STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jorge A. RODRIQUEZ, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Julio A. MELENDEZ, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Eula Mae SHERROD, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. John W. HARRIS, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Johnny B. SMITH, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Bessie L. THOMAS, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Eddie HUMPHRIES, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Bessie S. SHORTER, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Lester BENNETT, Appellee, 365 So. 2d 157

ALDERMAN, Justice. These consolidated cases are before us on direct appeals by the State from orders of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County and the County Court of Pinellas County. The various defendants were charged with violation of

Section 409.325(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), which provides in pertinent part that “[a]ny person who knowingly: (a) [u]ses, transfers, acquires, traffics, alters, forges, or possesses ... a food stamp ... in any manner not authorized by law is guilty of a crime . [Emphasis added.]” The trial courts dismissed the charges against the defendants because they found the language “in any manner not authorized by law” to be unconstitutionally vague. We conclude that

Section 409.325(2)(

a) is not unconstitutional, and we reverse. Legislative enactments are presumed valid. When reasonably possible and consistent with the protection of constitutional rights, this Court will resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor of its constitutionality. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So.2d 257 (Fla.1976). The test to determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague is whether men of common understanding and intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.

To meet the constitutional challenge of vagueness, a statute must convey a sufficiently definite warning as to what conduct is proscribed. Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla.1972). The defendants argue that the statute is vague because it does not expressly delineate what acts are prohibited or in what manner a food stamp may be used, and they also assert that the phrase “not authorized by law” has already been tested for vagueness in Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 30 So.2d 102 (1947), wherein this Court decided that

Chapter 22761, Acts of 1945, was unconstitutionally vague. The statute in Locklin provided in part:

Section 1. That it shall be unlawful for any person to commit any act under color of authority as an officer, agent or employee of the United States government, State of Florida, or any political subdivision thereof when such act is not authorized by law; or to intimidate or otherwise by color of authority cause any other person to release information or allow inspection of records or extend a privilege not required by law. Therein this Court determined; Under the provisions of this Act an officer or employee is just as amenable to prosecution for

an act done in good faith, when that act is not specifically authorized by law, as he would be for the commission of

an act done with evil intent and wilfully done in violation of law. . . [Emphasis supplied.] Locklin is distinguishable from the case now before us in that the statute involved in Locklin was broader than

Section 409.-325(2)(

a) because it prohibited a person from committing “any act under color or authority as an officer . . . when such act is not authorized by law.” In the present food stamp cases, however, because of the peculiar nature of the food stamp program, because it is a federal program, and because

Chapter 409 gives notice that it is a federal program with federal regulations, we conclude that the Legislature, by the use of the language “not authorized by law,” means not authorized by state and federal food stamp law. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the entire statute under consideration must be considered in determining legislative intent. Effect must be given to every part of the

section and every part of the statute as a whole. The Court will view the entire statute to determine legislative intent. State v. Hayles, 240 So.2d 1 (Fla.1970). Implicit in

Section 409.325(2)(a), when read in conjunction with the other sections of

Chapter 409, is the fact that the words “in any manner not authorized by law” refer to state and federal food stamp law. For example,

Section 409.-275 sets forth that the food stamp program is authorized expressly by the Congress of the United States and is administered by the Department of Agriculture.

Section 409.026 provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services shall receive and distribute food stamps donated by the United States and promulgate regulations pertaining thereto.

Section 409.-325(2)(a), when read in conjunction with Sections 409.275 and 409.026, is sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice that federal food stamp legislation and United States Department of Agriculture administrative regulations apply. Fla.Admin.Code Rule IOC-3.16 provides: The Food Stamp Program is administered according to rules and regulations established by Congress and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. 2015(

b) provided: Coupons issued to eligible households shall be used by them only to purchase food in retail food stores which have been approved for participation in the food stamps program at prices prevailing in such stores . 7 U.S.C. 2012(

b) defined “food” to mean: any food or food product for human consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, those foods which are identified on the package as being imported, and meat and meat products which are imported.

Section 409.325(2)(

a) is sufficiently definite to inform the defendants that their conduct in selling non-food items for food stamps was proscribed.

Upholding the constitutional validity of the Washington welfare fraud statute against an attack of vagueness, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that applicants or recipients of welfare assistance who possess ordinary intelligence and understanding know that, by their very nature, public assistance grants depend on eligibility, need, resource and income, and these persons should know that, in applying for public assistance, they are required by statute to report the truth in supplying material information. State v. Knowles, 79 Wash.2d 835, 490 P.2d 113 (1971).

Therein, the Court emphasized: [W]hen one participates in, becomes a part of, or by operation of law is subject to a particular statute which includes provisions imposing criminal or penal sanctions, he incurs a social as well as a legal duty to ascertain what conduct is required of him. And if the statute is so phrased that a person of ordinary understanding can be said to comprehend from its language what is prohibited and what is required, it is not unconstitutionally vague or uncertain. 490 P.2d at 116.

Defendants additionally argue that, if this Court holds that the phrase “in any manner not authorized by law” refers to state and federal food stamp law, then

Section 409.325(2)(

a) constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The State responds that it is well-settled by case law that the Legislature may adopt provisions of federal statutes and administrative rules that are in existence and in effect at the time the legislation is enacted. In Florida Industrial Commission v. State, 155 Fla. 772, 21 So.2d 599 (1945), we held that the Legislature may approve and adopt provisions of federal statutes and administrative rules made by federal administrative bodies, which provisions are in existence and in effect at the time the Legislature acts.

We went on to say, however, that to adopt in advance any federal act or ruling of any federal administrative body which may be adopted in the future would amount to an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. See also Freimuth v. State, 272 So.2d 473 (Fla.1972). More recently, in Department of Legal Affairs v.

Rogers, supra, wherein the “Little FTC Act” was challenged upon several grounds, one of which being that the Legislature intended to incorporate future holdings of a federal administrative body, this Court stated: Another aspect of the issue of delegation of legislative authority concerns the question of whether the legislature by the subject act intended to incorporate future (subsequent to the effective date of the statute) decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and federal court decisions.

To preserve the constitutional validity of the act, we would have to say that the legislative enactment intended only decisions made prior to its enactment. [Citations omitted.] Since the Legislature is presumed to have enacted a valid and constitutional law and since statutes are to be construed, when reasonably possible and consistent with protection of constitutional rights, in such a manner so as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, we conclude that the Legislature intended to incorporate federal law and regulations in effect at the time

Section 409.325(2)(

a) was enacted. The incorporation of only the federal law in effect at the time of the enactment of

Section 409.325 may appear unworkable because changes in the federal law would not take effect in Florida. The Legislature, however, to avoid this problem, may update

Chapter 409 each year, as they update Florida’s corporate income tax statute by bringing forward the Internal Revenue Code each year. See

Section 220.03(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1977). Accordingly, since we determine that

Section 409.325(2)(

a) is constitutional, we reverse the orders of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County and the County Court of Pinellas County and remand these cases for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. ENGLAND, C. J., and BOYD and OVER-TON, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, J., dissents with an opinion, with which ADKINS and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. . Defendant Rodriquez was charged with knowingly selling a .22 caliber revolver for $240 worth of United States Department of Agriculture food stamps. Defendant Melendez was charged with purchasing $1,000 worth of food stamps from another individual for $625.

Defendants Sherrod, Harris, Smith, Shorter, Humphries, Thomas and Bennett were each charged separately with selling non-food items in exchange for United States government food stamps. . Chapters 78-58, 77-402, 76-173, 75-293, 74-324, 73-321, and 72-278, Laws of Florida.