Eddie Samuel IVORY, Charles Johnson, Edmond Duhart, Ben Chaney, Blair Smith, George Heller, Robert J. Butler, and James Rutledge, Appellants, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Fla., Paul Mercheck, Director, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Appellees, 393 So. 2d 542

ENGLAND, Justice. This cause is before this Court on direct appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court upholding as facially valid

section 944.485, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), which requires, as a condition of parole eligibility, that prisoners disclose their assets and income, and that they be assessed the cost of their subsistence in prison. The payment of subsistence costs is subject to the prisoner’s ability to pay, and certain specified exemptions. Appellants raise several alleged constitutional infirmities in the subject statute, including abridgment of their right of disclo-sural privacy based on a decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc. v. State ex rel.

Shellenberg, 360 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), violation of the prohibition on ex post facto laws, deprivation of property without procedural due process, denial of the privilege against self-incrimination, and the unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The issue of disclosural privacy is foreclosed by our recent decision in Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc., 379 So.2d 633 (Fla.1980), quashing the lower court’s decision on which appellants rely. Similarly, the other alleged infirmities raised by appellants are devoid of merit and do not warrant extended discussion.

Appellants’ ex post facto argument presumes that

section 944.485 operates to increase “punishment” for prisoners whose crimes were committed prior to its effective date. This presumption, however, is mistaken, as the purpose of the statute is not punitive. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960); Zarsky v. State, 300 So.2d 261 (Fla.1974). Appellants’ procedural due process arguments presume a deprivation of liberty or property, but parole is neither. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); Moore v.

Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935, 94 S.Ct. 2649, 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974). Appellants’ assertion that the financial disclosure requirement violates their privilege against self-incrimination is raised prematurely. The claim of privilege must ordinarily be made at the time that disclosures are sought, see Communist Par-ty of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 105-10, 81 S.Ct. 1357, 1415-17, 6 L.Ed.2d 625 (1961), and it can appropriately be raised by individual inmates on their disclosure forms, see Garner v.

United States, 424 U.S. 648, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976). Finally, appellants’ unlawful delegation argument is simply not persuasive. In enacting

section 944.485, the legislature has prescribed sufficient standards and guidelines to comply with

article II,

section 3, of the Florida Constitution. Reynolds v. State, 383 So.2d 228 (Fla.1980); Florida State Board of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So.2d 653 (Fla.1979). The trial court’s order upholding

section 944.485 in the face of appellants’ constitutional challenges is affirmed. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C. J., and ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur. ADKINS and OVERTON, JJ., concur in the result only. BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.

Section 944.485, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978) provides:

(1) In recognition of the fact that many prisoners in the correctional system have sources of income and assets outside of the correctional system, which may include bank accounts, inheritances, real estate, social security payments, veteran’s payments, and other types of financial resources, and in recognition of the fact that the daily subsistence cost of incarcerating prisoners in the correctional system is a great burden on taxpayers of the state, each prisoner in the state correctional system, except those who have entered into an agreement under s. 947.135 prior to October 1, 1978: (

a) Shall disclose all revenue or assets as a condition of parole eligibility. (

b) Shall pay from such income and assets, except where such income is exempt by state or federal law, all or a fair portion of the prisoner’s daily subsistence costs, based upon the inmate’s ability to pay, the liability or potential liability of the inmate to the victim or the guardian or the estate of the victim, and the needs of his dependents. tí) Any prisoner who is directed to pay all or a fair portion of daily subsistence costs is entitled to reasonable advance notice of the assessment and shall be afforded an opportunity to present reasons for opposition to the assessment.

(3) The department shall promulgate, within 90 days of October 1, 1978, rules which implement this section. For the rules of the Department of Corrections regarding the financial disclosure of inmates pursuant to

section 944.485, see Florida Administrative Code rule 33-17.