Iva Nelson GONZALES, Appellant, v. CITY OF BELLE GLADE, Appellee; Gloria SMITH and Rudolph Sweet, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee, 287 So. 2d 669

ADKINS, Justice. Iva Nelson Gonzales, hereinafter referred to as “Gonzales,” appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the Municipal Court of the City of Belle Glade, Florida. Gloria Smith and Rudolph Sweet, hereinafter referred to as “Smith and Sweet,” appeal from a judgment of conviction entered by the County Judge’s Court of Jackson County, Florida. Both trial courts passed upon the validity of Fla.Stat. § 877.03, F.S.A. We have jurisdiction. Fla.Const, art. V, § 3(b)(1), F.S.A. This Court has consistently upheld the validity of the challenged statute, most recently in Bradshaw v.

State, 286 So.2d 4 (op. filed November 21, 1973), and prior thereto in State v. Magee, 259 So.2d 139 (Fla.1972). Nothing has occurred to warrant receding from these opinions. The entire records and transcripts in both cases demonstrate that the convictions must be reversed due to the unconstitutional application of the disorderly conduct statute.

In order for the statute to be constitutionally applied, it must be proved that some act on the part of the accused either corrupted the public morals, outraged the sense of public decency, affected the peace and quiet of persons who witnessed the conduct of the accused, or that the accused engaged in brawling or fighting, or engaged in conduct constituting a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct. As to what constitutes a “breach of the peace” or “disorderly conduct,” any factual situation can be viewed in light of the common law meaning of those terms.

This Court has consistently held that statutes should be read in the light of the common law. Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921); Meeks v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 95 So. 670 (1923), and Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845 (Fla.1955). All that appears from the record —taken in the light most favorable to the State and the City — is that Smith and Sweet participated in a protest march, that both made threatening comments to police officers, and that Gonzales was vocally dissatisfied with the service afforded her and her companions in an eating establishment.

There was no evidence that Smith or Sweet struck or even touched a police officer, that they actually offered a physical threat to any officer, or that they violated any law. Likewise, there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by Gonzales with the possible exception of the utilization of an intemperate expletive or two. In neither case was there any evidence that the actions of any of the appellants were more than annoying to those around them, and a violation of Fla.Stat. § 877.03, F.S.A., requires more than the creation of a mere annoyance.

These cases are reversed on the basis of the failure of the State and the City of Belle Glade to prove actions on the part of the appellants which would constitute violations of Fla.Stat. § 877.03, F.S.A. In light of this finding, it is improper to reach the issue of constitutionality vel non. Finch v. Fitzpatrick, 254 So.2d 203 (Fla.1971). For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial courts are reversed and the causes are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed herein. It is so ordered. ' ROBERTS, Acting C. J., McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., and DREW, Justice Retired, concur.

ERVIN, J., specially concurs. BOYD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion, in which ERVIN, J., concurs.