THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONALD TILLMAN, Defendant-Appellee, 355 Ill. App. 3d 194

JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant Ronald Tillman, and codefendants Jason Stampley, Yennitt Carlvin, and Manning Goldman, were charged with various drug offenses. Specifically, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence arguing that the police illegally entered his home and that the evidence they recovered was the fruit of the illegal arrest. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and denied the State’s motion to reconsider.

On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence recovered from defendant. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. At the suppression hearing, codefendant Manning Goldman testified that on October 6, 2002, between 6 and 6:30 p.m., he was at defendant’s apartment in the Robert Taylor Homes housing project located at 4037 South Federal Street. Defendant lived in apartment 1409. Goldman stated that he went there to play games and smoke marijuana with defendant and codefendants Jason Stampley and Vennitt Carlvin.

Goldman had been in the apartment for about 10 or 15 minutes, when, after exiting the bathroom, he saw that the police were in the apartment. The police searched him and found cannabis hidden in the crotch of his pants. Defendant testified that at the time of the incident, he and his aunt lived at 4037 South Federal Street in apartment number 1409. Defendant stated that he was smoking marijuana when he heard a knock at his door.

Defendant opened the door and the police, who were in street clothes and had their weapons drawn, entered the apartment, pushed defendant against the wall, and asked him who held the lease to the apartment. Defendant told the police that he was the leaseholder. Defendant retrieved his lease from his bedroom, which was in the back of the apartment, and the police began searching the entire apartment. When defendant returned from his bedroom to the living room, the officers told him to sit on the couch, where he remained while they searched his apartment.

The police kicked a hole in the front living room wall and recovered narcotics from defendant’s bedroom. Defendant did not give the police permission to enter his apartment, never signed a consent-to-search form, and never saw a search warrant. Officer Edwin Uteras testified that on October 6, 2002, he was working with Officers Lee, Snelling, Seinitz, and Schoeff. Officer Lee had informed him that an anonymous citizen reported that “drug dealers run in apartment 1409” of 4037 South Federal Street. Prior to October 6, 2003, Officer Uteras had made approximately 50 narcotics arrests at 4037 South Federal Street.

At about 6:15 p.m., Officer Uteras arrived at the building with Officers Schoeff and Seinitz. Upon his arrival, he saw that Officer Lee had detained Tywan Jordan, who was working “security,” at the stairwell of the building. Officer Lee told him that it was safe to proceed up the stairway. As Officers Uteras, Schoeff, and Seinitz went up the stairway, Officer Uteras saw Goldman and Stampley look in his direction and heard them say “slickers,” i.e., police. Goldman threw down a clear plastic bag containing cannabis, and Stampley threw cocaine onto the ground of the third floor.

Goldman and Stampley fled up the stairs and the officers recovered the dropped items. The officers then chased Goldman and Stampley up the stairs to the fourteenth floor. Officer Uteras did not see Goldman or Stampley enter apartment 1409, but by the time he reached the apartment, Officers Seinitz and Lee had entered the apartment and the door was open. Goldman was in the front living room on his knees and Stampley was next to him. Officer Joe Seinitz, who had been assigned to the public housing tactical unit for six years at the time of this incident, corroborated Officer Uteras’ testimony.

Officer Seinitz also testified that Officers Uteras and Schoeff recovered the items dropped by Stampley and Goldman and then followed him as he chased Stampley and Goldman up the stairway. Officer Seinitz saw Stampley and Goldman run into apartment 1409, and he followed them inside because he was pursuing two offenders he believed committed a felony. Upon entering the apartment, Stampley and Goldman stopped in the living room and were detained by other officers. Officer Seinitz saw defendant, who quickly walked from the living room to the back bedroom, and he followed him.

Officer Seinitz followed defendant into his room because defendant had something in his hand and because of his movements. He also followed defendant into his bedroom because, based on his experience as a public housing officer, he was concerned for his safety and believed a felony was in progress. After entering the bedroom, Officer Seinitz observed defendant place the item that was in his hand into a hole in the wall. Officer Seinitz then placed defendant in custody and kicked the wall about a foot below the hole. He recovered a bag containing 625 packets of suspected cocaine and a 9-millimeter handgun.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court took the motion under advisement. The court stated that the officers were in hot pursuit of Stampley and Goldman, and therefore had a right to he in defendant’s apartment. However, regarding defendant, the court stated: “Mr. Tillman is in a little bit of a different posture. He actually lives there. He’s got absolute standing there. >;< [With] Mr.

Tillman *** I think we have to start looking at it through fresh eyes and see does something happen while the police are in the apartment lawfully that would give them probable cause to start making seizures. ❖ * K< *** [W]hat I heard about Mr. Tillman is ambiguous, somewhat ambiguous, because the officer is being candid. He says, I don’t know what he had in his hand.

I don’t know what he’s doing exactly. *** I consider this to be on the close side.” The State filed a written response to defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing, in part, that: the officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment was lawful based on probable cause and exigent circumstances, the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; and, while inside the apartment searching for the fleeing felons, the police saw defendant in plain view in possession of what they thought was narcotics. After conducting another hearing on the motion, the court again took the matter under advisement.

The court then granted defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, stating, in part: “[T]here were police on patrol in a housing project. They had some information that there may be some suspicious activity that would warrant a police investigation about goings on in a particular unit. While they were in the hallways and common areas, they encountered two of the co-defendants. *** Their encounters with these two people, Mr. Stampley and Mr. Goldman, caused them to want to talk with them.

During these matters, both those men discarded contraband and bolted for the very apartment that the police were there to check out. They ran into the apartment. The police were in hot pursuit. I do not have a problem with the police fulfilling this hot pursuit of fleeing felons, and they got into somebody else’s unit lawfully. When they got inside the unit, it turns out that *** this is where Mr. Tillman lived. He is the leaseholder of this place. All this tumult is going on. People are running in. Plainclothes police officers are chasing people into a unit. Mr.

Tillman goes to the back of the unit and throws something into a hole in the wall. In light of everything going on there, the police did not know what he may have had, but this was his home. It was his unit. He put something in a hole in the wall, and what I find particularly relevant is that the police acknowledged that they did not see what he had in his hand and what they [sic] put in the hole in the wall. They did not see it. They did not know what it was. They went to the hole in the wall. They could not see what was there.

The police at that point started kicking into the hole in the wall and literally kicked through the dry wall, and at that time they discovered the contraband which is the subject of this motion. ❖ $ In this case, the police do not know what it was that Mr. Tillman put in that hole. And there may have been lots of things other than contraband or matters of danger that he put in the hole. *** It could have been anything. It is kind of neutral conduct.” The State filed a motion for the court to reconsider its ruling, which the trial court denied. The State then filed this appeal.

In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accord great deference to a trial court’s historical factual findings unless such findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, we review de novo the ultimate legal question of whether the evidence should be suppressed. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512-13 (2004).

Initially, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that exigent circumstances were present — the officers were in hot pursuit of Stampley and Goldman, and therefore, their entry into defendant’s home without a warrant was proper. The police may make a warrantless entry into someone’s home if exigent circumstances exist. People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1997). In determining whether a circumstance is exigent, we evaluate the totality of the circumstances and whether the officer acted reasonably at the time he entered the premises. People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 515 (1983).

The “hot pursuit” of a suspect who flees from a public place into his residence constitutes an exigent circumstance. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2410 (1976). Here, Officer Lee received information that “drug dealers [ran]” in defendant’s apartment. Officer Lee called his team for assistance and detained the man working “security” at the base of the stairwell of defendant’s building. After responding to Officer Lee’s call and talking to him at the scene, Officers Uteras, Seinitz, and Schoeff began to climb up the stairwell and saw Goldman and Stampley.

Goldman and Stampley had items in their hands, which they dropped to the ground, yelled “slickers,” and then ran up the stairs to defendant’s apartment. Officers Uteras and Schoeff recovered the items, a bag of cocaine and a bag of marijuana, dropped by Goldman and Stampley, and Officer Seinitz pursued Stampley and Goldman up the stairs because he believed they were committing a felony. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the officers’ experience, the officers properly entered defendant’s apartment, as they were in hot pursuit of Stampley and Goldman.

Next, we determine that Officer Seinitz had probable cause to arrest defendant. The police are entitled to make a warrantless arrest when they possess facts, at the time of the arrest, which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has occurred and that the person to be arrested committed the crime. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204 (1999). The probability of criminal activity and commonsense considerations, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, determine whether probable cause exists. People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 525 (1986).

Determinations of probable cause must be based on the totality of circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest (People v. Rucker, 346 Ill. App. 3d 873, 886 (2003) (modified upon denial of rehearing, February 2, 2004)) and must be considered from the arresting officer’s standpoint, with his skill and knowledge, not from an average citizen’s standpoint. People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1985). Here, Officer Seinitz chased Stampley and Goldman into defendant’s apartment, and upon entering the apartment, saw defendant in the living room holding something in his hand.

Defendant quickly walked back to his bedroom. Officer Seinitz followed defendant because he was concerned for his safety and believed a felony was in progress. Officer Seinitz then observed defendant put the object he was holding into a hole in the wall. The trial court characterized this as “neutral conduct.” We disagree with this characterization given the totality of the circumstances. The officers were aware of an anonymous tip concerning drug activity in apartment 1409 — defendant’s apartment.

When they arrived, the officers found a man working “security” on the first floor, and then encountered codefendants Stampley and Goldman. When codefendants saw the officers, they yelled “slickers,” a term for undercover police officers, then dropped bags of drugs and fled. Codefendants ran into apartment 1409, followed by the officers. Defendant was in the apartment holding something in his hand. When defendant saw the officers, he quickly walked away from them into a bedroom, where he put the item he was holding into a hole in the wall.

Under these circumstances, the officers could reasonably conclude that defendant was attempting to hide contraband. This reasonable belief provided probable cause for defendant’s arrest. See People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269 (2002) (in determining whether probable cause for arrest exists, an officer is not required to visually identify an item as a narcotic for the arrest to be valid). Finally, we decide that Officer Seinitz properly recovered the narcotics from the wall. A search incident to a valid arrest is proper if the search is conducted either contemporaneously or immediately prior to the arrest.

Rucker, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 886. Searching a person or a place under a suspect’s control, without a warrant, is lawful when the search is made subsequent to a lawful arrest and is conducted with the goal of locating other items connected to the crime. People v. Marquis, 24 Ill. App. 3d 653, 659-60 (1974). Here, Officer Seinitz’s seizure of the cocaine was made pursuant to a valid arrest, as stated above.

Further, as Officer Seinitz observed defendant place the object he was holding into a hole in the wall, an area immediately within defendant’s control, Officer Seinitz acted reasonably in searching the area and recovering the narcotics. Therefore, the tried court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine recovered by Officer Seinitz.

Based on our conclusion that Officer Seinitz had probable cause to arrest defendant and to search the hole in the wall, it is unnecessary for us to address the State’s alternative assertions that the contraband was discovered during a proper protective sweep and that it inevitably would have been discovered. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed,, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. O’BRIEN, J., concurs.

The trial court dismissed the charges against Carlvin, found Goldman guilty of possession of marijuana, and found Stampley guilty of possession of a controlled substance.