STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Daniel C. ATKINSON, Respondent, 831 So. 2d 172

PER CURIAM. We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: DOES THE JIMMY RYCE ACT APPLY TO PERSONS CONVICTED OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSES BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT WHO WERE NOT IN LAWFUL CUSTODY ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT? Atkinson v. State, 791 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the negative.

Atkinson was sentenced on September 25, 1996, to five years in prison for an offense that qualified him for commitment under the Jimmy Ryce Act (Ryce Act). In early 2000, Atkinson sought resentenc-ing pursuant to Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000), and was resentenced to twenty-one months in prison on May 25, 2000. The order granting Atkinson’s motion to correct sentence made the corrected sentence of twenty-one months effective, nunc pro tunc, on the date of the prior sentence. Under this new sentence, Atkinson’s prison term would have expired on June 25, 1998, even without the award of any gain time.

After the State filed a petition for Atkinson’s commitment under the Ryce Act on June 8, 2000, Atkinson petitioned the Second District Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from hearing the petition. Atkinson argued that the Act did not apply to him because he was not in lawful custody on the effective date of the Act (January 1, 1999) and thus the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the commitment petition. The district court agreed, granted Atkinson’s petition, and ordered the trial court to discharge him.

Section 394.925, Florida Statutes (2001), provides in pertinent part that the Ryce Act “applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense.” The district court determined that the custody requirement must be read to require lawful custody. The district court concluded that to interpret the requirement as requiring only actual custody, regardless of its lawfulness, would produce an unreasonable, harsh, or absurd consequence and thus- would be contrary to public policy. See Atkinson, 791 So.2d at 538-39. We agree.

A basic tenet of statutory construction compels a court to interpret a statute so as to avoid a construction that would result in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd consequences. See Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1997); State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038, 1045 (Fla.1995). It would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due process if we were to interpret

section 394.925 as requiring only actual custody. Pursuant to our ruling in Heggs, Atkinson’s sentence should have expired on June 25, 1998, and thus he should not have been in custody on the effective date of the Ryce Act. Thus, it would be fundamentally unfair not to give Atkinson the benefit of Heggs by recognizing his operative release date. Accordingly, we hold that the Ryce Act is limited to persons who were in lawful custody on its effective date. We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the decision below. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

HARDING, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and WELLS, JJ., concur. . See §§ 394.910-.930, Fla. Stat. (2000). As enacted in 1998, the Ryce Act appeared in

chapter 916, which is entitled "Mentally Deficient and Mentally Ill Defendants.” See §§ 916.31-916.49, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); ch. 98-64, at §§ 3-22, 447-55, Laws of Fla. After the Ryce Act went into effect on January 1, 1999, it was transferred to

chapter 394, which is entitled "Mental Health.” See ch. 99-222, §§ 1, 3-24, at 1373-87, Laws of Fla. . In Heggs, this Court concluded that the Crime Control Act of 1995 was unconstitutional because it violated the single subject requirement; consequently, the 1995 sentencing guidelines were invalidated and individuals sentenced under those guidelines were entitled to resentencing under the previous guidelines. .The Ryce Act was amended and renumbered effective May 26,

Section 916.45, the predecessor statute addressed by the district court below, now appears at

section 394.925. The two statutes are substantively identical. The

section further provides that the Act applies to “all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future.” We do not address this language, as it clearly does not apply to Atkinson. . Atkinson also argues that the State illegally detained him for fourteen days beyond the expiration of his sentence in order to file a commitment petition against him.

On appeal, the district court declined to address this claim, finding that it had not been properly raised because Atkinson argued it for the first time in his reply brief and because the claim was mooted by the court's resolution of Atkinson’s other claim. See Atkinson, 791 So.2d at 539. We similarly find the claim moot in light of our resolution of this case and decline to address it in our review of this case.