THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JANET L. TURNER, Defendant-Appellant, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1101

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court: The State charged defendant, Janet L. Turner, with theft. Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Knox County convicted defendant and sentenced her to 2 days’ imprisonment with credit for time spent in presentence incarceration and 24 months’ probation and assessed a $200 fine, costs, and penalties. Defendant appeals. For the reasons below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND The State filed an information charging defendant with theft by knowingly exerting unauthorized control over the property of Charles Vandell, consisting of two bundles of roofing shingles valued at $300, with the intent to permanently deprive Vandell of the use of the property. At defendant’s arraignment, defense counsel entered a plea of not guilty on the defendant’s behalf and waived defendant’s right to a trial by jury. Defendant was present during the arraignment, expressed oral assent to the bench trial date, and executed a written jury trial waiver.

On the day of trial, defense counsel moved for a continuance because he had a potential conflict of interest in calling the codefendant, Kevin Smith, to testify. Defense counsel had represented Smith at Smith’s plea hearing 30 to 60 days prior to trial. Smith pled guilty to charges stemming from the theft of the shingles. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to continue, finding that a conflict of interest did not exist and stating that, if necessary, it would admonish Smith of his right to silence regarding other unindicted offenses allegedly committed with a different person.

The cause proceeded to trial; defendant did not call Smith to testify. Dorothy Jones testified on behalf of the State. Dorothy lives next door to Vandell, and on the afternoon in question, she observed a vehicle parked on Vandell’s lot near several bundles of roofing shingles. Dorothy saw defendant standing by the car and saw a man, Kevin Smith, picking up bundles of shingles and putting them into the backseat of the car. Dorothy testified that defendant conversed with Smith and pointed to shingles. Dorothy further testified that when defendant saw Dorothy, she got back into the front passenger seat of the car.

Dorothy told her husband that someone was taking the neighbor’s shingles. Wilbur Jones, Dorothy’s husband, got up and yelled “Hey” at Smith three or four times before Smith got into the car, backed up, and sped off, running a stop sign. Wilbur did not see the defendant, but heard the passenger car door slam. Dorothy recorded the vehicle’s license plate number and contacted the police. During the course of their investigation, the police received a report from Lowe’s regarding a “suspicious” return of two bundles of shingles to the store. Police recovered the shingles from Lowe’s and contacted Vandell.

Smith and defendant were together at Lowe’s when police arrived in response to the report. Vandell went to his lot and noticed that two bundles of shingles were missing and, at the police station, identified the shingles recovered from Lowe’s. Vandell testified that each bundle weighs approximately 80 pounds. The police photographed the shingles and then returned them to Vandell. The police transported Smith and defendant to the police station. Smith spoke to police, but defendant did not. Following trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of theft. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS Four issues are raised on appeal: the sufficiency of the evidence to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense counsel’s conflict of interest in representing the defendant and codefendant, the knowing waiver of the right to a trial by jury, and defendant’s entitlement to a $10 credit for two days spent in presentence incarceration. A.

Sufficiency of the Evidence In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court will view the evidence “ ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution’ ” and determine whether “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).

The evidence must be “so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt” to merit reversal. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, 478 N.E.2d at 277. Circumstantial evidence that proves the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt “is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217, 780 N.E.2d 669, 685 (2002). The trier of fact can make reasonable inferences and is not required to prove “each link in the chain of circumstances” beyond a reasonable doubt or “search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence.” People v.

Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 380, 586 N.E.2d 1261, 1268 (1992). The court “will not substitute its judgment” for determinations made by the trier of fact regarding the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses (People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 51, 538 N.E.2d 461, 473 (1989)), but will not accept eyewitness testimony where “no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 818 N.E.2d 304, 308 (2004).

A defendant is accountable for the conduct of a codefendant when “[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/5 — 2(c) (West 2004). Mere presence at the scene of the crime with knowledge of its commission alone does not establish accountability, but active participation is not required to render a defendant accountable for the acts of another. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61, 554 N.E.2d 174, 190 (1990).

A defendant need not act affirmatively if there is a “common criminal plan or purpose.” People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 140-41, 646 N.E.2d 567, 571 (1995). A common criminal plan or design can be inferred from the circumstances, and a defendant need not express “[wjords of agreement” to be held accountable for a codefendant’s criminal acts. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141, 646 N.E.2d at 571. In Taylor, our supreme court identified some circumstances that may be considered by the trier of fact in determining defendant’s legal accountability.

These factors include: (1) presence at the scene without disapproval, (2) “flight from the scene,” (3) “failfure] to report the crime,” (4) close affiliation with the codefendant afterward, (5) sharing the proceeds of the criminal act, and (6) destroying or disposing of evidence. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141, 646 N.E.2d at 571. There is no indication in Taylor that the list of factors or circumstances was meant to be exhaustive.

Accompanying the codefendant to the scene with knowledge of the commission of a crime with any affirmative contact between the defendant and the codefendant indicates a shared criminal purpose. Compare People v. Houston, 258 Ill. App. 3d 364, 368, 629 N.E.2d 774, 778 (1994) (finding a common criminal design that defendant accompanied the codefendant to the scene of the crime, did not attempt to prevent the crime, and alerted the codefendant of a fleeing victim), with People v.

Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 268, 725 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (2000) (finding no shared criminal purpose because defendant did not appear at the scene with the codefendants, joined the codefendants to pay an unrelated monetary debt, and lacked knowledge regarding the circumstances of the ongoing confrontation). Defendant relies on People v. Ceasar, 231 Ill. App. 3d 54, 596 N.E.2d 89 (1992), and People v. Trapps, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 318 N.E.2d 108 (1974), to support her argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict.

Unlike in Ceasar or Trapps, there is no dispute that defendant accompanied the codefendant to the scene, and it was reasonable to infer that she not only had knowledge of the criminal purpose, but affirmatively acted to support that purpose by conversing with Smith during the crime and pointing to bundles of shingles. People v. Ceasar, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 56, 596 N.E.2d at 90 (finding that defendant’s appearance and flight with the codefendant after the commission of the crime was insufficient to hold him accountable); People v. Trapps, 22 Ill.

App. 3d at 1032-33, 318 N.E.2d at 110-11 (holding that defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime without any evidence that she knew of the codefendant’s actions, fled with the codefendant, or continued to associate with the codefendant did not support a finding of a common criminal design). Because it is already established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was at the scene without disapproving of the commission of the crime, fled with the codefendant, and was with him at Lowe’s afterward, it is not necessary to establish that she displayed a guilty conscience after she saw the witness, Dorothy Jones.

The trier of fact can infer from the facts that when defendant fled with her codefendant, she displayed a guilty conscience, thus further supporting an inference of a common criminal design. People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 142, 646 N.E.2d 567, 572 (1995) (stating defendant’s flight without a determination of defendant’s state of mind was sufficient to support a finding of a common criminal purpose).

However, we find nothing unreasonable about the trial court’s finding that defendant displayed guilty knowledge by getting back into the car when she saw the witness so that she could not be seen as well as when she was standing outside the car.

The evidence taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime without disapproval, flight with the codefendant, failure to report the crime, and continued association with the codefendant are sufficient to support an inference of a shared criminal design, and, therefore, sufficient to convict defendant of theft. B.

Conflict of Interest of Defense Counsel In defendant’s second contention on appeal, she argues for reversal of her conviction and remand for a new trial because her counsel labored under an impermissible conflict of interest. Per se conflicts of interest arise when defense counsel has a “contemporaneous association with either the prosecution or the victim” and requires no showing of prejudice to reverse a conviction. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 525 N.E.2d 30, 34-35 (1988). A per se conflict of interest presents a question of law and we review de novo. People v.

Miller, 199 Ill. 2d 541, 544, 771 N.E.2d 386, 387 (2002). Joint representation of defendants does not create a per se conflict on interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 347, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718 (1980). If defense counsel raises a conflict of interest, the trial court must either appoint new counsel or perform a factual inquiry to determine if an actual conflict of interest exists. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483-84, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 433-34, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178-79 (1978).

If the trial court fails to appoint new counsel or investigate the potential conflict, reversal is automatic without a showing of prejudice by the defendant. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 18, 525 N.E.2d at 36; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 488, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 436-37, 98 S. Ct. at 1180-81. The First District noted that the courts have not defined under what standard a court reviews the investigation into a potential conflict of interest. People v. Moore, 338 Ill. App. 3d 11, 16, 788 N.E.2d 68, 72-73 (2003).

The court found that the “decision involves the court’s need to oversee the courtroom and maintain the progress of proceedings,” therefore holding that the court would not disturb the trial court’s decision “absent an abuse of that discretion.” Moore, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 16, 78 N.E.2d at 72. Because defense counsel raised the conflict of interest prior to trial and the trial court inquired into the nature of the conflict, we will not reverse the conviction unless the trial court abused its discretion.

When the interests between codefendants are hostile or antagonistic, an impermissible conflict of interest arises out of joint representation that denies a defendant effective counsel. People v. Echols, 74 Ill. 2d 319, 327, 385 N.E.2d 644, 648 (1978). When a codefendant testifies against another defendant, the defenses are antagonistic, causing an impermissible conflict of interest. People v. Taylor, 165 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1021, 520 N.E.2d 907, 912 (1988); People v. Ware, 39 Ill. 2d 66, 67-68, 233 N.E.2d 421, 421-22 (1968).

When one defendant admits guilt while the other maintains innocence or when one defendant is allegedly more culpable than the other, the defenses are not antagonistic. People v. Drummer, 81 Ill. App. 3d 626, 630, 402 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1980); People v. Sanders, 209 Ill. App. 3d 366, 375, 568 N.E.2d 200, 205-06 (1991). A conflict of interest that is “hypothetical or speculative” does not create a duty that requires the trial court to appoint new counsel. People v. Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d 147, 169, 402 N.E.2d 157, 168 (1979); People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 300-01, 385 N.E.2d 649, 656 (1978).

The attorney-client relationship is not terminated when a codefendant has not been sentenced, despite being found or pleading guilty prior to the defendant’s trial; where such codefendant testifies to inculpate the defendant on trial, the defenses are antagonistic and defense counsel cannot properly represent one defendant without inculpating or harming the other. Taylor, 165 Ill.

App. 3d at 1021, 520 N.E.2d at 912 (holding defense counsel labored under a conflict of interest when a codefendant claimed innocence while claiming the other defendant was solely responsible for the criminal offenses); Ware, 39 Ill. 2d at 67-68, 233 N.E.2d at 422 (holding that defense counsel is not free to cross-examine and impeach a codefendant testifying for the State because defense counsel still had to advocate for the codefendant during sentencing). The codefendant was not testifying for the State and was sentenced to conditional discharge 30 to 60 days prior to defendant’s trial.

The attorney-client relationship between defense counsel and codefendant was severed; defense counsel was free to represent the defendant in a singular capacity. Defendant further argues that a conflict of interest remained because defense counsel knew about evidence of similar offenses allegedly committed by the codefendant and a different person.

Defense strategies and tactics are influenced by joint representation, but courts will not find a conflict of interest that requires speculation as to whether independent counsel would have pursued a strategy that would help one defendant while subjecting the other to self-incrimination. Echols, 74 Ill. 2d at 327-28, 385 N.E.2d at 648 (holding that the possibility that independent counsel would have pursued a strategy that might exculpate one defendant at the possible expense of the others is too speculative to constitute impermissible antagonism); People v. Sanchez, 161 Ill.

App. 3d 586, 594-95, 515 N.E.2d 213, 218-19 (1987) (finding no conflict of interest when defense counsel advised his client and potential but uncharged codefendant not to testify with potential exculpatory testimony because it would likely inculpate the witness in the offenses that were the subject matter of his other Ghent’s trial). The fact that defense counsel did not pursue one strategy to exonerate his client because a risk existed that his former client would inculpate himself in other, uncharged offenses does not create antagonistic defenses or a conflict of interest. Sanchez, 161 Ill.

App. 3d at 594-95, 515 N.E.2d at 218. The attorney-client relationship regarding the offense on trial was terminated, the codefendant was not yet charged with the new offenses, the defense counsel had not been appointed or retained to represent the codefendant, and the trial court stated it would admonish the codefendant regarding his right against self-incrimination. It is just as likely that defense counsel did not call Smith as a witness because Smith’s testimony would incriminate defendant.

Any conflict of interest was too speculative, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel for defendant. C. Defendant’s Waiver of Jury Trial Because a criminal defendant’s right to a trial by jury is fundamental, the issue of whether the defendant knowingly waived that right is not forfeited by failure to raise it in the trial court and is “considered under the plain error rule.” People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 270, 821 N.E.2d 253, 256 (2004); 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).

Because the issue presents a question of law and the facts are not in dispute, it is reviewed de novo. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270, 821 N.E.2d at 256. A defendant validly waives her right to a trial by jury only if she does so “(1) understanding^; and (2) in open court.” People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 285, 710 N.E.2d 833, 834 (1999); 725 ILCS 5/103 — 6 (West 2004). The trial court has a duty to ascertain whether a defendant understanding^ waives her right to a trial by jury, but such a determination depends on the “facts and circumstances of each particular case.” People v.

Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 469, 687 N.E.2d 48, 51 (1997). Although jury waivers made by defense counsel when the defendant was not present are invalid (Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285, 710 N.E.2d at 834), jury waivers are valid when made in open court by defense counsel “in defendant’s presence where defendant gave no indication of any objection.” People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 332, 469 N.E.2d 195, 197 (1984). Failure to obtain a written waiver does not necessitate reversal (People v. Brials, 315 Ill.

App. 3d 162, 176, 732 N.E.2d 1109, 1120 (2000)), but the existence of a written waiver supports a finding of a knowing waiver when accompanied by defense counsel’s request for a bench trial made in open court and in the defendant’s presence. People v. Steiger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 979, 982, 567 N.E.2d 660, 662 (1991). A defendant is bound by defense counsel’s waiver of a trial by jury when defendant is present in open court and does not object when the jury waiver is made or is explicitly discussed. Compare People v. Johnson, 347 Ill.

App. 3d 442, 444-45, 807 N.E.2d 693, 696 (2004) (finding a valid waiver made by defense counsel in a pretrial hearing because defendant did not object then or in subsequent hearings where the waiver was referenced), and People v. Asselbom, 278 Ill. App. 3d 960, 962-63, 664 N.E.2d 110, 112 (1996) (holding a waiver was valid when the defendant was present during a discussion regarding the jury waiver between the trial court and defense counsel immediately prior to trial), with People v. Watson, 246 Ill.

App. 3d 548, 549, 616 N.E.2d 649, 650 (1993) (finding invalid waiver when made outside defendant’s presence even though defendant was present during subsequent rescheduling conferences when the bench trial was discussed). Defendant was present during her arraignment when defense counsel requested a bench trial and waived her right to a trial by jury. Although the trial court did not explicitly discuss the waiver with the defendant, she did not express any objection and stated that she understood her presence was required for the bench trial.

On the same day as her arraignment, defendant signed a written jury waiver, which further supports that she knowingly waived her right to a trial by jury. People v. Steiger, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 982, 567 N.E.2d at 662. Based on the above analysis, we find that defendant knowingly waived her right to trial by jury.

The defendant’s two prior criminal convictions, along with six prior traffic convictions, while not necessary to our decision, add additional support for a finding of a knowing waiver because the convictions demonstrate a familiarity with the criminal justice system and, thus, a familiarity with her right to a trial by jury and with the ramifications of waiving that right. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 471, 687 N.E.2d at 52-53 (finding defendant’s four prior convictions supported a presumption of familiarity with jury waivers, thus supporting a finding of a valid waiver); People v. Johnson, 347 Ill.

App. 3d at 445 (finding defendant’s prior traffic and battery convictions demonstrated familiarity with the criminal justice system and supported a finding of a knowing waiver). D. Credit for Presentence Incarceration A defendant is entitled to a $5-per-day credit for each day of presentence incarceration. 725 ILCS 5/110 — 14 (West 2004); People v. Raya, 250 Ill. App. 3d 795, 802-03, 621 N.E.2d 222, 227-28 (1993); People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 457-58, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997).

The State concedes this issue, and defendant is entitled to a $10 credit on her $200 fine for her two days of presentence incarceration. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County, with instructions to the clerk to credit the defendant $10 for two days of presentence incarceration. Affirmed.