Dr. Gregory L. STRAND, Appellant, v. ESCAMBIA COUNTY, Florida, etc., et al., Appellees, 992 So. 2d 150

WELLS, J. We have before us an appeal from a final judgment validating a proposed bond issue from the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, in and for Escambia County, Florida. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. Upon consideration of appellee Escambia County’s motion for rehearing, we withdraw our revised opinion, filed on September 28, 2007, and substitute the following opinion. We affirm the circuit court’s final judgment. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 4, 2006, Escambia County (County) adopted Ordinance 2006-38 (Ordinance).

The Ordinance establishes the Southwest Escambia Improvement District (District) in the southwest portion of the County, running to the peninsula known as Perdido Key. The Ordinance also establishes the Southwest Escambia Improvement Trust Fund (Trust Fund), which will be used to finance or refinance infrastructure improvements in the District, and authorizes the use of tax increment financing to fund the Trust Fund.

In conjunction with the adoption of the Ordinance, the County adopted Resolution R2006-96 (Resolution) on May 4, 2006, authorizing the County to issue bonds not exceeding $135,000,000 for the District. The stated purpose of these bonds is to finance a four-lane road-widening project in the District to improve economic development within that area and alleviate traffic congestion. The bonds are to reach maturity no later than the thirty-fifth year after revenues are first deposited into the Trust Fund.

The Ordinance provides that the bonds are to be “payable out of revenues pledged to and received by the County and deposited to its Southwest Escambia Improvement Trust Fund.” Ordinance § 4(4). The Ordinance requires the County to appropriate to the Trust Fund by February 1 of each year an amount equal to the “Tax Increment” so long as any applicable indebtedness is outstanding. Id. § 4(l)-(3). The funds equaling the Tax Increment that are placed into the trust are known as “Tax Increment Revenues.” Id. § 2.

The Resolution employs the term “Trust Fund Revenues,” which are the moneys other than “Supplemental Revenues” deposited in the Trust Fund pursuant to the provisions of the Ordinance. Resolution art. I, § 101 (May 4, 2006). The Resolution provides that the bonds shall be repaid from “Pledged Funds,” which are the funds deposited in the Trust Fund including the Trust Fund Revenues and the Supplemental Revenues. Id. art. Ill, § 301.

The Resolution does require that if necessary, the County shall appropriate in its annual budget non-ad valorem revenues if available as Supplemental Revenues sufficient to secure the indebtedness in each fiscal year. However, the Resolution expressly states that the County does not covenant to maintain any services or programs now provided which generate non-ad valorem tax revenues. Id. § 304(m). The Ordinance and the Resolution dictate that the bonds do not pledge the full faith and credit or taxing power of the County, the State, or any political divisions thereof.

Section 4 of the Ordinance states as follows:

(4) The revenue Bonds and notes of every issue under this part are payable out of revenues pledged to and received by the County and deposited to its Southwest Escambia Improvement Trust Fund. The lien created by such bonds, notes or other forms of indebtedness shall not attach until the revenues referred to herein are deposited in the Southwest Escambia Improvement Trust Fund at the times, and to the extent that, such Tax Increment Revenues accrue.

The holders of such bonds, notes or other forms of indebtedness have no right to require the imposition of any tax or the establishment of any rate of taxation in order to obtain the amounts necessary to pay and retire such bonds, notes or other forms of indebtedness.

(5) Revenue Bonds issued under the provisions of this part shall not be deemed to constitute ... a pledge of the faith and credit of the County or the state or any political subdivision thereof, but shall be payable solely from the revenues provided therefor. Ordinance § 4(4)-(5).

Section 103(

i) of the Resolution reiterates that the bonds are payable solely from the Pledged Funds and “shall not constitute an indebtedness, liability, general or moral obligation, or a pledge of the faith, credit or taxing power of the Issuer, the State, or any political subdivision thereof.”

Section 301 adds that no bondholder shall ever have the right to compel the exercise of the ad valorem taxing power of the Issuer, the State or any political subdivision thereof, or taxation in any form of any real or personal property therein, or the application of any funds of the Issuer, the State or any political subdivision thereof ... other than the Pledged Funds as provided in this Resolution.

Section 302 explains that the bonds “shall not constitute a lien upon any property owned by or situated within the corporate territory of the Issuer, but shall constitute a lien only on the Pledged Funds.” Accordingly, no lien created by the bonds shall attach until the revenues are deposited in the Trust Fund. Finally, the Resolution includes a finding that “[t]he estimated Pledged Funds will be sufficient to pay all principal of and interest on the [bonds].” Resolution art. I, § 103(h).

On May 16, 2006, the County filed a complaint for validation in the Escambia County Circuit Court, seeking validation of the bond issuance. The state attorney promptly filed his answer, and Dr. Gregory Strand intervened pursuant to

section 75.07, Florida Statutes (2006). Dr. Strand argued that the bond issuance was distinguishable from the bond issuance approved by this Court in State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So.2d 875 (Fla.1980), and therefore required a referendum pursuant to the requirement of ar-tide VII,

section 12 of the Florida Constitution. On August 18, 2006, the circuit court entered the final judgment validating the bond issuance. The circuit court concluded that the County had the authority to issue the bonds and that the bonds were not subject to referendum pursuant to

article VII,

section 12. The circuit court cited to our decisions in Miami Beach and Penn v. Florida Defense Finance & Accounting Service Center Authority, 623 So.2d 459 (Fla.1993). Dr. Strand, the intervenor, appeals that final judgment. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In City of Gainesville v.

State, 863 So.2d 138, 143 (Fla.2003), this Court explained the scope of a bond validation proceeding as follows: We have previously explained the scope of a bond validation proceeding: “[CJourts should: (1) determine if a public body has the authority to issue the subject bonds; (2) determine if the purpose of the obligation is legal; and (3) ensure that the authorization of the obligation complies with the requirements of law.” State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1994).

This Court reviews the “trial court’s findings of fact for substantial competent evidence and its conclusions of law de novo.” Id. (citing Panama City Beach Cmty. Redev. Agency v. State, 831 So.2d 662, 665 (Fla.2002); City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 31 (Fla.1992)). The final judgment of validation comes to this Court clothed with a presumption of correctness. Wohl v. State, 480 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla.1985). III. ANALYSIS Dr. Strand raises three issues in his appeal: (

A) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance; (

B) whether the circuit court’s final judgment is supported by competent, substantial evidence; and (

C) whether the bonds required a referendum pursuant to the requirement of

article VII,

section 12 of the Florida Constitution. A. Denial of Continuance On June 29, 2006, the day before the bond validation hearing, Dr. Strand filed a motion for a thirty-day continuance, asserting that his counsel did not learn of the bond validation hearing until June 27, 2006. A continuance is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse. See Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla.2004); Lebron v. State, 799 So.2d 997, 1018 (Fla.2001). We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Strand’s motion for a continuance.

Section 75.06, Florida Statutes (2006), provides that notice of a bond validation hearing shall be effectuated by publishing notice in a newspaper published in the territory to be affected by the issuance of the bonds for two consecutive weeks, corn-mencing not less than twenty days before the date of the hearing. The record establishes that the notice was published more than one month prior to the June 30, 2006, validation hearing, on May 24, 2006, and again on May 31, 2006, in the Pensacola News Journal. The record also establishes that notice of intent to adopt the ordinance was published on April 23, 2006.

Thus, the County provided sufficient notice. Furthermore, Dr. Strand has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion for a continuance. Dr. Strand’s motion asserted that his counsel needed additional time to investigate “factual issues of notice” and “legal issues.” As discussed above, proper notice was provided, and accordingly, Dr. Strand was not prejudiced by any inability to pursue the issue of notice before the circuit court. As for legal issues, Dr.

Strand was permitted to make an oral argument at the hearing and to then file a legal memorandum outlining his legal arguments following the hearing. This opportunity to file a legal memorandum ensured that Dr. Strand’s arguments could be fully presented to the circuit court before the entry of the final judgment on August 18, 2006. Given the adequacy of the notice provided and the circuit court’s accommodation that ensured that Dr. Strand’s arguments could be heard, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Strand’s motion. B. Competent, Substantial Evidence Dr.

Strand argues that the circuit court’s adoption of the County’s proposed final judgment was an improper delegation of its authority to make independent findings of fact under Perlow. We find this contention is without merit. In Perlow, we did not hold that a trial court’s adoption of a proposed final judgment verbatim is improper per se, but rather, we held that “[wjhile a trial judge may request a proposed final judgment from either or both parties, the opposing party must be given an opportunity to comment or object prior to entry of an order by the court.” 875 So.2d at 390.

In the instant case, unlike in Perlow, the circuit court’s adoption of the proposed final judgment does not lead to the appearance of impropriety. Rather than ruling within hours of the hearing as occurred in Perlow, the circuit court in this case deliberated for six weeks before adopting the County’s proposed order. Although the trial court did not specifically ask Dr. Strand for a proposed final judgment, the circuit court reserved judgment until receiving legal memoranda from the parties, thereby giving Dr. Strand an opportunity to object and to propose a final order. Thus, Dr.

Strand was afforded a meaningful opportunity to review the County’s proposed final judgment, make objections, and make his own proposals. Therefore, the circuit court’s adoption of the County’s proposed final judgment was not improper. Dr. Strand next argues that the findings of fact contained in the circuit court’s final judgment are not supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, Dr.

Strand challenges the circuit court’s findings that the District project is necessary and serves a public purpose; that there is a sufficient nexus between the property within the District and the benefits of the project to be financed by the bonds; and that the public improvements to be financed by the revenue bonds are necessary. Dr. Strand’s argument is without merit. In this case, the County offered into evidence the Ordinance and the Resolution, and presented testimony concerning the purpose of the project and the tax increment financing mechanism.

In its final judgment, the circuit court relied primarily on the legislative findings contained in the Ordinance and the Resolution. This Court has held that “legislative declarations of public purpose are presumed valid and should be considered correct unless patently erroneous.” Boschen v. City of Clearwater, 777 So.2d 958, 966 (Fla.2001) (quoting State v. Housing Fin. Auth. of Pinellas County, 506 So.2d 397, 399 (Fla.1987)). The findings in the Ordinance and the Resolution must be accorded great deference by the trial court, and Dr. Strand has not demonstrated the findings to be clearly erroneous.

Moreover, this Court has recognized that the admission of a resolution may be sufficient evidence justifying a bond validation. In Rianhard v. Port of Palm Beach District, 186 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla.1966), this Court explained: Appellants question the fact that plans and specifications of the proposed improvements were not offered in evidence by appellee. We think the introduction of the supporting resolution in evidence is all that was necessary to justify validation. In State of Florida v.

Manatee County Port Authority, 171 So.2d 169 [Fla.1965], we approved as sufficient evidence to justify validation of revenue certificates similar to those in this ease only the introduction of the supporting resolution covering that issue. Nor did we there find it necessary that detailed plans and specifications of the proposed improvements to be undertaken from the funds of the proposed revenue certificates be submitted in evidence. Likewise in this case, the legislative findings are competent, substantial evidence sufficient to support the final judgment. C.

Legal Authority to Issue Bonds Without a Referendum The circuit court determined that the bonds could be validated without the referendum required by

article VII,

section 12, Florida Constitution, because the bonds to be issued under the Ordinance and the Resolution do not constitute an indebtedness, liability, or pledge of the faith, credit, or taxing power of the County. On appeal, Dr. Strand argues that the bonds should not have been validated because the County did not comply with the Community Redevelopment Act,

chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The County responds that

chapter 163 does not apply to the County’s issuance of the bonds. Rather, the County intends to issue the bonds based upon the powers granted to the County by

section 125.01, Florida Statutes (2006). We agree with the County. We find that this issue is controlled by our decision in Penn, in which we previously affirmed the Escambia County Circuit Court’s validation of bonds issued under a similar tax ordinance and resolution and issuance structure. Dr. Strand further argues, as the appellant in Penn contended, that this financing mechanism violates

article VII,

section 12 of the Florida Constitution, which requires a referendum for bonds payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve months after issuance. We rejected this argument in Penn because we found the financing mechanism in that case indistinguishable from the financing mechanism that we approved in Miami Beach. Likewise, we find that the financing mechanism in the instant case is not distinguishable from that which we approved in the Miami Beach case. Thus, we reject Dr. Strand’s argument that the bonds in this case require a referendum. On rehearing, Dr.

Strand argues, and the dissenters to our present opinion agree, that we should recede from our decision in Miami Beach. In Miami Beach, we reviewed a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dade County which validated bonds issued pursuant to sections 163.385 and 163.387, Florida Statutes (1977), which authorized the issuance of bonds utilizing tax increment financing to finance redevelopment projects. In Miami Beach, the opponents of the bond issuance contended that the bonds were payable from ad valorem taxation and therefore required a referendum.

The opponents maintained that the bonds were payable from ad valorem taxation because the required contributions of Dade County and the City of Miami Beach to the repayment fund were to be derived from taxes levied on the real property in the redevelopment area. In response, the Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency (Agency) argued that the bonds did not come within the referendum requirement because there was no pledge of the ad valorem taxing power of the county and city. Miami Beach, 392 So.2d at 893-94.

In its brief, the Agency maintained that “[t]he crux of the matter is that there is no pledge of the ad valorem taxing power to which bondholders may look, and which they may legally enforce, as a source of funds to pay the bonds.” Answer Brief to Initial Brief of Appellant at 32, State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So.2d 875 (Fla.1980) (No. 57997).

In our Miami Beach opinion, we decided the issue in favor of the Agency stating: The Agency contends in effect that where there is no direct pledge of ad valorem tax revenues, but merely a requirement of an annual appropriation from any available funds, the referendum provision of

article VII,

section 12 is not involved. We agree with this view.... 392 So.2d at 894. We thereafter delineated the history of judicial precedents which led to our conclusion and held: The bonds in the instant case are payable from a trust fund, and the fund will receive revenue from two sources. One source is the money the Agency receives from sales, leases, and charges for the use of, redeveloped property. This source is analogous to revenues generated by a utility or facility. The other source is the money to be contributed each year by the county and city, measured by the tax increment.

The source of this revenue is not limited to any specific governmental revenue. That the statutory duty to make the annual contributions would become a contractual duty, part of the obligation of the bonds, does not mean, however, that these bonds are payable from ad valorem taxation, in the constitutional sense of the term. The Agency notes that even though the money the county and city will use to make the contributions may come from ad valorem tax revenues, we have indicated this does not bring the bonds within the referendum requirement. Tucker v. Underdown, 356 So.2d 251 (Fla.1978).

In that ease, county bonds previously issued without referendum to finance a solid waste disposal system had been validated as payable from user charges, giving bondholders no power to compel the levy of ad valorem taxes for operating expenses or debt service. The subsequent lawsuit concerned whether the county had violated the covenants of the earlier bond issue by levying and spending ad valorem taxes for these purposes. The Court held that it had not. Tucker v.

Underdown supports the argument that there is nothing in the constitution to prevent a county or city from using ad valorem tax revenues where they are required to compute and set aside a prescribed amount, when available, for a discreet [sic] purpose. The purpose of the constitutional limitation is unaffected by the legal commitment; the taxing power of the governmental units is unimpaired.

What is critical to the constitutionality of the bonds is that, after the sale of bonds, a bondholder would have no right, if the redevelopment trust fund were insufficient to meet the bond obligations and the available resources of the county or city were insufficient to allow for the promised contributions, to compel by judicial action the levy of ad valorem taxation. Under the statute authorizing this bond financing the governing bodies are not obliged nor can they be compelled to levy any ad valorem taxes in any year.

The only obligation is to appropriate a sum equal to any tax increment generated in a particular year from the ordinary, general levy of ad valorem taxes otherwise made in the city and county that year. Issuance of these bonds without approval of the voters of Dade County and the City of Miami Beach, consequently, does not transgress

article VII,

section 12. Miami Beach, 392 So.2d at 898-99 (emphasis added). Two members of the Court dissented from this conclusion. In his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, Justice Boyd specifically expressed the view that the promised annual contributions to the trust fund based on the tax increment revenues constituted a pledge by the county and the city of their general revenue and made the bonds general obligation bonds, which were payable from ad valorem taxation. Id. at 900 (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the arguments advocated here by Dr.

Strand and the present dissenters were previously advanced in Miami Beach and rejected by this Court. In 1990, we reinforced our holding in Miami Beach in our decision in State v. School Board of Sarasota County, 561 So.2d 549 (Fla.1990). We stated: Regarding the bonds’ validity, the issue presented is whether a referendum is required by

article VII,

section 12 of the Florida Constitution (1968). We conclude that because these obligations are not supported by the pledge of ad valorem taxation, they are not “payable from ad valorem taxation” within the meaning of

article VII,

section 12, and referendum approval is not required. In State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So.2d 875 (Fla.1980), we interpreted the words “payable from ad valorem taxation” in

article VII,

section 12 and held that a referendum is not required when there is no direct pledge of the ad valorem taxing power. We noted that although contributions may come from ad valorem tax revenues: “What is critical to the constitutionality of the bonds is that, after the sale of the bonds, a bondholder would have no right, if [funds] were insufficient to meet the bond obligations ... to compel by judicial action the levy of ad valorem taxation.... [T]he governing bodies are not obliged nor can they be compelled to levy any ad valorem taxes in any year.” Id. at 898-99.

The agreements here, as in Miami Beach, although supported in part by ad valorem revenues, expressly provide that neither the bondholders nor anyone else can compel use of the ad valorem taxing power to service the bonds. Id. at 552 (footnote omitted) (alterations in original). Again, the majority’s decision was met by a dissent, which maintained that the financing mechanism employed in those cases were equivalent to issuing bonds and pledging ad valorem taxation to support them. Again, the dissenters’ view was rejected by the Court.

As referenced earlier, we affirmed the validation of a bond issuance in Escambia County in Penn on the basis of our decision in Miami Beach. We also relied on Miami Beach in affirming a bond validation in State v. Inland Protection Financing Corp., 699 So.2d 1352 (Fla.1997). We have stated that we are committed to the doctrine of stare decisis. N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 637 (Fla.2003).

In that case, we pointed out that the “doctrine of stare decisis, or the obligation of a court to abide by its own precedent, is grounded on the need for stability in the law and has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries.” Id. We observed that the doctrine was memorialized by this Court a century and a half ago in Tyson v. Mattair, 8 Fla. 107 (1858). We then set forth the questions to be considered when asked to recede from precedent, expressly stating that the presumption in favor of precedent is strong. The questions to be asked are:

(1) Has the prior decision proved unworkable due to reliance on an impractical legal “fiction”?

(2) Can the rule of law announced in the decision be reversed without serious injustice to those who have relied on it and without serious disruption in the stability of the law? And (3) have the factual premises underlying the decision changed so drastically as to leave the decision’s central holding utterly without legal justification? N. Fla. Women’s Health, 866 So.2d at 637. In the instant case, we do not find that the answers to these questions overcome the presumption in favor of stare decisis.

In answer to the first question, we have not been presented with evidence showing that the Miami Beach decision has proven unworkable due to reliance on a legal fiction. Rather, we find that the holding of the majority in Miami Beach was scrutinized and tested by the dissenters in Miami Beach and later in the School Board of Sarasota County decision, and determined by the Court’s majority to be developed from seasoned historic precedent.

In answer to several questions, we conclude that for the past twenty-seven years there has been widespread reliance upon the Miami Beach decision in the issuance of bond financing by local government authorities, including school boards, enabling the financing of many public works that have enhanced the quality of life in our State. Tax increment financing and the undergirding principles of our Miami Beach decision have been inextricably woven into the financial fabric of our State.

We conclude that receding from the precedent of Miami Beach would cause serious disruption to the governmental authorities that have relied upon that precedent for planning public works that are in various stages of development and approval. Finally, we do not find that any changes have occurred since the Miami Beach decision that affect that decision. There have in fact been no changes which would affect our construction of the applicability of

article VII,

section 12, to bond issues using the tax increment financing structure determined to be valid in Miami Beach —

article VII,

section 12 of the Florida Constitution has not been amended. The Constitutional Revision Commission which met in 1997 and 1998 proposed nine revisions to other sections of the Florida Constitution but did not propose any revision to the constitution that would change the holding of Miami Beach. See Fla. Constitution Revision Comm’n, Nine Proposed Revisions for the 1998 Ballot, http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/ballot.html; Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v.

City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 264 (Fla.2005) (“This determination [relating to the term ‘municipal or public purpose’] is consistent with the principle that the Legislature ‘is presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed,’ Florida Dep’t of Children Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla.2004), which is equally applicable on the constitutional level. See generally Coastal Fla. Police Benev. Ass’n v.

Williams, 838 So.2d 543, 548 (Fla.2003) (stating that rules governing statutory construction are generally applicable to construction of constitutional provisions).”). Alternatively, Dr. Stand contends that if we do not recede from Miami Beach and its progeny, we should find that it does not control the decision in this case. Dr. Strand argues that, instead, this case should be controlled by this Court’s decision in County of Volusia v. State, 417 So.2d 968 (Fla.1982).

In that case, we affirmed the Volusia County Circuit Court’s denial of validation of a bond issue in part because the circuit court found that Volusia County’s pledge of all legally available revenues other than ad valorem taxes would have the effect of requiring the levy of increased ad valorem taxation so that, under

article VII,

section 12, the bonds could not be issued without a referendum. In County of Volusia, we specifically affirmed the circuit court, holding: That which may not be done directly may not be done indirectly. See, e.g., State v. Halifax Hospital District, 159 So.2d 231 (Fla.1963). While the county has not directly pledged ad valorem taxes to the payment of the bonds, its pledge of all other available revenues, together with its promise to do all things necessary to continue to receive the various revenues, will inevitably lead to higher ad valorem taxes during the life of the bonds, which amounts to the same thing.

We find in this case that the pledge of all available revenues, together with a promise to maintain the programs entitling the county to receive the various revenues, will have a substantial impact on the future exercise of ad valo-rem taxing power and brings this case within the rule of Halifax Hospital District. The taxpayers of Volusia County must have an opportunity to vote on the bond issue. 417 So.2d at 972. In the present case, the County argues that County of Volusia is distinguishable because

section 304(m)(

l) of the Resolution expressly does not covenant to maintain any services or programs now provided or maintained by the County which generate non-ad valorem revenues. The County further points out that we approved a similar financing mechanism in Murphy v. City of Port St. Lucie, 666 So.2d 879 (Fla.1995). We agree that as in City of Port St.

Lucie, the instant Ordinance and Resolution differ from those in County of Volusia in that non-ad valorem revenues here are to be used only as a supplemental source of funding in the event that the Trust Fund revenues are insufficient for debt service and in that the County expressly does not covenant to maintain services or programs for the purpose of generating income to repay the bonds. See City of Port St. Lucie, 666 So.2d at 881. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we affirm the final judgment of validation of the Escambia County Circuit Court. It is so ordered.

ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ„ and CANTERO, Senior Justice, concur. QUINCE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, C.J., concurs. BELL, J., recused. .The Ordinance defines “Tax Increment” as: [T]he amount equal to the lesser of (

a) the amount by which (

i) the tax revenues that would have been generated at the millage rate in effect for the current Fiscal Year at the current Assessed Valuation exceeds (ii) the tax revenues that would have been generated at the millage rate in effect for the current Fiscal Year at the Base Assessed Valuation and (

b) an amount equal to the sum of (i) 110% of the debt service of any outstanding indebtedness secured by the Tax Increment Revenues coming due in such Fiscal Year and (ii) an amount sufficient to restore any deficiencies in payment of debt service for such indebtedness for prior periods and to fund any planned expenditures described in Section 4(6) hereof.

Ordinance § 2. . “Supplemental Revenues” are County revenues derived from a source other than ad valorem taxation on real and personal property that are appropriated and deposited into the Trust Fund in the event that the Trust Fund Revenues are not sufficient to pay the debt service on the bonds. Resolution art. I, § 101; art. III, § 304. . “Pledged Funds” are “collectively, (

i) the Trust Fund Revenues; (ii) the Supplemental Revenues, ... and (iii) except for moneys, securities and instruments in the Rebate Account, all moneys, securities and instruments held in the Funds and Accounts established by this Resolution.” Resolution art. I, § 101. .

Article VII,

section 12 of the Florida Constitution states: Local Bonds. — Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and local governmental bodies with taxing powers may issue bonds, certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certificates, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve months after issuance only: fa) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and only when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation; or (

b) to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption premium thereon at a lower net average interest cost rate. .

Section 125.01, Florida Statutes (2006), states: Powers and duties.-— (

l) The legislative and governing body of a county shall have the power to carry on county government. To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law, this power includes, but is not restricted to, the power to: (

m) Provide and regulate arterial, toll, and other roads, bridges, tunnels, and related facilities.... (

r) Levy and collect taxes, both for county purposes and for the providing of municipal services within any municipal service taxing unit, and special assessments; borrow and expend money; and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of indebtedness.... (

w) Perform any other acts not inconsistent with law, which acts are in the common interest of the people of the county, and exercise all powers and privileges not specifically prohibited by law. . In Penn we stated: Under the ordinances, the bonds will be secured by lease payments from the city and county, which in turn are secured by tax increment revenues measured in part by future increases in ad valorem tax receipts. Any shortfall will be made whole by non-ad valorem revenues, but the bondholders' lien attaches only to monies actually deposited in the trust funds. 623 So.2d at 461. .

Likewise, we find that our decision in Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Co. v. Magaha, 769 So.2d 1012, 1025 (Fla.2000), is distinguishable because in that case, we found that the size of the lease payments together with the consequences of the nonsubstitution clause in the lease-purchase agreements which were the subject of that action would eventually force the county to spend ad valo-rem taxes to make the lease payments. The present Ordinance and Resolution do not contain a clause similar to the nonsubstitution clause in Frankenmuth.