BILL KROHE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Defendant-Appellant, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1133

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court: In June 2000, plaintiff, Bill Krohe, was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension by the City of Bloomington Pension Board (Board) based on injuries he sustained as a firefighter for defendant, the City of Bloomington (City). Thereafter, plaintiff requested that the City continue to pay the health insurance premiums for him and his family pursuant to

section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)). The City denied the request, stating it was not required to pay the premiums. In October 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting the trial court enter an order that plaintiff was entitled to have the premiums paid by the City pursuant to

section 10 of the Act. In March 2001, the trial court, in construing

section 10 of the Act, found the City was required to pay the health insurance premiums. On appeal, the City argues the trial court erred in interpreting “catastrophic” injury under

section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)) to mean any injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under

section 4 — 110 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/4 — 110 (West 2000)). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND In June 2000, plaintiff was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension by the Board based on injuries he sustained while performing his duties as a firefighter for the City. Later that month, plaintiff requested that the City continue to pay the health insurance premiums for him and his family pursuant to

section 10 of the Act, which provides, in part: “An employer who employs a full-time *** firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee,” his spouse, and dependent children. 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2000).

The City countered it was not required to pay premiums for plaintiff and his family because “a line[-] of[-]duty injury is not equivalent to suffering a ‘catastrophic’ injury.” In October 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking an order from the trial court that he was entitled to have the health insurance premiums for him and his family paid by the City pursuant to

section 10 of the Act. 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000). The complaint alleged the purpose of

section 10 was “to protect all firefighters who are receiving a duty-related disability without limitation on the nature of the injury.” In January 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on plaintiffs complaint. The issue before the court was whether plaintiff had suffered a “catastrophic injury” as defined by the Act. Plaintiff maintained the phrase “catastrophic injury” was ambiguous and required the court to determine the legislative intent to determine its meaning.

Specifically, plaintiff argued the trial court should consider the comments made by Senator Laura Kent Donahue in the November 1997 legislative debate to override Governor Edgar’s veto of House Bill 1347, which became the Act at issue here. Senator Donahue stated, in part: “I’d like to say for the sake of the record what we mean by catastrophically injured. What it means is that it is our intent to define ‘catastrophically injured’ as a police officer or firefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line-of-duty disability.” 90th 111. Gen.

Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue). In March 2001, the trial court, in its order construing

section 10 of the Act, stated the parties agreed plaintiff sustained an injury while performing his duties as a firefighter and as a result was permanently injured. The trial court found in favor of plaintiff stating, in part: “Because the term, ‘catastrophically injured’ is not defined, the [c]curt has reviewed the legislative debate to determine the intent and meaning of this language.

The legislative debate clearly indicates that those individuals (a firefighter in this case) who are disabled in the line of duty are entitled to have their health insurance premiums paid by the employer (in this case the City of Bloom-ington).” This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS The City argues the trial court erred in construing

section 10 of the Act to require it to pay plaintiffs health insurance premiums after plaintiff was disabled in the fine of duty. We disagree. Statutory construction is a matter of law and appellate review is de novo. People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623, 753 N.E.2d 554, 557 (2001). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269, 703 N.E.2d 901, 906 (1998). The words of a statute are to be given their plain and commonly understood meanings. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 314 Ill. App. 3d 296, 301, 734 N.E.2d 18, 22 (2000). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to the other tools of statutory construction. Segers v. Industrial Comm’n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 431, 732 N.E.2d 488, 494 (2000).

Section 10 of the Act provides, in part: “An employer who employs a full-time *** firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority ***. *** * * * (

b) In order for the *** firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance coverage under this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the *** firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. Nothing in this [sjection shall be construed to limit health insurance coverage or pension benefits for which the officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children may otherwise be eligible.” 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000).

The term “catastrophic injury” is not defined by the Act. Thus, we must look elsewhere to determine the intent of the legislature. In its brief, the City correctly states that a statute is not interpreted by the statements or comments of legislators; rather, “ ‘a statute is interpreted by its language, which if certain and unambiguous, must be given effect as written.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Chicago SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Revenue, 306 Ill. App. 3d 977, 986, 715 N.E.2d 719, 726 (1999), quoting People v. James, 246 Ill. App. 3d 939, 948, 617 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1993).

Here, however, the intent of the language of the Act is uncertain and ambiguous. Such ambiguity leads us to consider the legislative history in order to reach the end result in this case. See People v. Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d 174, 178, 643 N.E.2d 865, 868 (1994) (where a statute’s language is ambiguous, examination of legislative history is appropriate).

As the trial court did, we note that Senator Donahue, for the sake of the record, stated the legislature intended to define those “ ‘catastrophically injured’ as *** police officer[s] or firefighter[s] who, due to injuries, [have] been forced to take a line-of-duty disability.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue). In determining legislative intent, courts may “consider relevant statements by legislators concerning the nature and effect of the proposed law.” Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 178, 643 N.E.2d at 868.

The comments made by Senator Donahue, the bill’s sponsor, should not be discounted by the judiciary in determining legislative intent when the remarks were purposefully included in the record for the sole reason of specifying legislative intent. Consideration of legislative debates is a legitimate and beneficial source for determining the intent of the legislature. See People v. Billingsley, 67 Ill. App. 2d 292, 297, 213 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1966) (committee comments are an appropriate and valuable source for determining legislative intent).

As the fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, the trial court’s review of the transcripts of the legislative debate was appropriate. We are mindful the First District Appellate Court has reached a decision contrary to our holding today. See Villarreal v. Village of Schaumburg, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 759 N.E.2d 76 (2001). In Villarreal, a police officer injured in the performance of his official duties for the defendant village sought benefits under the Act. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1159, 759 N.E.2d at 78.

The First District cited a federal statute in assigning its own definition to the term “catastrophic injury” and also reviewed the laws of other states. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1164, 759 N.E.2d at 82-83. It is unclear whether the floor debates from the Illinois Senate were ever brought to the court’s attention, but the court concluded the language of the act was clear and unambiguous and eschewed extrinsic aids of statutory construction for interpretive guidance.

We conclude the meaning of the term “catastrophic injury” necessarily sets the parameters of the legislative enactment, and, as such, the term’s uncertain definition renders the Act ambiguous. In the case sub judice, the dissent criticizes the majority for ignoring Town of the City of Bloomington v. Bloomington Township, 233 Ill. App. 3d 724, 599 N.E.2d 62 (1992). 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1139. City of Bloomington, however, was not a case where legislative debates were examined to construe the meaning of a statute.

Instead, the defendant, Bloomington Township, offered the expert testimony of the executive director of the Township Officials Association of Illinois to opine on the legislative intent of a statute. City of Bloomington, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 599 N.E.2d at 69. The court correctly rejected the evidence as improper for determining legislative intent. City of Bloomington, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 599 N.E.2d at 69. The dicta cited by the dissent, however, have no application here.

The questions posed in the dissent suggest the senators expected no deference to be given to the chief sponsor in defining the term “catastrophic injury.” 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1139. Thus, we pose our own rhetorical question: does our dissenting colleague really believe the senators intended for the definition assigned by the chief sponsor of the bill to be ignored in favor of whatever definition the judiciary assigned to the term?

In his epilogue, our dissenting colleague suggests the legislature can amend the Act to apply to future disabled line-of-duty victims but the Act provides no relief for plaintiff in this case. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1143. We choose to grant plaintiff the benefits the legislature intended for him to receive. We simply assign the same meaning to “catastrophic injury” as that assigned by the bill’s chief sponsor in floor debate before the full Senate, the media, and the public in a forum where every word is recorded and preserved for public and judicial scrutiny.

We trust the policymakers will amend the statute and make it more limiting if the chief sponsor’s definition of “catastrophic injury” is not acceptable. Clearly, the Illinois General Assembly sought to fulfill an important state interest by enacting this statute providing additional benefits for the state’s public safety officers. The legislative branch of government is responsible for making public policy, and the judiciary should give effect to enactments by the legislature establishing public policy.

Here, there is no challenge of constitutional infirmity, and our deference to the clearly expressed will of the legislature is required. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to the insurance benefits sought for himself and his family. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed. MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.