Eva M. HOGLE, Appellant, v. Edmund G. HOGLE, Appellee, 535 So. 2d 704

SHARP, Chief Judge. Eva Hogle appeals from a dissolution judgment. The sole issue is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Edmund Hogle to pay only $100.00 per month for child support. The record in this case is scant. Edmund represented himself at the final hearing, claiming he could not afford an attorney. When his turn came to present his case, he rambled in a confused and disorganized fashion, touching primarily on matters not directly relevant to his ability to pay support. However, the quality of his in-court statements indirectly supports the trial judge’s decision in this case.

The trial judge made a finding that Edmund Hogle has “at this time ... a limited ability to pay child support.” He required Edmund to pay $100.00 per month; and he ruled that Edmund’s $2000 arrearage (which had accrued pursuant to temporary support orders) would stand as a judgment against him, earning interest at 12%. In the court file there are at least three contempt orders against Edmund. Apparently, he has not been able to pay the $200 per month child support required of him pursuant to his joint stipulation dated February 1987, which formed the basis of the temporary support orders.

The same trial judge presided over the contempt hearings. At the final hearing, Edmund testified that he first worked for Mano’s Pizza in DeLand. He then went into the Army and was trained in communications. While in the Army he earned a B.S. Degree in computer science. His job was to operate and maintain electronic equipment, including computers. Edmund was in the Army for 11 to 12 years. He reached the level of E-4, but encountered problems. He was unable to earn enough points for a further promotion, and thus was discharged on a non-reenlistment basis.

At the time of the hearing, he had been out of the Army two years and four months. All that Edmund wanted to do was get back into the Army. He said he would be willing to start all over again at the entry level. However, he could not manage to reenlist. In civilian life, Edmund was unable to find any employment. He testified he tried to find employment in his “line of work,” although he did not try computer repair jobs. He had recently sought employment as a busboy in a restaurant. He was also applying to work as a teacher’s aide.

He had been keeping busy working as a school volunteer, and doing yard work for his grandparents. He has no income and is living with his mother. He testified he has many problems — family and personal. If this testimony is believed, as the trial judge did in this case, then there was no error or breach of discretion in the trial judge’s failure to impute income to Edmund, based on his Army earnings, skills and degree. Those things are only indicia of earning ability. They do not establish it as a matter of law. See Brotman v. Brotman, 528 So.2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).

In order to impute income, the trial judge must find that the parent owing a duty of support has the actual ability to earn more than he or she is currently earning, and that he or she is deliberately refusing to work at that higher capacity to avoid support obligations. Here the trial judge concluded Edmund was doing the best he could. AFFIRMED. COWART, J., concurs. COBB, J., dissents with opinion.