PIRELLI ARMSTRONG TIRE CORPORATION, formerly known as The Armstrong Rubber Company, a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Meta E. JENSEN, as Personal Representative of Alwin H. Jensen, Deceased, and Matthew W. Jensen, a minor child, by and through his Guardian Meta E. Jensen, Appellees/Cross Appellants, 752 So. 2d 1275

PER CURIAM. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corporation [Pi-relli] was sued for a catastrophic tire failure that resulted in the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Alwin Jensen and injuries to their four-year-old son Matthew. This case was before us on appeal from the final judgment of liability and damages, which we affirmed. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Jensen, 688 So.2d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Pirelli now challenges the assessment of attorneys’ fees against it under

section 768.79, Florida Statues (1993), the offer of judgment statute. It claims primarily that in this personal injury case a contingency risk multiplier cannot be used to calculate a reasonable fee in addition to the factors already enumerated in the statute. We disagree with this suggested

interpretation and affirm. In so doing, we align ourselves with the Fourth and Fifth Districts on this issue. See Collins v. Wilkins, 664 So.2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), and Garrett v. Mohammed, 686 So.2d 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), review denied, 697 So.2d 510 (Fla.1997). The tragic accident that orphaned young Matthew Jensen took place on December 18, 1993. In April, 1994, the appellees commenced the underlying tort suit. The complaint advanced alternative theories of manufacturing defect, design defect, inadequate warning, or absence of warning. In July, 1994, the appellees served a three million dollar demand for judgment pursuant to

section 768.79. Although given an enlargement of time to respond, the demand expired without Pirelli accepting it. Trial began in February, 1995. The appel-lees abandoned the manufacturing defect theory based on reports from tire experts so the trial court entered a directed verdict on that claim. The trial court also entered a directed verdict on the inadequate warning claim. The case, therefore, went to the jury on the theories of design defect and absence of warnings.

The jury found no design defect but found Pirelli negligent for failing to warn of dangerous propensities in the tire and awarded appel-lees $ 5,402,089.45. The appellees moved to tax costs, investigative expenses, and attorneys’ fees; preliminary hearings were held. The issue was put on hold until the appeal on liability was concluded when our mandate issued in March, 1997. More evidence was then presented to the trial court on the reasonableness of the fees and whether the contingency risk multiplier could be used in these circumstances.

The trial court decided it was proper to apply the contingency risk multiplier and assessed fees in the following manner: it first calculated the lodestar figure at slightly over $ 414,-000.00; it then applied a contingency risk multiplier of 2.5, thus increasing the amount to just over $ 1 million; it then reduced that amount by 25% based on certain criteria in

section 768.79(7)(b); to this total of $ 777,675.95 it added prejudgment interest of $ 183,200.96. The final judgment on fees awarded the appellees $ 960,876.91. Pirelli contends that applying the contingency risk multiplier in assessing fees under

section 768.79 is error because the trial court must use only the criteria the statute lists. This is the same argument raised in Collins that the Fourth District rejected, as did the Fifth District in Garrett. We agree with Judge Warner’s expressed reasoning in Collins.

Section 768.79(7)(

b) directs the trial court to consider, in determining the reasonableness of the fee, certain enumerated factors “along with all other relevant criteria ” (emphasis ours). The statute also refers the trial court to the guidelines promulgated by the supreme court. See § 768.79(6)(a), (b). These guidelines include the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, one of which, rule 4-1.5, fees for legal services, refers to whether or not the fee is fixed or contingent. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(b)(8). Additionally, in setting a reasonable fee, rule 4-1.5(

c) provides that all factors in this rule should be considered, “and may be applied, in justification of a fee higher or lower than that which would result from application of only the time and rate factors.” Thus, it is clear that the legislature authorized trial courts to consider and apply a contingency risk multiplier when awarding an attorneys’ fee under

section 768.79. See also Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828, 831 (Fla.1990). Inasmuch as the procedure is clearly outlined in the statute, we decline to construe it in a manner inconsistent with its directive, despite the fact that it enhances the award in such a generous manner. The trial court properly applied the statute as written. Because we perceive this issue to be an important one for the administration of justice in this state, we certify the following question as one of great importance. WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF A CONTINGENCY RISK MULTIPLIER TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER

SECTION 768.79, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT STATUTE, VIOLATE THE GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION AFFORDED UNDER THE UNITED STATES OR FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Affirmed. PATTERSON, C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur. CASANUEVA, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. .

Besides the application of the contingency risk multiplier to attorneys' fee awards under the offer of judgment statute, Pirelli also raises the following issues which we affirm without discussion: the trial court abused its discretion in finding that appellees had made their demand for judgment in good faith; if the trial court could apply the contingency risk multiplier, it was improperly applied to this case; the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award a reduced fee under the circumstances of this case; and the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest.

In the cross-appeal, the appellees raise the issues of whether the trial court erred by judging the "then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim" criterion in the statute from the wrong temporal perspective and whether the trial court erred in reducing the time expenditure amounts to arrive at the lodestar figure without the benefit of expert testimony. We also affirm the issues on the cross-appeal without discussion. . A similar suit on behalf of Mrs. Jensen’s estate was begun in federal court.