THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER MOORE, Defendant-Appellant, 397 Ill. App. 3d 555

JUSTICE COLEMAN delivered the opinion of the court: Christopher Moore was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to consecutive 30-year and 6-year terms of imprisonment as a result.

In the instant appeal, he contends that: (1) the trial court’s denial of his request for a one-day continuance violated his due process right to present evidence in his defense; (2) the prosecution’s improper comments and misstatements of the evidence in opening and closing argument denied him a fair trial; (3) the trial court improperly imposed a consecutive sentence on the armed robbery count on the basis of a presumption that the jury’s general verdict represented a finding that he was guilty of a more culpable homicide than felony murder; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to tender jury verdict forms specifying the basis for the murder verdict, thereby allowing an improper conviction of armed robbery in addition to a felony murder conviction based upon the same offense.

We affirm. BACKGROUND Tayaab Larry was attacked in a Chicago park on July 25, 2004, and died of his injuries on August 2. Khalia Wright testified that as of the night of the attack, she was involved with Moore, and that she had previously dated Larry. On the night of the attack, Wright and a friend, Jillian Griffith, agreed to go out with Larry and one of his friends, Jermaine Williams. Larry and Williams picked up Wright and Griffith in Williams’ red Chevrolet, and the four eventually drove to a park.

Wright testified that a group of men entered the park, that the men approached the two couples, and that the couples walked away from the men and toward the car. Wright heard a thump, turned toward the sound, and saw Larry on the ground and a man standing over him with a baseball bat. At trial, Wright identified Moore as the man with the bat. She had not mentioned Moore when first questioned by police about the incident and testified that she had not originally identified him because she had been afraid, although she also testified that Moore had not threatened her or asked her to conceal his involvement.

Wright testified that she had seen Moore the day after the attack and that Moore told her that he and his friends had followed her the night before and had seen her kiss Larry in the park. Jillian Griffith’s trial testimony was similar to Wright’s. She was in the park, walking away from the group of men who had approached them, when her attention was drawn to the group behind her by a loud sound. She saw Larry on the ground and a man holding a bat. Like Wright, she did not implicate Moore in the attack when first questioned by police, but identified him as the man with the bat in later questioning and at trial.

Griffith also saw Moore going through Larry’s pockets while Larry was on the ground. Jermaine Williams testified that he was with Tayaab Larry, Khalia Wright and Jillian Griffith in the park when they were approached by a group of seven or eight men. Jermaine saw one of the men take a full swing with a baseball bat and strike Larry in the back of the head. Larry fell immediately, and Williams saw the attacker strike him with the bat four more times as he was on the ground.

Williams testified that the bat-wielder and others in the group then attacked him, and that he was knocked down and kicked, but was able to run away from them without suffering serious injury. Williams said that he owned the car that the couples rode in, but that Larry had driven to the park and kept the keys in his pocket. When Williams returned to the park after the attack, the car was gone, and he reported it as stolen. Police saw Williams’ car on July 30, 2004, and stopped it. Antonio Nettles was driving the car and Dante Myles was a passenger.

The police returned the car to Williams, and he found two items inside that did not belong to him: a cell phone later proved to belong to Myles and an Illinois Department of Corrections form that appeared to have been issued for Nettles. Dante Myles testified that on the night of the incident, he saw Moore hit Larry with a baseball bat. He said that no one else present at the time had a bat. A few days later, Myles saw Moore driving a red Chevrolet that he had not seen him drive before. Myles asked if he could drive the car, Moore gave him the keys, and Myles drove the car and returned it.

He later saw Antonio Nettles driving the car. Myles admitted that when he was first questioned by police, he had untruthfully denied being present at the time of the attack. Antonio Nettles testified that he was shooting dice in the park on the night of the incident when he was approached by Moore and a group of men. Moore said that he was planning to rob “his girlfriend’s new boyfriend.” Nettles continued his dice game while the group left the park and then returned. He was still playing dice when he heard a loud sound from about 30 feet away.

When he looked toward the source of the sound, he saw a man on the ground and Moore standing over him with a baseball bat. Lovell Polk testified that he saw Moore in the park on the night of the incident, that Moore asked him to “sucker punch” someone, and that Moore pointed out the intended target. Polk said that he punched the man and knocked him down and that Moore struck the man while he was on the ground. Polk further testified that Antonio Nettles gave Moore a baseball bat and that Moore hit the man with the bat three times. Polk also saw Moore search Larry’s pockets.

Polk had originally been charged with first degree murder in Larry’s homicide and had denied involvement in the crime. He testified against Moore as part of an agreement that included a plea of guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and a seven-year prison sentence for that offense. Polk had claimed that he was beaten by police officers while in custody, but explained at trial that the abuse had prompted him to tell the truth about the incident and that he had withheld the facts because he had been threatened by Moore.

An additional witness, Frederick Louis, testified that he was in the park at the time of the incident. Louis saw Polk punch a man in the face and then saw Moore take a bat and hit the man in the head. Another witness, Milton Presley, testified that Moore, Nettles, Louis and some other men visited him at an apartment across the street from the park on the night of the attack. Presley testified that after the men left, he could see from the apartment’s window that a group of people were fighting in the park. Presley said that he did not see Moore with a bat and that he did not see Moore strike anyone.

The parties stipulated that Presley had given a different account of the night’s events when questioned by the police. According to the stipulation, Presley had told police that Moore had come to his apartment with a bat, that Moore had said that the man who was involved with his girlfriend was in the park across the street, and that he had seen Moore hit a man three times with a bat while the man was on the ground. The stipulation further provided that Presley told police that Moore later bragged about beating Larry.

Desmond Mitchell testified that Moore had come to his apartment on the night of the attack and asked him for help in fighting someone who was “messing with his girl.” Mitchell did not accompany Moore, but Moore told him later that he had punched a man in a fight and knocked him out. Moore, who was arrested in Detroit on October 4, 2004, presented three witnesses in his defense. Patricia Felder testified that she was a friend of Moore’s family and that she had known him since he was five or six years old.

She said that she and Moore worked together on the renovation of an apartment in Detroit in June, July and August 2004 and that she had seen him almost daily during that period. She said that Moore was playing cards with her and her family in Detroit on the night of July 25, 2004, that they played into the next morning, and that she also saw Moore in Detroit at about 2 p.m. on July 26. Moore’s mother, Crystal Thomas, testified that he had left Chicago for Detroit on June 6, 2004, and that to her knowledge, he did not come to Chicago from June to August.

Dominique Brown testified that she was Khalia Wright’s friend and Moore’s ex-girlfriend. She said that she was visiting Wright on July 23 or 24, and that Wright’s cousin, Walt, was also present. Brown heard Wright tell her cousin that Larry was a stalker, that he would not leave her alone, and that she wanted him gone. Wright’s cousin had a bat at the time, and Brown believed that he had beaten Larry at Wright’s request. Moore sought to have the trial continued for one day to allow the testimony of Brandy Alexander.

Moore’s counsel advised the court that the defense had purchased an airline ticket to bring Alexander from Detroit at the end of the day on November 30, 2006, that she was scheduled to stay in Chicago overnight, and that the defense was prepared to call her to the stand on the morning of December 1. The court denied Moore’s motion, and the case was submitted to the jury on November 30.

The jury was instructed that it could find Moore guilty of first degree murder if it found that he intended to kill Larry or do him great bodily harm; if he knew that his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Larry; or if he killed Larry in the course of an armed robbery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder on a general verdict form for that offense, and also found Moore guilty of armed robbery. The court sentenced him to a 30-year prison term for murder and a consecutive 6-year prison term for armed robbery. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS I.

Denial of Motion for Continuance Moore contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a continuance and that this denial violated his right under the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions to present evidence in his defense. On Wednesday, November 29, 2006, Moore’s counsel advised the court that he had witnesses prepared to testify and that he expected one of them to be present in court on Friday, December 1. The court responded, “I wasn’t going to do testimony on Friday.

This was going to end Thursday at the latest.” On Thursday, November 30, before the presentation of testimony, defense counsel advised the court: “We have three witnesses here who are ready to testify. The problem is the fourth witness, Mr. [sic] Brandy Alexander, indicated to my investigator and to myself last week that she would be here. In anticipation that [the prosecutor] would end State’s case on Thursday, Ms. Alexander arranged to be here first thing Friday morning to testify coming in on a flight tonight. We sent her a ticket. We have lodging for her. Problem is State ended yesterday, Judge.

So although I am ready to go forward with three witnesses today I would be asking for the case to be held over until tomorrow so the fourth witness, Ms. Alexander, to [sic] come.” Counsel for the prosecution commented, “Judge, from the beginning of this trial when we talked to the jurors, you said on the outset Friday would be the date this trial ends on the outset.” The court stated: “As I said, at the latest we are going to—if worse came to worst, we were going to argue Friday morning. I don’t like to do evidence on Friday and then send them out on a Friday. So now here we are Thursday.

The State I remember saying they were thinking they would be Wednesday or Thursday that they would be finished. Okay. So they finished yesterday. Everyone knew who the witnesses were and stuff. I have told the jury that now we are probably going to finish up today and argue today, so I am going to do three short witnesses and send them home for today and come back tomorrow and argue on a Friday. No, I’m not going to do that. I’m sorry but when I started on Monday I indicated that all we would do is argue if we had to go on Friday.” The court denied the motion for a continuance.

The defense renewed the motion after the testimony of its three scheduled witnesses. The court asked defense counsel whether Alexander would be “another alibi witness to testify defendant was in Detroit,” and counsel answered, “Yes.” The court concluded, “It would be repetitive. There was plenty of notice to the trial schedule, and I am sorry. But I am not delaying the whole

schedule of the trial because you failed to get your witness here.” The trial court then denied a defense motion for a mistrial. In our view, the desire to adhere to a predetermined

schedule was not a proper basis for the denial of the brief continuance requested by Moore in the instant case. “Speedy administration of justice is desirable, but the desire for speed must not be allowed to impinge upon the constitutional requirement of a fair opportunity to defend.” People v. Shrum, 12 Ill. 2d 261, 265 (1957). The trial court explicitly accepted the possibility that the proceedings would extend to Friday, December 1, for closing argument and jury instructions. The record reveals no basis for the court’s refusal to allow the same extension of its

schedule to permit Moore to present an alibi witness. However, our disapproval of the court’s action does not compel reversal of Moore’s conviction. In reviewing the trial court’s denial of Moore’s motion, we must consider: (1) whether the defendant was diligent in attempting to secure the presence of the witness; (2) whether the defendant has shown that the testimony of the witness was material and might have affected the verdict; and (3) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 307 (1992). In People v. Sargent, 184 Ill.

App. 3d 1016 (1989), this court emphasized that a defendant seeking review of the denial of a motion for a continuance could not demonstrate the materiality of the witness or the prejudice from the exclusion of her testimony in the absence of an offer of proof that detailed the substance of the proposed testimony. “A defendant seeking a continuance to secure the presence of a witness must make an offer of proof of that witness’ proposed testimony. *** The court has no way of knowing the materiality of testimony sought to be introduced without an offer of proof, even if it is told by counsel that the proposed evidence is in the nature of corroboration of an alibi.” Sargent, 184 Ill.

App. 3d at 1022-23. In the instant case, Moore did not make an offer of proof. He did not specify the nature of Alexander’s proposed testimony in a motion for new trial or otherwise. As a result, the record is devoid of any showing that Alexander’s testimony would have been material and noncumulative or that its exclusion would have been prejudicial. In the absence of this showing, the denial of a continuance to permit her testimony cannot require reversal of Moore’s conviction. II.

Prosecution Comments Moore argues that various prosecution comments during opening statement and closing argument denied him a fair trial. The first such statement identified by Moore was a remark during opening that Moore gave Williams’ car to Dante Myles in exchange for Myles’ silence about the attack: “As you will hear, from Danta [sic] Myles, that car was given to him, just a few days after that as a gift by Christopher Moore.

I have no doubt that was a gift for his silence.” The prosecution returned to the subject in closing: “You heard from Dante and Antonio as well about this defendant, Chris Moore, driving around in that car and giving that car to them to Dante and Antonio a few days after that. A gift, maybe sharing in the proceeds, maybe trying to insure their silence.” A defense objection interposed at this point was overruled. Moore correctly notes that there was no testimony that he gave the car as a gift or that he used it to buy the silence of Myles or Nettles. Citing People v.

Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d 22, 30 (1991), Moore asserts that these comments were improper in that they overstated the evidence against him. He also argues that the prosecutor’s statement of personal belief that the car was a gift was improper. See People v. Lee, 229 Ill. App. 3d 254, 260 (1992) (“It is prejudicial error for the prosecutor to express personal beliefs or opinions, or invoke the integrity of the State’s Attorney’s office, to vouch for the credibility of a prosecution witness”).

Moore also cites as improper the prosecution’s statement that Jermaine Williams was “100% sure” in identifying him as the bat-wielding attacker; its claim, without apparent evidentiary support, that Jillian Griffith was so afraid of him that she moved out of the neighborhood, and its assertion that he had attacked Larry in front of “like 20 people.” Prosecution comments in opening statement or closing argument do not require reversal if they do not result in “substantial” prejudice. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127-28 (1998).

Moore’s convictions in the instant case cannot properly be reversed in the absence of a determination that the comments at issue had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdicts. We do not believe that the record supports the conclusion that the cited comments impacted the jury’s verdict. Two of the comments at issue made only collateral suggestions of Moore’s guilt.

The prosecution’s statements regarding Moore’s supposed gift of Williams’ car to Dante Myles were apparently intended to demonstrate that Moore attempted to conceal his actions, while the assertion that Jillian Griffith relocated because of her fear of Moore portrayed him in a decidedly negative light. But neither statement related to the primary evidence of Moore’s guilt: the multiple testimonials to his efforts to recruit allies in his planned attack on Tayaab Larry and the several eyewitnesses to the attack and its immediate aftermath, the majority from individuals who knew Moore prior to the incident.

In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the jury’s verdict was in any way the result of the prosecution’s unfounded claims that he tried to buy the silence of one witness or that another feared him. Similarly, we do not believe that the prosecution’s brief and isolated characterization of the certainty of Jermaine Williams’ testimony, even if inaccurate, outweighed the jury’s own assessment of that testimony. We reject the assertion that these comments resulted in prejudice to Moore.

The prosecution’s reference to Moore’s attack occurring in the presence of “like 20 people” is, in our view, a fair comment on the evidence presented. Jermaine Williams testified that seven or eight men approached his group of four in the park. Antonio Nettles testified that at the time of the incident, he was removed from the groups containing Larry and Moore, gambling on a dice game. Since the prosecution’s comment was an explicit approximation, we conclude that it was fairly supported by the evidence of the number of people in the park at the time of the incident. In

summary, we hold that none of the comments made by the prosecution in opening or closing merit reversal of Moore’s conviction. III. Absence of Separate Murder Verdict Forms The jury was instructed that it could find Moore guilty of first degree murder if it found that he had intended to kill, if he committed acts that he knew created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, or if Larry was killed in the course of Moore’s commission of an armed robbery. The defense did not object to this instruction, nor did it offer specific murder verdict forms for submission to the jury.

The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of both first degree murder and armed robbery. Moore argues that the general murder verdict cannot be presumed to represent a finding that he was guilty of either intentional or knowing murder, and that in the absence of such presumption, the jury’s verdict must be considered a finding on the felony murder charge. As a result, Moore argues that his conviction and sentence for armed robbery, a lesser included offense of his murder, must be vacated. People v. Smith, 183 Ill. 2d 425, 432 (1998).

Moore’s argument ignores the long-standing “one-good-count” rule, which provides that a general verdict of guilty on a multiple-count indictment is interpreted to be a finding of guilt on each count. People v. Lymore, 25 Ill. 2d 305, 307-08 (1962). When, as in the instant case, the jury has been instructed on intentional, knowing, and felony murder and returns a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder, the one-good-count presumption results in a determination that the defendant has been found guilty of the most culpable mental state, intentional murder. People v.

Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403, 411-12 (1994); People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 455-56 (1988). The one-good-count rule has consistently been interpreted to permit a defendant found guilty of murder by a general verdict to receive enhanced sentencing based upon his presumed guilt of intentional murder even where the enhancement could not have been based upon a felony murder conviction. In People v. Baker, 127 Ill. App. 3d 565 (1984), the defendant was convicted of murder by a general verdict and also convicted of home invasion; he received consecutive sentences for the two offenses. 127 Ill. App. 3d at 566.

The defendant contended that his home invasion conviction, as a lesser included offense of his felony murder, could not stand. 127 Ill. App. 3d at 569. This court held that the jury’s general verdict was construed as a guilty verdict on the intentional murder charge, held that the defendant’s home invasion conviction was not a lesser included offense of intentional murder, and affirmed the convictions and consecutive sentences for murder and home invasion. 127 Ill. App. 3d at 569, In People v. Sample, 326 Ill.

App. 3d 914 (2001), the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, armed robbery, and home invasion and received consecutive sentences for each offense. 326 Ill. App. 3d at 916. The murder conviction was based upon a jury’s general verdict after being instructed on intentional and felony murder, and the defendant sought vacation of his armed robbery and home invasion convictions as lesser included offenses of the felony murder. This court rejected the defendant’s contention. “In this case, defendant was charged with and the jury was instructed on both intentional murder and felony murder.

Defense counsel did not object to the submission of a general verdict form nor is there any evidence in the record that counsel tendered alternative verdict forms requiring the jury to find him guilty or not guilty of felony murder. The State’s proof was applicable to both charges and the jury returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The most serious of the first degree murder charges in this case is the one with the most culpable mental state: intentional murder. Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d at 411, 634 N.E.2d at 723-24. Under Cardona, therefore, this charge was the appropriate basis for sentencing.

Although defendant is correct that armed robbery and home invasion are lesser included offenses of felony murder, neither is a lesser included offense of intentional murder. Thus even if the consecutive sentences would have been inappropriate for a specific verdict on felony murder, the ‘good count’ of intentional murder renders the sentences proper.” Sample, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 929, appeal denied, 198 Ill. 2d 629 (2002). In People v. Griffin, 375 Ill.

App. 3d 564 (2007), the defendant argued that a general verdict of guilty on a murder charge could not also support an additional sentence for armed robbery, a lesser included offense of the charged felony murder. This court rejected that argument, holding that “the most serious first degree murder charge, intentional murder, was the proper basis for sentencing.” 375 Ill. App. 3d at 571-72.

The court held that the defendant’s convictions for murder and armed robbery required consecutive sentences; accordingly, it vacated the concurrent sentences imposed by the trial court and remanded for the imposition of consecutive sentences. 375 Ill. App. 3d at 573-74. Moore argues that our supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (2009), prohibits the use of a general murder verdict to support his conviction and sentence for armed robbery. In Smith, the court reviewed convictions and sentences imposed in addition to convictions of first degree murder based upon general verdicts.

The court held that “where, as here, specific findings by the jury with regard to the offenses charged could result in different sentencing consequences, favorable to the defendant, specific verdict forms must be provided upon request and the failure to provide them is an abuse of discretion.” Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 23. Moore asserts that Smith prohibits use of the one-good-count rule where its application could result in adverse sentencing consequences for the defendant. We do not share Moore’s

interpretation of Smith. Although portions of the Smith opinion suggest disapproval of the use of the one-good-count rule to subject a defendant to more severe sentencing, the court’s discussion is clearly dependent on the case’s procedural context: the trial court denied the defense request to submit separate verdict forms to the jury.

The Smith court repeatedly noted this context: “it is a violation of due process to deny a defendant the opportunity to have the jury decide his theory of defense” (233 Ill. 2d at 23); “because the presumption that arises from application of the ‘one good count rule’ could work a prejudice against [defendants] at sentencing, the presumption cannot substitute for the jury’s actual findings, at least where defendants have requested that the jury make specific findings with regard to the degree of the offense” (emphasis added) (233 Ill. 2d at 23); “the trial courts erred when they refused defendants’ requests for separate verdict forms” (233 Ill. 2d at 23).

The significance of this procedural context has been confirmed by the supreme court. In People v. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d 244 (2009), the court distinguished Smith: “The present case is a world away from Smith. Here, defendant did not object to the general verdict form and did not request a special verdict form. Again, the holding of Smith was conditioned on the trial court’s refusal to grant such a request and did not establish a rule that the court must act sua sponte to give a specific verdict form.

Additionally, defendant is challenging the validity of the one-good-count rule, something which was expressly not done in Smith.” Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 273. Baker, Sample, and Griffin demonstrate that the one-good-count principle has long been employed to permit enhanced sentencing, including the imposition of consecutive sentences for additional felonies, by construing a general first degree murder verdict as a finding of guilt on an intentional murder charge. We believe that this use of the principle is among the corollary rules explicitly left undisturbed by Smith.

The Davis court’s discussion of Smith demonstrates that the distinguishing factor entitling the defendant to relief from the application of the one-good-count principle in Smith was the request for separate verdict forms at trial, not the mere possibility that the principle would subject him to increased punishment. Accordingly, we reject Moore’s argument that he is entitled to the relief granted in Smith because he, like the defendant there, received consecutive sentences, while the defendant in Davis did not.

Since Moore did not request separate verdict forms in the instant case, we hold that Smith offers no support for his assertion that the general murder verdict could not support his armed robbery conviction. In addition to its confirmation of the continued validity of the one-good-count principle, the Davis court also explained that even if the application of the principle were improper, any resulting error “did not amount to a structural defect that required automatic reversal.” Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 273. The court based its analysis upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Hedgpeth v.

Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 172 L. Ed. 2d 388, 129 S. Ct. 530 (2008) (per curiam). “Relying upon analogous cases, the Supreme Court in Pulido easily concluded that in cases where a jury is instructed on multiple theories of guilt, one of which is improper, a harmless-error analysis is applicable. Pulido, 555 U.S. at 60, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 391, 129 S. Ct. at 532.” Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 270. The Davis court held that one-good-count issues are subject to plain error analysis on review if the defendant did not object to the use of a general verdict form at trial. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 273.

Under plain error review, “the defendant has the burden to persuade the court that the error was prejudicial, that is, defendant must show that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against him.” Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 274. The Davis court held that the evidence of the defendant’s commission of intentional or knowing murder was sufficiently strong to compel the conclusion that he was not prejudiced by the failure to present separate murder verdict forms to the jury. Davis, 233 Ill. 2d at 273-74.

The Davis court’s plain error analysis is readily applicable to the instant matter. Several witnesses testified to the premeditated nature of Moore’s attack on Tayaah Larry. Two trial witnesses and one pretrial witness account reported Moore’s hostility toward Larry because of their competing relationships with Khalia Wright. Four separate witnesses testified that Moore struck Larry with a bat; one of the witnesses, Jermaine Williams, specified that Moore took a full swing with the bat and struck Larry in the head.

Proof of such action establishes the intent to cause death or great bodily harm necessary to support a conviction for first degree murder. People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 87-88 (1987). We hold that the evidence of Moore’s intent to cause death or great bodily harm to Larry was clearly sufficient to permit the jury to return a guilty verdict on both intentional murder and knowing murder charges. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the jury, if permitted to specify the basis for its murder verdict, would have returned a not guilty verdict on the intentional murder and knowing murder charges.

We find that Moore has failed to demonstrate that the lack of specific verdict forms produced the verdict against him and that he has failed to make the showing of prejudice necessary for a reversal under plain error review. IV Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Our conclusion that Moore has not demonstrated the prejudicial impact of the absence of separate verdict forms also dictates our disposition of his contention that his counsel’s failure to submit separate forms was impermissibly deficient.

When a defendant is unable to show a reasonable probability that the correction of counsel’s alleged deficiencies would have produced a different result, his ineffective assistance claims fail. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 201-02 (1988). We hold that Moore has not shown a reasonable probability that separate verdict forms would have resulted in not guilty verdicts on the intentional murder and knowing murder charges. As a result, we reject his assertion that his counsel’s deficiencies require reversal of his convictions or modification of his sentences.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. Affirmed.