In re ESTATE OF ROBERT R. RENCHEN, Deceased (Robert T. Renchen, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Renchen et al., as Guardian of Vera Renchen, Defendants-Appellants), 405 Ill. App. 3d 1141

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court: In this Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) appeal, we must answer the following question certified by the trial court: whether the finding of paternity in a decree of adoption is dispositive of the paternity of the adopted child when no motion to vacate was timely filed in the adoption case and when thereafter a petition to establish alternative paternity was filed in a collateral probate proceeding. We understand that, in a vacuum, that question makes no sense.

Generally speaking, an adoption cuts off both the obligations and rights of a natural father. For purposes of inheritance, an adopted child is the child only of his adoptive parents. However, the legislature has created a statutory exception which provides that a person adopted by a descendent of a natural parent’s grandparent may inherit from both his adoptive and natural parent. 755 ILCS 5/2 — 4(d)(1) (West 2006). Under the facts of this case, we answer the certified question in the negative. FACTS Judith York gave birth to Robert Todd York (Todd) on November 21, 1968, during her marriage to Gary York.

Ergo, Gary York was Todd’s presumptive natural father. Judith and Gary later divorced. Judith (now deceased) then married William Renchen. William is a brother to decedent Robert R. Renchen. William and Judith legally adopted Todd. Todd York became Todd Renchen. An adoption order identifies Gary York as Todd’s natural father. The adoption terminated Gary York’s parental rights. Todd has never challenged the adoption or any part of it. No one disputes that William Renchen is Todd’s adoptive and, therefore, legal father. Robert Renchen, William’s brother, died intestate on April 21, 2007.

Todd filed pleadings in the probate court alleging that the decedent, Robert Renchen, was, in fact, his natural father. On June 18, 2007, Todd filed a petition for letters of administration claiming that decedent’s heirs were: Robert Todd Renchen, son Vera Renchen, mother Richard Renchen, brother Thomas Renchen, brother William Renchen, brother. On July 16, 2007, Thomas Renchen, another of William’s brothers, filed a petition for letters of administration stating that the heirs of Robert R. Renchen were: Vera Renchen, mother Richard Renchen, brother Thomas Renchen, brother William Renchen, brother.

Also on July 16, 2007, Thomas and William Renchen filed a motion to strike Todd’s petition for letters of administration stating that Todd was adopted on February 8, 1973, in Kankakee County by Judith Renchen, his natural mother, and her husband, William Renchen. On August 22, 2007, Thomas Renchen, William Renchen and Vera Renchen (appellants) filed a motion for

summary judgment stating that Todd was the son of William Renchen by virtue of an adoption in Kankakee County dated February 8, 1973. The motion further stated that:

(1) Robert Todd Renchen’s mother, Judith, was married to a Gary York on December 11, 1965;

(2) Robert Todd York was born to Gary and Judith York on November 21, 1968;

(3) Judith York then divorced Gary York and subsequently married William Renchen;

(4) William and Judith Renchen then filed a petition to adopt Robert Todd York and that petition was granted on February 8, 1973; and

(5) Robert Todd York was decreed the adopted child of William and Judith Renchen and the child’s name was changed to Robert Todd Renchen. Attached to the motion was an affidavit of Judith Renchen and a copy of the decree of adoption. The motion also stated that this order of adoption was dispositive of the paternity of Todd. On August 1, 2007, Todd filed a motion for

summary judgment claiming that he was the natural son of decedent Robert R. Renchen. He attached a DNA test report in support of his motion. On January 9, 2008, Todd filed a counterpetition to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship. We should note that Todd makes reference to the supporting record in his brief. However, the only record filed with this court is 10 pages which include: Todd’s two-page motion for

summary judgment and which are marked with an “exhibit 1” sticker; the petition for letters of administration filed by Todd in the circuit court; a two-page affidavit of Richard Renchen; a copy of the decree for adoption; and the DNA test report. Appellants filed a motion for involuntary dismissal of Todd’s counterpetition. Further, they filed a motion to strike Todd’s motion for

summary judgment as to heirship. On December 5, 2008, the court denied all motions. Thereafter, on motion of the appellants, the trial court certified the above-mentioned question. On October 20, 2009, we granted appellants’ motion for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308. 155 111. 2d R. 308. ANALYSIS Appellants request that we both answer the certified question and reverse the trial court’s denial of their motions. However, the scope of review of an interlocutory appeal brought under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 is strictly limited to the certified question. In re Estate of Williams, 366 Ill.

App. 3d 746, 748, 853 N.E.2d 79 (2006). As the question certified by the trial court must be a question of law, the applicable standard of review is de nova. Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 58, 879 N.E.2d 910 (2007). The question before us is whether the finding of paternity in a decree of adoption is dispositive as to the adopted child when no motion to vacate was timely filed in the adoption case and when, thereafter, a petition to establish alternative paternity was filed in a collateral probate proceeding. The parties agree that the ultimate issue is heirship.

In the case at bar, Robert R. Renchen died intestate. Todd Renchen filed a petition for letters of administration claiming that he was the son of Robert R. Renchen. He filed various other pleadings, all related to his claim that he is the biological son of Robert. Evidence submitted in support of a motion for

summary judgment included DNA test results from DDC DNA Diagnostics that allegedly indicate a 99.995% probability that decedent is the father of Todd Renchen. Todd Renchen argues that he was adopted by William Renchen “a descendant of the great-grandparent of the child.” Therefore, he may inherit from the decedent’s estate. The Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) states: “(

d) For purposes of inheritance from or through a natural parent and for determining the property rights of any person under any instrument, an adopted child is not a child of a natural parent, *** unless one or more of the following conditions apply:

(1) The child is adopted by a descendent or a spouse of a descendent of a great-grandparent of the child, in which case the adopted child is a child of both natural parents.” 755 ILCS 5/2 — 4(d)(1) (West 2006). Appellants contend that according to the adoption decree, Todd’s natural mother, Judith, was married to Gary York on December 11, 1965. Further, Todd was born to Gary and Judith York on November 21, 1968. Judith York then divorced Gary York and subsequently married William Renchen, who adopted Todd on February 8, 1973.

Appellants argue that an adoption decree can be collaterally attacked only on the grounds that the adoption court lacked jurisdiction. In re J.D., 317 Ill. App. 3d 419, 422, 739 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (2000). Moreover, collateral attacks on adoptions decrees, which disrupt consistently upheld law, and legislative intent have not been, nor should they be, given special treatment within a decedent’s estate under the Probate Act. Todd, on the other hand, argues that he is not attempting to become “un-adopted,” nor is he attacking the adoption decree.

Rather, he is simply trying to establish heirship under the Probate Act in accordance with

section 2 — 4(d)(1). 755 ILCS 5/2 — 4(d)(1) (West 2006). Appellants next argue that Todd’s counterpetition to establish a parent-child relationship is barred by the two-year limitations period set forth in

section 8(a)(1) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/8(a)(l) (West 2006)). Todd disagrees and cites to Tersavich v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford, 143 Ill. 2d 74, 79, 571 N.E.2d 733 (1991), and

section 8(

c) of the Parentage Act in support of his argument that the limitations contained in the Parentage Act are applicable to the case at bar.

Section 8 of the Parentage Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(

c) This Act does not affect the time within which any rights under the Probate Act of 1975 may be asserted beyond the time provided by law relating to distribution and closing of decedent’s estates or to the determination of heirship, or otherwise.” 750 ILCS 45/8 — 4(c) (West 2006). In Tersavich, the plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment that sought the construction of a trust. The plaintiff alleged that she was the daughter of the decedent and was born out of wedlock. Defendant moved for

summary judgment on the basis that the action was time-barred under

section 8 of the Parentage Act. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, and the appellate court reversed. The supreme court affirmed the holding that, as the illegitimate daughter was an heir of the testator by virtue of the Probate Act, the question of her parentage was not at issue and, therefore, the limitations period of the Parentage Act did not apply. Tersavich, 143 Ill. 2d at 81. We agree that the facts before us are different from those in Tersavich. We discuss it because a party raised it. We do not find it controlling.

As in Tersavich, Todd is trying to establish heirship under the Probate Act, rather than attempting to establish a parental relationship under the Parentage Act. We do not find that Todd is trying to “undo” the adoption decree. He alleges a right to inherit from his natural father due to the fact that the Probate Act allows one to inherit from both the adoptive parent and the natural parent when the adoptive parent is “a descendent or a spouse of a descendent of a great-grandparent of the child.” 755 ILCS 5/2 — 4(d)(1) (West 2008).

The propriety of the trial court’s ruling on appellants’ motion to dismiss Todd’s counterpetition to establish a parent-child relationship is not properly before us. However, we find it necessary to discuss this in order to explain our rationale for our answer to the certified question. Prior to filing the counterpetition, Todd had filed his petition for letters of administration alleging a right to inherit from decedent. As set forth above, this is because he alleges that William is a descendant of a great-grandparent of the child pursuant to

section 2 — 4(

d) of the Probate Act. 755 ILCS 5/2 — 4(d) (West 2008). Establishing a parent-child relationship under the Parentage Act is an entirely different matter from seeking to establish heirship under the Probate Act. This is made plain by the language of the Probate Act, which allows a child to inherit from both his adoptive parent and his natural parent where an adoptive parent is a descendant of a great-grandparent of the child. 755 ILCS 5/2 — 4(d) (West 2008). That statute clearly presumes that there is no relationship between the child and his natural parent since it involves only a child who has been adopted.

Therefore, even though we do not address the propriety of the trial court’s ruling in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss the counterpetition to establish a parent-child relationship, we find it to be irrelevant to our answer to the certified question. This is because Todd does not need to establish a parent-child relationship with decedent as defined by the Parentage Act in order to inherit. He only needs to prove that the decedent was his natural father. Under the facts of this case, we find the answer to the certified question to be “No.” The facts of this case are rare but not unique.

The legislature specifically provided for the course of action now taken by Todd. If Todd can prove that Robert was his natural father, he may inherit from both his natural father and adoptive parents in accordance with

section 2 — 4(d)(1) of the Probate Act. 755 ILCS 5/2— 4(d)(1) (West 2006). Contrary to appellants’ arguments, a finding in the probate action that Todd is the natural son of Robert would have no effect on the adoption. William Renchen would still be Todd’s legal father. The Parentage Act states that its time limitations do not affect the time within which any rights under the Probate Act may be asserted relating to the determination of heirship. See 750 ILCS 45/8(c) (West 2006). Appellants and the dissent would have us read this provision out of the Parentage Act.

How else can one establish heirship other than by establishing blood relationships which ultimately depend upon paternity? Why else would the legislature say that the limitations contained in the Parentage Act do not apply when trying to establish heirship under the Probate Act? Clearly, the legislature recognized the obvious: heirship ultimately depends upon paternity. It then clearly stated that the limitations contained in the Parentage Act do not apply to proceedings under the Probate Act relating to the determination of heirship.

The dissent’s argument seems to be anchored on a finding by the trial court in the adoption proceeding that Gary York is Todd’s natural father. The argument is that it is too late to attack that finding. However, the reason Todd cannot dispute the finding in the adoption proceeding is expiration of the statute of limitations contained in the Parentage Act. The dissent ignores the legislature’s directive at

section 8(c). 750 ILCS 45/8(c) (West 2006). The limitations do not apply in this probate proceeding. The dissent implies that Todd must have proved his probate claim before even filing it. Todd alleges a claim against the estate of Robert Renchen. What is magical about this claim where, unlike any other probate claim, it must be proven conclusively before it is filed?

In conjunction with a petition for rehearing, appellants have requested that this court issue a certificate of importance pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 316 (155 111. 2d R. 316) “so that the issue may be decided by the Supreme Court.” We decline to do so. Should appellants wish to file a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (236 111. 2d R. 315), the supreme court can decide for itself whether it wishes to address this issue. The application for a Supreme Court Rule 316 certificate of importance is denied.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative, deny appellants’ petition for rehearing and deny appellants’ application for certificate of importance. Certified question answered. Petition for rehearing denied. Application for certificate of importance denied. WRIGHT, J., concurs.