In re MARRIAGE OF MARY BETH SINGEL, Petitioner-Appellee, and THOMAS J. SINGEL II, Respondent-Appellant, 373 Ill. App. 3d 554

JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court: Respondent, Thomas J. Singel II, appeals from an order denying his motion for additional time in which to file a postjudgment motion under

section 2 — 1203(

a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1203(a) (West 2004)) against a judgment dissolving his marriage to petitioner, Mary Beth Singel. We agree with petitioner that we lack jurisdiction, and we dismiss the appeal. On April 3, 2006, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and resolving all of the issues raised by petitioner’s dissolution petition.

Thirty days later, on May 2, 2006, respondent filed a “Motion for Extension of Time for Filing of Motion to Reconsider Judgment of April 3, 2006.” The motion alleged that, on May 1, 2006, respondent retained new counsel and that, because counsel had not yet received the case file from the previous attorney or reviewed the trial transcripts, he could not file a postjudgment motion within the 30-day limit of

section 2 — 1203(a). Citing Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183), the motion requested an extension of time in which to file a motion to reconsider the judgment. Respondent did not actually file a motion to reconsider the judgment, either within 30 days or at any time thereafter. On June 8, 2006, petitioner responded to the motion. She contended first that Rule 183 did not apply to the time limit set by

section 2 — 1203(

a) and thus could not enable respondent to obtain an extension. Petitioner observed that, under

section 2 — 1203(a), a post-judgment motion must be filed “within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1203(a) (West 2004). She contended that, because respondent had neither filed a postjudgment motion nor obtained an extension within 30 days after the entry of the dissolution judgment, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the extension or any other relief. On August 15, 2006, the trial court “denied” respondent’s motion.

The court held that it had lost jurisdiction over the case because no proper postjudgment motion had been filed within 30 days of the judgment. On September 12, 2006, respondent filed a notice of appeal. We must dismiss this appeal as untimely. A notice of appeal from a final judgment must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or, if a timely motion directed against the judgment is filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending motion directed against the judgment. 210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).

Here, respondent filed his notice of appeal on September 12, 2006, more than 30 days after the entry of the dissolution judgment. Thus, his appeal is untimely unless there was a timely postjudgment motion that extended the time in which to appeal. There was no such motion. A proper postjudgment motion under

section 2 — 1203(

a) must request a rehearing, retrial, modification or vacatur of the judgment, or similar type of relief against the judgment. County of Cook v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 358 Ill. App. 3d 667, 672 (2005). As its title indicates, respondent’s “Motion for Extension of Time for Filing of Motion to Reconsider Judgment” did not request relief against the judgment, but merely permission to file a motion that would do so. Therefore, because respondent did not file a proper postjudgment motion, his notice of appeal was untimely.

Because a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional, his appeal must be dismissed. See Lowenthal v. McDonald, 367 Ill. App. 3d 919, 925 (2006). Contrary to what respondent contends, it does not matter that he filed his motion for an extension of time within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. Under

section 2 — 1203(a), an initial extension beyond the 30-day limit must be granted within that 30-day period. Lowenthal, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 921-22. Finally, respondent’s reliance on Rule 183 is in vain. Even if, arguendo, the rule authorized the trial court to grant an extension past the deadline set by

section 2 — 1203(a), the fact remains that the trial court did not do so within the 30 days required by

section 2 — 1203(a). In any event, however, we agree with petitioner that Rule 183 does not apply here. The rule allows the trial court to extend the time for filing a “pleading” or for “the doing of any act which is required by the [supreme court] rules.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 183. By its plain terms, the rule applies only to the time limits for pleadings and to time limits that have been set by the supreme court rules. Robinson v. Johnson, 346 Ill. App. 3d 895, 905 (2003). Therefore, the trial court could not have used Rule 183 to grant respondent more time to file a postjudgment motion under

section 2 — 1203(a). The appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. BYRNE, J., concurs. The trial court’s order also granted petitioner’s postdissolution petition for a rule to show cause against respondent and allowed her to file a petition for the attorney fees that she incurred in bringing the petition. The order stated that there was no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of the part of the order denying respondent’s motion for more time in which to file a motion to reconsider the dissolution judgment. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).