CRANE RENTAL OF ORLANDO, INC., Appellant, v. Ford S. HAUSMAN, Appellee, 518 So. 2d 395

ORFINGER, Judge. Crane Rental appeals from a final judgment in which the trial court found that its self-propelled cranes were not motor vehicles, as defined by Florida law, and therefore subject to ad valorem taxes. We affirm. Crane Rental (Crane) owns and operates 15 self-propelled cranes. In 1985, the Orange County Property Appraiser (Appraiser) assessed ad valorem taxes on the cranes as personal property. Crane refused to pay the taxes, on the basis that the cranes were motor vehicles and therefore exempt from ad valorem taxes under

Article VII,

section 1(b), of the Florida Constitution. Crane appealed to the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board, pursuant to

section 194.011, Florida Statutes. The Board ruled that the carriers upon which the cranes were affixed are motor vehicles and, as such, were not subject to ad valorem taxes. However, the cranes were found to be subject to ad valorem taxes because they were equipment “not part of the motor vehicle.” The Appraiser then brought an action in circuit court under

section 194.036, Florida Statutes. The Appraiser contended that the entire crane units were subject to ad valorem taxes as personal property. Crane filed a counterclaim, contending that the entire crane units were motor vehicles and therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation. After considering testimony and other evidence, the trial court issued an order of final judgment setting forth conclusions of law and fact. The trial court found that although the cranes were self propelled, the purpose of the propulsion was to enable the cranes to transport themselves to perform work at construction sites.

The court determined that the cranes were neither designed nor used to transport persons and properties, and that any use over the highways was incidental to the main purpose for which the cranes were designed, i.e., for use in construction. Finally, the court found that the cranes were designed on integral chassis as one tool and are not sold in separate pieces. The court concluded that the cranes were not motor vehicles as defined by law and therefore were subject to ad valorem taxes as personal property. From this final judgment Crane appeals and we have jurisdiction.

We begin our analysis by recognizing that all real and personal property in this state is subject to taxation unless expressly exempted by law. § 196.001, Fla. Stat. (1985). Exemptions to the taxation of personal property are to be narrowly construed against a party claiming a grant of exemption. Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District, 341 So.2d 498 (Fla.1976), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 804, 98 S.Ct. 32, 54 L.Ed.2d 61 (1977); Adams Construction Equipment Co. v. Hausman, 472 So.2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

Section 1(b),

Article VII, of the Florida Constitution provides for an exemption to ad valorem property taxes for “motor vehicles ... as defined by law.” Id. Thus, the narrow issue before us is whether the vehicles owned by Crane are motor vehicles as defined by law, and thus exempt from ad valorem taxation. In looking to a legislative definition of motor vehicle, we find that the term is defined in numerous places throughout the Florida Statutes. See § 316.003(21), Fla.

Stat. (1985) (“motor vehicle” is “[a]ny vehicle which is self-propelled ... ”; § 316.003(76), Fla.Stat. (1985) (vehicle is defined as “[e]very device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway....”); § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. (1985) (under Florida no-fault law, motor vehicle means “any self-propelled vehicle with four or more wheels which is of a type of design and required for use on highways of this state ...”); § 322.01, Fla.Stat. (1985) (motor vehicle is “[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails ...”).

See also § 520.02, Fla. Stat. (1985). These various

definitions should be read pari materia. In determining that the motor vehicles owned by Crane were not motor vehicles, the court below relied upon the definition provided in

Chapter 320, relating to the licensing of motor vehicles: 320.01

Definitions, general. — As used in the Florida Statutes, except as otherwise provided, the term: (1) “Motor vehicle” means: (

a) An automobile, motorcycle, truck, trailer, semitrailer, truck tractor and semitrailer combination, or any other vehicle operated on the roads of this state, used to transport persons or property, and propelled by power other than muscular power, but the term does not include traction engines, road rollers, such vehicles as run only upon a track, bicycles, or mopeds as defined in s. 316.-003(2). § 320.01(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). We agree with the trial court that the legislature did not intend a self-propelled crane to be classified as a motor vehicle for the purpose of exemption from ad valorem property taxes.

The supreme court considered this issue in Forbes v. Bushnell Steel Construction Co., 76 So.2d 268 (Fla.1954). In that case, the owner of two self-propelled cranes was assessed an ad valorem tax on the cranes as personal property. The parties stipulated in that case that the cranes were designed for exclusive use in construction work, that the vehicles operated over public highways, and were self-propelled by gasoline engines, and that they had been issued certificates of title and license tags. Based on this stipulation, the trial court declared that the cranes were not subject to ad valorem taxation.

The tax assessor appealed and the supreme court reversed: It seems to us that if we affirm the decree brought here for review the rule will have been established that any equipment mounted on wheels equipped with pneumatic tires that is capable of being self-propelled on the highways by means of a gasoline engine is a motor vehicle, and therefore immune from ad valorem taxation under our laws, even though the equipment is designed exclusively for construction work and is used for this purpose. 76 So.2d at 269.

The Forbes court noted that the record was silent as to whether the crane’s operation on the highways was primary or incidental to the “main and ordinary uses” of the vehicles. Furthermore, there was no evidence concerning the design of the cranes, i.e., whether they were permanently affixed to a chassis or mounted on separate vehicles. The court declared that some evidence pertaining to these considerations was necessary to determine whether the cranes were motor vehicles for the purpose of ad valorem taxation.

In the proceeding below, the Appraiser introduced evidence relevant to the factors discussed by the supreme court in Forbes. The primary purpose of these vehicles is for their use as cranes in construction. These vehicles are not used for the primary purpose of transporting persons or property. Although the cranes transport a driver, and some of the cranes also carry a crane operator,

section 320.01(12) excludes the driver from the definition of passenger. The cranes are capable of transporting buckets, additional boom extensions, and other equipment. However, these items are only appurtenant to the use of the vehicles as cranes. Clearly, the vehicles are not used for the primary purpose of transporting and delivering such items to the construction site. Rather, their use of the highways is solely for the purpose of taking them to the construction site where they are used as cranes.

Finally, although there was some evidence showing that it was possible to remove the crane mechanism from the chassis, and that the items could be sold separately, we believe that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the cranes are designed as one unit, were purchased as such by Crane, and were used as complete integrated units. Thus, we reject any argument that the cranes were equipment mounted upon a motor vehicle which transported them and thus were only subject to a partial assessment. Cf. 1956 Op.Att’y Gen. Fla. 056-314 (October 31, 1956); 1950 Op.Att’y Gen.

Fla. 050-144 (March 23, 1950) (vehicle and attached equipment should be considered as separate, depending upon primary use). Our conclusion that the legislature did not intend these vehicles to be classified as motor vehicles, is further supported by the definition of special mobile equipment in

Chapter 316, Florida Statutes:

(49) SPECIAL MOBILE EQUIPMENT. —Any vehicle not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and only incidentally operated or moved over a highway, including, but not limited to, ditchdigging apparatus, well-boring apparatus, and road construction and maintenance machinery, such as asphalt spreaders, bituminous mixers, bucket loaders, tractors other than truck tractors, ditchers, leveling graders, finishing machines, motor graders, road rollers, scarifiers, earth-moving carryalls and scrapers, power shovels and draglines, and self-propelled cranes and earth-moving equipment.

The term does not include house trailers, dump trucks, truck-mounted transit mixers, cranes or shovels, or other vehicles designed for the transportation of persons or property to which machinery has been attached. [Emphasis added]. § 316.003(49), Fla.Stat. (1985). We believe this expresses the legislature’s intent to distinguish machinery that requires the use of public highways to transport itself from motor vehicles, which are used primarily to transport persons or property. See also M.J.S. v.

State, 453 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (construction backhoe is not a motor vehicle, as defined by Florida law); 1955 Op.Att’y Gen. Fla. 055-113 (May 31, 1955) (earth moving vehicle mounted on pneumatic tires and used solely for off-highway work not a “motor vehicle”). Finally, Crane argues that because its vehicles were subject to a license tax, that

Article VII,

section 1(b), of the Florida Constitution prohibits an ad valorem assessment. We find nothing in the constitution or the statutes to compel such a conclusion. Evidence submitted by the Appraiser below shows that the cranes were assessed a license tax under tax class 94 of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles tax classifications. Tax class 94 is provided for Tractor cranes, power shovels, well drillers and other such vehicles, so constructed and designed as a tool and not a hauling unit, used on the roads and highways incidental to the purpose for which designed.

The constitution prohibits ad valorem taxation on those vehicles which are classified as motor vehicles. However, this provision does not prohibit the Department from assessing a license tax on personal properties. The fee paid by Crane is for the privilege of enabling it to use the public highways to transport its cranes to the construction sites where work is performed. This does not mean however that these cranes are motor vehicles and therefore exempt from taxation as personal property.

The supreme court has held that a vehicle may still be a motor vehicle under the law, even though it is not licensed as such. Nolan-Peeler Motors v. Wood, 128 Fla. 756, 175 So. 523 (Fla.1937). Conversely, simply because a vehicle has been assessed a license tax, does not mean that it is a motor vehicle as defined by law. Forbes, 76 So.2d at 270 (“mere fact that the plaintiff has certificates of title and license tags therefor, or that the vehicles are operated upon the highways, is not decisive of the question.”) In

summary, we believe that a fair reading of the statutory

definitions of “motor vehicle” supports the trial court’s findings; Crane’s vehicles do not operate on the pub-lie highways as motor vehicles for the purpose of transporting property or persons. Rather, they are mobile construction equipment that use the public highways for the purpose of locating from one construction site to another and are therefore personal property and subject to ad valorem taxation. We therefore affirm the trial court’s final judgment. UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. . (

b) Motor vehicles, boats, airplanes, trailers, trailer coaches and mobile homes, as defined by law, shall be subject to a license tax for their operation in the amounts and for the purposes prescribed by law, but shall not be subject to ad valorem taxes. . Fla.R.App.P. 9.110(a)(1), 9.030(a)(1). . Prinzo v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 465 So.2d 1364 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 695 (Fla.1985). . According to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 1985 license rate sheet, the license fee for tax class 94 is $36.50, significantly less them the annual license tax of $244.00 to $983.00, depending on weight, assessed for "tractor-trucks."