Glenn SMITH and Douglas Gilding, Appellants, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee, 974 So. 2d 1110

ALLEN, J. The appellants challenge an order by which their complaint was dismissed, upon their failure to comply with filing fee requirements under

section 57.085, Florida Statutes. The appellants are prison inmates who joined together in a single action contesting Department of Corrections rules regarding prison mail. Both appellants sought a declaratory judgment, and one of them also raised an issue regarding a prison disciplinary matter. However, only one of the appellants submitted the necessary information under

section 57.085 for the deferral of prepayment as to the filing fee and costs, while asserting that only that one appellant should be held responsible for the filing fee and costs in connection with the joint action. The circuit court rejected that assertion, and ruled that the appellants could not maintain their joint action as this approach would subvert the legislative intent underlying

section 57.085. In Schmidt v. McDonough, 951 So.2d 797 (Fla.2006), the supreme court established that when a prison inmate files a civil action combining a claim which is subject to the

section 57.085 procedure with a claim for which prepayment of the filing fee might be waived under

section 57.081, Florida Statutes, the entire action is subject to

section 57.085 without a prepayment waiver under

section 57.081, Florida Statutes. The court indicated that to exempt such a “mixed” action from

section 57.085 would undermine the statutory purpose and invite the filing of frivolous piggy-backed claims. The reasoning in Schmidt likewise applies in the present case, where the appellants are attempting to combine their individual claims in a way which would partly avoid the

section 57.085 requirements and allow one of the appellants to pursue claims without being subject to either

section 57.081 or

section 57.085. The circuit court thus properly ruled that this type of mixed action cannot be maintained in the manner it was presented by the appellants, as they must both be subject to the

section 57.085 procedure. The appellants question the constitutionality of

section 57.085, and suggest that it violates their right of access to the courts. However, the supreme court has recognized that the legislature may address the prepayment of fees and costs as provided in

section 57.085. See Jackson v. Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 790 So.2d 381 (Fla.2000). And because this statute is consistent with the permissible legislative goal expressed therein, and does not significantly impede access to the courts, it comports with the constitutional right of access. See, e.g., Henderson v. Crosby, 883 So .2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The appealed order is therefore affirmed. WEBSTER, J., concurs. BENTON, J., concurs in judgment with opinion.