FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant, v. The CITY OF GAINESVILLE, Appellee, 918 So. 2d 250

PARIENTE, C.J. In this case, we review a decision holding unconstitutional a law that requires payment by a municipality of ad valorem taxes on property owned and used exclusively by the municipality to provide telecommunications services to the public. See Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 859 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The applicable provision in our state constitution provides that “[a]ll property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” Art. VII, § 3(a), Fla. Const. We have mandatory jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.

Const. Because we conclude that providing telecommunications services does not as a matter of law always serve municipal or public purposes, ad va-lorem taxation of a municipality’s telecommunications facilities is not facially unconstitutional. In reaching this conclusion, we do not dispute that telecommunications services are essential services.

Rather, we make the narrower determination that in providing these services, regardless of circumstances such as the availability of the same services through other providers, a municipality does not as a matter of law engage in an activity essential to the welfare of the community. We therefore reverse the decision of the First District Court of Appeal holding the statutory provisions imposing ad valorem taxation on these telecommunications facilities facially unconstitutional. I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY As part of the nationwide transition from single-provider telecommunications services to a competitive marketplace, the Florida Legislature enacted legislation in 1995 authorizing governmental entities including municipalities to sell two-way telecommunications services to the public. See § 364.02(12), Fla. Stat. (1995) (defining “telecommunications company” to include “every political subdivision in the state offering two-way telecommunications service to the public for hire within this state by the use of a telecommunications facility”).

However, in 1997 the Legislature made that authority conditional upon payment of ad valorem taxes or equivalent fees on facilities used to provide the telecommunications services. See ch. 97-197, § 2, at 3738-42, Laws of Fla.

Section 2 of the 1997 enactment created

section 166.047, Florida Statutes (1997), which provides in pertinent part: 166.047 Telecommunications services. — A telecommunications company that is a municipality or other entity of local government may obtain or hold a certificate required by

chapter 364, and the obtaining or holding of said certificate serves a municipal or public purpose under the provision of s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, only if the municipality or other entity of local government:

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pays, on its telecommunications facilities used to provide two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire and for which a certificate is required pursuant to

chapter 364, ad valorem taxes, or fees in amounts equal thereto, to any taxing jurisdiction in which the municipality or other entity of local government operates. Any entity of local government may pay and impose such ad valorem taxes or fees. (Emphasis supplied.) In other words, the Legislature conditioned the grant of the power to obtain or hold a certificate from the Public Service Commission (PSC) for operation of a telecommunications facility on the municipality’s payment of ad valo-rem taxes, and specified that payment of the taxes is necessary for the facility to serve a public purpose under the municipal powers clause of the Constitution. In the same act, the Legislature amended

section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1995), to exclude the telecommunications services authorized in

section 166.047 from the statutory ad valorem tax exemption for municipally owned property “used for governmental, municipal or public purposes” contained in

section 196.199(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). See ch. 97-197, § 8, Laws of Fla. The pertinent portion of

section 196.012(6), as amended, specifies that “[pjroviding two-way telecommunications services to the public for hire by the use of a telecommunications facility, as defined in s. 364.02(13), and for which a certificate is required under

chapter 364 does not constitute an exempt use for purposes of s. 196.199,” with exceptions inapplicable here. § 196.012(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). The amended provisions operate in tandem.

Section 166.047(3) invokes the municipal powers provision of the state constitution to mandate ad valorem taxation, and the amendment to

section 196.012(6) disqualifies municipally owned and operated telecommunications facilities from a statutory ad valorem tax exemption for municipal property. The purpose and effect of this legislation is to make property owned and used by a municipality for a telecommunications business subject to ad valorem property taxation. See Fla. H.R. Comm, on Util. & Comm., CS for CS for HB 313

(1997) Staff Analysis 1 (July 1, 1997) (on file with Comm.) (stating that

chapter 97-197 “removes the exemptions that municipalities, counties, or other entities of local government have on ad valorem taxes on property used for the purpose of providing telecommunications services to the public”). The City of Gainesville (the City), operating under the fictitious name Gainesville Regional Utilities, acquired certificates from the PSC to operate as a public telecommunications provider. The City then began selling communications infrastructure and integrated telecommunications services to the public, charging contractually agreed-upon rates.

Under the service agreements with the City, customers do not have any leasehold interest in the City’s telecommunications property. The City uses a fiber-optic network to provide private line service and special access service for the transmission of voice, data, and video.

In its 1995 base planning study, the City stated that “[n]o substantial communication services competition appears to be emerging in Gainesville,” and asserted that “[i]f the citizens of Gainesville are to be provided with all of the benefits which will be possible through the National Information Superhighway at a reasonable price, a major independent investor will need to assume a role in shaping the communications environment.” The City anticipated that its telecommunications business would make it both a provider of services and a promoter for the entry of new service providers.

The City stated in its 1995 start-up business plan that its “overall business activities” would benefit the local economy by creating competition in what it termed a “monopoly market,” producing additional revenues for the City, and keeping profits within the community. In its pleadings in this case, the City specified that by 2000, it had invested approximately $10 million in infrastructure and equipment. In 2000, the City filed suit seeking a declaration that the portions of

chapter 97-197 imposing the tax obligation on its telecommunications facilities are unconstitutional under

article VII,

section 3(a). The trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of the City and declared sections 2 and 3 of

chapter 97-197 facially unconstitutional. The First District affirmed, holding that “the property in question is being used by the City for a municipal purpose and the legislature’s attempt to condition the provision of these municipal services on the payment of an amount equal to any ad valorem tax liability is in direct conflict with

Article VII,

Section 3(

a) of the Florida Constitution.” Dep’t of Revenue, 859 So.2d at 597. Judge Ervin dissented, concluding that the amendments “are a proper exercise of the legislature’s discretion to classify real property for ad valorem taxation.” Id. at 601 (Ervin, J., dissenting). II. ANALYSIS

Article VII,

section 4 of the Florida Constitution requires a “just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation,” with exceptions that do not apply here. However, governmentally owned property is generally excluded from taxation, through either immunity or exemption. An exemption presupposes an ability to tax, whereas an immunity implies the absence of that ability. See Greater Orlando Aviation Auth. v. Crotty, 775 So.2d 978, 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The state and counties are immune from taxation. See Canaveral Port Auth. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 690 So.2d 1226, 1228 (Fla.1996); Park-N-Shop, Inc. v.

Sparkman, 99 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla.1957). Unlike counties, municipalities are not subdivisions of the state and are therefore subject to taxation absent an exemption. See Greater Orlando Aviation Auth., 775 So.2d at 980.

Article VII,

section 3(

a) of the Florida Constitution confers on property owned by municipalities an exemption from ad valo-rem taxation under certain circumstances. To qualify for the exemption in

article VII,

section 3(a), the property must be both owned by a municipality and used exclusively by the municipality for municipal or public purposes. In this case, the parties’ arguments generally reflect the majority and dissenting opinions below. In accord with the First District majority, the City asserts that

chapter 97-197 on its face violates

article VII,

section 3(

a) by targeting for taxation property that is used by a municipality exclusively for the “municipal or public purposes” of providing telecommunications services to residential and business customers -within the municipality. The Department of Revenue, relying on Judge Ervin’s dissent and precedent holding leasehold interests in municipal property ineligible for the constitutional exemption, argues for a narrower construction of “municipal or public purposes” that would exclude a municipality’s telecommunications business that competes with the private sector for customers. The determination of a statute’s constitutionality and the

interpretation of a constitutional provision are both questions of law reviewed de novo by this Court. See Zingale v. Powell, 885 So.2d 277, 280 (Fla.2004). “While we review decisions striking state statutes de novo, we are obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.” Florida Dept, of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla.2005). Further, a determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. See State v.

Bales, 343 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla.1977); Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). In Zingale, in which we were called upon to construe a constitutional provision limiting increases in annual tax assessments of homestead property, we recognized that “[o]ur task in this case of constitutional

interpretation follows principles parallel to those of statutory

interpretation.” 885 So.2d at 282. We reiterated from our prior precedent that “[a]ny inquiry into the proper

interpretation of a constitutional provision must begin with an examination of that provision’s explicit language.” Likewise, this Court endeavors to construe a constitutional provision consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters.... The fundamental object to be sought in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the framers and the provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to fulfill the intent of the people, never to defeat it.

Such a provision must never be construed in such manner as to make it possible for the will of the people to be frustrated or denied. ... Moreover, in construing multiple constitutional provisions addressing a similar subject, the provisions “must be read in pari materia to ensure a consistent and logical meaning that gives effect to each provision.” Id. at 282-83 (citations omitted) (quoting Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fisk & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 838 So.2d 492, 501 (Fla.2003)).

Although we have held that statutory provisions granting tax exemptions should be strictly construed, this rule of construction does not apply to exemptions claimed by municipalities. See State ex rel. Green v. City of Pensacola, 126 So.2d 566, 569 (Fla.1961). The facial constitutionality of the statute imposing a tax obligation on municipally owned and operated telecommunications facilities hinges on whether providing two-way telecommunications services to the public always serves “municipal or public purposes” as contemplated in

article VII,

section 3(a). If so, the property used exclusively by a municipality to provide these services cannot be taxed, and the legislation requiring payment of taxes on the property as a condition of operation is unconstitutional on its face. The term “municipal or public purposes” is not defined in

article VII,

section 3(a). Although “governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function” is statutorily defined in

section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (2004), which also concerns tax exemptions for governmentally owned property, “[a] reading of

section 8(

a) of

article VII clearly establishes that it is a self-executing provision and therefore does not require statutory implementation.” City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 374 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla.1979). Therefore, the statutory definition does not control the construction of the term “municipal or public purposes” in the constitutional provision. In addition, the statutory definition in

section 196.012(6) applies only to property leased from governmental entities.

Article VII,

section 3(

a) was adopted in the 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution. To place this provision in historical perspective, we explore its antecedent provisions in the Florida Constitution of 1885, which also provided an exemption from ad valorem taxation for property used for “municipal purposes.” Then we discuss the adoption of

article VII,

section 3(

a) and precedent interpreting and applying that provision. Next we compare the definition of “municipal and public purposes” in

article VII,

section 3(

a) with the definition of “municipal purposes” used in applying

article VIII,

section 2(b), which governs municipal powers. Finally, we specify how the term “municipal or public purposes” is to be defined in construing the ad valorem tax exemption for property owned and used exclusively by a municipality, and apply that definition in determining whether

chapter 97-197 is facially constitutional. A. Tax Exemptions for Property Used for Municipal Purposes Under the 1885 Constitution Before the 1968 revision, tax exemptions for property used for municipal purposes were covered in two different constitutional provisions: The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, ... and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. Art. IX, § 1, Fla.

Const. (1885) (emphasis supplied). The property of all corporations ... shall be subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary, or charitable purposes. Art. XVI, § 16, Fla. Const. (1885) (emphasis supplied).

Article IX,

section 1 differed from

article XVI,

section 16 in that the former provision was not limited solely to corporations, and the property did not have to be held exclusively for the listed purposes. See State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 486, 8 So.2d 15, 16 (1942). In its use of the term “as may be exempted by law,”

article IX,

section 1 was not self-executing, and therefore a tax exemption under that provision required legislative authorization. See Rast v. Hulvey, 77 Fla. 74, 80 So. 750, 752 (1919). Shortly before these provisions were supplanted by the 1968 Constitution, this Court held that

article XVI,

section 16 was also not self-executing. See Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So.2d 821, 825 & n. 5 (Fla. 1968) (receding from Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church, 142 Fla. 657,195 So. 607 (1940)). In the few cases in which this Court was expressly called upon to construe the “municipal purposes” exemptions in the 1885 Constitution, we deferred to the Legislature. In State ex rel. Harper v. McDavid, 145 Fla. 605, 200 So. 100 (1941), a taxpayer challenged an exemption for property owned by a city housing authority and used for a low-rent housing and slum clearance project.

The Legislature had authorized municipalities to erect low-rent housing units and exempted them from ad valorem taxation by declaring that they served municipal purposes. See id. at 101. This Court upheld the tax exemption against challenges under both

article IX,

section 1 and

article XVI,

section 16 of the 1885 Constitution. See id. at 101-02. The Court noted that it had previously “conceded power in the legislature to define a municipal purpose as contemplated by the provisions of the Constitution alluded to.” Id. at 102.

Responding to the claim that providing low-rent housing did not serve a valid municipal purpose, the Court stated: It is contended that the business of the Housing Authority is in no sense municipal, that it is in direct competition with private enterprise and even though declared by the legislature to be strictly municipal and charitable, its properties should not be exempt from taxation and that any attempt to make them so should be held in violation of the Constitution.

What constituted a municipal purpose is a legislative question that should not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. A municipal purpose is much broader in its scope than it was a generation ago. Under our system of jurisprudence, constitutional validity may be determined by practical operation and effect. Measured by this test, we cannot say that the legislature exceeded its power in pronouncing the properties of the Housing Authority held for a municipal purpose free from all forms of taxation.

They are held not for profit, must be restricted to a low income group, and contribute materially to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people. They aid materially in reducing the cost of fire prevention and police protection and the Housing Authority is authorized to make annual compensation to the City in lieu of taxes and other services furnished. There is no suggestion that the officers charged with the administration of the present scheme have failed in their duty and being so, we must assume that the law has been faithfully observed.

The time was when a municipal purpose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as were strictly governmental but that concept has been very much expanded and a municipal purpose may now comprehend all activities essential to the health, morals, protection, and welfare of the municipality. Id. (emphasis supplied). Five years later, this Court relied on the same definition in holding that electric light poles and other properties held and used by a city to supply electric power to customers in an adjacent county could not be taxed by that county under

article IX,

section 1 of the 1885 Constitution. See Saunders v. City of Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 240, 25 So.2d 648, 649 (1946). The Legislature had exempted from ad valorem taxation property owned by a municipality’s public utility but located in a different county. See id. The Court concluded that furnishing electric current served a municipal purpose. As in McDavid, we explicitly rejected the claim that the exemption was invalid “because it might enable the City to compete with private utilities required to pay taxes,” again deferring to the Legislature’s judgment “as the arbiter of this question.” Id. at 650.

The Court held that “[i]t is a controlling factor that the owner of the property has no stockholders, or partners, and any income must necessarily accrue to the general public.” Id. at 651. McDavid and Saunders demonstrate that in applying the non-self-executing provisions of the 1885 Constitution, this Court deferred to the Legislature’s authorization of municipal functions and clear intention to exempt property used therefor from ad valorem taxation.

Further, we held that a municipal purpose could be served even though the activity was one that competed with the private sector, if the Legislature determined that the activity was essential to the welfare of the municipality. The Court accepted the Legislature’s determination that providing low-income housing and electrical power to those in need were “essential” municipal services. B. Tax Exemptions for Municipal Use of Municipal Property Under the 1968 Constitution The 1968 constitutional revision effected changes in the exemption from ad valorem taxation for property used for municipal purposes.

Unaltered since its adoption in 1968,

article VII,

section 3(

a) provides in full: All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation. A municipality, owning property outside the municipality, may be required by general law to make payment to the taxing unit in which the property is located. Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation. This provision differs from its antecedents in the 1885 Constitution in two significant ways.

First, as stated above, it does not require legislative authorization to activate the self-executing exemption for property owned and used exclusively by the municipality for municipal or public purposes. In other words, no longer was the exemption contingent upon the Legislature declaring that an activity served a municipal purpose and was therefore tax exempt.

See Mikos, 374 So.2d at 460 (holding change in statutory language on exemption irrelevant because provision is self-executing “and therefore does not require statutory implementation”); see generally 2 Tax Section, The Florida Bar, Florida State and Local Taxes, ¶ 5.03[4], at 215 (1984) (describing exemption in

article VII,

section 3(

a) as “unique, ... mandatory and self-executing”). Second, the self-executing exemption requires use of the property by the municipality that owns it, whereas

article XVI,

section 16 of the 1885 Constitution did not require ownership and use by the municipality as long as the property was “held and used exclusively” for municipal purposes. A tax exemption for portions of property used “predominantly” for municipal purposes, regardless of ownership, still requires legislative authorization under the express terms of

article VII,

section 3(a). The requirement that the property be both owned and used exclusively by the municipality was seen as a response to the 1965 decision in Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District v. Paul, 179 So.2d 349, 353 (Fla.1965), holding that municipal property leased to a corporation for a racetrack served a public purpose because it contributed to the economic well-being of the community, rendering the lessees’ interest in the property exempt from ad valorem taxation. See Volusia County v.

Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 341 So.2d 498, 501 (Fla.1976) (“Perceiving decisions [such as Daytona Beach Racing] as creating inequities in the tax structure, the draftsmen of the Constitution of 1968 limited the municipal purpose exemption to ‘property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes.’ ”); Bonnie Roberts, Ad Valorem Taxation of Leasehold Interests in Gov-emmentally Owned Property, 6 Fla. St.

U.L.Rev. 1085, 1091-92 (1978) (stating that Daytona Beach Racing “dealt a substantial blow to the legislature’s attempt to tax leasehold interests,” and. that the drafters of the 1968 Constitution “attempted to deal with the problem by limiting the constitutional grounds on which an exemption could be based”). Effectuating the intent of the framers and voters, we held in Volusia County that property leased from a municipality and used to generate a profit was not exempt from ad valorem taxation under

article VII,

section 3(a). See 341 So.2d at 502 (stating that the corporation’s use of the leasehold on governmental property to make profits for its stockholders is “determinative”). The decision in Volusia County marked one step in a series of cases in which this Court developed a separate and more restrictive test under

article VII,

section 3(

a) for private interests in municipal property. Under this test, a tax exemption is constitutionally permitted only if the use by the private entity “could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds.” Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So.2d 238, 246-48 (Fla.2001) (quoting Roberts, supra, at 1092). In Sebring Airport Authority we applied this standard, known as the “governmental-governmental” test, to invalidate a statutory tax exemption granted under

section 196.012(6) for profitmaking endeavors such as convention and visitor centers, sports facilities, concert halls, arenas and stadiums. We have also applied the “governmental-governmental” test to uphold ad valorem taxation of property leased from an airport authority by food, drink, and merchandise vendors, as well as property leased from a governmental authority for both residential and commercial uses. Sebring Airport Authority ultimately established that for private leaseholds of municipal property, the “governmental-governmental test” governs eligibility for the constitutional tax exemption in

article VII,

section 3(a). See 783 So.2d at 248 (“Pursuant to this ‘governmental-governmental’ standard,

article VII,

section 3(

a) does not permit municipal property leased to private entities for governmental-proprietary activities to be tax exempt.”). Our review of the history of

article VII,

section 3(

a) and the pertinent case law demonstrates that the test for private interests in municipally owned property was never intended to apply to property both owned and used exclusively by a municipality for municipal or public purposes. For property both owned and used exclusively by the municipality, the question becomes whether “municipal or public purposes” under

article VII,

section 3(

a) of the 1968 Constitution is as broad as “municipal purposes” under the corresponding provisions of the 1885 Constitution as interpreted in decisions such as McDavid and Saunders. As discussed above,

article VII,

section 3 does not provide a definition of “municipal or public purposes,” just as its antecedent provisions in the 1885 Constitution did not define “municipal purposes.” The 1968 provision added the term “public purposes,” but this addition neither broadened nor narrowed the exemption. This Court had previously held that “public purposes,” the term specified in a statutory tax exemption for governmental property, was synonymous with “municipal purposes.” See Daytona Beach Racing, 179 So.2d at 353; Gwin v. City of Tallahassee, 132 So.2d 273, 276 (Fla.1961). Thus, although the framers of

article VII,

section 3(

a) sought to limit the holding in Daytona Beach Racing, they did so by requiring both ownership and exclusive use of the property by the municipality rather than by narrowing the definition of municipal purposes. In our decisions since 1968 on tax exemptions under

article VII,

section 3(

a) for property both owned and used exclusively by a municipality, we have not elaborated on the meaning of “municipal or public purposes.” In Ford v. Orlando Utilities Commission, 629 So.2d 845, 846 (Fla.1994), this Court concluded that property located outside Orlando but owned and used by the city for an electrical power plant was used for a valid municipal purpose. We held that under the “clear and unambiguous language” of

article VII,

section 3(a), the property was exempt from taxation. Id. at 847. In Mikos, we held that property owned and held as open space or reserved for future needs was constitutionally exempt from ad valorem taxation under

article VII,

section 3(a). See 374 So.2d at 460. This Court recognized that “property owned by a municipality is not exempt from taxation if it is used for a private purpose,” but held that “vacant land held by a municipality is presumed to be in use for a public purpose if it is not actually in use for a private purpose on tax assessment day.” Id. at 460-61. C. “Municipal Purposes” Under

Article VIII,

Section 2(

b) The City asserts that “municipal or public purposes” should receive the same broad construction as “municipal purposes” under

article VIH,

section 2(

b) of the Florida Constitution, which prescribes municipal powers. Adopted in the same 1968 revision as

article VII,

section 3(a),

article VIII,

section 2(

b) provides in pertinent part: Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.) Under this provision, municipalities have “inherent power to meet municipal needs,” and the “legislature’s retained power is ... one of limitation.” Lake Worth Utils. Auth. v. City of Lake Worth, 468 So.2d 215, 217 (Fla.1985).

Previously, “municipalities were inherently powerless, absent a specific grant of power from the legislature.” Id. We recognized the broad sweep of municipalities’ inherent power under

article VIII,

section 2(

b) in State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So.2d 1206 (Fla.1978), where we stated:

Article VIII,

Section 2, Florida Constitution, expressly grants to every municipality in this state authority to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services. The only limitation on that power is that it must be exercised for a valid “municipal purpose.” It would follow that municipalities are not dependent upon the Legislature for further authorization. Legislative statutes are relevant only to determine limitations of authority- id at 1209; see also City of Ocala v.

Nye, 608 So.2d 15, 17 (Fla.1992) (reiterating “municipal purposes” requirement from City of Sunrise as only constitutional limitation on municipal power). In City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla.1983), this Court held that providing day care educational facilities is a valid municipal purpose under

article VIII,

section 2(b). We stated that we would accept the Legislature’s determination that an activity served a municipal purpose absent an abuse of discretion. See id. at 1280. The Court also noted that the term “municipal purposes” had been broadly interpreted and included such activities as maintenance and operation of a radio broadcasting system by a municipality, citing to State v. City of Jacksonville, 50 So.2d 532 (Fla.1951). Gidman, 440 So.2d at 1280. City of Jacksonville concerned validation of revenue certificates to finance a municipally owned and operated radio station.

There this Court employed the same definition of municipal purpose as in McDavid and Saunders, the two pre-1968 tax exemption cases, stating that “[t]hough there was a time when a municipal purpose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as were strictly governmental that concept has been very much expanded and a municipal purpose may now comprehend all activities essential to the health, morals, protection and welfare of the municipality.” City of Jacksonville, 50 So.2d at 535. Unfortunately, the language in some of these cases has been imprecise.

See Gid-man, 440 So.2d at 1281 (defining a municipal purpose as being “rationally related to the health, morals, protection and welfare of the municipality”) (emphasis supplied); Basic Energy Corp. v. Hamilton County, 652 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (defining municipal purpose under

article VIII,

section 2(

b) as “one that is related to the health, morals, safety, protection or welfare of the municipality”) (emphasis supplied). Therefore, we specifically distinguish precedent construing

article VIII,

section 2(b), which uses language that is overly broad for determining eligibility for the ad valorem tax exemption in

article VII,

section 3(a). There is another reason to conclude that the precedent construing “municipal purposes” under

article VIII,

section 2(

b) is of limited use in construing

article VII,

section 3(a). As stated above, prior to the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, the Legislature had complete discretion to prescribe municipal powers. Thus, the legislative determination that operation of a radio station, parking garage, or public auditorium served a municipal or public purpose was largely unchecked, absent an abuse of discretion. See Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla.1953) (parking facility); Starlight Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, 57 So.2d 6 (Fla.1952) (auditorium); City of Jacksonville, 50 So.2d at 535 (radio station).

The Court was unwilling to hold that the Legislature abused its discretion in determining that a municipal project that it had authorized served a public purpose. The precedent discussed above shows that this broad construction of municipal powers remains in force under

article VIII,

section 2(b), in which the Legislature’s remaining authority is to limit, rather than authorize, municipal powers. In fact, the only restriction we have placed on the exercise of municipal powers for a municipal purpose under

article VIII,

section 2(

b) is to hold that “borrowing money for the primary purpose of reinvestment is not a valid municipal purpose.” State v. City of Orlando, 576 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.1991). Because the definition of “municipal purposes” applied under

article VIII,

section 2(

b) has been imprecise, and because that provision and

article VII,

section 3(

a) serve different functions, we conclude that not every municipal activity that the Legislature either declined to prohibit after the 1968 revision, or had authorized in older cases relied upon in construing the 1968 municipal powers provision, was intended to also qualify for the constitutional ad valorem tax exemption in

article VII,

section 3(a). Thus, an activity may serve valid “municipal purposes” under

article VIII,

section 2(

b) and constitute a permissible municipal function, but not serve “municipal or public purposes” under

article VII,

section 3(

a) making the property owned by the municipality and used exclusively by it for the activity eligible for the constitutional ad valorem property tax exemption. D. Delineating “Municipal or Public Purposes” Under

Article VII,

Section 3(

a) In the absence of any indication in the Constitution to the contrary, we conclude that the term “municipal or public purposes” should be construed in accordance with the definition utilized by the Court in its prior decisions on the constitutional tax exemption. There is nothing in the language of

article VII,

section 3(

a) that evinces an intent to create a more restrictive definition of “municipal or public purposes” for property that is owned and used exclusively by the municipality than the definition applied to “municipal purposes” under the 1885 Constitution in McDavid and Saunders through the 1968 adoption of the current provision. Although McDa-vid and Saunders rested at least in part on judicial deference to the Legislature’s assessment of what type of activity served municipal purposes, we have no basis to conclude that a narrower construction was intended when the self-executing exemption was included in the 1968 Constitution. To the contrary, had the framers of

article VII,

section 3(

a) intended to narrow the exemption, they could have specifically defined “municipal or public purposes,” or used different terms altogether. This determination is consistent with the principle that the Legislature “is presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed,” Florida Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla.2004), which is equally applicable on the constitutional level. See generally Coastal Fla. Police Benev. Ass’n v.

Williams, 838 So.2d 543, 548 (Fla.2003) (stating that rules governing statutory construction are generally applicable to construction of constitutional provisions). As stated by one observer shortly after the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, cases construing the constitutional municipal purposes exemption and the statutory public purposes exemption “continue to be good law even after the adoption of the new constitution.” Robert F. Williams, Note, Property Tax Exemptions Under

Article VII,

Section 3(

a) of the Florida Constitution of 1968, 21 U. Fla. L.Rev. 641, 643 (1969). We therefore conclude that the “municipal or public purposes” for which municipally owned property must be exclusively used in

article VII,

section 3(

a) to qualify for an ad valorem tax exemption encompass activities that are essential to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within the municipality. We agree with the dissent on the parameters of this test, but disagree on its application in determining the facial constitutionality of the challenged legislation. E. Whether the Tax Exemption Under

Article VII,

Section 3(

a) Necessarily Applies to Municipal Telecommunications Facilities In putting this definition into practice, we focus on the word “essential,” which is generally defined as something basic, necessary, or indispensable. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 396 (10th ed. 1999). For example, an “essential element” is one on which proof is required in order to establish a legal claim or criminal offense. See, e.g., Rubano v.

Dep’t of Transp., 656 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Fla.1995) (“Proof that the governmental body has effected a taking of the property is an essential element of an inverse condemnation action.”); Randall v. State, 760 So.2d 892, 901 (Fla.2000) (“[PJremeditation is the essential element that distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder.”). Thus, inherent in the word essential is the concept of great need or necessity. A thread of necessity also runs through the precedent concerning tax exemptions for municipal use of municipally owned property that we have discussed.

In McDavid, which held a tax exemption for a public housing facility valid, the Legislature had declared that housing conditions were “a menace to the health, safety, and morals of the people ... necessitating] excessive expenditures for crime and fire prevention, health, and welfare,” and that public safety “demandfed]” replacement of slums by “sanitary and better housing facilities.” 200 So. at 101 (emphasis supplied).

In upholding the tax exemption for property owned by a municipal power company located in another county in Saunders, we recognized that the Legislature “was doubtless well aware of the need for light, heat and power by those areas outside of municipalities.” 25 So.2d at 650. Similarly, in Ford, this Court held that the production of electricity by a municipality’s power company served a municipal purpose. See 629 So.2d at 847. Such services are essential in that municipally owned power companies have legally protected monopolies within their territorial boundaries, and have traditionally provided these services.

See § 366.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2004); City of Homestead v. Beard, 600 So.2d 450, 452 (Fla.1992). Finally, the tax-exempt status upheld in Mikos for vacant land held by a municipality to preserve natural open spaces or for future needs, 374 So.2d at 461, is consistent with the traditional municipal function of providing parks for the municipal population. Cf. City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So.2d 493, 495 (Fla.1953) (stating that “[i]n all heavily populated municipalities the police power should be exercised by municipal officials to afford all of the people light, air, [and] an opportunity for recreation”).

Unlike electrical power and public parks, telecommunications services have historically been provided by the private sector. The Legislature’s rationale for opening telecommunications services to competition by various entities including municipalities was to “provide customers with freedom of choice, encourage the introduction of new telecommunications service, encourage technological innovation, and encourage investment in telecommunications infrastructure.” § 364.01(3), Fla. Stat. (2004).

However, under the law applicable to this-case, municipalities may enter the market regardless of whether their participation furthers any of these goals. In other words, a municipality, using infrastructure advantages gained from its pre-existing utility operations, may enter a market in which a high level of service and competition already exists without introducing new levels of service, fostering innovation, or encouraging infrastructure investment.

If that is the case, the municipal telecommunications company does not provide a service that is essential to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within the municipality. Because this is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of legislation taxing municipal use of municipally owned property, we need not determine whether the specific services provided by the City pass this test. As stated above, in a facial constitutional challenge, we determine only whether there is any set of circumstances under which the challenged enactment might be upheld.

See Bales, 343 So.2d at 11 (“[A]ny legislative enactment carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, including a rebuttable presumption of the existence of necessary factual support in its provisions.

If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court’s power of inquiry ends.”) (citation omitted); Cashatt, 873 So.2d at 434 (“A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an ‘as applied’ challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”) We conclude that in a situation in which municipal telecommunications services do not promote any of the goals set forth above from

section 364.01, Florida Statutes, for the benefit of the municipal population, property used to provide those services does not serve “municipal or public purposes” and therefore is not exempt from ad valorem taxation under

article VII,

section 3(a). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons we have stated, we hold that

section 166.047(3), Florida Statutes (1997), as enacted in

chapter 97-197,

section 2, Laws of Florida, and the amendment to

section 196.012(6) contained in

section 3 of the same act are not unconstitutional on their face. We do not determine the constitutionality of these provisions as applied. We reverse the decision of the First District holding the provisions facially unconstitutional, and remand with directions to reverse the

summary judgment granted in the City of Gainesville’s declaratory judgment action in this case. It is so ordered. WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion. . The validity of the statutory requirement that counties and local governmental entities other than municipalities pay ad valorem taxes on property used in providing telecommunications services is not before us in this case. .

Article VIII,

section 2(b), Florida Constitution, provides that "[mjunicipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.” Thus, both

article VII,

section 3(

a) and

article VIII,

section 2(

b) use the term "municipal purpose.” .

Section 196.199(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), which has remained unchanged since 1995, provides: All property of the several political subdivisions and municipalities of this state or of entities created by general or special law and composed entirely of governmental agencies, or property conveyed to a nonprofit corporation which would revert to the governmental agency, which is used for governmental, municipal, or public purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation, except as otherwise provided by law. .The City has also signed thirty leases with seven wireless telecommunications providers to locate antennas on thirteen towers owned or operated by the City.

Its complaint challenging taxation on these facilities was dismissed on procedural grounds. See Crapo v. City of Gainesville, 855 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), review denied, 895 So.2d 404 (Fla.2005). . See art. VII, § 4(a)-(e), Fla. Const. . The statutory tax exemption in

section 196.012(6) is as follows: Governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any municipality, agency, special district, authority, or other public body corporate of the state is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds. .

The Legislature has long had the authority to grant cities the status of municipal corporations. See Coen v. Lee, 116 Fla. 215, 156 So. 747, 749 (1933) (“The creation of municipal corporations with governmental powers and the establishment and regulation of municipalities are inherent legislative powers ....”); § 165.041(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (“A charter for incorporation of a municipality ... shall be adopted only upon a special act of the Legislature....”). . The Court grounded this aspect of its holding in

article VIII,

section 8 of the 1885 Constitution, which gave the Legislature power to prescribe the jurisdiction and powers of municipalities. . See Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 375 So.2d 283, 287 (Fla.1979). . See Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425 (Fla.1975). . The Court noted that although

article VII,

section 3(

a) permits taxation of municipally owned property located outside the municipality if authorized by general law, the Legislature had not authorized such taxation. See id. at 847; accord Schultz v. Crystal River Three Participants, 686 So.2d 1391, 1392-93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (in absence of general law requiring payments to tax unit in which plant was located, cities' interest in nuclear power plant was tax exempt under

article VII,

section 3(

a) and

section 196.199(2)(c), Florida Statutes). . The dissent asserts that our decision in this case cannot be reconciled with Mikos. We disagree. The presumption underlying Mikos, that vacant land owned by a municipality is held for a public purpose, would be inappropriate for municipally owned property used by the municipality to engage in a business venture to provide services in competition with the private sector. . The 2005 Legislature enacted-, and the Governor signed, legislation placing restrictions on municipalities operating telecommunications businesses. See Ch.2005-132, § 8, Laws of Fla.

The new law requires municipalities that plan to start a telecommunications business to conduct hearings on whether the services it proposes to provide are already generally available in the community. The law also places financing, pricing and accounting restrictions on municipalities providing telecommunications services, and provides that if a municipality cannot show a profit from its telecommunications business within four years, it must cease operations, enter into a partnership with private business, or put the question of whether to continue to provide service to a vote of its governing body.

Municipalities that, as of April 1, 2005, had a certificate to sell telecommunications services are exempted from some of the new requirements.