ App.-Prise at Tab 6 ¶ 15.) According to Leahy, Collins and she approved Prise’s termination on September 23, 2005, because of Prise’s unwillingness to cooperate with her superiors’ decision to move forward with the Saturday visitation. (Id. ¶ 16.) This decision was later reconsidered, and Prise was given a warning letter instead of a termination notice. (Id. ¶ 17.) Leahy declared that, after Prise was warned not to resist Alderwoods’ management decisions, several rabbis from the Pittsburgh area sent letters to Alderwoods’ personnel threatening to urge the members of their congregations to boycott Hirsch Funeral Home if it did not adhere to Jewish customs and protocols. (Id. ¶ 18.) The letters from Rabbi Kaminsky and Rabbi Berkun are included within the record. (Id. at Tab 46.) Also included within the record is an email from Rabbi Bisno to Amos. (Id.) All three of these communications included expressions of support for Prise’s efforts to conform Hirsch Funeral Home’s practices to Jewish law. (Id.) Rabbi Berkun’s letter was dated September 27, 2005, and Rabbi Bisno’s email to Amos was sent on the evening of September 28, 2005. (Id.) Although the letter from Rabbi Kaminsky was undated, it is apparent that all these communications were sent to Alderwoods in the immediate aftermath of the Baum visitation, which was conducted on Saturday, September 24, 2005.

The record also includes an email from Prise to Leahy dated September 29, 2005. (Id. at Tab 47.) In that email, Prise stated that she wanted to “discuss damage control regarding the current situation,” and that she had “some ideas” that could be implemented to “effectively remedy the situation.” (Id.) Leahy explained in her declaration that Prise insisted that Aider-woods apologize to the Jewish community in order to avoid the boycott which had been threatened by the rabbis. (Id. at Tab 6 ¶ 18.) Leahy evidently told Prise that Alderwoods would work to accommodate the needs of customers of all religious backgrounds, and that further acts of insubordination would not be tolerated. (Id. ¶ 19.) At that point, Leahy apparently instructed Prise to take two weeks off in order to “cool down and recommit herself to her job.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Leahy’s declaration concerning Prise’s resistance to Alderwoods’ decision to accommodate the Baum family is corroborated by other evidence in the record.

In a deposition conducted on May 2, 2008, Amos testified that Prise started to yell at him irrationally after learning that the Baum visitation would be conducted on a Saturday. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 7; Amos Dep. 125-26, May 2, 2008.) On April 17, 2008, Hilgefort testified that Prise was upset about Alderwoods’ decision to accommodate the request of the Baum family. (Pis.’ J.A. at Tab 6; Hilgefort Dep. 90, Apr. 17, 2008.) In light of the testimonial and documentary evidence contained in the record, it is clear that Alderwoods satisfied its burden of production with respect to Prise’s first paid suspension.

Prise was placed on involuntary paid leave again on November 2, 2005, and she never returned to her job at Hirsch Funeral Home. In a declaration dated January 21, 2009, McDermott stated as follows: 6. I held a staff meeting on November 2, 2005 at Brandt. During the meeting, Deborah Prise stated that all services at the Hirsch Funeral Home were prohibited during the Jewish Sabbath and Jewish holidays. I reminded Prise that management had decided Hirsch should serve families on those days and that a staff meeting was not the time to discuss the operating hours at Hirsch.

Prise began to yell and said that she was going to attend the Rabbinical Council and urge the rabbis to boycott Hirsch unless it agreed to close on the Jewish Sabbath and Jewish holidays. 7. Heather Rady then began yelling that if Hirsch was closed on the Sabbath and Jewish holidays, then Christian funeral directors should not have to work on Christmas. I again tried to defuse the situation by stating that this was not the time for such a discussion. 8. Prise and Rady then engaged in a heated argument about Jewish and Christian faiths and whether all employees should have holidays off.

The atmosphere in the meeting became very tense, and both Prise and Rady spoke in heated, angry voices. The meeting eventually dissolved because Prise and Rady ignored my attempts to control the situation. 9. Afterwards, I informed Randy Amos of the events that occurred at the staff meeting and the tension created by Prise’s refusal to abide by management’s decision regarding operating hours.

I also informed Amos that Prise intended to urge local rabbis, again, to boycott Aider-woods if Hirsch did not change its operating schedule. (Defs.’ App.-Prise at Tab 10 ¶¶ 6-9.) In her declaration, Leahy stated that she feared that Prise’s “disruptive behavior, including the possibility of a renewed public campaign against Alderwoods, would damage business at Hirsch.” {Id. at Tab 6 ¶ 22.) Leahy declared that Collins and she decided to place Prise on a temporary paid leave while Alderwoods personnel decided how to resolve the dispute concerning Saturday operations at Hirsch Funeral Home. {Id. ¶ 23.) This evidence is sufficient to satisfy Alderwoods’ burden of production with respect to Prise’s second paid suspension.

As noted earlier, because Prise’s second paid suspension essentially ended with her termination, it is clear that Aider-woods’ proffered reasons for placing Prise on leave were its reasons for “discharging” her. iv) Pretext The next stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework is the shifting burden to plaintiff to show pretext. In order to defeat Alderwoods’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to her disparate treatment claims, Prise must persuade the court that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that she was the victim of religion-based discrimination. She can do so either directly by showing that a discriminatory animus most likely motivated Alderwoods or indirectly by showing that Alderwoods’ proffered reasons for its actions are unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. She argues that she can do both, but neither argument is persuasive.

The court must address whether plaintiff can demonstrate that defendants’ stated reasons for her termination were a pretext for religion-based discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has developed the following two-prong test (the “Fuentes test”) that a plaintiff must meet to show pretext: [T]o defeat

summary judgment when the [employer] [articulates] legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its action, the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994); see Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 370 (3d Cir.2008) (“Put another way, to avoid

summary judgment the plaintiffs evidence rebutting the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons must allow a fact-finder reasonably to infer that each of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, that the proffered reason is a pretext).”). The two prongs of the Fuentes test are distinct. The court will analyze both prongs of the Fuentes test to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented by plaintiff to defeat defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. See Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-13 (3d Cir.1997) (analyzing ADEA action under both prongs of Fuentes framework). 1. Prong one of Fuentes test Prong one of the Fuentes test focuses on whether plaintiff submitted evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably disbelieve the defendants’ articulated legitimate reasons for the plaintiffs termination.

Under this prong, the plaintiff must point to: weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons [such] that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them “unworthy of credence” and hence infer that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason “did not actually motivate” the employer’s action. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644. The district court under this prong must focus on the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir.1992) (stat

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