JACK v. JACK, 239 Mich. App. 668

Holbrook, Jr., J. Plaintiff appeals as of right from the parties’ judgment of divorce. We reverse and remand. The parties are the parents of two minor children, Erin, bom on November 30, 1992, and Adam, bom on June 26, 1995. The parties separated in early 1998. On February 20, 1998, a stipulated order was entered granting both temporary physical and legal custody of the children. In the January 29, 1999, judgment of divorce, the parties were granted joint legal custody, but defendant was granted sole physical custody. Plaintiff’s appeal is focused entirely on the issue of custody of the two children.

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by failing to determine whether an established custodial environment existed. We agree. MCL 722.27(l)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(l)(

c) states that the circuit court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.

The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered. Because a temporary custody order existed, the trial court was required to make a finding regarding the issue whether an established custodial environment existed.

Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 53-54; 475 NW2d 394 (1991); DeVries v De Vries, 163 Mich App 266, 270; 413 NW2d 764 (1987). “Where a trial court fails to make a finding regarding the existence of a custodial environment, this Court will remand for a finding unless there is sufficient information in the record for this Court to make its own determination of this issue by de novo review.” Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 304; 477 NW2d 496 (1991). Accord Bowers, supra at 53-54.

Upon review de novo of the record, we believe that the evidence shows that an established custodial environment existed with both parents. Duperon v Duperon, 175 Mich App 77, 80; 437 NW2d 318 (1989) (“An established custodial environment can exist in more than one home.”). The record establishes that the children looked to both parents to provide them with “guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(l)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(l)(c).

While defendant may have provided the majority of the financial support for the children despite an apparent ability of plaintiff to provide more assistance than he did, we do not believe that this necessarily means that such an environment existed only with defendant. Further, the fact that the children’s primary residence remained in defendant’s home after the parties separated did not extinguish the custodial environment that existed with plaintiff. See Nielsen v Nielsen, 163 Mich App 430, 433; 415 NW2d 6 (1987).

Therefore, because the trial court committed a clear legal error by failing to find that a custodial environment existed with both parents, Bowers, supra at 54, we hold that the case must be remanded to determine whether there was clear and convincing evidence that a change in custody was in the best interests of the children. Nielsen, supra at 433-434. Finally, we reject plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in admitting the psychological report prepared by Dr. Andrew Maltz in connection with the custody dispute in this matter.

At plaintiff’s request, the trial court ordered that “the parties and the two minor children undergo a psychological evaluation with Dr. Andrew Maltz . . . with a report to be submitted to the Court with regard to the issue of custody.” Further, while plaintiffs counsel objected at trial to plaintiffs being questioned about the contents of the report, counsel also indicated that plaintiff had no “problem with the Court” reviewing Dr. Maltz’ report.

Therefore, because plaintiffs position on appeal is contrary to his position below, and because he waived any objection he may have had to the trial court’s reviewing the report, we conclude that plaintiff’s argument is without merit. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520; 583 NW2d 199 (1998); Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 537-538; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Cavanagh, P.J., concurred.