COUNTY OF PALM BEACH, Florida, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida et al., Appellees, 342 So. 2d 56

ENGLAND, Justice. This case is an appeal from a judgment of the Palm Beach County Circuit Court declaring invalid a $50 million bond issue approved by the voters of Palm Beach County. We have jurisdiction pursuant to

Article V,

Section 3(b)(2) of the Florida Constitution. The trial judge below construed the resolution by which the Palm Beach County Commission proposed the bond issue as authorizing the use of the proceeds for the unconstitutional purpose of maintaining beaches and parks, and declared the issue invalid for that reason. He also found that

Chapter 75-471, Laws of Florida, could not cure the complete failure of the county to publish notice of the bond election in the manner required by

Section 100.211, Florida Statutes (1973), because this curative legislation also authorized the use of the bond proceeds for the maintenance of beaches and parks. We reverse. There is no question but that the manner in which the officials of Palm Beach County conducted the election proceedings surrounding this bond issue was deplorable. Infirmity after infirmity crept into the bonding process, and ill-considered and equally careless attempts were made to cure the defects.

Nonetheless, the present posture of the matter is that we are obliged to accept or reject that which the voters of the county overwhelmingly approved. Based on the law presently in existence in this state, we can fulfill the voters’ expectations by validating the bonds, with a limiting construction placed on the use of the word “maintenance”.

Article VII,

Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, limits the power of counties to issue bonds to the two purposes of financing or refinancing capital projects, and to refund outstanding bonds at a lower interest cost. Bonds cannot be issued for the purpose of non-capital expenditures, such as payment of daily maintenance expenses.

In this case, the County Commission passed a resolution which stated in relevant part that the bond proceeds would be used to finance “the cost of the acquisition, maintenance and preservation of beaches, parks, bicycle trails, parking facilities, access strips and facilities appertenant (sic) thereto . . . .” If it were clear that references to “maintenance” were intended to mean constitutionally prohibited non-capital expenditures, we would have no choice but to affirm the judgment of the trial court. It is far from clear, however.

County Commissioners are presumed to have acted in accordance with their duty to uphold the Constitution of this state, and this Court is bound to avoid constitutional questions concerning a statute by severing objectionable phraseology where necessary. In the context of the resolution the term “maintenance” is not so clear and unambiguous that all would agree it means operating as opposed to capital expenses. It reasonably can be read to mean “capital maintenance”, such as replacing fallen trees or eroded beaches. When such ambiguity exists, intent is the touchstone.

Before us, the Commission has avowed its intention to use the bond proceeds only for constitutionally proper capital projects, and after the election it adopted a resolution validating the election which omitted the word “maintenance”. We accept the averments of the Commission, cognizant of the fact that if any attempt is made to use bond proceeds in an improper manner an action for injunc-tive relief would lie. As regards the failure to comply with the notice requirements of

Section 100.211, this Court has very clearly stated that after-the-fact validating legislation is perfectly proper to cure procedural defects. In this case the Legislature in

Chapter 75-471 declared the election valid because notice had been given through the mailing of a sample ballot to all registered voters in the county. While such substituted notice would not constitute substantial compliance with

Section 100.211, the facts of this case present no grounds for the overruling of established precedent. Our construction of the term “maintenance” as used by the Commission is also applicable to the use of that word by the Legislature. We therefore find that the failure to give statutory notice was cured by subsequent legislative validation. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Palm Beach County Circuit Goúrt is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings- not inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, SUND-BERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion with which ROBERTS, J., concurs. . Cf. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798 (Fla.1957). . State v. Calhoun County, 126 Fla. 376, 170 So. 883 (1936). . Weiss v. Leonardy, 160 Fla. 570, 36 So.2d 184 (1948). . Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936). . Coon v. Board of Public Instruction, 203 So.2d 497 (Fla.1967) (curative legislation abrogating a prior legislative mandate setting the percentage of freeholders required to petition for an election); State v.

County of Sarasota, 155 So.2d 543 (Fla.1963) (curative legislation directed at defects in statutory publication of notice requirements). .Chapter 75-471 provides: “All acts and proceedings in connection with the election held in Palm Beach County on November 5, 1974, including the failure to publish notice of such election as required by s. 100.211, Florida Statutes, since notice of such election was in fact given by the mailing of sample ballots to all registered voters, to authorize the issuance of bonds of Palm Beach County, for the purpose of providing funds for financing the costs of acquisition and maintenance of beaches and parks are hereby ratified, validated, and confirmed and said election is declared to be legal and valid in all respects.”