DANIEL GOODMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CHRIS WARD, Respondent-Appellant (Will County Officers Electoral Board et al., Respondents), 397 Ill. App. 3d 875

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: Daniel Goodman petitioned the Will County Officers Electoral Board (Board), objecting to listing Chris Ward as a candidate on the ballot in the primary for the office of circuit court judge of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Fourth Subcircuit (subcircuit). The Board denied Goodman’s petition. On review, the Will County circuit court reversed the Board’s decision. We reverse the Board’s decision and affirm the circuit court’s ruling.

BACKGROUND Ward acknowledged to the Board, to the circuit court, and to this court that he did not reside within the subcircuit on the date he petitioned the Board to be placed on the primary ballot. In Goodman’s petition objecting to Ward’s candidacy, he argued that Ward’s failure to reside within the subcircuit was a violation of

article VI,

section 12, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §12) (section 12), and therefore Ward’s name should not appear on the ballot. The Board denied Goodman’s petition, and the circuit court reversed the Board’s decision. Ward appealed. Additionally, Ward moved this court to stay the circuit court’s decision. We granted the stay. ANALYSIS As a preliminary matter, we note that in his notice of appeal, Ward stated that he was appealing from the circuit court’s ruling. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has said that an appellate court must review an electoral board’s determination de novo.

See Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 886 N.E.2d 1011 (2008). Therefore, in this case, we review de novo the Board’s ruling. In pertinent part,

section 12 says, “A person eligible for the office of Judge may cause his name to appear on the ballot as a candidate for Judge at the primary *** by submitting petitions.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §12.

Article VI,

section 11, of the Illinois Constitution (section 11), states that, “[n]o person shall be eligible to be a Judge or Associate Judge unless he is a United States citizen, a licensed attorney-at-law of this State, and a resident of the unit which selects him.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §11. Ward contends that

section 12 did not require him to reside within the subcircuit on the date he submitted his nominating petitions to the Board. He asserts that he need not take up residency in the sub-circuit at any time prior to the election. Goodman, however, argues that the residency requirement of

section 12 bars Ward’s name from being placed on the ballot. Although the parties’ arguments focus on

section 12, we observe that as a threshold matter, the definition of the term “eligible” in

section 11 is dispositive of this issue. The Illinois Supreme Court has instructed that an appellate court is to review an electoral board’s factual findings under the manifest weight of the evidence standard and questions of law under the de novo standard. Girot v. Keith, 212 Ill. 2d 372, 818 N.E.2d 1232 (2004). In this case, because the facts are not in dispute, we review de novo the question of law concerning construction of

section 11. See Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 886 N.E.2d 1011. Generally, the rules of statutory construction apply to the construction of provisions of the Illinois Constitution. Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138 (1976). In interpreting a constitutional provision, the language used should be given its plain and commonly understood meaning, unless it is clearly evident that a contrary meaning was intended. Coalition, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138. Fortunately, we do not have to approach this issue in a vacuum because the Illinois Supreme Court has previously interpreted

section 11. In Maddux v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill. 2d 508, 514 n.3, 911 N.E.2d 979, 984 n.3 (2009), the court stated, “Under

section 11 of the judicial article, to be eligible to run for judicial office a person must be a citizen, an attorney, and a resident of the district in which the judicial seat is being sought.” Thus, the court interpreted “a resident of the unit which selects him,” in

section 11, to mean “a resident of the district in which the judicial seat is being sought.” Maddux, 233 Ill. 2d at 514 n.3, 911 N.E.2d at 984 n.3. We observe that

section 11 concerns both judges and associate judges. Therefore, also helpful in determining the residency requirement for eligibility to be a judge is the February 1, 2007, amendment to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 39 (eff. February 1, 2007). Rule 39 implements

article VI,

section 8, of the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §8), which directs the supreme court to provide by rule for the appointment of associate judges. The 2007 amendment to the rule substituted “Any attorney who seeks appointment to the office of associate judge must be a United States citizen, licensed to practice law in this state, and a resident of the unit from which he/she seeks appointment” for “Any attorney licensed to practice law in this state who seeks appointment to the office of associate judge.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 39 (eff. February 1, 2007).

Arguably, prior to this amendment, a licensed attorney-citizen in Illinois had to be or become a resident of a circuit on or before the effective date of appointment. The current Rule 39 makes it clear that is not the case. Notably, the 2007 amendment tracks the qualifications of

section 11, but substitutes “a resident of the unit from which he/she seeks appointment” for “a resident of the unit which selects him.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 39 (eff. February 1, 2007); Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §11. In Thies v.

State Board of Elections, 124 Ill. 2d 317, 325, 529 N.E.2d 565, 569 (1988), regarding a statute, our supreme court said, “the legislature is without authority to change or add to the qualifications [for a judgeship] unless the [Illinois] Constitution gives it the power.” Certainly, just as the legislature is without such authority, the supreme court would not change or add to the qualifications for a judgeship, in a supreme court rule, unless the Illinois Constitution gave it the power. Additionally, in Thies, our supreme court indicated that there might be an arguable ambiguity in

section 11. See Thies, 124 Ill. 2d at 325, 529 N.E.2d at 569. However, the court went on to say: “[I]t would seem logical that under

section 11, if the unit that selects the judge is the circuit, then any person otherwise qualified who lives anywhere in the circuit is qualified. Similarly, if the unit that selects the judge is a county or a division of the circuit, then any otherwise qualified person who resides within the unit would be eligible for the judgeship.” Thies, 124 Ill. 2d at 325, 529 N.E.2d at 569. Thus, our supreme court indicated in Thies that in order to be eligible to be a judge in a geographical unit that is smaller than a circuit, such as the subcircuit in this case, the judge must reside within the smaller geographical unit.

As a matter of Illinois constitutional history, the 1848 and 1870 Constitutions required geographic residency for a person to be eligible for judicial office. The 1848 Constitution required that “[n]o person shall be eligible to the office of judge of any court of this state *** who shall not for two years next preceding his election have resided in the division, circuit or county in which he shall be elected.” Ill. Const. 1848, art. V, §11. The 1870 Constitution continued the 1848 requirements of geographic residency but without a minimum specified term. See Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI.

Under the 1964 amendment to the judicial

article of the 1870 Constitution, to be eligible for the office of judge, the person had to be “a resident of the judicial district, circuit, county or unit from which selected.” Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI (1964), §15. George Braden and Rubin Cohn, in their book prepared for the Illinois Constitution Study Commission in 1969, stated simply that the eligibility provisions in

article VI,

section 15, retained the “general current geographic residency requirements of prior Constitutions.” G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated & Comparative Analysis 368 (1969). That history suggests that

section 11 of the 1970 Constitution continues the same general current geographic residency requirements of past versions of the Illinois Constitution. Finally, the record of the proceedings of the Illinois Constitutional Convention that adopted the 1970 Constitution stated that “12 million copies of the ‘Official Text [of the 1970 Constitution] With Explanation’ were printed in newspaper tabloid form by the Secretary of State. One copy was mailed to each registered voter in the State.” 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2667. The record of proceedings also gave the following commentary concerning

section 11: “This revises

Article VI,

Section 15 of the 1870 Constitution. It extends the requirements of residence and attorney status to the new Associate Judges, formerly known as magistrates.” 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2719. Therefore, the record of proceedings again shows the historical continuity of the residency requirement of

section 11. CONCLUSION The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the residency requirements in

section 11 for eligibility to be a judge in Illinois. In Thies, the court noted that where a judgeship concerns a portion of a circuit, residency was required in that portion. In Maddux, the court observed that such residency was required in order to seek election for such a judgeship. The supreme court’s

interpretation of

section 11 is consistent with Rule 39 and with the constitutional history of residency requirements for judgeships in Illinois. In this case, under the plain language of

section 11 as interpreted by our supreme court in Thies and Maddux, Ward was required to be a resident of the sub-circuit in order to seek election in the primary for a judgeship there. Therefore, we hold that the Board erred as a matter of law by ruling that Ward was not required to be a resident of the subcircuit for his name to be placed on the primary ballot.

Consequently, we vacate our stay of the circuit court’s order instanter, and therefore Ward’s name should be removed from the official ballot as a candidate for the fourth suhcircuit of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit for the Democratic Party at the primary election on February 2, 2010. Will County circuit court judgment affirmed; Will County Officers Electoral Board judgment reversed. LYTTON, J., concurs.