In re FAITH B. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Perseta B., Respondent-Appellant), 359 Ill. App. 3d 571

JUSTICE GEOMETER delivered the opinion of the court: Respondent, Perseta B., appealed a series of orders of the circuit court of Kane County that resulted in placing her two minor children, Stephen B. and Faith B., in guardianships with two maternal aunts. Respondent alleged error in (1) the circuit court’s decision to adjudicate the minors abused and neglected and (2) the circuit court’s determination that private guardianship is the appropriate permanency goal. We disagreed with respondent’s first contention and found we lacked jurisdiction regarding the second. See In re Faith B., 349 Ill. App. 3d 930 (2004).

Respondent appealed to the supreme court, which affirmed our decision as to the first point, but found jurisdiction present as to the second. In re Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d 1 (2005). The supreme court then remanded the case to this court for consideration of respondent’s second issue, and we now address it on its merits. The setting of a permanency goal is governed by

section 2 — 28 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 — 28 (West 2002)), which establishes a number of possible goals for a child.

Relevant considerations include the following: “(1) the age of the children; (2) the options available for permanence; (3) the current placement of the children and the intent of the family regarding adoption; (4) the emotional, physical, and mental status or condition of the children; (5) the types of services previously offered and whether the services were successful and, if not successful, the reasons the services failed; (6) the availability of services currently needed and whether the services exist; and (7) the status of any siblings.” In re S.E., 319 Ill. App. 3d 937, 942-43 (2001).

The Act directs that, whenever possible, the child’s family ties should be preserved. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2(1) (West 2002). However, it also sets forth other considerations, including the welfare of the child and the need to establish permanency “at the earliest opportunity.” 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2(1) (West 2002). The trial court possesses broad discretion in setting a permanency goal, and its decision will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 467, 472 (2000); In re K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 675, 682 (2000).

A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only where an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d 764, 779 (2003). Respondent’s chief complaint is directed at the time frame in which the events that led to the setting of the permanency goal transpired, which she terms as “mind-boggling.” She points out that the alleged events upon which the State’s petition was based occurred in July 2003. The State filed its petition in August 2003. On November 20, 2003, following a dispositional hearing, the permanency goal of guardianship was set.

While this short time frame is certainly outside of the norm in cases like this, that fact in no way undermines the trial court’s decision. Cases involving the care and custody of minors should be resolved as quickly as possible. Indeed, they must be, given the legislature’s clear directive that permanency be attained as early as possible. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 2(1) (West 2002). Thus, it is not the speed with which the judgment was rendered that we must examine — for that may have been a salutary thing — but the rationale of the decision itself.

In deciding on the goal of guardianship, the trial court essentially reasoned negatively, eliminating other goals for various reasons until only guardianship was left. The court ruled: “Well, I am going to comment on this at this point in time, because I think at the dispositional hearing the Court does have to make a determination on the goal, and I think guardianship would be the appropriate goal in this case, at least at this point in time as the mother has indicated that she does not have a mental health issue and indicated — has indicated that she does not wish to seek any treatment.

So that means any kind of return home goal would be ruled out. And, likewise, certainly because the children are in relative placement here, we are not talking about any kind of substitute care pending termination of parental rights. An adoption would be ruled out, because these children have a long term bond with their mother that I do not believe at this point in time that this Court would ever find that that should be disrupted.

I mean, certainly I would need significant evidence to find that the parental relationship would need to be disrupted, which leaves us at the goal of guardianship.” We fully endorse the trial court’s reasoning. Respondent does not, of course, challenge the trial court’s reasoning regarding the elimination of the more disruptive goals of adoption and termination of parental rights. We note that the trial court acknowledged the significant relationship between respondent and the minors in eliminating adoption.

She does, however, assert that the trial court should have given her another opportunity to seek care and services before disregarding the goal of return home. While respondent’s point does not entirely lack merit, we cannot say that a conclusion opposite to that drawn by the trial court is clearly apparent, given respondent’s refusal or inability to work with DCFS personnel as well as her definitive in-court statements that she would not seek care. Therefore, we cannot say that eliminating the return-home goal was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

Moreover, viewing the evidence as a whole, we cannot say that a conclusion opposite to the selection of private guardianship is clearly warranted, as is required to reverse a decision of a trial court under the manifest-weight standard of review. In re M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 779. Viewed in its entirety, the evidence shows that respondent has significant mental-health problems that have led to erratic behavior, which, at some times, has impacted directly on the minors. Respondent has refused treatment, been unable to cooperate with DCFS personnel, and stated that she has no problem and needs no treatment.

That respondent can point out some conflicting evidence, such as her testimony that she tried calling DCFS several times, is insufficient for us to disturb the decision of the trial court. See Wencordic Enterprises, Inc. v. Berenson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 913, 918 (1987) (“We will reverse the judgment of the trial court only when its decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence [citation], not when the evidence is merely conflicting”). In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County. Affirmed. CALLUM, J., concurs.