James Harold THOMPSON, as a Citizen and Taxpayer of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. The Honorable D. Robert GRAHAM, Governor of The State of Florida, and George Firestone, Secretary of State of the State of Florida, Respondents, 481 So. 2d 1212

McDonald, justice. We have before us a petition for a writ of mandamus asking that we direct the secretary of state to expunge certain of the governor’s vetoes from the state’s official records. We have jurisdiction pursuant to

article V,

section 3(b)(8), Florida Constitution, and we decline to issue the writ. The 1985 legislature enacted committee substitute for senate bill 848, a bill which amended chapters 235 and 203, Florida Statutes, and which authorized and provided funds for specific public education capital outlay (PECO) projects. In June 1985 the governor vetoed several of the specific appropriations in

section 35 of CS/SB 848. Claiming that CS/SB 848 is not a general appropriations bill and, therefore, is not subject to the governor’s line item veto provided for in

article III,

section 8(

a) of the state constitution, the Florida House of Representatives filed this petition for writ of mandamus. The governor responded to the petition and also filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the house lacks both capacity to sue and standing to seek the requested relief. Thompson, speaker of the house, then joined the suit, petitioning as a citizen and taxpayer of the state. We disagree with Thompson and hold that the appropriations contained in CS/SB 848 are subject to the line item veto.

The 1968 Constitution, in dealing with vetoes, provides: In all cases except general appropriations bills, the veto shall extend to the entire bill. The governor may veto any specific appropriation in a general appropriation bill, but may not veto any qualification or restriction without also vetoing the appropriation to which it relates. Art. Ill, § 8(a), Fla. Const.

Article IV,

section 18 of the predecessor 1885 Florida Constitution provided in part: “The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bills making appropriations of money embracing distinct items.” In Brown v. Firestone, 882 So.2d 654 (Fla.1980), we noted the concerns of the Constitutional Revision Commission about this Court’s decision in Green v. Rawls, 122 So.2d 10 (Fla.1960), which seemingly construed

article IV,

section 18 to authorize the governor to veto an appended qualification in the use of an appropriated item without vetoing the appropriation itself. We concluded that “the principal motivation behind revision of

article IV,

section 18, was to prevent the governor from altering legislative intent by requiring him to veto both a qualification or restriction and the appropriation to which it relates. 382-So.2d at 668. It was “to prevent the creative exercise of the gubernatorial veto.” Id. at 667. In Brown we made it clear that under the current veto provision the governor cannot do this. He must accept the appropriation with the qualification or must reject it all. We do not believe the 1968 change otherwise modified the governor’s veto powers as it related to appropriations.

Chapter 216, Florida Statutes (1983), sets out the general state budget process. That

chapter defines an appropriations act as the authorization of the Legislature, based upon legislative budgets ..., for the expenditure of amounts of money by an agency and the legislative branch for stated purposes in the performance of the functions it is authorized by law to perform. § 216.011(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1983). By statute the commissioner of education is directed to submit a budget covering PECO projects to the legislature, which budget request will include the amounts of needed appropriations. § 235.41, Fla.Stat. (1983). Moreover,

chapter 235 defines a capital project, for PECO purposes, as “sums of money appropriated from the Public Education Capital Outlay and Debt Service Trust Fund to the state system of public education and other educational agencies as authorized by the legislature.” § 235.-011(2), Fla.Stat. (1983). Finally, an appropriation is defined as “a legal authorization to make expenditures for specific purposes within the amounts authorized in the appropriations act.” § 216.011(l)(b), Fla.Stat. (1983). In its title CS/SB 848 states that it is

an act “authorizing and providing funding for specified public educational capital outlay projects.” The

definitions set out lead to the conclusion that, in the context of this PECO bill, “authorizing and providing funding” is simply another way of saying “appropriating” and in our opinion comes within the definition of a general appropriations bill as it relates to the governor’s veto power. Thompson, to support his contention that CS/SB 848 is not a general appropriations bill, cites Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 57 S.Ct. 252, 81 L.Ed. 312 (1937).

In Bengzon the Governor-General of the Phillipines used his line item veto to strike a single section, dealing with gratuities for justices of the peace, from a twelve-section act. The Court found the act not to be an appropriations bill on which the line item veto could be used. In so holding the Court defined both what an appropriations bill is and is not: The term “appropriation act” obviously would not include

an act of general legislation; and a bill proposing such

an act is not converted into an appropriation bill simply because it has engrafted upon it a

section making an appropriation. An appropriation bill is one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriations of money from the public treasury. Id. at 413, 57 S.Ct. at 253. The Court then went on and stated: “To say otherwise would be to confuse an appropriation bill proposing sundry appropriations of money with a bill proposing sundry provisions of general law and carrying an appropriation as an incident.” Id. Seizing on the fact that only one of CS/SB 848’s sections, covering twelve of the act’s eighty pages, authorizes expenditure of funds, Thompson argues that any appropriations in the PECO bill are mere incidents to substantive legislation.

Section 35 of CS/SB 848, however, contains eighty-six specific items and authorizes the expenditure of over a half billion dollars. We simply do not see how these appropriations are merely “incidental” and necessary solely to implement a substantive law as was the case in Bengzon. Each appropriated item is a distinct project and not dependent on any other; collectively, the allocated funds amount to a general appropriation for educational capital outlay. Except for the fact that each is an educational project item, there is no direct relationship between those items vetoed by the governor and those allowed to become law.

Article III,

section 8(

a) gives the governor the power to “veto any specific appropriation in a general appropriation bill.” “An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.” Bengzon, 299 U.S. at 414-15, 57 S.Ct. at 254. Thompson argues that holding CS/SB 848 subject to the line item veto will infringe upon the legislature’s prerogative to write the laws and to establish funding priorities. We do not agree.

The veto power, while it can be used to nullify or suspend legislative intent, cannot be used to alter or amend legislative intent. Brown v. Firestone. The governor may not reassign vetoed moneys to other uses; he can neither create projects nor require the legislature to do so. The funds vetoed in this appropriation remain unexpended rather than being used for a different purpose. The governor’s veto power is balanced against the legislature’s power. To do as this petition requests would have a chilling effect on this balance of power.

We hold that the governor had the power to exercise the line item veto as to CS/SB 848, and we decline to issue the requested writ. It is so ordered. OVERTON, J., concurs. BOYD, C.J., concurs with an opinion. SHAW, J., concurs specially with an opinion. ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion. EHRLICH, J., dissents with an opinion in which ADKINS, J., concurs. . Ch. 85-116, Laws of Fla. . Because Thompson as a citizen and taxpayer of the state clearly has standing to bring this suit, Brown v. Firestone, 382 So.2d 654 (Fla.1980); Department of Administration v.

Horne, 269 So.2d 659 (Fla.1972), we need not decide in this opinion the question of whether the house, or Thompson as speaker of the house, has capacity or standing to bring this action. Thus, we decide this case as though Thompson were the sole petitioner. We reserve the right, at our option, to deal with this issue by separate order.