ROGER LOTT et al., both Indiv. and as Next Friend on Behalf of Kyle Lott, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM STRANG, as Special Adm'r for William C. Seehausen, Deceased, Defendants (Wayne Seehausen et al., Defendants-Appellees), 312 Ill. App. 3d 521

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court: In September 1998, plaintiffs, Roger and Jean Lott, sued defendants Wayne and Bonnie Seehausen and the estate of their son, William Seehausen, an unemancipated minor, for damages resulting from an automobile collision. The Lotts alleged that William’s negligence caused the collision. In counts IV¡ V, and VI of their complaint, the Lotts further alleged that Wayne and Bonnie’s negligent supervision of William was a proximate cause of their injuries. The trial court struck those allegations and dismissed the Lotts’ common-law claims against Wayne and Bonnie, pursuant to

section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 1998)). The Lotts bring this interlocutory appeal, arguing that their complaint states a cause of action against Wayne and Bonnie. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND In September 1996, William was driving eastward on Route 16 in Jersey County. At the same time, Jean Lott and her son, Kyle, were traveling west on Route 16. William’s car crossed the centerline and collided head-on with the Lotts’ vehicle. As a result, William died, and Jean and Kyle were injured. The Lotts allege that William was intoxicated when the accident occurred.

In September 1998, the Lotts filed a multicount complaint against William’s estate, Wayne, and Bonnie. In counts IV through VI of their complaint, the Lotts alleged that

(1) Wayne and Bonnie had a duty to supervise William so as to prevent him from doing harm to others, and (2) they breached that duty. Specifically, the Lotts alleged that Wayne and Bonnie knew that William had previously been at fault in an automobile accident in which he struck a Jersey County deputy sheriff, and yet they failed to take appropriate steps to prevent William from again harming others.

In April 1999, they amended counts IV through VI to add that Wayne and Bonnie had the opportunity to control William by (1) taking away his car keys, (2) taking away his driving privileges, and (3) not letting him drive unless they were with him to supervise. In May 1999, Wayne and Bonnie filed a motion to dismiss counts IV through VI pursuant to

section 2 — 615 of the Code. In that motion, Wayne and Bonnie admitted that William was involved in an accident in October 1995 in which he struck a Jersey County sheriffs car. In July 1999, the trial court granted Wayne and Bonnie’s motion and struck counts IV V and VI of the Lotts’ complaint, thereby dismissing the Lotts’ common-law claims against Wayne and Bonnie. The trial court entered a finding that no just reason existed for delaying enforcement or appeal of its order (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), and this appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review In Vernon v.

Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (1997), the supreme court addressed the standard of review for cases dismissed pursuant to

section 2 — 615 of the Code and wrote the following: “The question presented by a

section 2 — 615 motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. [Citations.] A cause of action will not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which will entitle the plaintiff to recover. [Citation.] *** Since ruling on a motion to dismiss does not require a court to weigh facts or determine credibility, we review the complaint de novo.” B.

Parental Liability Parents in Illinois are not liable for the torts of their minor children merely because of the parent-child relationship. Bishop v. Morich, 250 Ill. App. 3d 366, 370, 621 N.E.2d 43, 46 (1993). Parents may be liable, however, if they failed to adequately control or supervise their children pursuant to

section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter Restatement) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316, at 123-24 (1965)), which states as follows: “A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so [as] to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (

a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (

b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.” See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill. App. 3d 184, 200, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur, and (2) the parents had the opportunity to control the child. Bishop, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 370, 621 N.E.2d at 46. C.

The Lotts’ Complaint The Lotts contend that their complaint states a cause of action because, with the knowledge of William’s prior accident, Wayne and Bonnie had (1) a duty to prevent him from harming others in the same way, and (2) the opportunity to do so by restricting William’s use of the car. We are not persuaded. Simply put, knowing that their son had a car accident one year earlier did not constitute knowledge of prior conduct sufficient to put Wayne and Bonnie on notice that William’s collision with the Lotts was likely to occur.

To hold otherwise would impose a duty on Illinois parents far greater than that defined by

section 316 of the Restatement and far greater than sound public policy permits.

Section 316 imposes a duty on parents when they are in a position to exercise immediate control over their children to prevent some foreseeable harm. It does not impose a duty on parents to take precautionary disciplinary measures or to regulate their children’s behavior on an ongoing basis. As comment b to

section 316 explains: “The duty of a parent is only to exercise such ability to control his child as he in fact has at the time when he [(!)] has the opportunity to exercise it and [(2)] knows the necessity of so doing.” Restatement § 316, Comment b, at 124 (1965). The Lotts do not allege that specific circumstances arose which presented an opportunity for Wayne and Bonnie to intervene and prevent their injury. Rather, their complaint alleges that the accident would not have happened if Wayne and Bonnie had properly disciplined William and regulated his conduct on a long-term, ongoing basis.

Section 316 does not impose liability for such broadly defined omissions. The following illustration clarifies the type of circumstances under which

section 316 is intended to come into play: “A is informed that his six-year-old child is shooting at a target in the street with a .22 rifle, in a manner which endangers the safety of those using the street. A fails to take the rifle away from the child, or to take any other action. The child unintentionally shoots B, a pedestrian, in the leg. A is subject to liability to B.” Restatement' § 316, Illustration, at 124 (1965). In the scenario presented above, the parent can step in and stop the child from causing harm. However,

section 316 does not impose a duty on parents to prevent their children from ever entering into a situation where they might commit a negligent act. See Pesek v. Discepolo, 130 Ill. App. 3d 785, 787, 475 N.E.2d 3, 4-5 (1985) (although the parents knew of their 15-year-old son’s propensity for criminal and quasi-criminal behavior, they could not reasonably foresee that he would commit rape); Barth v. Massa, 201 Ill.

App. 3d 19, 28-29, 558 N.E.2d 528, 534 (1990) (knowing their son had a propensity to misuse guns did not put parents on notice that he would buy a stolen gun, commit a burglary, and shoot a police officer). The Lotts argue that their case is analogous to Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill. App. 3d 184, 478 N.E.2d 603 (1985), in which the Second District Appellate Court held that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a negligent-supervision claim. In that case, the defendant worked at a bank and her desk was equipped with a silent alarm button.

On one occasion, the defendant’s three-year-old son pushed the alarm button and the police responded to the alarm. Six days later, when the defendant’s son was at work with her again, another bank employee told her that the last time the boy was there he had set off the alarm. The employee instructed the defendant to keep the boy away from the button. Later that day, the boy pushed the button and the plaintiff, a police officer, was injured while responding to the alarm. Duncan, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 187-88, 478 N.E.2d at 605.

The reviewing court held that the plaintiff stated a claim because the defendant (1) knew of the need to control the boy, and (2) had the opportunity to do so. Duncan, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 200, 478 N.E.2d at 613. The circumstances present in Duncan are far more analogous to those described in the illustration from the Restatement than they are to those present here. The parent in Duncan knew of the need to control her son in identical circumstances to those that existed the first time he triggered the alarm, just six days earlier.

In addition, the mother was in the immediate vicinity of the child and the button when the incident occurred. Duncan does not stand for the proposition that parents have a legal duty to take the car keys away from any child who has ever been involved in an accident. We hold that even if the allegations contained in the Lotts’ complaint are taken as true, it fails to state a cause of action. Wayne and Bonnie’s knowledge of William’s prior accident did not give rise to a duty pursuant to

section 316 of the Restatement. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed. McCullough, j., concurs.