In re MARRIAGE OF KRYSTAL LYNN GUTHRIE, Petitioner-Appellee, and BRIAN LEE GUTHRIE, Respondent-Appellant, 392 Ill. App. 3d 169

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court: Petitioner, Krystal Lynn Guthrie, filed a petition for the dissolution of her marriage with respondent, Brian Lee Guthrie, in the circuit court of Jefferson County. Petitioner also filed a petition for removal, seeking permission to move with the sole child of the marriage, B.G., to Arizona. The circuit court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage that also granted the petition for removal and stated terms for visitation by respondent. On appeal, respondent raises issues regarding whether the grant of the petition for removal was proper.

FACTS On August 14, 2006, petitioner and respondent were married in Phoenix, Arizona. In September 2006, they moved to Illinois. The product of their union was a boy, B.G., born January 20, 2007. On March 28, 2007, petitioner left Illinois and went to Arizona with the child. On April 23, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for the dissolution of the marriage in the circuit court of Jefferson County, Illinois. On July 11, 2007, the court entered an agreed temporary order. The order provided visitation for respondent during the daytime on every Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.

Petitioner was granted leave to take B.G. on vacation to Arizona from July 3, 2007, to July 24, 2007. On November 9, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for leave to remove. On December 20, 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition for removal. On the date of the hearing, petitioner was 21 years old, respondent was 20 years old, and B.G. was 11 months old. Petitioner described a series of moves she has made since her wedding. At first, the parties lived with petitioner’s mother in Phoenix.

The parties then moved to Illinois and lived with respondent’s parents for three months until his parents kicked them out after a dispute. Petitioner stated that after leaving respondent’s parents’ home, she stayed in a local hotel room with her mother and then got an apartment in the area before returning to Phoenix. Petitioner testified that the longest continuous period she has lived in Illinois was during the pendency of this action. Petitioner testified that she met respondent in Phoenix and that she has no family or close friends in Illinois.

Petitioner testified that if the removal was granted, she would live with her mother and younger sister in a three-bedroom house in Phoenix. She testified that she has been unable to secure gainful employment in Illinois because she has no one to watch B.G. but that if allowed to return to Phoenix, she would be able to work as a cashier at a Safeway grocery store. Petitioner stated that she would facilitate visitation for respondent and that she would be able obtain travel vouchers for respondent through her father’s employment with American Airlines.

Petitioner also described her long-term plans to obtain a degree in nursing and possibly move closer to the region, such as Springfield, Missouri. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that she was on public aid. She also admitted that she was not currently able to get travel vouchers through her father’s employment and that she had to purchase her own ticket for travel to the hearing. Petitioner also admitted that her mother would move to Illinois if the removal was not granted and that she would try to settle in the Chicago area.

Jean Guerena, petitioner’s mother, described her residence and her expectations if petitioner and B.G. were to live in Phoenix. Guerena testified that she has been an accounts receivable clerk at Safeway for more than a decade and that petitioner’s 14-year-old sister could help in the upbringing of B.G. were they to return to Phoenix. Respondent testified that he was living with his parents in McLeansboro. He described how he interacted and played with B.G. during visitation. Respondent described feeding, bathing, and dressing B.G. Respondent believed that a removal would hinder his relationship with B.G.

Additionally, respondent testified that he could not afford the travel. On cross-examination, respondent admitted that he had dishonestly led petitioner to believe that he wanted her to return to Illinois to work through marital problems. Respondent’s father testified that respondent was an active and involved father. He described how respondent changes diapers and feeds B.G. Respondent’s father testified that he and his wife would help raise B.G. if a removal was not granted. On February 7, 2008, the court entered a judgment of the dissolution of the marriage.

The court awarded petitioner custody and granted her permission to remove B.G. to Arizona. Respondent was granted visitation and petitioner was ordered to pay a portion of respondent’s expenses for travel to Arizona for visitation. The court found as follows: “8. That [petitioner and respondent] have previously entered a mediation agreement that resolves all issues of this marriage, except the issues of removal of [B.G.] to Arizona and visitation. 9.

The [petitioner returned to the State of Illinois in April 2007 in the belief that the parties were going to reconcile their marriage when certain events occurred which caused this action to be filed. 10. The [p]etitioner has more realistic employment opportunities in the State of Arizona. 11. The [petitioner’s family resides in Phoenix, Arizona[,] and would be and is able to provide both support and assistance to [petitioner and [B.G.] The [Respondent’s family is not on speaking terms with the [petitioner and have [sic] not previously offered to watch [B.G.] while [petitioner works. 12.

The [petitioner has been the primary caregiver for [B.G.] since the time of his birth. 13. The [Respondent has had a dismal employment record and his level of financial support to the child is inadequate for the [petitioner to remain in Illinois. 14. The motives of both parents in this cause are not an issue. 15. Despite the distances involved and the [c]ourt’s preference for more frequent visits with less duration, the visitation

schedule proposed by [petitioner is reasonable and realistic even taking into account that [Respondent may not be able to take advantage of all scheduled visits. 16. The [c]ourt has considered the factors set forth in In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316 (1988)[J and any and all relevant evidence in this cause[ ] and finds that it is in the best interest of [B.G.] that [p]etitioner be allowed to remove him from the State of Illinois.” Respondent appeals. ANALYSIS

Section 609(

a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2004)), which governs petitions for removal, provides as follows: “(

a) The court may grant leave *** to any party having custody of any minor child or children to remove such child or children from Illinois whenever such approval is in the best interests of such child or children.

The burden of proving that such removal is in the best interests of such child or children is on the party seeking the removal.” In In re Marriage of Eckert, the Illinois Supreme Court announced that “the mere desire of the custodial parent to move to another State, without more, is insufficient to show that the move would be in the [child’s] best interest.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 325, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (1988). In re Marriage of Eckert established factors that should be considered by a circuit court in evaluating a petition for removal.

First, the court should review the proposed move in terms of the possibility of an improved quality of life for the custodial parent and the child. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. Second, the court should evaluate the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the removal to determine whether the custodial parent is attempting to frustrate visitation. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. Third, the court should evaluate the motives of the noncustodial parent for resisting the removal.

In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. The court should examine the potential harm to the child, the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent, and the rights of the noncustodial parent. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327-28, 518 N.E.2d at 1045-46. The court should also assess whether a reasonable and realistic visitation

schedule can be developed. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1045-46. In light of the factors outlined in In re Marriage of Eckert, the record supports the ruling of the circuit court. The circuit court found that it was in the best interest of B.G. to allow petitioner to relocate to Phoenix. In accordance with the first factor outlined in In re Marriage of Eckert, the court found reasons that a removal would likely improve the quality of life for the custodial parent and the child. The court noted that petitioner has been the primary caregiver for B.G. since the time of his birth.

Specifically, the court found that petitioner had more realistic employment opportunities in Arizona and that her family would be able to provide both support and assistance upon a removal. These findings, along with the testimony of petitioner and her mother at the hearing, suggest proper motives for seeking the removal and not an intent to frustrate visitation. Respondent contends that his visitation

schedule is unreasonable and unrealistic. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 277 Ill. App. 3d 675, 681, 660 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (1996). The court found that despite the distance involved and a preference for more frequent visits with less duration, the visitation

schedule was reasonable. Furthermore, the court specifically delineated the terms of visitation and ordered petitioner to pay a portion of the costs of respondent’s travel. Respondent also contends the court improperly considered irrelevant evidence. The court found that petitioner had been lured back to Illinois under false pretenses, that respondent’s parents had forced the parties out of their house, and that respondent has a dismal employment record inadequate to support petitioner staying in Illinois. Considering the circumstances of the case, these findings were relevant to the best interest of the child.

This case involved a marriage of short duration where the parties met and initially lived in Arizona. In light of this context, these findings support the conclusion that the child would be provided with a more secure and stable environment if the removal is allowed. In re Marriage of Eckert noted that the determination of the best interest of a child is not subject to a simple bright-line test. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. The factors in In re Marriage of Eckert are not exclusive, and a court may consider other evidence relevant to the circumstances of the case.

See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d 498, 523, 791 N.E.2d 532, 546 (2003); In re Marriage of Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 312, 321, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (1996). The paramount concern is the best interest of the child. In re Marriage of Johnson, 277 Ill. App. 3d 675, 680-81, 660 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (1996). The findings of the court were relevant to the best interest of the child, considering the circumstances of the case, and indicate a deliberate assessment of the personalities and capabilities of the parties by the finder of fact.

The circuit court had the best opportunity to observe the parties and assess their personalities and capabilities. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330, 518 N.E.2d at 1047. A ruling on a removal should not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Main, 361 Ill. App. 3d 983, 989, 838 N.E.2d 988, 994 (2005). As In re Marriage of Eckert recognized, “ ‘The presumption in favor of the result reached by the trial court is always strong and compelling in this type of case.’ ” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330, 518 N.E.2d at 1047, quoting Gallagher v.

Gallagher, 60 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31-32, 376 N.E.2d 279, 283 (1978). The record supports the grant of the petition for removal. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the order of the circuit court of Jefferson County is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. SPOMER, J., concurs.