Anthony Joseph DELANO, Appellant, v. DADE COUNTY et al., Appellees, 287 So. 2d 288

BOYD, Justice. This cause is before us on appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County. Appeal was originally taken from the Circuit Court to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, and the latter Court has transferred the cause to this Court, pursuant to Rule 2.1.a(5)(d), Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A. On April 18, 1973, this Court denied appellee’s motion to transfer the cause to the Third District and suggestion of lack of jurisdiction.

However, after argument of the cause on the merits, our careful reconsideration and analysis of the record and briefs and arguments of counsel sustains the view that the cause .should he transferred to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, for reasons which will be set forth below. While appellant maintains that, “The

Summary Judgment appealed construed controlling provisions of the Florida and Federal Constitutions,” this Court’s recent decision in Ogle v. Pepin prevents us from obtaining jurisdiction over this cause in the suggested manner. Nor is jurisdiction in this Court established by the fact that the trial court, in its order, inherently passed upon the validity of Sections 2-42(22) and 2-47 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County. As to the latter, it has been urged that Florida Constitution

Article VIII,

Section 6(e), F.S.A. [incorporating the provisions of Florida Constitution

Article VIII, Section 11 (1885)], by prohibiting the Legislature from enacting any special laws relating to Dade County, has, in effect, given all Dade County ordinances the dignity of special acts of the Legislature, thus allowing for the direct appeal to this Court of cases in which the trial court has passed upon the validity of such ordinances, pursuant to Florida Constitution

Article V,

Section 3(b)(1), F.S.A. We disagree with this theory of our jurisdiction.

Article V,

Section 3(b)(1), F.S.

A., approved by the citizens of this State in the November, 1972, general election, and becoming effective January 1, 1973, provides: “The Supreme Court shall hear appeals . from orders of trial courts and decisions of district courts of appeal initially and directly passing on the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty . . . (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing provision does not, in our view, allow for a construction which would include the right of direct appeal to this Court of cases in which the trial court has passed upon the validity of Dade County, or any other “Home Rule” county, ordinances.

In this instance, the rule of inclu-sio unius est exclusio alterius is particularly . appropriate. If the citizens of this State had wanted to include Home Rule Ordinances for consideration by this Court on the same basis as state statutes, they could have said . so. They did not. Accordingly, this cause is herewith transferred to the District Court of Appeal, Third District. It is so ordered. CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion. . Said Judgment reads, in pertinent part: “It is therefore “ORDERED and ADJUDGED that “1. Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted; “2. Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby denied; “3. Defendant Dade County has stipulated that in the event this Order is reversed on appeal, and thereby Plaintiff is held entitled tó reinstatement, Plaintiff’s back pay is presently in the amount of $45,962.94 and is entitled to a longevity bonus in the amount of $250.00. “4. Final

Summary Judgment is entered hereby in favor of Defendant Dade County and each party shall bear its own costs.” . 273 So.2d 391 (Fla.1973).