Belinda McGUIRE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent, 489 So. 2d 729
Opinion
McDONALD, Justice. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has certified the following question as one of great public importance: IS RULE 16-D-2.04(l)(e), FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, WHICH REQUIRES IN PART THAT “BATHING COSTUMES SHALL CONFORM TO COMMONLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS” UNCONSTITUTIONAL? McGuire v. State, 466 So.2d 236, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
article V,
section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. We answer in the negative and approve the opinion of the district court. Belinda McGuire was arrested on May 14, 1982 after jogging without a bathing suit top on Air Force Beach in the John D. McArthur Beach State Recreation area. Prior to the state assuming control of the property, the northern portion of Air Force Beach had been considered “clothing optional.” After the property became a state recreation area, however, the Department of Natural Resources attempted to eliminate this option. McGuire was cited for violating rule 16D-2.04(l)(
e) of the Florida Administrative Code, which provides in pertinent part: “In every bathing area all persons shall be clothed as to prevent any indecent exposure of the person. All bathing costumes shall conform to commonly accepted standards at all times.” At trial McGuire challenged rule 16D-2.04(l)(
e) on vagueness grounds. The trial court upheld the conviction and the circuit court, in its appellate capacity, affirmed. On writ of certiorari the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam without opinion. On the authority of Moffett v. State, 340 So.2d 1155 (Fla.1976), the district court denied McGuire’s subsequent petition for rehearing. The court did, however, certify the instant question to this Court. McGuire argues that rule 16D-2.-04(l)(
e) is unconstitutional on the grounds of facial overbreadth and facial vagueness. She contends that the provision is over-broad because it can be extended beyond nude sunbathing to other areas of conduct such as, presumably, the wearing of provocative but otherwise acceptable bathing attire. We find that McGuire lacks standing to raise the overbreadth issue. This Court recently examined an analogous claim in City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla.1985). In Del Percio the owner and manager of a bar appealed their convictions of violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting partial female nudity.
Although the circuit court affirmed their convictions, the district court held the ordinance, inter alia, overbroad and reversed the convictions. The ordinance prohibited any female person from exposing “to public view any portion of her breasts below the top of the areola.” Id. at 199. In quashing the opinion of the district court, this Court analyzed the doctrine of overbreadth as applied to nudity regulations. The respondents in Del Percio argued that the ordinance prohibited socially acceptable attire such as swimsuits and low cut evening gowns and therefore reached beyond the permissible scope of regulation.
This Court, however, ruled that the respondents had no standing to challenge the burden that the ordinance potentially placed on such activities because individuals had no constitutionally protected right to wear such attire. More specifically, we stated that “the right to dress as one pleases ... has little or no first amendment implications.” Id. at 202. McGuire propounds largely the same overbreadth argument as did the respondents in Del Percio.
While acknowledging that topless jogging could be constitutionally prohibited by a specifically drawn rule, McGuire wishes to step into the shoes of other beach-goers who might inadvertently violate commonly accepted standards by wearing unduly provocative bathing attire. The regulation in question, however, does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, and, thus, McGuire is foreclosed from this avenue of attack. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Del Percio, 476 So.2d at 202.
Turning to McGuire’s vagueness argument, we stress that nudity is not in and of itself a constitutionally protected activity. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 n. 7, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2273 n. 7, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1323, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th Cir.1984). Nudity is protected as speech only when combined with some mode of expression which itself is entitled to first amendment protection. South Florida Free Beaches, 734 F.2d at 610; Chapin v.
Town of Southampton, 457 F.Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D.N.Y.1978). See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). Nude sunbathing is not associated with dance, literature, or any other form of expression. South Florida Free Beaches, 734 F.2d at 610; Chapin, 457 F.Supp. at 1173. Accordingly, the courts of this nation have uniformly held that unassociated nudity is subject to government limitations.
See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 512, 77 S.Ct. at 1323; South Florida Free Beaches, 734 F.2d at 610; Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir.1976); United States v. Hy-mans, 463 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.1972); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash.2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978); State v. Miller, 54 Hawaii 1, 501 P.2d 363 (1972). In light of this lack of constitutional protection, McGuire must, demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); South Florida Free Beaches, 734 F.2d at 611.
Generally speaking, a vagueness inquiry focuses on ensuring that criminal responsibility does not attach where one could not reasonably understand that contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963); City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So.2d 151 (Fla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989, 93 S.Ct. 312, 34 L.Ed.2d 256 (1972). McGuire argues that the phrase “shall conform to commonly accepted standards at all times” is so vague that she did not know that topless jogging and sunbathing on a public beach were prohibited.
We find this contention remarkable because on April 28, 1982, well before her arrest on May 12, McGuire received an individual warning from the park manager against sunbathing topless at Air Force Beach. Moreover, this Court has previously addressed an analogous statute. Moffett v. State involved two women arrested for topless sunbathing on a public beach in St. Lucie County.
They were convicted of violating Florida’s disorderly conduct statute, which provides in pertinent part that “[wjhoever commits such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.” § 877.03, Fla.Stat. (1975). On direct appeal to this Court, the two women attacked the statute on several constitutional grounds. In affirming the convictions, this Court stated: Since the beginning of civilization public nudity has been considered improper.
We are fully aware of the changing social values as expressed in the new modes of dress, but are convinced that by enacting
Section 877.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the Legislature intended to prohibit adult females from appearing in public places, including Florida’s beaches, with openly exposed breasts. 340 So.2d at 1156. In rejecting the appellants’ constitutional claims, the Court noted that it had addressed these same issues previously in State v. Magee, 259 So.2d 139 (Fla.1972). In Magee the police observed the appellees having sexual relations in an automobile and charged the appellees with violating
section 877.03. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding
section 877.03 unconstitutionally void for vagueness. According to the trial court, the statute’s language lacked the “definiteness and certainty required to establish standards that convey to the average citizen of common understanding a warning of what conduct is proscribed by the statute.” Id. at 140. On appeal, however, this Court disagreed. We ruled that the terms “public decency” and “corrupt the public morals” are terms of general understanding and that anyone of common intelligence would be perfectly aware that such public exposure was prohibited. Id.
The reasoning, expressed in Moffett, behind prohibiting adult females from exposing their breasts on public beaches applies equally in the instant case. Additionally, any person of common intelligence would be perfectly aware from the posted notices that an adult female is prohibited from jogging topless on Air Force Beach. See South Florida Free Beaches, 734 F.2d at 611; Magee, 259 So.2d at 140; Morales v. State, 407 So.2d 230, 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We stress our belief that the Department of Natural Resources could have and should have utilized more precise language in drafting rule 16D-2.04(l)(e).
If the government wishes to prohibit the public exhibition of genitalia, the areolae of womens’ breasts, or pubic hair, then the government should say so. The regulation of public nudity, however, is within the ambit of the state’s police power, and we will not second-guess the specific language which the state may use in regulating such activity where that language is not constitutionally infirm. A law need not furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited in order to comply with constitutional requirements. Morales, 407 So.2d at 231.
McGuire has failed to demonstrate that the regulation at issue is so vague as to fail to put her on notice that her activities were proscribed. We find this result particularly compelling in the case at bar because park officials issued an individual warning to McGuire prior to her arrest. McGuire also argues that the judge misstated the law when he instructed the jury that indecent exposure means exposing one’s self “in such a manner as to be offensive to common decency, or lewd or obscene.” McGuire insists that a finding of lasciviousness should have been specifically required as well.
We find, however, that the instruction, by containing the synonymous word “lewd,” sufficiently conveyed this meaning to the jury. See McKinley v. State, 33 Okl.Cr. 434, 244 P. 208 (1926); Black’s Law Dictionary 817 (5th ed. 1979). Likewise, we find McGuire’s objections to certain testimony and prose-cutorial statements to be without merit. Therefore, we approve the opinion of the district court. It is so ordered. BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs. SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ADKINS, J., concurs.
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