STATE of Florida, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Todd E. DUMAS, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, 700 So. 2d 1223

HARDING, Justice. We have for review Dumas v. State, 686 So.2d 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance: UNDEQ So.2d 370 (Fla. 1995), REQUIRING THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED REGARDING THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED PRIOR TO CONVICTING A DEFENDANT OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT WITH INJURY OR DEATH, DID THE 1993 AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA STATUTE 316.027, WHICH DIVIDED THE.

OFFENSE OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT INTO TWO FELONIES, ONE A SECOND DEGREE FELONY IF A DEATH WAS INVOLVED, AND THE OTHER A THIRD DEGREE FELONY IF AN INJURY WAS INVOLVED, THEN. REQUIRE THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED REGARDING THE MANCUSO KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT BASED ON THE ACTUAL OFFENSE CHARGED, TO WIT: DEATH IF SO CHARGED OR INJURY IF SO CHARGED? Id. at 626-27. We have jurisdiction pursuant to

article V,

section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question in the negative. Todd E. Dumas was convicted of vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in a death after he struck and killed a pedestrian along Interstate 4 in Orlando on the night of August 4, 1994.

The statute under which Dumas was convicted, entitled “Accidents involving death or personal injuries,” was amended in 1993 to create two separate offenses: leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, a third degree felony; and leaving the scene of an accident involving death, a second degree felony. See § 316.027(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). On appeal, the district court reversed Dumas’ conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving death, finding that the jury had been improperly instructed as to the knowledge element for this offense.

The trial court instructed the jury that the State was required to prove that Dumas “knew or should have known that the death of or injury to [the victim] resulted from the collision.” The district court concluded that the jury must be instructed in the alternative, depending on the charge involved, and that in the instant case the jury had been instructed that it could convict Dumas for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in a death if it found that he left the scene knowing only that an injury had occurred. Dumas, 686 So.2d at 625. The district court cited this Court’s analysis in State v.

Mancuso, 652 So.2d 370 (Fla.1995), and the new jury instruction which followed our decision in Mancuso as supporting this conclusion in Dumas’ case. Dumas, 686 So.2d at 626. In Mancuso, this Court held that “criminal liability under

section 316.027 requires proof that the driver charged with leaving the scene [of an accident involving death or injury] either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that the jury should be so instructed.” 652 So.2d at 372. We accordingly directed the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases to prepare an instruction consistent with our opinion in Mancuso. Id.

The new instruction, which was not approved in time to be applicable to the instant case, provides: Before you can find the defendant guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 3. (Defendant) knew or should have known of the [injury to] [death of] the person. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 280 g. In the instant case, the district court concluded that the bracketed portions of the instruction must be given in the alternative depending on the charge involved. Dumas, 686 So.2d at 626.

The court further concluded that such instruction is consistent with the reasoning of Mancuso. Id. We do not agree. In Mancuso, we determined that knowledge was an essential element of

section 316.027 because (1) the statute imposes a more severe penalty for leaving an accident where personal injuries are involved than does a similar statute imposing sanctions where only property damage is involved; and (2) the statute requires a driver to take an affirmative course of action which necessarily requires that the driver be aware of the facts giving rise to the duty. 652 So.2d at 372. When this Court decided Mancuso in 1995,

section 316.027 addressed only one crime, the felony of willfully leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death. The 1993 amendment divided the offense into two felonies: leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury (which remained a third-degree felony) and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (which became a second-degree felony). See § 316.027(l)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). In Dumas, the district court concluded that this division requires that the knowledge element be divided as well.

Under the district court’s construction of the statute,'the State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that a death occurred in order to obtain a conviction for the second-degree felony of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. In contrast, the State contends that only knowledge of injury need be proven in either case and, rather than the driver’s knowledge of the extent of the injuries, it is the result that determines what offense has occurred. We find the State’s construction of the statute to be the correct one.

Florida law imposes an affirmative duty on a driver to stop, render aid, and provide certain information necessary for an insurance claim and an accident report whenever there is an injury. § 316.062, Fla. Stat. (1995). Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete these duties. § 316.027(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). One of the main purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive medical assistance as soon as possible. Herring v.

State, 435 So.2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“It is apparent that the purpose of sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance and names of those involved in the traffic accident is exchanged by the parties.”). The fact that a death rather than an injury has occurred does not trigger a different set of duties. Thus, the knowledge element that triggers the affirmative duty is the same in each circumstance, but the sanction imposed is determined by the results of the accident.

This result-driven sanction implicitly recognizes the possibility that a fleeing driver’s failure to stop and render aid may be the reason that an injured person dies. Moreover, requiring proof that a driver had knowledge of death would lead to an absurd result: a driver who callously leaves the scene of a serious accident can avoid a second-degree felony conviction by disavowing knowledge of death. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, we find this construction of

section 316.027 to be consistent with our opinion in Mancuso. We noted that there are two primary rationales for interpreting the statute as requiring knowledge of injury: (1) the statute imposes a more severe criminal penalty for leaving the scene of an accident where personal injuries are involved than does a similar statute which imposes sanctions where only property- damage is involved; and (2) a driver must be aware of the facts giving rise to the affirmative duties imposed by the statute in order to be held liable for not performing those duties. Mancuso, 652 So.2d at 372.

These rationales are not undercut by a single knowledge standard.

There is a vast gulf between the sanctions imposed for leaving the scene of an accident where only property damage is involved, and where knowledge need not be proven, and the criminal penalties for leaving the scene of an accident where injury or death is involved. ' Compare § 316.061(1), Fla.' Stat. (1995) (sanction for leaving scene of accident involving property damage is fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than sixty days or both) with § 316.027(l)(a) (sanction for leaving scene of accident involving personal injury is fine not exceeding $5000 or term of imprisonment not exceeding five years or both) and § 316.027(l)(b) (sanction for leaving scene of accident involving death is fine not exceeding $10,000 or term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years or both).

Also,- the State - must still prove that the driver was aware of the facts giving rise to the affirmative duty: that personal injury has occurred. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision below. It is so ordered. OVERTON, GRIMES and WELLS, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion in which KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. . Prior to the 1993 amendment, the statute provided that leaving the scene of an "accident resulting in injury or death” was a third-degree felony. § 316.027, Fla. Stat. (1991). .

We decline to address the issues raised in Dumas' cross-petition.