BENJAMIN FIERKE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Transport Service, Inc., Appellee.), 309 Ill. App. 3d 1037

JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court: Claimant, Benjamin Fierke, sought benefits pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)) for injuries allegedly sustained while in the employ of Transport Service, Inc., employer. The arbitrator determined claimant’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment and awarded 24/? weeks of temporary total disability, medical expenses and 38 weeks of permanent partial disability.

On review, the Industrial Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the arbitrator finding no causal connection between claimant’s condition of ill-being and his employment. The circuit court of Will County confirmed the decision of the Commission. Claimant appeals, contending the decision of the Commission, as confirmed by the circuit court of Will County, is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree. Claimant worked for employer as a commercial tank truck driver. Claimant mainly drove local routes but once a week made long runs to either Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin or Minnesota.

He worked between 50 and 80 hours per week, spending between 30 and 35 hours a week driving. The balance of his work time was spent filling and emptying the tanker. While driving, claimant used his right hand to shift gears. At the time of arbitration claimant had worked for employer some 24 years. In the fall of 1992, claimant noticed that while driving his right hand would go completely numb. At night his hand would become so numb or so painful that he could not sleep. During a doctor’s visit for an unrelated problem on September 18, 1992, claimant complained of his problems with his right hand.

On September 22, 1992, claimant underwent an electromyogram nerve conduction test (EMC), which revealed median nerve entrapment or carpal tunnel syndrome. On September 25, claimant was again examined by Dr. Augustin for the unrelated medical problem. According to the doctor’s office notes, claimant argued with the doctor that his unrelated problem was work related. The doctor disagreed. At the end of the notes for that day, Dr. Augustin commented: “Plan — Refer to Ortho.

M.D. for carpal tunnel synd.” Directly under this comment is written and circled: “This is related to work directly — under Workmen’s Comp.” Claimant was next examined by Dr. Loughran, who recommended surgical release of the carpal tunnel. Employer then requested that claimant be examined by another physician, Dr. Shermer, in October 1992. Dr. Shermer agreed that claimant had carpal tunnel syndrome and needed surgery. In his report, Dr.

Shermer noted: “The relationship to [claimant’s] work duties is not clear, although the theory of cumulative and repetitive stress, over a period of time, has been used to link these conditions of trauma at work.” Surgery was ultimately performed on June 3, 1993, by Dr. Loughran. Claimant returned to full duty without restrictions on June 21, 1993. Claimant testified he still experiences pain and numbness in his hand although reduced. He further reported reduced strength over all and intermittent pain at night and when shifting the truck. Claimant’s examining physician, Dr.

Charles Carroll, “a renowned hand specialist,” found evidence of industrial impairment. As to causation, he noted Dr. Augustin’s comments that claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome was related to his occupation. Dr. Carroll did not challenge or otherwise contradict this opinion. Employer presented some evidence through cross-examination of claimant that he had done some remodeling work on five rooms of his house in and prior to 1992 consisting primarily of painting and trim work. The arbitrator concluded claimant’s repetitive trauma accident arose out of and in the course of his employment and awarded benefits.

The Commission, with one dissent, concluded otherwise and reversed the decision of the arbitrator. The Commission specifically stated: “A key element to proving a repetitive trauma theory is producing clear and detailed evidence of the manner and means in which the work activities alleged to have constituted the repetitive trauma were performed. It does not appear from the record that the Petitioner presented a clear and detailed evidence of the manner and means in which the work activities alleged to have constituted the repetitive trauma were performed.

The Petitioner merely stated that shifting gears was the cause of his carpal tunnel syndrome. He did not describe the pressure needed to shift the gears, how long the gears had to be held, how often he shifted the gears in an eight hour day, any vibration caused by the gear shift, etc. Additionally, the medical evidence presented did not include any opinion from any provider that the Petitioner’s carpal tunnel syndrome was causally related to his occupation.

In a repetitive trauma *** case, there must be a showing that the injury is work related and not the result of the normal degenerative aging process.” Nunn v. Industrial Comm’n, 157 Ill. App. 3d 470, 510 N.E.2d 502 (1987). It is the province of the Commission to weigh and resolve conflicts in the evidence and to choose among conflicting inferences therefrom. Dexheimer v. Industrial Comm’n, 202 Ill. App. 3d 437, 442, 559 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (1990).

Only when the decision of the Commission is without substantial foundation in the evidence or its findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence should the Commission’s decision be set aside. 202 Ill. App. 3d at 442-43, 559 N.E.2d at 1037. While we are reluctant to set aside a Commission decision on a factual question, we must not hesitate to do so when the clearly evident, plain and indisputable weight of the evidence compels an apparent, opposite conclusion. Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 244 Ill. App. 3d 563, 567, 613 N.E.2d 822, 825 (1993).

An opposite conclusion is apparent in this instance, and, accordingly, we must reverse the decision of the Commission. Under the Act, compensation may be awarded for a claimant’s condition of ill-being even though the conditions of his or her employment do not constitute the sole, or even the principal, cause of injury. Lasley Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 274 Ill. App. 3d 890, 893, 655 N.E.2d 5, 8 (1995); Teska v. Industrial Comm’n, 266 Ill. App. 3d 740, 742, 640 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1994).

In order to constitute an accidental injury within the meaning of the Act, the claimant need only show that some act or phase of the employment was a causative factor of the resulting injury. Teska, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 742, 640 N.E.2d at 3; Mendota Township High School v. Industrial Comm’n, 243 Ill. App. 3d 834, 837, 612 N.E.2d 77, 79 (1993). Additionally, an injury is considered accidental even though it develops gradually over a period of time as a result of a repetitive trauma, without requiring complete dysfunction, if it is caused by the performance of claimant’s job. Cassens Transport Co. v.

Industrial Comm’n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 324, 330, 633 N.E.2d 1344, 1348 (1994). A nonemployment-related factor that is a contributing cause with the compensable injury in an ensuing injury does not break the causal connection between the employment and claimant’s condition of ill-being. Teska, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 742, 640 N.E.2d at 3. See also International Vermiculite Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 77 Ill. 2d 1, 4, 394 N.E.2d 1166, 1167 (1979). The fact that other incidents, whether work related or not, may have aggravated claimant’s condition is irrelevant. Lasley Construction, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 893, 655 N.E.2d at 8.

At the time of the accident, claimant had worked for employer over 20 years as a truck driver. Claimant spent some 30 to 35 hours of each work week driving, and the majority of his driving was done locally. Claimant testified he used his right hand continuously to shift, help steer the truck and operate various ancillary hydraulic equipment on the vehicle. He also testified his symptoms worsened in proportion to the amount of time spent operating the truck.

He had had no prior injuries to his right arm or hand, but by the fall of 1992, claimant testified his right hand often would go completely numb while driving. At night his hand would become so painful or numb that he could not sleep. His treating doctor noted in claimant’s treatment reports that claimant’s’ carpal tunnel syndrome was directly related to work. Dr. Carroll, the renowned hand specialist who examined claimant, restated this conclusion without comment or contradiction.

It would therefore appear, as the arbitrator concluded, that claimant’s condition of ill-being was causally connected to his employment. The Commission, however, found fault with the fact that causation was not directly established by any of the medical evidence. Ignoring the treating doctor’s notes, there is no requirement that there be any doctor’s testimony to establish causation when the record contains medical evidence consistent with claimant’s testimony and the findings of the treating doctor. See Gubser v. Industrial Comm’n, 42 Ill. 2d 559, 564, 248 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1969).

In denying claimant benefits, the Commission also pointed to the fact that claimant did remodeling work on his home. The evidence as to how much time, when and what exactly claimant did during these projects is scanty at best. Even if these tasks combined with claimant’s job duties resulted in his present condition of ill-being, claimant is still entitled to compensation. Again, claimant must only prove that some act or phase of his employment was a causative factor, not the sole cause of injury. Clearly claimant met his burden.

The quantitative proof improperly demanded by the Commission as to the repetitive náture of claimant’s employment was more than the Commission required of the evidence it relied upon to conclude claimant’s symptoms arose from his home remodeling activities. See Darling v. Industrial Comm’n, 176 Ill. App. 3d 186, 194-95, 530 N.E.2d 1135, 1141-42 (1988). The record before us simply does not support the Commission’s conclusion. We therefore conclude the decision of the Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the decision of the Commission, as confirmed by the circuit court, and further reinstate the decision of the arbitrator. Reversed. RAKOWSKI, COLWELL, and HOLDRIDGE, JJ., concur.