Linroy BOTTOSON, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, etc., Respondent, 833 So. 2d 693

PER CURIAM. Linroy Bottoson, a prisoner under sentence of death and an active death warrant, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He seeks relief pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, -, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), wherein the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Arizona capital sentencing statute “to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.” Although Bottoson contends that he is entitled to relief under Ring, we decline to so hold.

The United States Supreme Court in February 2002 stayed Bottoson’s execution and placed the present case in abeyance while it decided Ring. That Court then in June 2002 issued its decision in Ring, summarily denied Bottoson’s petition for certiorari, and lifted the stay without mentioning Ring in the Bottoson order. The Court did not direct the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider Bottoson in light of Ring.

Significantly, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has reviewed and upheld Florida’s capital sentencing statute over the past quarter of a century, and although Bottoson contends that there now are areas of “irreconcilable conflict” in that precedent, the Court in Ring did not address this issue.

In a comparable situation, the United States Supreme Court held: If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). We also reject Bottoson’s claim that his rights under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), were violated.

We find Atkins inapplicable in light of the fact that Bottoson already was afforded a hearing on the issue of mental retardation and was permitted to introduce expert testimony on the issue. The evidence did not support his claim. See Bottoson v. State, 813 So.2d 31, 33-34 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 2670, 153 L.Ed.2d 844 (2002). Accordingly, we deny Bottoson’s petition for habeas relief. This Court’s stay of execution shall terminate at 5 p.m. on the thirtieth day following the filing of this opinion. No motion for rehearing will be allowed. It is so ordered.

WELLS and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur. HARDING, Senior Justice, concurs with an opinion. WELLS and QUINCE, JJ., concur specially with opinions. ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur in result only with opinions. . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. . See Bottoson v. Florida, 534 U.S. 1121, 122 S.Ct. 981, 151 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002). . See Bottoson v. Florida, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2670, 153 L.Ed.2d 844 (2002). . See, e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989); Spaziano v.

Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).