Ronald Lee BELL, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee, 841 So. 2d 329

PER CURIAM. We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Ronald Lee Bell, Jr. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Bell’s convictions but reduce the sentence of death on this seventeen-year-old to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. I. FACTS A. GUILT PHASE Ronald Lee Bell, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon and armed kidnaping with a weapon. Bell was seventeen years and ten months of age at the time that these crimes were committed.

He lived with his parents and was a high school senior. The victim of both crimes was Cordell Richards and the crimes occurred on February 2 and 3, 1999. The testimony at trial de-tañed the following sequence of events. On March 4, 1999, Richards’ decomposing body was found in a wooded area at the end of a cul-de-sac in an undeveloped portion of a housing subdivision in Okaloo-sa County. Richards’ remains, which were partially skeletonized and burned, were tied to a tree with a chain and a rope. Dr. Michael Berkland, the medical examiner, inspected the remains at the scene and then performed the autopsy. Dr.

Berkland found that the body was in an advanced state of decomposition and that there were multiple fractures to the head, which were the result of blunt force trauma. He also found injury to the victim’s shoulder blade, sternum, ribs, arm and wrist. Based upon the burn patterns, Dr. Berkland concluded that the burning occurred post-mortem. Dr. Berkland also concluded that the manner of death was homicidal violence with combined features of blunt force trauma to the head, body, and upper extremities, and probable chop injury to the left neck.

Kimberly Maestas, Renee Lincks, and Bell were all charged with the murder of Richards. Maestas and Lincks testified against Bell, and the testimony regarding the events leading up to the homicide of Richards came primarily from them. At the time of the homicide, Bell, who was seventeen, and Maestas, who was sixteen, had been dating for a few months. Maes-tas had been “kicked out” of her parents’ home. Maestas and Bell met Richards through a newspaper listing advertising a place to live, and Maestas moved into the extra bedroom in Richards’ apartment. Richards was thirty-one years of age.

Maestas testified that after she moved into Richards’ apartment, Richards made inappropriate sexual advances. Richards would come into Maestas’s room wearing only bikini underwear. One time Richards propositioned her for sex. Maestas testified that when she said “no,” Richards grabbed her shoulders and pushed her against the wah. She started to cry and asked him not to do that. Richards pushed her against the wall a second time and she hit her head. Maestas testified that Bell found out about Richards’ attack when he saw the bruises on Maestas’s back.

Lincks, who was fifteen, was a friend of Maestas, and came to the apartment to spend the night with her. That night, Richards asked Maestas and Lincks if they wanted to sleep with him in his bed. This made Maestas and Lincks uncomfortable, and so Lincks called a friend, who took them to Bell’s house. Bell later took Maestas and Lincks back to Richards’ apartment and left a baseball bat with them in case something happened. Later, Richards called Maestas and Lincks from his bedroom telephone and made statements that upset them, so they paged Bell and he came to the apartment to help them.

When Bell entered the apartment, he confronted Richards about his behavior towards Maestas and Lincks. Bell and Richards started pushing one another. Bell placed Richards in a choke hold and Richards lost consciousness. Bell told Lincks to get the bat and she gave it to Maestas. Maestas hit Richards in the legs with the bat. Bell told Lincks to get a rope from his ear and a blanket from Richards’ bed. Richards was tied with the rope, rolled in the blanket and placed in Bell’s car. Bell then drove to a wooded area at the end of a cul-de-sac.

Maestas held the flashlight while Bell and Lincks carried Richards into the woods. At some point they stopped, and Bell told Maestas to shine the flashlight in Richards’ face while Lincks asked Richards for his PIN numbers. Bell then told Maestas to hit Richards with the baseball bat, which she did, and Richards asked Bell not to kill him. Lincks also hit Richards with the baseball bat.

According to Maestas and Lincks, Bell told them that they were not hitting Richards hard enough and so Bell hit Richards very hard and said, “Look, I’m Babe Ruth.” They then carried Richards deeper into the woods and tied and chained him to a tree. Maestas testified that Bell poured lighter fluid on Richards and set Richards on fire while he was still alive and groaning. Bell returned to the scene a few more times. He first returned later that day with Maestas and Lincks to make sure that Richards was dead. Bell and Lincks went into the woods while Maestas waited at the car.

Bell and Lincks could hear Richards yelling for help. When Bell and Lincks returned to the car, Lincks told Maestas that Bell had tried to break Richards’ neck. They left the scene and drove to a Target store where they bought a meat cleaver and duct tape and then returned to Richards’ location. Bell and Lincks went back into the woods, where Bell cut Richards’ throat. The two then returned to Maestas five or ten minutes later. Bell went back to the body again after he and Lincks decided that Bell had not cut Richards’ throat enough.

That night, a friend of Bell’s came over and helped to forge checks on Richards’ account. A few days later, they pawned Richards’ television and violin. About a week after that, Bell, Maestas and Maes-tas’s fourteen-year-old sister went to Richards’ location again. Richards was dead at this time. Bell poured gasoline on the body and started a fire. On February 13,1999, the police went to Richards’ apartment to check on Richards’ whereabouts after one of Richards’ friends told the police that he had been unable to contact Richards.

The officers tried to get the attention of anyone who might be in the apartment by pounding on the doors and windows. When no one responded, one of the officers entered the apartment through a window. One of the bedroom doors was secured with a deadbolt lock and a towel was stuffed underneath the door. The officers knocked on the bedroom door and Bell opened it. Maestas was in a sleeping bag on the floor. Bell and Maestas appeared to be just waking up. They denied knowing anything about Richards’ whereabouts. After the State presented its case, Bell waived his right to present evidence and his right to testify.

The jury thereafter found Bell guilty of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon and armed kidnap-ing with a weapon. B. PENALTY PHASE At the penalty phase, the State presented no additional evidence. Bell presented the testimony of his father and grandfather, as well as school and jail records. Bell’s father, Ronald Bell, Sr., who is a youth pastor, testified that Bell was an usher at his church and vice president of the youth district association. He also said that Bell was a high school senior who planned to join the Air Force to become an electrician.

In addition, Bell’s father testified that Bell attended school regularly and had maintained several jobs, which contributed to the family’s income. Bell’s grandfather, Austin Lee Bell, who is a minister, testified that while growing up, Bell spent weekends with him and his wife and that Bell’s grandmother was a strict disciplinarian. He said that during Bell’s visits to his house, Bell would attend his grandfather’s church and participate in youth activities. The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of twelve to zero.

The trial court imposed a sentence of death, finding the following five statutory aggravators: (1) the capital felony was committed during a kidnaping; (2) the capital felony was committed to avoid arrest; (3) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (4) the capital felony was heinous, atrocious or cruel (“HAC”); and (5) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (“CCP”).

The trial court also found one statutory miti-gator — Bell’s age of seventeen years and ten months at the time of the crime (little weight) — and seven nonstatutory miti-gators: (1) disparate treatment of code-fendants Lincks and Maestas (little weight);

(2) Bell was a good student (little weight);

(3) Bell was a model prisoner while awaiting trial (very little weight);

(4) Bell had a good family support system (little weight);

(5) Bell was active in church (slight weight);

(6) Bell was gainfully employed for various periods of time, and had the potential to finish high school and further his education (some weight); and

(7) Bell has a very supportive extended church family (little weight). The trial court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and agreed with the jury’s unanimous decision in favor of the death penalty. On appeal, Bell now raises one guilt-phase and four penalty-phase issues. Although Bell does not raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we have independently reviewed the evidence in this case and we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. See Sexton v. State, 775 So.2d 923, 933-34 (Fla.2000); Brown v.

State, 721 So.2d 274, 277 (Fla.1998) (citing § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. (1997)). II. ANALYSIS A. GUILT PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENT Bell raises one claim of error during the guilt phase: that a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument constituted an improper personal attack on defense counsel. He also asserts in connection with this argument that the trial court erred in allowing the State to accuse defense counsel of telling the jury not to follow the law. Bell relies on our recent decision in Brooks v.

State, 762 So.2d 879, 904-05 (Fla.2000), to support his argument that the State personally attacked the defense and told the jury not to follow the law. However, unlike Brooks, in this case the State’s closing argument remarks were in response to a defense argument that the jury should give Bell the same sentence that a codefendant received. Therefore, the argument was not an improper personal attack on defense counsel but a response to defense counsel’s own argument to the jury. Even if there was error in this case, we would conclude that these isolated comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, we reject Bell’s claim on this issue. B. CONSIDERATION AND WEIGHT GIVEN TO BELL’S AGE OF SEVENTEEN AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME In its sentencing order, the trial court found Bell’s age at the time of the crime to be a mitigating factor and gave the mitigator little weight. On appeal, Bell now contends that the trial court was laboring under an erroneous legal standard when finding and weighing Bell’s age as a mitigator. At the sentencing hearing, the court also discussed the nonstatutory mitigator of the disparate treatment of codefendant, Renee Lincks.

In particular, the court stated: This Court determines that the Office of the State Attorney could not have legally sought the death penalty against co-defendant Renee Lincks as she was fifteen years of age at the time the crimes were committed, and therefore, it is constitutionally impermissible to apply the death penalty to a fifteen year old. Further, the Office of the State Attorney did not seek the death penalty in the trial of co-defendant Kristal Maestas, and therefore, her sentence of life in prison was the only sentence open to this Court.

After the trial court completed the sentencing, the State advised the court as follows: STATE: Judge, your order, I think, contains a misstatement of the law, in that after the arrest of these individuals, the Court found that it was unconstitutional to execute a minor under the age of seventeen. You stated under the age of sixteen. COURT: Fifteen. STATE: Under the age of seventeen. In other words anyone that hasn’t reached their seventeenth birthday cannot receive the death penalty.

The Supreme Court changed the law after Maestas was arrested, and we were legally precluded from seeking the death penalty for Maestas. COURT: Okay, I thought it was just Lincks you were precluded from. STATE: I didn’t want to upstage you or anything here, but I wanted to state for the record that that’s the law and give you an opportunity to amend your order. COURT: All right, I’ll make a written amendment. Is that agreeable with counsel? DEFENSE: Fine. The trial court thereafter made that handwritten change in the sentencing order to the

section marked “non-statutory mitigating factors: The disparate treatment of co-defendant Renee Lincks” and the Court announced the change orally to Bell. This Court has determined that the death penalty is cruel or unusual if imposed on a defendant under the age of seventeen. See Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.1999). Although the trial court initially was incorrect with regard to the constitutionally permissible age of execution, that error was corrected when the State brought the error to the trial court’s attention.

Thus, the trial court’s statement about the legal age of execution did not improperly affect the weight it accorded to Bell’s age. This Court has determined that “[t]he relative weight given each mitigating factor is within the discretion of the sentencing court.” Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1055 (Fla.2000). However, in Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 418 (Fla.1998), we stated that “the closer the defendant is to the age where the death penalty is constitutionally barred, the weightier [the age] statutory mitigator becomes.” Further, in Ellis v.

State, 622 So.2d 991, 1001 (Fla.1993), the Court stated: Whenever a murder is committed by one who at the time was a minor, the mitigating factor of age must be found and weighed, but the weight can be diminished by other evidence showing unusual maturity. It is the assignment of weight that falls within the trial court’s discretion in such cases. (Emphasis supplied.) Although the Court in Ellis acknowledged that the assignment of weight falls within the trial court’s discretion, when the statutory mitigator is age and the defendant is a minor that discretion is limited.

Indeed, the Ellis Court also stated that “there must be some evidence tending to support the finding of unusual maturity. Otherwise, the mitigating factor of age must be accorded full weight as a statutory mitigating factor.” Id. at 1001 n. 7 (emphasis supplied). The Court noted that if the trial court were to have unbridled discretion in the application of the age mitigator, then in effect the trial court would have the ability to exclude everyone from the category. See id. at 1001.

According to Ellis, “nothing in the statute reflects any intention that a court should have discretion to render the statute applicable to no one at all.” Id. Thus, the trial court must afford the mitigating factor of age “full” weight, unless the trial court makes a finding of unusual maturity. See id. It is only after a trial court makes a finding of unusual maturity that the trial court can exercise discretion in assigning diminished weight to the mitigator. In this case the trial court did not find that Bell was unusually mature.

Rather, the trial court stated that “there was not evidence of record that [Bell] was abused, neglected or not provided with a normal, healthy environment and supported by loving parents.” Thus, although there was no evidence of abuse or neglect, there was likewise no finding by the trial court of “unusual maturity.” The only finding the trial court made on this mitigator was that Bell’s childhood was normal.

Moreover, to the extent that Bell displayed positive characteristics in that he was active in church, did well in school, and maintained steady jobs, we note that these characteristics tend to reflect the lifestyle of a normal, healthy seventeen-year-old, rather than the unusual lifestyle of a teenager “old in the ways of the world.” Shellito v.

State, 701 So.2d 887, 843 (Fla.1997) (assigning little weight to the statutory age mitigator and relying on evidence of the eighteen-year-old defendant’s extensive crime record, which started at age thirteen, involved twenty-two arrests, thirty separate crimes, and eight felony convictions, to find that the defendant was, “[a]l-though young in years ... old in the ways of the world”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning little weight to this mitigator. C.

AVOID ARREST AGGRAVATOR In its sentencing order, the trial court found that the State had proven the avoid arrest aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, Bell contends that avoiding arrest was not his dominant motive in killing Richards because his motive for killing Richards was his anger over Richards’ sexual harassment of Maestas and Richards’ assault on her when she rebuffed his sexual advances.

This Court has held that in order “[t]o establish the avoid arrest aggravating factor where the victim is not a law enforcement officer, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of a witness.” Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 610 (Fla.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1103, 122 S.Ct. 2308, 152 L.Ed.2d 1063 (2002); see also Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 148, 160 (Fla.1998). “Mere speculation on the part of the state that witness elimination was the dominant motive behind a murder cannot support the avoid arrest aggravator.

Likewise, the mere fact that the victim knew and could identify defendant, without more, is insufficient to prove this aggravator.” Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 676 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 966, 122 S.Ct. 2678, 153 L.Ed.2d 850 (2002); see also Consalvo v. State, 697 So.2d 805, 819 (Fla.1996). The State contends that the record evidence establishes that Bell’s sole or dominant motive for murdering Richards was to avoid arrest.

In particular, the State argues that by the nature or manner of the killing itself, Bell’s dominant motive was eradicating signs of the assault and torture to which he had subjected Richards. Our review of the record, however, indicates that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the State proved the avoid arrest aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the State’s theory regarding Richards’ murder is possible, it is equally plausible that Bell’s motive for killing Richards was premised upon Bell’s anger at Richards because of his attack on Maestas.

Moreover, as Bell contends, the two cases relied upon by the trial court, Hall v. State, 614 So.2d 473 (Fla.1993), and Preston v. State, 607 So.2d 404 (Fla.1992), are distinguishable because in those cases, no other reasonable motive could be inferred from the evidence.

See Hall, 614 So.2d at 477 (“Here, the evidence leaves no reasonable inference except that Hall and Ruffin killed the victim to eliminate the only -witness .... ”); Preston, 607 So.2d at 409 (“The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts of this case is that Preston kidnapped Walker from the store and transported her to a more remote location in order to eliminate the sole witness to the crime.”). Accordingly, we determine that the trial court’s finding of the avoid arrest aggravator was error. D.

PROPORTIONALITY OF BELL’S DEATH SENTENCE Although not argued by Bell as a separate point on appeal, this Court has an independent duty to review the proportionality of Bell’s death sentence as compared to other cases where the Court has affirmed death sentences. See Jennings v. State, 718 So.2d 144, 154 (Fla.1998). In Urbin v.

State, 714 So.2d 411, 416-17 (Fla.1998), we summarized the scope and obligation of our death penalty review: In performing a proportionality review, a reviewing court must never lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been reserved for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders. State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.1973). See also Jones v.

State, 705 So.2d 1364, 1366 (Fla.1998) (reasoning that “[t]he people of Florida have designated the death penalty as an appropriate sanction for certain crimes, and in order to ensure its continued viability under our state and federal constitutions ‘the Legislature has chosen to reserve its application to only the most aggravated and unmitigated of [the] most serious crimes.’ ”) (footnote omitted). Proportionality review “requires a discrete analysis of the facts,” Terry v.

State, 668 So.2d 954, 965 (Fla.1996), entailing a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravated and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis. We underscored this imperative in Tillman v. State, 591 So.2d 167 (Fla.1991): We have described the “proportionality review” conducted by this Court as follows: Because death is a unique punishment, it is necessary in each case to engage in a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review to consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital cases.

It is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990). The requirement that death be administered proportionately has a variety of sources in Florida law, including the Florida Constitution’s express prohibition against unusual punishments. Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const. It clearly is “unusual” to impose death based on facts similar to those in cases in which death previously was deemed improper. Id.

Moreover, proportionality review in death cases rests at least in part on the recognition that death is a uniquely irrevocable penalty, requiring a more intensive level of judicial scrutiny or process than would lesser penalties. Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; Porter. ... Thus, proportionality review is a unique and highly serious function of this Court, the purpose of which is to foster uniformity in death-penalty law. Id. at 169 (alterations in original) (citations and footnote omitted).

As we have repeatedly explained, “[a] proportionality review involves consideration of the totality of the circumstances of a case and comparison of that case with other death penalty cases.” Snipes v. State, 733 So.2d 1000, 1007 (Fla.1999) (emphasis added). As in Snipes, another case involving the death penalty imposed on a seventeen-year-old, when we compare the totality of the circumstances of this case to other similar cases, we conclude that a sentence of death is inappropriate. We acknowledge the multiple aggrava-tors in this case; however, we note that we have stricken the avoid arrest aggravator.

Further, although we acknowledge that CCP and HAC have been established because of the length of time that the actual murder took to accomplish, we conclude that the mitigation in this case is substantial — mindful in particular that Bell was seventeen years of age at the time of the crime, which is as close as one can be in Florida to the age at which the death penalty is constitutionally barred. In addition, we also note the mitigating circumstance found by the trial judge of the disparate treatment of the codefendants.

Indeed, in conjunction with the great weight given to the age mitigator, we find it significant that all of the defendants involved were teenagers attempting to confront a decidedly adult situation. Of particular note is the life sentence given to Bell’s girlfriend Maestas. Maes-tas appears to have been not only the instigator behind the series of events that culminated in the murder but also appears to be equally culpable for the murder itself.

Indeed, it was Maestas, who was living on her own after being “kicked out” of her parents’ home, who initially called Bell to complain of Richards’ improper sexual advances. That phone call by Maestas resulted in Bell actually seeing the bruises on Maestas’s back made by Richards. The next night it was Maestas who paged Bell to come to the apartment to help them after Richards asked both Maestas and her friend Lincks to sleep in his bed. Bell then confronted Richards about his behavior. Although it was Bell who placed the victim in a choke hold, it was Maestas who first hit Richards with the baseball bat.

It is apparent that Maestas was involved from the beginning to the end, including having purchased the chain, rope, and lock with Bell and participating with Bell throughout the crime. Moreover, this version of the events comes solely from Maestas and Lincks, who would have obvious reasons to discount their culpability. Yet we do not base our conclusion regarding proportionality solely on the disparate treatment of the codefendants. In evaluating the totality of circumstances we begin with the age mitigator.

With regard to the age mitigator, as we have explained above, the trial court abused its discretion in affording Bell’s age of seventeen only little weight. Without a finding of unusual maturity, this statutory mitigator should have been given great weight.

In addition, we point to the following additional mitigators found by the trial court: disparate treatment of codefendants Lincks and Maestas; Bell was a good student; Bell was a model prisoner while awaiting trial; Bell had a good family support system; Bell was active in church; Bell was gainfully employed for various periods of time, and had the potential to finish high school and further his education; and Bell had a very supportive extended church family.

In any event, while our proportionality review involves a comparison with other similar cases where the death penalty has been imposed, Bell’s age and the unique circumstances of Bell’s background make a comparison with our cases more difficult. The only other cases where the death penalty has been upheld for seventeen-year-olds are Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla.1996), and LeCroy v. State, 533 So.2d 750, 758 (Fla.1988). We do not find the totality of the circumstances of this case similar to either of those cases.

In Bonifay, the seventeen-year-old defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and grand theft. The trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed while Bonifay was engaged in a robbery; (2) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. See 680 So.2d at 415 n. 1. The trial court found the following statutory mitigators:

(1) Bonifay had no significant history of prior criminal activity (very little weight), and

(2) Bonifa/s age of seventeen at the time of the crime (some weight). See id. at 415 n. 2. In addition, the court found several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances including:

(1) Bonifay experienced a less-than-ideal family background (some weight);

(2) Bonifay exhibited good behavior while incarcerated (little weight);

(3) Bonifay had a potential for rehabilitation (some weight); and

(4) Bonifay was remorseful about the death of the victim (some weight). See id. However, as we explained in Snipes, “the defendant in Bonifay had admitted involvement in several prior crimes, one of which was a prior burglary in which someone was stabbed several months prior to the murder. Further, not only was the defendant in Boni-fay hired to commit the murder; when the murder actually occurred, Bonifay callously killed the wrong person.” 733 So.2d at 1008.

Likewise, in LeCroy, 533 So.2d at 755, the seventeen-year-old defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of robbery with a firearm. He appealed a sentence of death on one count of first-degree murder. The judge found three aggravating factors: (1) previous conviction of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (2) capital felony committed while the appellant was engaged in the commission of robbery with a firearm; and (3) capital felony committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. See id. at 755.

In mitigation, the judge found that (1) the appellant had no significant history of prior criminal activity; and (2) the appellant was seventeen years of age at the time of the murder. See id. In this case, we have a seventeen-year-old who committed a heinous and atrocious crime; however, that is where the similarity with either Bonifay or LeCroy ends. Neither Bonifay nor LeCroy involved the disparate treatment of the codefendants as a mitigator. Also absent from Bonifay and LeCroy is the evidence of substantial mitigation in the form of the positive attributes Bell exhibited up until this particular murder.

We consider the evidence that Bell was an usher at his church, vice president of the youth district association, a high school senior whose plan after graduation was to enter the Air Force, and that he attended school regularly and maintained several jobs, which contributed to the family’s income to be in his favor rather than work against him. Common sense dictates that Bell’s positive attributes should make it less likely that we would uphold the imposition of the death penalty on this seventeen-year-old.

Therefore, we conclude that the mitigation in this case is more compelling than in either LeCroy or Bonifay. If anything we find this case more similar to Snipes, 733 So.2d at 1007-08, where we vacated the death sentence of a seventeen-year-old, and to Cooper v. State, 739 So.2d 82 (Fla.1999), where we reduced the death sentence of an eighteen-year-old to life. See id. at 85 (vacating death sentence where three aggravators were weighed against substantial mitigation including brain damage and youth).

In this case, we conclude that the statutory mitigator that Bell was seventeen years of age is an extremely significant factor that, together with the other mitigation, renders the death penalty disproportionate. Because we conclude that Bell’s sentence of death should be reduced to life, we deem it unnecessary in this case to address the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to offenders under the age of eighteen (issue 3) and the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty scheme (issue 5).

Accordingly, we affirm Bell’s convictions but reduce Bell’s sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. SHAW, J., concurs in result only. HARDING, Senior Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which WELLS and LEWIS, JJ., concur. . Maestas was convicted at trial of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

According to the sentencing order, Maestas was sixteen at the time of the crime and the State did not seek the death penalty against her. . Maestas stated that she decided to testify at Bell’s trial in the hope that she might gain some benefit in a future clemency petition. In exchange for Lincks’s testimony at Bell's trial, the State allowed her to plead guilty to manslaughter and false imprisonment with a deadly weapon, with a maximum sentence of fifteen years. Lincks was fifteen years old at the time of the crime. . Sometime prior to the crime, Bell and Maestas bought a chain, a rope, and a lock. .

Bell claims that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor during his guilt-phase rebuttal closing argument to accuse defense counsel of telling the jury not to follow the law and that the prosecutor levied an improper personal attack against defense counsel; (2) the trial court erred in failing to give proper consideration and weight to Bell’s age of seventeen at the time of the crime; (3) a death sentence for offenders under the age of eighteen is unconstitutional; (4) the trial court erred in improperly considering the ag-gravator that the homicide was committed to avoid arrest; and (5) imposition of the death sentence in the absence of notice of the aggravating circumstances to be considered or of jury findings on the aggravators and death eligibility violates due process and the protection against cruel or unusual punishment or both.