DORA MAE JABLONSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant (Natalie S. Ingram, Defendant), 398 Ill. App. 3d 222

JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiffs, Dora Mae Jablonski (Dora) and John L. Jablonski, Jr., as the special administrator and personal representative of the estate of Dora’s deceased husband, John L. Jablonski, Sr. (John), brought this action against Ford Motor Company (Ford), alleging strict product liability and negligence in the design of their 1993 Lincoln Town Car automobile as a result of a collision in which John was killed and Dora was seriously injured.

Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the fuel tank system in the Lincoln Town Car was defective, unreasonably dangerous, and negligently designed by Ford. The plaintiffs also filed a negligence claim against Natalie S. Ingram, the driver of the vehicle that collided with the Jablonskis’ vehicle, but that claim was settled before the trial. Plaintiff Dora Jablonski moved prior to the trial for leave to file a willful-and-wanton-conduct count and to seek punitive damages, and after a hearing, her motion was granted by the trial court.

The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their strict product liability claims at the close of all the evidence, and the case against Ford was submitted to the jury on the negligent-design claims and on the willful-and-wanton-conduct claims seeking punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict against Ford, assessing the plaintiffs’ total damages in excess of $43 million, including $15 million in punitive damages, on which the circuit court of Madison County entered a judgment. The circuit court denied Ford’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Ford timely appeals from the judgment.

Ford raises numerous claims of error, which we restate generally as follows: the trial court erred (1) in submitting any of the plaintiffs’ negligent-design claims to the jury, (2) in making various evidentiary rulings, (3) in instructing the jury on the negligence claims, and (4) in submitting Dora’s punitive damages claim to the jury and instructing the jury on that claim. Due to the nature and complexity of the many issues raised on appeal by Ford, we must provide an extensive review of the evidence produced at the trial. Additional facts will be provided where necessary.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. BACKGROUND This case arose from a July 3, 2003, automobile accident in which Dora and John were traveling in their 1993 Lincoln Town Car, which was the last car in a line of traffic stopped at a construction site on Interstate 270, near its intersection with Illinois Route 203, in Madison County, Illinois. Ingram, who was driving a 1995 Chevrolet Lumina, while distracted and looking for her sunglasses, rear-ended the Jablonskis’ vehicle. At the point of the collision, she was traveling at least 56 miles per hour and by some estimates 65 miles per hour.

According to witnesses, Ingram did not brake or leave skid marks, and she struck the rear of the Jablonski vehicle dead center. As a result of the collision, the fuel tank in the Lincoln Town Car was crushed, a pipe wrench located in the trunk of the Jablonskis’ car penetrated the fuel tank, and a fire immediately ensued. It is undisputed that gasoline leaking from the damaged fuel tank caused the fire. Both Dora and John were eventually able to exit their vehicle but were engulfed in flames and suffered severe burn injuries.

John suffered burns over 80% of his body and died two days later as a result of his burn injuries. Dora suffered burns over 32% of her body, including her face, and by the time of the trial, she had suffered through extensive burn treatment, reconstructive surgery, and rehabilitation. She will need extensive care and treatment for the remainder of her life. At the time of the accident, John was 74 and Dora was 71. They had been married for more than 50 years and had raised four children. The extent of the Jablonskis’ injuries and the medical expenses associated with those injuries are not disputed.

Ford does not challenge the amount of the verdict and makes no claim that either the compensatory damages or the punitive damages are excessive. The plaintiffs’ negligence claims were focused upon the design of the fuel tank system in the 1993 Lincoln Town Car. Evidence presented by both parties revealed that the Lincoln Town Car, the Mercury Grand Marquis, the Ford Crown Victoria, and the Ford Crown Victoria Police Interceptor (Police Interceptor) are all “Panther platform” vehicles. Ford developed the Panther platform and first introduced it in the 1979 model year.

The characteristics of Panther platform vehicles include a large, deep trunk, a solid axle, rear-wheel drive, and body-on-frame construction. The fuel tank in Panther platform vehicles is located forward of the trunk, behind the rear axle and between the rear wheels, a configuration known as an “aft-of-axle” or “vertical-behind-the-axle” fuel tank. While aft-of-axle fuel tanks were common when the Panther platform was developed in 1979, Ford has placed the fuel tank forward of the axle in every new passenger car platform it has since designed.

By 1991, a majority of all the new automobiles manufactured had fuel tanks forward of the axle. At the time of the trial, the Panther platform vehicles and the Mustang were the only types of vehicles Ford still manufactured with an aft-of-axle fuel tank. The plaintiffs presented exhibits, including Ford records, and the testimony of Ford employees which the plaintiffs argued revealed that Ford had long been aware of the potential dangers associated with the aft-of-axle fuel tank design, including the danger of objects in the trunk puncturing the fuel tank in a collision.

In the late 1960s, Derwyn Severy, a researcher at UCLA, conducted a series of automobile collision experiments, partially funded by Ford, for the purpose of obtaining “information relating to the injury exposure for high-speed rear-end collisions, including the lethal hazard of gasoline-fed post[ ]crash fires.” The Severy research resulted in an

article in a publication of the Society of Automotive Engineers, which was introduced into evidence. The

article included this conclusion among its findings: “Initial findings indicate that much progress can be made in reducing the possibility of crash fires by incorporation of relatively inexpensive design considerations relating to fuel tanks and related fuel systems. *** Preliminary studies suggest that the area cradled by the rear wheels, above the rear axle and below the rear window!,] represents an improved location for the fuel tank.

This location is least often compromised from collisions of all types.” On October 3, 1969, Roger Daniel, a safety engineer at Ford, sent a handwritten memo to his superiors at Ford entitled “Future Gas Tank Location.” In the memo, Daniel stated his understanding that the “future direction as to fuel tank location is to hang the tank under the trunk,” and he asserted that “for all vehicles except wagons and convertibles, the best tank location by far appears to be directly above the axle.” Daniel stated that an advantage of this design was that it would be “almost impossible to crush the tank from the rear.” On January 23, 1970, Daniel prepared a typewritten memo, also signed by Robert Fredericks, Ford’s principal research engineer for safety engineering, which stated as follows: “We have examined possible fuel tank locations and determined that the safest place for a fuel tank is directly above the rear axle and below the package tray.

In rear[-]end accidents, the tank is above and forward of vehicle components likely to crush during the collision or deform it, while in lateral accidents, the tires, axle, and wheelhouse structure provide extensive protection against rupture or even excessive deformation.” The memo described the proposed tank location in detail and concluded that in that location the tank “is high enough in the trunk to essentially preclude rupture from in-trunk articles during an accident.” On February 9, 1971, Ford prepared a “Cost Engineering Report” to determine the potential cost of moving the fuel tank to the above-the-rear-axle location.

The report concluded that the cost of the design change at that time would have been $9.95 per vehicle. This design change was not incorporated into the 1979 Panther platform. The plaintiffs introduced excerpts of an evidence deposition of Kenneth K. Kohrs that had been taken in another case on February 26, 1992, just prior to the production of the Jablonskis’ Lincoln Town Car.

At that time, Kohrs was the vice president of car product development for Ford, which he agreed meant that he was the person with “the highest direct responsibility for the engineering design and development of private passenger automobiles sold in North America.” He testified that he understood he was testifying as a representative of Ford and acknowledged that “it is Ford’s position that the automotive industry should incorporate in a new product the latest state of the art with regard to overall vehicle safety that is feasible from a high volume production standpoint.” Kohrs stated that Ford has “always been aware of [its] responsibility to minimize the effect of post[ ]crash fires and the need to continually reduce the incidence.” He further acknowledged that Ford had produced fuel system designs for the Fox platform vehicle which incorporated shields for the fuel tank.

He also admitted that Ford had produced the Capri for the European market in the 1970s and that the Capri had an above-the-rear-axle fuel tank. Kohrs acknowledged that the location of the fuel tank in the Capri had been marketed by Ford as a safety feature and that the Capri had passed a 30-mile-per-hour fixed-barrier crash test. Brian Geraghty, a Ford employee for more than 40 years, who, at the time of the trial, was the director of Ford’s design analysis office, was called by the plaintiffs as an adverse witness.

Geraghty testified that before the Jablonskis’ accident on July 3, 2003, Ford knew that there had been police car collisions in which the fuel tank was punctured, resulting in fires and the deaths of the occupants. Ford was aware that between 1983 and 2003, five deaths and seven injuries resulted from collisions in which items in the trunk had punctured the fuel tank. The police cars involved in these accidents were Police Interceptors that were built on the Panther platform.

Geraghty acknowledged that the state police agencies in both Florida and Arizona had requested that Ford study the issue of fires caused by the puncture of fuel tanks by items in the trunk as a result of rear-end collisions. Geraghty identified an exhibit prepared by Dr. Michelle Vogler, at the request of Ford, for the Arizona Highway Patrol, with statistics concerning the fire risk in various vehicles involved in fatal rear-end collisions.

The data in that exhibit indicated that Lincoln Town Cars were involved in fatal rear-end collisions more than three times more often than Ford Escorts, a much smaller vehicle designed with a forward-of-the-axle fuel tank. Geraghty also identified an exhibit indicating that in the years 2002 to 2003, there were more than 15 million registered vehicles in the United States that had their fuel tanks located behind the axle but that, at the time of the trial, no vehicles on that list were still being manufactured or sold with a fuel tank in that location, except Ford’s Panther platform vehicles.

The plaintiffs introduced as admissions, and read to the jury, excerpts from a deposition of Michael J. Harrigan, Sr., taken in another case on December 11, 2003. Harrigan had worked in the design of fuel systems at Ford since 1977. In 1986, he became the chairman of the Fuel Systems Technical Standards Committee of the Society of Automotive Engineers. The committee includes approximately 50 individuals employed by various automobile manufacturers and automobile component part manufacturers. Its purpose is to develop standards and recommended practices for the automotive industry in the design of fuel systems.

Harrigan also taught a class on fuel systems engineering to Ford engineers beginning in 1991. Portions of the 2000 version of the class manual were introduced into evidence. Harrigan agreed that he is an expert in “fuel system design standards.” Harrigan acknowledged that since the introduction of the Escort in 1981, all the passenger cars designed at Ford have been designed with the fuel tank forward of the axle.

He confirmed that Ford’s preferred fuel tank location is forward of the axle, but he acknowledged that the fuel tank design for Panther platform vehicles had not changed since their introduction in 1979. Harrigan agreed that a part of the role of the engineer in designing a fuel system for an automobile is to protect the customer. He testified that engineering standards require that a fuel system be designed to avoid allowing anything to penetrate or puncture the fuel tank in a crash. If a hazard is identified that the design cannot prevent from occurring, Harrigan agreed that shielding should be employed.

He acknowledged that Ford had used high-density polyethylene shielding to shield fuel tanks in some of its vehicles since the 1970s, and he agreed that the shielding was technically and economically feasible to use. The manual for the fuel systems engineering class that Harrigan used to teach Ford engineers provides that it is the “engineer’s role” to “eliminate potential hazards” in the product.

The manual then states that if the engineer cannot “design [a] hazard out of the product,” he should “design a guard or shield.” As a “last resort” the engineer is taught to “provide a clear warning” if the hazard cannot be designed out of the product and an appropriate guard or shield cannot be designed. Finally, the manual provides that the engineer should consider not releasing the product if a hazard still exists.

Cam Cope, an expert consultant who determines the cause and origin of vehicle fires, testified for the plaintiffs that the major cause and the original source of the Jablonskis’ fire was the pipe wrench that was propelled through the trunk wall and into the fuel tank. He also opined that the collision caused a smaller hole in the fuel tank and that the smaller hole was another likely source of the fire. Mark Arndt testified as an expert witness for the plaintiffs. He has a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering and specializes in automotive engineering.

For approximately 20 years, he has provided consulting services regarding motor vehicle crashes, particularly those involving postcrash fires, and in that capacity he has investigated thousands of crashes involving fires. He is a member of the Society of Automotive Engineers and served on its Fuel Containment Standards Committee, which is charged, in part, with the responsibility for developing standards and recommended practices for the design of fuel systems in motor vehicles.

He has also published peer-reviewed articles on postcrash vehicle fires and on the analysis of similar incidents to determine product safety. In preparation for his testimony, Arndt and his staff examined and photographed the Jablonskis’ Lincoln Town Car, removed the fuel tank, and performed a detailed analysis of this accident. He also performed an analysis of other similar incidents. Arndt compiled a list of 44 accidents between 1981 and 2003 involving postcrash fires in rear-impact collisions of Ford automobiles.

Most of the vehicles involved were Panther platform automobiles, and all of them were designed with a vertical-behind-the-axle fuel tank. Many of the occupants of the vehicles suffered severe burn injuries or died of burn injuries. Arndt’s list included 11 incidents, prior to the Jablonskis’ accident, involving Police Interceptors where the fuel tank was punctured by an item located in the trunk. Arndt had personally investigated approximately 20 of the incidents on the list, and he relied upon the list of incidents in forming his opinions.

Arndt also prepared and relied upon a separate list of similar incidents that had been compiled from an interrogatory answer filed by Ford in another case in 1992. That list was also introduced into evidence and included 416 accidents involving Ford vehicles with behind-the-axle fuel tanks in which the fuel tank was torn, punctured, or split open, and it revealed 378 fatal burn injuries. Arndt expressed the opinion that the pipe wrench located in the trunk of the Jablonskis’ vehicle penetrated the front and rear walls of the fuel tank, causing the two larger holes in the fuel tank.

He also noted that an additional, smaller hole in the fuel tank was caused by the crushing of the low-fuel reservoir in the fuel tank. Arndt confirmed that the low-fuel reservoir had also penetrated the fuel tank in one of the prior similar incidents described in an exhibit. From the standpoint of safety, Arndt opined that there are basic engineering standards for the design of products. Once a hazard is identified, the engineer should attempt to design the hazard out of the product.

If the hazard cannot be eliminated in the design process, then the engineer should design a guard or shield to protect the consumer from the hazard. If the guard or shield does not eliminate the hazard, then the consumer should be provided with a warning describing how to prevent the potential harm in the product. In Arndt’s opinion, the fuel containment system in the Jablonskis’ 1993 Lincoln Town Car was defective in that the fuel tank was located in the likely crush zone in a rear-end collision and was vulnerable to being punctured by items in the trunk.

At the time of the manufacture of the Jablonskis’ automobile, a safer and more practical location for the fuel tank would have been forward of the axle. Further, if Ford did not change the location of the fuel tank, it should have provided shields that protected it from being punctured by other component parts of the vehicle or items in the trunk and a guard that enabled consumers to align items in the trunk laterally so they would be less likely to puncture the tank. Finally, Ford should have provided the consumer with a warning of the danger of objects in the trunk puncturing the fuel tank.

The plaintiffs also introduced evidence regarding postcrash fires in rear-end collisions involving Panther platform Police Interceptor vehicles subsequent to the sale of the Jablonskis’ 1993 Lincoln Town Car but before the 2003 accident. During this 10-year period, law enforcement agencies became increasingly aware of high-speed rear-end collisions in which police officers were injured or killed in post-crash fires in Police Interceptors. Typically, these accidents occurred when the officers were stopped on the side of major highways and were performing their duties.

In some incidents, the fuel tank was breached by being crushed against component parts of the vehicle, and in others it was damaged by trunk contents. As a result of these incidents, police agencies began making complaints to Ford and to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). In 2001, as a result of these complaints, Ford issued a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB), which was sent to all the Ford dealers. The TSB applied to 1992 to 2001 Crown Victorias, 1992 to 2001 Lincoln Town Cars, and 1992 to 2001 Mercury Grand Marquis.

It noted that police agencies had reported postcrash fires in high-speed rear impacts, and it provided a recommended service procedure for vehicles “exposed to extremely high-speed rear impacts.” Specifically, it instructed dealers to replace a hex-head bolt on a park-brake cable with a round-head bolt and to grind down a metal tab that protruded from a “U” bracket on the rear stabilizer bar axle attachment. These parts had been identified as having breached the fuel tank in high-speed rear-end collisions.

The issuance of the TSB prompted the NHTSA, in October 2001, to open an investigation into postcrash fires in Ford’s Panther platform vehicles. That investigation was completed in October of 2002, and the NHTSA required no action by Ford. During 2002, police agencies continued to complain about the danger of postcrash fires, and government officials in both Florida and Arizona suggested that a moratorium should be declared on future purchases of Panther platform vehicles for use by law enforcement.

In March of 2002, Janet Napolitano, then the Attorney General of Arizona, wrote a letter to Ford expressing concern about the incidence of fuel-fed fires in Police Interceptors.

In June of 2002, Ford representatives met with Napolitano and then announced the formation of a “Blue Ribbon Panel” of Ford and law enforcement representatives that committed to a 90-day program to evaluate fuel system upgrades and police procedures as a part of a “Police Officer Safety Action Plan.” In September of 2002, Ford and the Arizona Attorney General’s office held a joint press conference and announced the actions taken and to be taken as a result of the 90-day program. First, Ford announced that it had developed a Police Interceptor package upgrade kit (Upgrade Kit).

The Upgrade Kit consisted of shields designed to protect the fuel tank from being punctured by component parts identified as puncture hazards in high-speed rear-end collisions. Ford had crash-tested the shields at 75 miles per hour and had found them effective. Second, the Blue Ribbon Panel announced recommendations for improved police safety procedures, including “Trunk Packing Considerations,” which advised officers on the placement of items in the trunk to reduce the potential for the fuel tank being ruptured by trunk contents.

Third, Ford announced the development of an optional “Trunk Pack,” consisting of a drop-in trunk liner made of high density polyethylene, which required the user to place objects in the trunk laterally rather than longitudinally. A sticker located on the Trunk Pack instructed the user to “align hard or sharp police equipment laterally.” Finally, Ford announced the creation of a Web site where the law enforcement community could find information about the work of the Blue Ribbon Panel and updates on Ford’s Police Interceptor design-safety efforts.

In October of 2002, Ford notified, by first class mail, all the registered owners of Police Interceptors and all the United States Ford, Lincoln, and Mercury dealers of the availability of the Upgrade Kit. In March of 2003, Ford also notified its 32,000 government fleet customers. The Trunk Packing Considerations were available through the Web site and with the purchase of the optional Trunk Pack. Civilian owners of Panther platform vehicles, including the Jablonskis, received no notice of the availability of the Upgrade Kit, Trunk Pack, or Trunk Packing Considerations.

The decision not to notify civilian users of Panther platform vehicles was made by Sue Cischke, a vice president and officer of Ford and the highest-ranking Ford employee responsible for vehicle safety. Cischke testified by deposition that Ford chose not to notify civilian users because it was Ford’s opinion that the risk of fuel-fed, postcrash fires in high-speed rear-impact collisions is unique to police users because police officers have significantly greater exposure to that type of collision.

Ford, in its defense, presented extensive documentary and testimonial evidence in support of the safety of Panther platform vehicles. It defended the design of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car with the testimony of experts who opined that there was no defect in the fuel system, that a change in the location of the fuel tank would reduce the effectiveness of other desirable attributes of the Panther platform vehicles, and that, considering the overall design of the Panther platform vehicles, the fuel tank is in the best location for that vehicle.

Ford also presented evidence that the Panther platform met and exceeded all United States government safety standards for its fuel containment system. Further, Ford introduced the NHTSA report on its investigation into the safety of the Panther platform fuel system in which the NHTSA neither recommended nor required any change in Ford’s design. Ford presented testimony that millions of Ford Panther platform vehicles had been driven for years with a small incidence of postcrash fires, suggesting that the design of the fuel system was reasonably safe.

Finally, Ford presented evidence that the Jablonski accident was a unique occurrence since it was the only crash known in a Panther platform vehicle other than a Police Interceptor in which trunk contents punctured the fuel tank; therefore, Ford argued, a design change based upon such an unlikely occurrence was not warranted. Jack Ridenour, Jr., is a Ford employee in the design analysis department who heads a team of engineers who analyze the performance of Ford vehicles in the field, investigate crashes, and consult with engineers designing future vehicles.

Among other duties, he analyzes the performance of fuel systems on Ford vehicles in crashes. As a mechanical engineer, Ridenour joined the fuel system design group at Ford in 1971 and worked in that group until 1977, designing and developing fuel systems for Ford. He has taught the fuel system engineering classes at Ford. Ridenour investigated the Jablonskis’ accident and offered opinions about the safety of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car and the design of Panther platform vehicles. Ridenour testified that when he began working at Ford in 1971, Ford was well aware of the Severy research introduced by the plaintiffs.

According to Ridenour, the Daniel memos introduced by the plaintiffs represent further research Ford did in response to the Severy article. Further, the document showing that Ford analyzed the cost of incorporating the design changes advocated by Severy and Daniel at $9.95 per vehicle confirmed that Ford was considering alternatives.

Ridenour agreed that the over-the-axle design advocated by Severy and Daniel was superior to the under-the-trunk location for the fuel tank which was then being used, but he noted that those alternatives did not include the vertical-behind-the-axle location ultimately adopted for the Panther platform. According to Ridenour, once Ford had fully tested the over-the-axle location, it was determined that it was not a workable design. Ridenour described the possible tank locations and explained the overall design process. He opined that there is no optimum fuel tank location for all cars.

The design of the fuel system depends upon the design of the car, and the fuel system used by Ford in the Panther platform vehicles was designed for that type of car. The Panther platform vehicle is a large passenger automobile with a body-on-frame construction, rear-wheel drive, and a spacious trunk. If the fuel tank were moved in the Panther platform vehicle to the forward-of-the-axle location, the body-on-frame construction and rear-wheel drive would also have to be eliminated, and it would be a totally different car.

In his opinion, the vertical-behind-the-axle fuel tank location was the best and safest design for the 1993 Lincoln Town Car and provided the most protection for occupants from all types of crashes. During his testimony, Ridenour identified, and Ford introduced into evidence, the certification package for 1993 Panther platform vehicles, including the Town Car, in which Ford certified that all of its Panther platform vehicles met federal motor vehicle safety standards.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 301 required that a vehicle withstand, with minimum fuel leakage, a rear impact with a nondeformable 4,000-pound barrier moving at 30 miles per hour. The 1993 Lincoln Town Car met this standard. In fact, the certification package revealed that Ford performed the FMVSS 301 testing at 35 miles per hour and that the Town Car had passed.

Ford also performed more rigorous internal testing which required that the Lincoln Town Car withstand, with minimal fuel leakage, three separate car-to-car fuel-system-integrity crash tests performed at 50 miles per hour, and the 1993 Town Car passed that testing as well. According to Ridenour, at the time of the production of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car, only Ford and General Motors had internal standards requiring testing at 50 miles per hour.

Ridenour acknowledged the design standards in Ford’s fuel system engineering materials which require that an engineer design a hazard out of a product, guard against it, or provide a warning, but he testified that, in his opinion, Ford met those standards in the design of the Panther platform vehicles. He testified that Ford performed a thorough design review and located the fuel tank in the safest place for Panther platform vehicles. He also opined that Ford guarded against a penetration of the fuel tank by placing a steel trunk wall between the rear of the vehicle and the fuel tank.

Ridenour testified that no warning was necessary, either in 1993 when the Jablonski vehicle was produced or thereafter, with regard to the danger of trunk contents puncturing the fuel tank. In his opinion, it was not reasonably foreseeable that a pipe wrench would puncture the fuel tank since Ford was unaware of any such incidents by 1993 and, prior to the Jablonskis’ accident, had knowledge of trunk content punctures in police vehicles only.

Finally, Ridenour testified that, in his opinion, the Panther platform vehicles, including the Jablonskis’ 1993 Lincoln Town Car, are reasonably safe in high-speed rear-end collisions. Walter Newell is the president and the lead investigator of Newell Investigative Services. He was hired by Ford to investigate the cause and origin of the Jablonski vehicle fire. At the time of the trial, he had been a fire investigator for 23 years and had investigated more than 3,000 vehicle fires. A majority of the postcollision vehicle fires he had investigated involved vehicles with aft-of-axle fuel tanks.

Newell agreed with the opinion of the plaintiffs’ expert, Cam Cope, that the primary cause of the Jablonski vehicle fire was the leakage of fuel from the fuel tank as a result of the holes caused by the pipe wrench. He disagreed with Cope’s additional conclusion that the smaller hole caused by the crushing of the low-fuel reservoir was a contributing cause of the fire. Ford called Dr. John Habberstad, a mechanical engineer and an expert in accident reconstruction, as an expert witness. Habberstad had been involved in accident reconstruction for 35 years and had investigated more than 2,000 accidents.

Based upon his investigation of this accident, he testified that the speed of Ingram’s vehicle at impact was 65 miles per hour. He further testified that he had been involved in the investigation of many accidents in which a fuel tank was breached, and he stated that he had never observed a tank punctured by an item in the trunk. Finally, in his opinion, if the Upgrade Kit shields developed by Ford had been installed on the Jab-lonski vehicle, they would have had no effect on this accident. Mark Noble, a mechanical engineer and an expert in the analysis of auto accidents, was called as an expert witness by Ford.

Noble began his career as an engineer in the fuel system department at Chrysler Corp. (Chrysler). Eventually, he supervised that department and was responsible for the design of the fuel systems in Chrysler vehicles. In 1980, he left Chrysler and has since worked as an expert in the analysis of auto accidents. In Noble’s opinion, the Jablonski accident was a unique occurrence that resulted from a combination of factors not likely to be repeated.

In his view, the speed of the Chevrolet Lumina that struck the Jablonski Town Car, the configuration of the Lumina, the alignment of the vehicles at impact, the location and alignment of the pipe wrench in the trunk, the type of trailer hitch on the Town Car, and other factors all combined to cause the pipe wrench to penetrate the fuel tank. Noble noted that, out of millions of Town Cars, this is the only known accident in which the fuel tank has been breached by an item in the trunk. If all the Panther platform vehicles are included, this is the only known incident in a non-police vehicle.

According to Noble, this type of incident is so rare that the risk of trunk contents puncturing the fuel tank should be given little consideration in designing a fuel system. Noble opined that there is no optimum fuel tank location for all cars but that there may be an optimum location for a particular vehicle. In designing the location of a fuel tank, the features of a particular vehicle should be taken into account.

According to Noble, the Town Car has features that reduce the risk of fuel tank punctures, including a steel frame, a steel floor pan, and a deformable steel tank, as well as the fact that the tank is 40 inches from the rear bumper. In his opinion, the optimum location for the fuel tank in the 1993 Lincoln Town Car was the vertical-behind-the-axle location, as it was designed. Finally, it was Noble’s opinion that the 1993 Lincoln Town Car is a “very safe overall vehicle” with a “very safe” fuel tank location.

Sue Cischke, called as a witness by Ford, reiterated and expanded her testimony provided by deposition during the plaintiffs’ case. As the highest-ranking safety officer at Ford, she explained Ford’s safety philosophy in the design of its products. First, Ford meets all federal safety standards. Second, it makes voluntary agreements with other manufacturers to improve product safety and then treats compliance with those agreements the same as federal safety standards. Third, Ford has internal safety standards beyond the federal standards that it monitors with extensive product testing.

Fourth, it strives to meet public domain guidelines such as those promoted by Consumer Reports. Finally, Ford continually develops and offers enhanced safety features. Cischke identified the NHTSA report of its investigation into post-crash fires resulting from high-speed rear-end collisions in Panther platform vehicles, and the report was admitted into evidence. The report required no action by Ford and, according to Cischke, supported her decision not to notify nonpolice users of Panther platform vehicles of the danger of trunk contents puncturing the fuel tank.

Cischke confirmed her belief that any danger from trunk contents was limited to police vehicles due to their increased exposure to high-speed rear-end collisions. Since the Jablonski accident was the first such occurrence reported to Ford in a non-police vehicle, Ford had no basis upon which to believe that a warning was necessary for civilian users. Further, Cischke testified that, even if she had known of the Jablonski accident, she would not have warned civilian users based upon a single occurrence.

Cischke agreed that engineering safety standards require a manufacturer to first attempt to design a hazard out of a product and, if that is not possible, to shield or guard against the hazard and, if the hazard cannot be shielded, to then warn the consumer about the hazard. In her opinion, however, there was no foreseeable risk of trunk contents puncturing the fuel tank in Panther platform civilian vehicles and no safety hazard that required design consideration or warnings. Ford called Dr. Paul Taylor as an expert witness.

Taylor is a mechanical engineer employed by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates, a nationwide firm involved in analyzing accidents. He is experienced in investigating accidents and in statistical analysis. Taylor disagreed with the similar-incident analysis of Mark Arndt and expressed the opinion that nothing in Arndt’s lists of prior similar incidents provides proof that the 1993 Lincoln Town Car was unreasonably dangerous.

Taylor analyzed the frequency of fatal rear-end collisions involving postcrash fires by comparing the number of vehicles involved in those incidents to the total number of vehicles of that type manufactured. Millions of 1993 Lincoln Town Cars were sold. According to Taylor, the number of 1993 Lincoln Town Cars involved in fatal rear-end collisions involving postcrash fires is only .0009% of the total number of those vehicles sold. In other words, 99.9991% of 1993 Lincoln Town Cars were not involved in that type of fatal collision.

In Taylor’s opinion, these statistics show that the 1993 Lincoln Town Car is not an unreasonably dangerous vehicle. Finally, Dr. Edward Caulfield, president of Packer Engineering, testified for Ford as an expert witness. Caulfield is a consultant in accident investigation. At Ford’s request, he studied the strength of the frame on Panther platform vehicles, evaluated the cause of the Jablon-ski accident, and considered whether a guard would have prevented the accident.

First, it was his opinion that the strength of the frame was appropriate, that placing the fuel tank within the frame was a good design, and that the design of the tank location was safe. Second, he concluded that the pipe wrench puncturing the fuel tank was such a rare, unique, and unforeseeable event that a design engineer could not be expected to anticipate and design against such an occurrence.

Third, after extensive testing to determine whether adding shields to the fuel tank would have prevented the postcrash fire in this case, it was his conclusion that there is no feasible alternative guarding design which would have prevented the pipe wrench from piercing the tank. Finally, in his opinion, the 1993 Lincoln Town Car has a reasonably safe design and Ford’s engineers were not negligent in adopting that design. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the plaintiffs dismissed their claims for strict product liability and proceeded only on their negligence and willful-and-wanton-conduct counts.

The trial court conducted a conference on jury instructions at which Ford objected to various instructions that were given by the court and submitted instructions that were refused. We will discuss those rulings in more detail below. After closing arguments, the case was submitted to the jury, which rendered verdicts in excess of $5 million for the injuries and death of John Jablonski, Sr., in excess of $23 million for the injuries of Dora Jablonski, and $15 million in punitive damages for Dora Jablonski.

Ford’s posttrial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial was denied, and this appeal followed. ANALYSIS We begin by recognizing that the plaintiffs’ compensatory-damages claims were submitted to the jury on a negligent-design theory. “Illinois cases considering a cause of action for defective products liability sounding in negligence rather than strict liability are rare, probably because it appears to plaintiffs that it is easier to prove the strict liability count.” Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 95, 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1141 (2005).

Thus, we must first acknowledge the framework upon which the issues in this case must be analyzed. To establish a product liability action asserting a claim based upon negligent product design, the plaintiff must establish, as in other negligence cases, “the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty, an injury that was proximately caused by that breach, and damages.” Calles v.

Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 270, 864 N.E.2d 249, 263 (2007). “The key distinction between a negligence claim and a strict liability claim lies in the concept of fault.” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 270, 864 N.E.2d at 263. A strict liability claim is concerned only with the condition of the product, while “in a negligence claim, a defendant’s fault is at issue in addition to the condition of the product.” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 270, 864 N.E.2d at 263-64.

Thus, in both types of cases alleging a product-design claim, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a defective condition in the product at the time it left the manufacturer’s control. Carrizales v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 226 Ill. App. 3d 20, 36, 589 N.E.2d 569, 580 (1991). In a negligent-product-design claim, the plaintiff must also provide evidence of “a standard of care by which to measure a defendant’s design and establish a deviation from that standard.” Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 96, 828 N.E.2d at 1141. “A manufacturer is held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts” (Anderson v.

Hyster Co., 74 Ill. 2d 364, 368, 385 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1979)) and “has a nondelegable duty to design reasonably safe products.” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 270, 864 N.E.2d at 264. An automobile manufacturer has a duty “ ‘to use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of its product, bearing in mind that the intended and actual use of automobiles results in collisions.’ ” Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 52, 56, 669 N.E.2d 608, 612 (1996), quoting Buehler v.

Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 61, 374 N.E.2d 460, 464-65 (1977). “The crucial question in a negligent-design case is whether the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in the design of the product.” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 270, 864 N.E.2d at 264. “In determining whether the manufacturer’s conduct was reasonable, the question is ‘whether in the exercise of ordinary care the manufacturer should have foreseen that the design would be hazardous to someone.’ ” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 271, 864 N.E.2d at 264, quoting American Law of Products Liability 3d §28:48, at 28-66 (1997). “To show that the manufacturer acted unreasonably based on the foreseeability of harm, the plaintiff must show the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk posed by the product design at the time of manufacture.” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 271, 864 N.E.2d at 264.

A. Negligence Claims Ford first argues that the circuit court erred by not granting it a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to justify submitting any of their negligence claims to the jury. Our review of the trial court’s decision on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is de novo. McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132, 720 N.E.2d 242, 257 (1999).

A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not properly entered unless the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict could ever stand. Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 109, 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (1997). If “reasonable minds might differ as to inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the facts presented,” then a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be entered. Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 351, 654 N.E.2d 1365, 1374 (1995).

Neither a trial court nor a court of review is allowed to reweigh the evidence or “substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way.” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452-53, 603 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1992). In this case, the trial court submitted four claims of negligence for the jury’s consideration.

The jury was instructed as follows: “[The plaintiffs] claims *** that [Ford] was negligent in one or more of the following respects: Equipping the 1993 Lincoln Town Car with a vertical-behind-the-axle fuel tank without adding shields or guards; or Failing to locate the fuel tank above the axle or forward of the rear axle; or Failing to warn of the risk of trunk contents puncturing the fuel tank; or Failing to inform of the existence of the Trunk Pack and/or Trunk Pack Recommendations.” The jury entered a general verdict for the plaintiffs.

Neither party submitted special interrogatories designed to determine upon which claim or claims of negligence the jury based its verdict. We will first examine Ford’s argument that the first three claims of negligence should not have been submitted to the jury. The fourth claim requires a separate analysis. 1. Claims of Negligent Location of Fuel Tank, Failure to Guard, and Failure to Warn Ford first argues that the plaintiffs failed to establish that it breached any recognized standard of care in the design of the fuel tank system in the 1993 Lincoln Town Car.

As a result, Ford concludes that the trial court erred in submitting the plaintiffs’ claims that Ford was negligent in locating the fuel tank, in failing to include guards, and in failing to warn that the fuel tank could be breached by trunk contents.

Ford argues that the plaintiffs “made no attempt” to show that the location of the fuel tank behind and not above or forward of the rear axle “violated any standard of care recognized in the industry or by any governmental agency” and that the evidence was “uncontroverted that Ford complied with applicable industry and governmental standards of care.” In support of this argument, Ford cites Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 828 N.E.2d 1128 (2005). In Blue, the plaintiff was injured when he used his foot to push a box into a commercial trash compactor while it was running.

Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 83, 828 N.E.2d at 1134. A consulting engineer testified for the plaintiff that the machine could have been made safe by incorporating certain safety features that were technologically available when the machine was manufactured, but he offered no testimony about the industry standard. Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 83-84, 828 N.E.2d at 1134.

The majority opinion in Blue noted that a product suffers from a design defect when it “conforms to the intended design but the intended design itself, or its sale without adequate instructions or warnings, renders the product not reasonably safe.” Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 89-90, 828 N.E.2d at 1137, citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §1, Comment a, at 6 (1998). In Blue, the court cited with approval the appellate court opinions in Baltus v. Weaver Division of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill. App. 3d 821, 557 N.E.2d 580 (1990), and Carrizales v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 226 Ill.

App. 3d 20, 589 N.E.2d 569 (1991), and stated as follows: “[A] plaintiff raising a negligence claim must do more than simply allege a better design for the product; he must plead and prove evidence of a standard of care by which to measure a defendant’s design and establish a deviation from that standard. [Citations.] Thus, to establish a negligence claim for a defective design of a product, a plaintiff must prove that either (1) the defendant deviated from the standard of care that other manufacturers in the industry followed at the time the product was designed[ ] or (2) that [sic] the defendant knew or should have known, in the exercise of ordinary care, that the product was unreasonably dangerous and defendant failed to warn of its dangerous propensity.” Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 96, 828 N.E.2d at 1141.

In dicta, the Blue majority opinion noted that since the plaintiff offered no evidence of an industry standard or its breach, the plaintiff likely failed to prove his negligent-product-design claim, although that issue was not raised by the defendant. Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 100, 828 N.E.2d at 1143. We note that the precedential effect of Blue has been called into question.

The Blue court described the issue before it as whether “the risk-utility analysis normally used in strict products liability cases is applicable to defective product design cases involving only a negligence theory of recovery.” Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 81, 828 N.E.2d at 1133. Based upon the court’s analysis of Baltus and Carrizales, that question was answered in the negative. Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 97, 828 N.E.2d at 1142. In Calles, however, the supreme court found that the appellate court erred in following the holding in Blue that the risk-utility test does not apply to negligent-product-design claims.

Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 269-70, 864 N.E.2d at 263. As the court noted: “There was no majority opinion in Blue holding that the risk-utility test was not applicable to negligent-product-design cases. Rather, as Justice Freeman pointed out, only three Justices (Thomas, Garman, and Kilbride) concurred in this conclusion. [Citation.] As such, the conclusion that the risk-utility test is not applicable in negligent-product-design cases is not binding precedent. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellate court erred in reversing

summary judgment based on Blue and we must review anew the trial court’s order that Scripto owed no duty, nor breached any duty owed.” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 269-70, 864 N.E.2d at 263. The court in Calles then proceeded to analyze the plaintiffs negligence claim without reference to the Blue court’s requirement that the plaintiff establish a standard of care in the industry and a deviation from that standard.

Rather, the court in Calles stated as follows: “The crucial question in a negligent-design case is whether the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in the design of the product. [Citations.] In determining whether the manufacturer’s conduct was reasonable, the question is ‘whether in the exercise of ordinary care the manufacturer should have foreseen that the design would be hazardous to someone.’ [Citations.] To show that the manufacturer acted unreasonably based on the foreseeability of harm, the plaintiff must show the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk posed by the product design at the time of manufacture.” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 270-71, 864 N.E.2d at 264.

Since we believe that the plaintiffs in this case produced sufficient evidence for this case to be submitted to the jury under either Blue or Calles, the outcome in this case is not affected by these differences. In Baltus, a mechanic, who was injured when a transmission he was working on slipped off a transmission jack and injured his hand, sued the manufacturer of the transmission jack on a negligent-design theory. Baltus, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 557 N.E.2d at 582.

The plaintiff in Baltus alleged generally that the manufacturer negligently failed to design the transmission jack with appropriate safety guards and safety devices, but he had no expert testimony to support his claims. Baltus, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 824-25, 557 N.E.2d at 582. The manufacturer presented the testimony of a registered professional engineer that the transmission jack was in a reasonably safe condition when it left the manufacturer’s control and that it was manufactured and designed in a reasonably safe manner. Baltus, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 825, 557 N.E.2d at 583.

In affirming the circuit court’s grant of a

summary judgment to the defendant, the Baltus court compared negligent-product-design cases to medical malpractice cases and held that these cases generally require both expert testimony and proof of a standard of care against which the manufacturer’s design can be judged. Baltus, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 836, 557 N.E.2d at 589. Because the plaintiff produced no evidence of reasonable and feasible alternative designs in the industry and because his claim of negligent design was based solely upon his opinion, the evidentiary basis of his claim was insufficient to withstand a

summary judgment. Baltus, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 829-30, 557 N.E.2d at 585. In Carrizales, the plaintiff was injured “when flammable vapors from his gasoline-soaked clothing were ignited by the flame of a gas-fired hot water heater.” Carrizales, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 589 N.E.2d at 571-72. The plaintiffs negligent-product-design claim was dismissed by the trial court. Carrizales, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 589 N.E.2d at 572.

On appeal, the court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim, but it affirmed the dismissal of the negligent-product-design claim, stating as follows: “Plaintiff in this case failed to plead facts alleging that other manufacturers designed heaters with any of the alternative safety features or designs that plaintiff set out in his complaint. Because plaintiff does not establish a standard of care by which to measure defendant’s design, it cannot be determined by the pleadings whether defendant negligently manufactured a defective product because it did not conform to such a standard.

In a complex products liability case such as this, we may not find defendant negligently designed the heater by simply relying on plaintiff’s opinion.” Carrizales, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 37, 589 N.E.2d at 581. Ford asserts that plaintiffs failed to prove a standard of care and a deviation from that standard. We disagree. This is not a case like Blue, Baltus, or Carrizales where the plaintiff failed to present expert testimony or any evidence of feasible alternative designs used by other manufacturers in the industry.

Here, the plaintiffs presented ample evidence of a standard of care to support their negligent-product-design claims. The plaintiffs’ expert, Mark Arndt, and virtually every engineer who testified for Ford agreed to the general engineering standard of care in the design of complex products, and each witness stated that standard in nearly identical terms. Once a design engineer identifies a potential hazard in a product, he is obligated to attempt to design the hazard out of the product. If he is unable to do so, he should design a shield or guard to eliminate the hazard.

If that is impossible, he should warn the consumer about the hazard. Not only did all the engineers who testified on the subject agree that these are the obligations of the design engineer but the evidence revealed that Ford specifically taught these principles to its own design engineers. Proof of this general engineering standard alone has been held sufficient. See Sobczak v. General Motors Corp., 373 Ill.

App. 3d 910, 918, 924, 871 N.E.2d 82, 90, 94-95 (2007) (the appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to prove a standard of care, where the plaintiff’s expert testified that the standard of care within the engineering industry is that “ ‘when you identify a potential hazard that affects the safety to the passengers, you need to guard against that hazard and prevent it from causing some risk or danger to the occupants of the vehicle’ ”). In this case, however, the plaintiffs’ proof goes much further.

The plaintiffs’ expert, Mark Arndt, testified that, at the time the 1993 Lincoln Town Car was manufactured, other automobile manufacturers were producing automobiles with the fuel tank located forward of the axle. Arndt expressed the opinion that Ford was negligent in the design of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car in that, at the time it was produced, a safer and more practical location for the fuel tank would have been forward of the axle.

Arndt further opined that if Ford chose to locate the fuel tank aft of the axle, it should have designed guards or shields which would have protected the tank from being punctured by component parts of the vehicle and trunk contents and which would have required users of the vehicle to align trunk contents laterally. Specifically, feasible shield designs suggested by Arndt included the very designs Ford adopted in its Upgrade Kit and Trunk Pack in response to concerns by police agencies that officers were being injured and killed when trunk contents punctured fuel tanks in Panther platform police vehicles.

Finally, it was Arndt’s opinion that Ford should have warned users of the danger of objects in the trunk puncturing the fuel tank. Thus, unlike Blue, Baltus, or Carrizales, the plaintiffs in this case presented expert testimony that the product was defective and evidence of an alternative product design in existence in the industry. Further, the plaintiffs proved that, as early as the 1960s, Ford’s own engineers were aware of the potential dangers of an aft-of-the-axle fuel tank location, including the danger of trunk contents puncturing the tank in a collision.

Ford’s engineers recommended at that time that future automobiles be designed with the tank located above the axle. Ford’s witnesses admitted that, beginning in 1981 with the design of the Ford Escort, every new passenger car designed by Ford has been designed with the fuel tank located forward of the axle. The plaintiffs presented evidence that by 1991 a majority of new passenger cars manufactured had fuel tanks located forward of the axle, and that, at the time of the trial, the Panther platform and the Mustang were the only types of vehicles Ford still manufactured with an aft-of-the-axle fuel tank.

Thus, the plaintiffs not only presented evidence of feasible alternative designs existing in the industry but also presented evidence of a clear trend in the industry, including at Ford, to eliminate the aft-of-the-axle fuel tank design. Finally, we note that it was Ford’s own instruction that was given to the jury on negligence and the standard of care.

That instruction provided as follows: “When I use the word ‘negligence’ in these instructions, I mean the failure to do something which a reasonably careful manufacturer would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful manufacturer would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful manufacturer would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.

To establish a negligence claim for a defective design of a product, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant deviated from its own standard or from the standard of care in the industry when the product was designed. That means it was the duty of the defendant to use ordinary care for the safety of plaintiffs with respect to the design of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car. When I use the words ‘ordinary care’, I mean the care a reasonably careful manufacturer would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.

The law does not say how a reasonably careful manufacturer would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the jury was instructed, at Ford’s request, that it is sufficient proof of negligence if the defendant deviated from its own standard of care. The evidence was clear at the trial that Ford’s preferred design after 1981 was for the fuel tank to be located forward of the axle.

Ford can hardly complain if the jury was instructed, at its request, that it was sufficient for the plaintiffs to prove that Ford deviated from its own standard of care in the design of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car. We believe that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence on the standard of care to justify the submission of their first three claims of negligence to the jury. By far, the primary focus of the evidence in this case was upon the issue of the appropriate location of the fuel tank.

The plaintiffs presented extensive evidence of alternative fuel tank locations recognized and used in the automobile industry, including at Ford. The evidence revealed that Ford’s engineers were well aware of the danger of an aft-of-the-axle fuel tank being punctured in a rear-end collision, including by trunk contents, long before the manufacture of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car.

The plaintiffs alleged that Ford should have either moved the fuel tank to a safer location or provided a guard or shield to prevent a puncture of the fuel tank by component parts of the vehicle or trunk contents or warned consumers about the danger of trunk contents puncturing the fuel tank. There was ample evidence on the standard of care to justify the submission of these claims to the jury, and the trial court did not err in denying Ford’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on that basis.

We note that Ford also argues that the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence on the issue of proximate cause with respect to the failure-to-guard and failure-to-warn claims. This argument is without merit. Proximate cause is generally a fact question for the jury to determine. Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 52, 57, 669 N.E.2d 608, 612 (1996). Evidence presented by the plaintiffs revealed that Ford conducted crash testing of Panther vehicles at 75 miles per hour after the installation of the guards developed for police vehicles, with no penetration of the fuel tank.

This evidence alone is sufficient to create a fact question on the issue of whether the failure to provide guards for the fuel tank proximately caused the Jablonskis’ injuries. Likewise, there was ample evidence that loading tools and other items into the trunk in a lateral position reduces the likelihood of those items puncturing the fuel tank in a high-speed rear-end collision. No warning to that effect was given, and we believe a fact question existed about whether that failure to warn was a proximate cause of the Jablonskis’ injuries.

We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, and we believe that the plaintiffs’ claims of negligence based upon the location of the fuel tank, the failure to guard the fuel tank, and the failure to warn of the danger of trunk contents penetrating the fuel tank were properly submitted to the jury. The plaintiffs supported those claims with evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Ford was negligent.

Likewise, Ford defended those claims with the testimony of experts that the fuel system in the 1993 Lincoln Town Car was not defective, that it was not negligently designed, and that it met all the industry and government safety standards. The jury heard conflicting evidence and determined the facts based upon that evidence. 2. Failure to Inform of Trunk Pack and Trunk Pack Recommendations Claim We next examine separately the plaintiffs’ fourth claim of negligence that was submitted to the jury.

That claim alleged that Ford was negligent in “[flailing to inform of the existence of the Trunk Pack and/or Trunk Pack Recommendations.” Ford attacks the submission of this claim to the jury on several fronts. First, Ford argues that there is no postsale duty to warn in Illinois and that, since the evidence is clear that the Trunk Pack and Trunk Pack Recommendations did not exist until long after the manufacture of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car, the trial court submitted a claim that is not recognized under Illinois law.

Second, Ford argues that no postsale-duty-to-warn claim was pleaded until after the trial and that it was prejudiced by the allowance of late amendments to include this claim. Finally, Ford argues that even if this claim was recognized under Illinois law, it should not have been submitted to the jury because the plaintiffs failed to prove that Ford breached a recognized standard of care or that the postsale failure to warn caused their injuries. Ford asserts that the submission of this claim entitles it to a new trial.

The plaintiffs counter that any error in submitting this claim was cured by the entry of a general verdict. The plaintiffs argue, however, that the submission of this claim was not error in that, under Illinois law, a manufacturer who has a duty to warn at the time a product leaves its control has a continuing duty to warn of that defect. The plaintiffs further assert that Ford was well aware, in advance of the trial, of the plaintiffs’ claims based upon Ford’s failure to warn consumers about the Trunk Pack and Trunk Pack Recommendations and cannot claim surprise and prejudice in the submission of this claim.

Finally, the plaintiffs argue that sufficient evidence was presented for the submission of this claim to the jury. a. General Verdict We begin our analysis of this issue by examining whether the return of a general verdict cures any error in the submission of the fourth claim. The plaintiffs claim that

section 2 — 1201(

d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1201(d) (West 2004)) governs this issue. That

section provides as follows: “(

d) If several grounds of recovery are pleaded in support of the same claim, whether in the same or different counts, an entire verdict rendered for that claim shall not be set aside or reversed for the reason that any ground is defective, if one or more of the grounds is sufficient to sustain the verdict; nor shall the verdict be set aside or reversed for the reason that the evidence in support of any ground is insufficient to sustain a recovery thereon, unless before the case was submitted to the jury a motion was made to withdraw that ground from the jury on account of insufficient evidence and it appears that the denial of the motion was prejudicial.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1201(d) (West 2004).

The plaintiffs focus upon the first portion of the statute providing that a general verdict shall not be set aside or reversed if any one of several grounds is sufficient to sustain the verdict. The plaintiffs argue that their continuing-duty-to-warn claim was properly presented to the jury but that even if the trial court erred in submitting that claim, any error was cured by the entry of a general verdict, since the plaintiffs’ other three claims of negligence were properly submitted and it is impossible to determine upon which of the claims the jury based its verdict.

Ford focuses upon the latter part of the statute, points out that it did request that all four claims of negligence be withdrawn from the jury, and argues that even if the other three claims of negligence were properly submitted to the jury, the submission of the plaintiffs’ “unsupported, unpleaded[,] and unrecognized” postsale-duty-to-warn claim was prejudicial, entitling Ford to a new trial. We agree with the plaintiffs.

It has long been the rule in Illinois that where there is a general verdict and several claims are presented, the verdict will be upheld against a challenge that a claim is defective, if there is sufficient evidence for any one or more claims, and the defendant cannot claim prejudice if he failed to request separate verdicts or special interrogatories to determine upon which claims the jury found for the plaintiff. Moore v.

Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill. 2d 288, 294, 263 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1970) (“It is settled law that where several causes of actions are charged and a general verdict results, the verdict will be sustained if there are one or more good causes of action or counts to support it,” and the defendants, having failed “to ascertain upon which count or counts the jury returned its verdicts *** by submitting a separate form of verdict as to each count” “cannot complain or seek to take advantage of their failure”); Witherell v.

Weimer, 118 Ill. 2d 321, 329, 515 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1987) (“When there is a general verdict and more than one theory is presented, the verdict will be upheld if there was sufficient evidence to sustain either theory, and the defendant, having failed to request special interrogatories, cannot complain”); Dillon v.

Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 492, 771 N.E.2d 357, 363 (2002) (in a medical malpractice action where the defendants claimed prejudice in the untimely assertion of an additional claim of negligence that was submitted to the jury, the supreme court refused to set aside a general verdict, which was supported by sufficient evidence on other theories, where the defendants failed to request special interrogatories and there was therefore “no way of knowing on what theory the jury found defendants negligent”).

The rule sustaining a general verdict if it is supported by one or more good theories has been applied equally to defense verdicts. Krklus v. Stanley, 359 Ill.

App. 3d 471, 479, 833 N.E.2d 952, 959-60 (2005) (in a medical malpractice action where the plaintiff complained that the issue of contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury, a general verdict for the defendants was sustained where the verdict could be based either on a finding that the defendants were not negligent or on a finding that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence was more than 50% of the total fault and where the plaintiff failed to submit special interrogatories to determine the basis of the jury’s findings); Orzel v. Szewczyk, 391 Ill.

App. 3d 283, 290, 908 N.E.2d 569, 575 (2009) (in a legal malpractice action, a general verdict for the defendants was sustained against a claim of prejudice in submitting a claim of contributory negligence where the verdict could have been based upon a finding that the plaintiff failed to prove negligence and where the plaintiff did not submit special interrogatories). The court in Foley v. Fletcher, 361 Ill. App. 3d 39, 836 N.E.2d 667 (2005), provided an excellent explanation of the general-verdict rule.

Foley was a medical malpractice case in which the jury was instructed upon four possible theories of negligence. The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiffs, and neither side requested special interrogatories to determine upon which theories the jury found the defendants negligent. The defendants claimed prejudice in the submission of the fourth theory, arguing that it was based upon an expert opinion allowed in violation of Supreme Court Rule 213 (210 Ill. 2d R. 213).

Because of its application to this case, we quote extensively from the Foley opinion: “Plaintiffs claim there was enough evidence to support the jury’s verdict under theories ‘a,’ ‘b[,’] and ‘c,’ so even if theory ‘d’ was tainted by a Rule 213 violation, reversal would not be necessary. Plaintiffs contend that one defective theory of liability will not disturb a general verdict where there was sufficient evidence to sustain the other theories. *** Defendants contend

section 2 — 1201(

d) notwithstanding, the entire verdict must be set aside here because the facts conform to an exception to the general rule that one defective ground is not enough to defeat a verdict.

Defendants focus on the clause, ‘unless before the case was submitted to the jury a motion was made to withdraw that ground from the jury on account of insufficient evidence and it appears that the denial of the motion was prejudicial.’ [Citation.] Defendants allege that the criteria in the exception were met because: (1) defendants moved to withdraw theory ‘d’ before the case was submitted to the jury; (2) their basis for the motion was [an opinion witness’s] improperly admitted and therefore insufficient evidence; (3) the trial court then denied their motion; and (4) the denial resulted in prejudice to defendants.

But defendants are unable to show prejudice because they cannot show that the jury based its verdict on the instruction at issue. Neither side requested special interrogatories under

section 2 — 1108 of the Code. [Citation.] A defendant cannot expect recourse where a plaintiff presents more than one theory of her case, the defendant does not request special interrogatories!,] and the jury returns a general verdict. [Citations.] Nor can it be presumed that reversal is warranted because the jury was misled by the court’s instruction unless there is some indication that the jury was improperly influenced. [Citation.] Without the jury’s answer to a special interrogatory on theory ‘d,’ we could not conclude that defendants were prejudiced even if [the opinion witness’s] testimony was admitted in error.” Foley, 361 Ill.

App. 3d at 49-50, 836 N.E.2d at 676. The pertinent facts in this case are almost identical to those in Foley. The plaintiffs presented four theories of negligence. We have already determined that the first three theories were properly submitted; therefore, only the fourth theory remains in question. Ford moved to withdraw the fourth theory before the case was submitted to the jury, arguing that the evidence supporting that theory was improperly admitted. The trial court denied Ford’s motion and submitted the fourth theory.

Ford now claims prejudice resulting from the submission of the fourth theory, entitling it to a new trial. As in Foley, Ford cannot claim prejudice, because it failed to submit special interrogatories from which the basis of the jury’s finding of negligence could be determined. Since Ford submitted no special interrogatories to determine whether the jury relied upon the plaintiffs’ fourth theory of negligence — “[flailing to inform of the existence of the Trunk Pack and/or Trunk Pack Recommendations” — we have no way of determining whether that theory played any role in the jury’s decision.

On the record before us, the jury might have based its decision entirely upon one or more of the plaintiffs’ other claims of negligence, without considering the fourth claim at all. Since Ford failed to submit special interrogatories to determine this issue, it cannot now claim prejudice. Consequently, even if the plaintiffs’ fourth claim of negligence was improperly submitted and was based upon inadmissible evidence, we must sustain the general verdict. b.

Continuing Duty to Warn Regardless of the foregoing, we find no error in the submission of the plaintiffs’ fourth claim of negligence. “The decision to give or deny an instruction is within the trial court’s discretion. The standard for determining an abuse of discretion is whether, taken as a whole, the instructions are sufficiently clear so as not to mislead and whether they fairly and correctly state the law.” Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 505, 771 N.E.2d at 371. We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury on the plaintiffs’ fourth claim of negligence.

The parties correctly discuss this issue under a failure-to-warn analysis. The instruction in question only asserts that Ford was negligent in “[flailing to inform” about the “Trunk Pack and/or Trunk Pack Recommendations.” No claim is made that Ford had a duty to retrofit the Jablonskis’ 1993 Lincoln Town Car with the Trunk Pack. Ford argues that there is no postsale duty to warn under Illinois law. Although the plaintiffs urge us to adopt that rule, they agree that Illinois law does not generally impose upon a manufacturer a postsale duty to warn of hazards first discovered after a product has left its control.

They argue, however, that if a manufacturer knew or should have known of the hazard at the time of manufacture, so that a duty to warn existed when the product left its control, that duty to warn is continuous. Thus, the plaintiffs argue, if a manufacturer later develops safety features or safety information for the purpose of protecting consumers from a hazard of which it had knowledge at the time the product was originally sold, it has a duty to use reasonable care to inform users of the product of the existence of those safety features and information. We agree with the plaintiffs.

First, it is incorrect to state that no Illinois case has imposed a postsale duty to warn of hazards discovered after a product is sold, because that duty has been clearly imposed for pharmaceutical products. A drug manufacturer has a “ ‘continuous duty *** to warn physicians of the dangers incident to prescribing the drug, to keep abreast of scientific developments touching upon the manufacturer’s product[,] and to notify the medical profession of any additional side effects discovered from its use.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill.

App. 3d 265, 278, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1211 (1997), quoting Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970). The need to impose a continuing duty to warn upon a pharmaceutical manufacturer is evident. Illinois cases involving other products and analyzing whether a manufacturer has a postsale duty to warn decline to impose that duty, unless the manufacturer knew or should have known of the hazard at the time the product was manufactured.

Likewise, the cases cited by Ford decline to impose a postsale duty to warn of a hazard discovered after manufacture but suggest that a continuous duty to warn exists if the manufacturer knew or should have known of the hazard when the product left its control. In Collins v. Hyster Co., 174 Ill. App. 3d 972, 529 N.E.2d 303 (1988), the plaintiff was injured on a forklift. The trial court struck certain allegations of negligence based upon a continuing duty to warn. The specific allegations are not detailed in the opinion.

The court stated as follows: “[T]he trial court’s ruling is correct in that we have not discovered any authority in Illinois for extending the duty to warn beyond the time when the product left the manufacturer’s control unless Hyster knew or should have known at that time that the product was defective. Here, there is no evidence that Hyster should have known the product was defective at the time it left Hyster’s control of which it would have had a continuing duty to warn against in the event the hazard was discovered subsequent to the time it left the manufacturer’s control.

Certainly the law does not contemplate placing the onerous duty on manufacturers to subsequently warn all foreseeable users of products based on increased design or manufacture expertise that was not present at the time the product left its control.” (Emphasis added.) Collins, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 977, 529 N.E.2d at 306. Thus, in Collins, the court declined to impose a postsale duty to warn, but that ruling was not applied to circumstances in which the manufacturer knew that the product was defective when it left its control. In Kempes v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 192 Ill.

App. 3d 209, 548 N.E.2d 644 (1989), a child was injured when he cut into a golf ball and the paste center squirted into his right eye. There was no evidence in the record from which it could be determined that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the existence of that danger at the time the golf ball was manufactured. The court stated, “ ‘[T]o hold a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger of which it would be impossible to know based on the present state of human knowledge would make the manufacturer a virtual insurer of the product ***.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Kempes, 192 Ill.

App. 3d at 218, 548 N.E.2d at 649, quoting Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1980). Then the court simply asserted that there is no duty to warn beyond the time a product leaves the manufacturer’s control “ ‘unless it knew or should have known at that time that the product was defective.’ ” Kempes, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 218, 548 N.E.2d at 649, quoting Collins, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 977, 529 N.E.2d at 306.

Again, nothing in Kempes suggests that a postsale, continuing duty to warn would not be imposed upon a manufacturer who knew or should have known of the hazard when the product left its control. Finally, in Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 302 Ill. App. 3d 879, 707 N.E.2d 239 (1999), the plaintiff alleged that the plaintiff’s decedent was injured and died as a result of the negligent design of the seat assembly on a Farmall tractor manufactured by the defendant.

The plaintiff alleged, in part, that the defendant Navistar International Transportation Corp. was negligent in failing to provide postsale warnings to foreseeable users after learning of the hazard presented by the seat assembly and in failing to retrofit the seat assembly postsale to eliminate the hazard. Those allegations were stricken by the trial court, and a judgment was entered upon a jury verdict for the defendant.

The court in Modelski made a clear distinction between a duty to warn of hazards of which the manufacturer had knowledge at the time the product was manufactured and those of which there was no such knowledge. It is clear that it was the latter which was at issue in Modelski, because the court described the claims of the parties as follows: “In this case, Navistar argues that it was under no legally recognized duty to warn foreseeable users of any dangers associated with the use of its Farmall Model 450 tractor of which it was not aware, nor should it have been, when the tractor left its control.

The plaintiff contends that the manufacturer of a product is under a continuing duty

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