Patrick COCHRANE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee, 997 So. 2d 1221

PER CURIAM. Patrick Cochrane appeals an order denying his very unusual postconviction motion, which essentially asked the trial court to clarify whether he is or is not a convicted felon. We conclude that we have no jurisdiction and dismiss this appeal. In 1992, Mr. Cochrane was charged with a third-degree felony. In August 1992, he entered a written plea of nolo contendere in exchange for a withhold of adjudication and one year’s probation. In July 1993, an affidavit of violation of probation was apparently filed against Mr. Cochrane, although our record does not contain that affidavit.

The record contains an order of probation revocation entered on August 16, 1993, after a hearing before Judge William J. Nelson.

This form order found the “Probationer has not properly conducted self, but has violated the conditions of Probation in a material respect,” and “Ordered and Adjudged that the Probation of aforesaid Probationer is hereby revoked.” Just below this appears the caption, “SENTENCE:” after which the court typed in “$175.00 Probation Fees to be subtracted from Cash Bond; balance of Bond to be refunded to the Defendant.” At that same time, the court clerk prepared a “memorandum of sentence” and placed a check in a box labeled “adjudicated.” Apparently, the clerk has relied on the memorandum of sentence to report Mr.

Cochrane to be a convicted felon to the relevant authorities. In 2007, Mr. Cochrane filed a “motion to direct clerk of this court to correct records” in his closed criminal case. This motion asked the trial court to instruct the clerk to report to the local sheriff and to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement that Mr. Cochrane had not been adjudicated guilty of an offense. The trial court denied the motion on July 16, 2007. Mr. Cochrane moved for rehearing. The trial court denied rehearing on August 31, 2007, and Mr. Cochrane thereafter appealed to this court.

Assuming only for the sake of argument that this postconviction motion filed in 2007 in the closed criminal case was a proper motion, it was filed on the premise that it was a motion filed after entry of final judgment. The motion was not filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 or 3.850 or any other specific rule of criminal procedure. Assuming the order entered to dispose of this motion was an appealable order, the time for filing the appeal extended only thirty days after the order was rendered. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D).

Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), the rendition of an order may be stayed if an “authorized” and timely motion for rehearing has been filed. Here, however, a motion for rehearing was not authorized for an order entered on this type of motion. See, e.g., Griffis v. State, 593 So.2d 308, 308-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (concluding that a motion for rehearing was not authorized for an order entered on a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800 under a prior version of the rule that did not specifically permit a rehearing of such orders). Accordingly, this appeal is untimely and must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed. WHATLEY and WALLACE, JJ., Concur. ALTENBERND, J., Concurs with opinion. . See also Fla. R.App. P. 9.100(c)(1) (requiring petitions for certiorari be filed within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed).