John OVERSTREET, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent, 629 So. 2d 125

PER CURIAM. We review Overstreet v. State, 611 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in which the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance: PURSUANT TO

SECTION 775.084(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHEN ADJUDICATION IS WITHHELD AND A DEFENDANT SENTENCED AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TO INCARCERATION FOLLOWED BY PROBATION SUBSEQUENTLY COMMITS A FELONY WHILE INCARCERATED FOR THE PRIOR OFFENSES, CAN THE PRIOR OFFENSES INVOLVING WITHHELD ADJUDICATION BE TREATED AS PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR PURPOSES OF HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDER SENTENCING? We have jurisdiction pursuant to

article V,

section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution and answer the question in the negative. Overstreet committed the instant offense while incarcerated for three 1990 cases, involving multiple felony offenses. The court withheld adjudication on each of the 1990 offenses and sentenced Overstreet as a youthful offender to four years in the Department of Corrections boot camp, to be followed by a two-year probationary period. While he was in boot camp, the State charged Overstreet with aggravated battery on another inmate, and he pled nolo conten-dere to the reduced charge of aggravated assault.

During sentencing, the State introduced copies of the 1990 offenses (in which adjudication was withheld) to establish the predicate for his being sentenced as an habitual violent felony offender. The trial court treated the 1990 offenses as convictions and sentenced Overstreet to a five-year term as an habitual offender, and the district court affirmed. In construing subsection 775.084(2), Florida Statutes (1991), we must bear in mind that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in a manner most favorable to the accused. Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991).

The State concedes that a literal reading of subsection 775.084(2) would not include offenses committed during the incar-cerative portion of a sentence. Nevertheless, the State contends that the legislature intended to include those individuals who commit a felony before their term of incarceration, community control, or any other sentence has expired and that a literal reading of the

section contravenes legislative intent and public policy. We disagree. Legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. S.B.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So.2d 687 (Fla.1978). The legislature is assumed to know the meaning of the words in the statute and to have expressed its intent by the use of those words. In the instant ease, the plain language of subsection 775.-084(2) includes only those offenses occurring while on probation, and nothing in the statute indicates any legislative intent to the contrary.

We decline to add words to a statute where, as in this case, the language is clear and unambiguous. “It is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language.” State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691 (Fla.1993). If the legislature did not intend the results mandated by the statute’s plain language, then the appropriate remedy is for it to amend the statute. Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision of the district court. It is so ordered.

BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. McDONALD, J., dissents with an opinion. . Subsection 775.084(2) reads: "For the purposes of this section, the placing of a person on probation without an adjudication of guilt shall be treated as a prior conviction if the subsequent offense for which he is to be sentenced was committed during such probationary period.”