STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Mark MANN, Defendant-Appellant, 129 N.M. 600

OPINION APODACA, Judge. {1} Defendant appeals his convictions for second-degree murder, intentional child abuse resulting in death, and aggravated battery of a household member. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) extraneous material was presented to the jury by one of the jurors, which (

a) tainted the jury process and (

b) entitled Defendant to a new trial, or at the least an evidentiary hearing, to determine whether Defendant was prejudiced by the extraneous material; (2) his convictions for both second-degree murder and intentional child abuse resulting in death violate his right not to be placed in double jeopardy; and (3) the trial court erred in not giving an instruction on defense of another as a defense to the aggravated battery against a household member. {2} On Issue 2, we hold that although Defendant can be charged with both second-degree murder and intentional child abuse resulting in death, he cannot be convicted of both crimes without violating his right to be free from double jeopardy.

On Issue 3, we determine that Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on his defense of another claim to the charge of aggravated battery against a household member. Finally, on Issue 1, the panel is divided, and on that issue this opinion represents a dissenting view. The majority having held otherwise on this issue, we affirm only the conviction of intentional child abuse resulting in death, based on our disposition of Issue 2. Departing from the views expressed by my esteemed colleagues, I would hold that extraneous material came before the jury, resulting in a presumption of prejudice to Defendant.

I would also hold that the State failed to rebut the presumption and as a result Defendant is entitled to a new trial. Because I dissent on this issue, this opinion will first discuss Issues 2 and 3, on which the entire panel concurs, followed by my own discussion and proposed disposition of Issue 1. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND {3} In the early morning hours of August 30, 1996, Noel Mann, Defendant’s six-year-old son, suffered a fatal injury as a result of being impaled in the chest by a screwdriver.

Defendant contended that the child, upon leaving the bathroom, slipped on a rug, knocked the screwdriver off a hamper, and then fell on the screwdriver, causing the fatal injury. The State contended that Defendant intentionally stabbed the child with the screwdriver. After the child received the injuries, Defendant’s live-in fiancee, called 911 and attempted to help the child.

Defendant, apparently believing that it would be fatal to the child if he was moved, attempted to prevent his fiancee from assisting by physically attacking her. {4} During the trial, Defendant called a physicist as an expert witness to testify on the possibility or probability for the child’s injury to have occurred in the manner contended by Defendant.

The expert witness testified regarding the mechanics, including the speed of falling bodies, the biomechanics of hard objects striking the human body, the amount of force necessary to cause certain injuries, and the probability, in general terms, of a screwdriver falling off a hamper in such a manner as to cause the injuries that ultimately resulted in the death of Defendant’s son.

The expert concluded that, although a series of events playing out as Defendant posited was not “impossible,” the “probability” of such an occurrence “was extremely small.” {5} After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Defendant’s trial attorney interviewed some of the members of the jury. The interviews revealed that during jury deliberations, Juror No. 7, who had a background in engineering and physics, presented his views on Defendant’s expert witness’ testimony to the other eleven jurors.

In particular, Juror No. 7 performed probability calculations for the other jurors and wrote those calculations down on an easel. The calculations he performed and presented were not presented by Defendant’s expert witness. {6} Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on this information and filed a request for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether and to what extent extraneous material was considered by the jury in reaching its verdict.

The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, but instead, outside of the presence of both the State and Defendant, interviewed Juror No. 7 and the four other jurors that Defendant indicated had knowledge of the extraneous material. A transcript of those interviews was made available to both Defendant and the State. The trial court also informed both counsel before the scheduled interviews that if there were additional jurors they wanted to be interviewed or additional questions they requested be asked, they were to so advise the trial court.

After interviewing the five jurors, the trial court ruled that the jury based its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial. The court thus denied the motion for a new trial. II. DISCUSSION A. Defendant’s Conviction for Second-Degree Murder and Child Abuse Resulting in Death Violated Defendant’s Right to be Free from Double Jeopardy {7} Defendant, relying on his constitutional right of protection from double jeopardy as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article II,

Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution, contends that his conviction for second-degree murder for the death of his child and his conviction for child abuse resulting in death for the death of the same child violates his right to be free from double jeopardy. See U.S. Const. Amend V; N.M. Const, art. II, § 15. We agree. {8} The double jeopardy clauses of both constitutions protect against multiple punishments for the same offense. Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 7, 810 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1991).

Our Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test, known as the Swafford analysis, to be used in analyzing a double jeopardy claim based upon multiple punishments for the same offense. The first step is to ask whether the conduct underlying the offenses is unitary, i.e., whether the same conduct of the defendant violates more than one statute. The second step is to ask whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for the unitary conduct.

Only if the first part of the test is answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative, will the double jeopardy clause prohibit multiple punishment in the same trial. State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 22, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). {9} Conduct is unitary if it is not sufficiently separated by time or place, and the object and result or quality and nature of the act cannot be distinguished. See State v. Livernois, 1997-NMSC-019, ¶ 20, 123 N.M. 128, 934 P.2d 1057; State v.

Contreras, 120 N.M. 486, 490, 903 P.2d 228, 232 (1995); Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13-14, 810 P.2d at 1233-34. Defendant was charged with and ultimately convicted of second-degree murder and child abuse resulting in death. The State’s theory was that Defendant impaled his son in the chest with a screwdriver. It is not disputed that there was only one act, the impaling of the child with the screwdriver, and only one victim. Cf. State v. Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, ¶ 18, 127 N.M. 504, 984 P.2d 185. As a result, there was no separation of time or place, and the result, quality, and nature of the act cannot be distinguished.

Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13-14, 810 P.2d at 1233-34. Consequently, the act was unitary. {10} Because we have determined that the conduct was unitary, we must next consider the second prong — whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments in this instance. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 23, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075. Initially, we conduct this inquiry by determining if the elements of one offense are subsumed within the elements of the other. Id. If they are, then for double jeopardy purposes, the statutes are the same, and Defendant cannot be punished for violating both statutes.

Id. {11} To find Defendant guilty of child abuse resulting in death, the jury was required to find the following elements:

(1) Defendant intentionally and without justification cruelly punished his son;

(2) Defendant’s actions or failure to act resulted in his son’s death;

(3) Defendant’s son was less than eighteen years of age. See UJI 14-602 NMRA 1999; NMSA 1978, § 30-6-1(0 (1989). “Intentionally” is defined as purposely doing

an act. See UJI 14-610 NMRA 1999. The elements of second-degree murder are:

(1) Defendant killed another human being without lawful justification; and

(2) Defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to another human being. See UJI 14-210 NMRA 1999; NMSA 1978, § 30-2-l(B) (1994). The State must also prove that Defendant acted intentionally, that is, that he purposely did the act the law declares to be a crime even if he did not know it was unlawful. See UJI14-141 NMRA1999. {12} Under either statute, there is a requirement that the jury find that Defendant intentionally committed

an act that resulted in the death of his son. Because there are additional elements to the crime of child abuse resulting in death, namely that the victim is less than eighteen, and that Defendant must be acting to cruelly punish the victim, our inquiry should focus on whether Defendant could have committed intentional child abuse resulting in death without committing second-degree murder. Under either statute, he must act intentionally. Under the second-degree murder statute (Section 30-2-l(B)), Defendant must do

an act that creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Under the child abuse statute (Section 30-6-1(0), Defendant’s actions must result in the death of the victim.

An act that results in the death of the victim, by definition, has a strong probability of resulting in the death of the victim. {13} Because the child abuse statute requires a finding that Defendant intended to cruelly punish the child and that the victim be under the age of eighteen, the child-abuse statute and the second-degree murder statute can stand independently and thus the elements of one are not subsumed within the other. If the two statutes can stand independently, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the legislature intended multiple punishments.

Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 23, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075. Other indicia of legislative intent, however, such as the language, history, and subject of the statutes may be used to overcome the presumption. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234. {14} Under the facts of this appeal, we believe the presumption that multiple punishments are appropriate is overcome by the general rule that one homicide by the acts of one defendant should result in one homicide conviction. See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 53, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660; see also State v.

Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 64, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789 (stating that defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy is violated by his conviction of intentional child abuse resulting in death and felony murder); State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 85, 792 P.2d 408, 417 (1990) (holding that it is a violation of double jeopardy for defendant to be sentenced for both intentional child abuse resulting in death and first-degree murder).

Applying the rationale and holdings of Cooper and Mora, we hold that Defendant cannot be punished for both intentional child abuse resulting in death and second-degree murder. {15} The next question we must address is which conviction should be vacated. As a general rule, the lesser offense must be vacated. See Pierce, 110 N.M. at 86-87, 792 P.2d at 418-19. Based on the facts of this case, Defendant could not have committed the offense of intentional child abuse resulting in death without also committing second-degree murder.

For that reason, second-degree murder is a lesser included offense of intentional child abuse resulting in death. “The rule of merger precludes an individual’s conviction and sentence for a crime that is a lesser included offense of a greater charge upon which defendant has also been convicted.” Id. at 86, 792 P.2d at 418 (emphasis added). Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder must therefore be vacated. B. Defendant Was Entitled to an Instruction on Defense of Another {16} Defendant requested a jury instruction on defense of another by use of non-deadly force.

Defendant orally amended the instruction in open court. The instruction requested was a defense to the charge of aggravated battery against a household member. Defendant contended that he was attempting to hold the screwdriver still to protect his son because he was afraid the boy might suffer more extensive injuries if the screwdriver was moved. It was Defendant’s theory that if in fact he committed a battery against Patricia St. Jeor, the household member, it was justified because he was attempting to defend his son from further injury.

The trial court refused to give the instruction on the basis that “it was [the court’s] recollection that Mr. Mann testified that he didn’t remember this happening, that he didn’t remember striking Ms. St. Jeor, and speculation as to why he did that would be speculation, and there’s insufficient evidence before the court at this time for this instruction to be given.” {17} When a defendant raises defense of another as a justification for his actions, an instruction on the defense should be given “ ‘if there is any evidence, even slight evidence, to support the claim.’ ” State v.

Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (quoting State v. Duarte, 121 N.M. 553, 556, 915 P.2d 309, 312 (Ct.App.1996)). Our Supreme Court has interpreted this standard to “require evidence that is ‘sufficient to allow reasonable minds to differ as to all elements of the defense.’ ” State v. Lopez, 2000-NMSC-003, ¶ 23, 128 N.M. 410, 415, 993 P.2d 727 (quoting State v. Branchal, 101 N.M. 498, 500, 684 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Ct.App.1984)). UJI 14-5182 NMRA 1999 sets forth the elements of the defense of another — nondeadly force by defendant: The defendant acted in defense of another if: 1.

There was an appearance of immediate danger of bodily harm to _ as a result of _; and 2. The defendant believed that _was in immediate danger of bodily harm from _ and _ to prevent the bodily harm; and 3. The defendant used the amount of force that the defendant believed was reasonable and necessary to prevent the bodily harm; and 5. The apparent danger to _would have caused a reasonable person in the same circumstances to act as defendant did. {18} We must review the evidence presented to determine if there is any evidence, however slight, to support all elements of the defense.

Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143. If a defendant presents sufficient evidence so that reasonable minds may differ as to all elements of the defense, the defense instruction must be given. State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 249, 719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Ct.App.1986) (abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 168, 861 P.2d 192, 204 (1993)). There need not be a showing by Defendant that his son was in actual danger from the actions of Ms. St. Jeor. Rather, there must be a showing that Defendant was in fear of apparent or immediate danger. Id. at 250, 719 P.2d at 1271.

There must be evidence, however, that Defendant’s fear was reasonable. Id. There must be some evidence that Defendant “acted as a reasonable person would have acted in the same circumstances.” Id. With these principles in mind, we now examine the evidence presented. {19} The victim of the aggravated battery testified that after hearing a commotion in the bathroom and a scream, she rushed to the bathroom to see what was going on, rushed back to call 911, put some clothes on, and then returned to the bathroom. She approached the child in an attempt to calm him and keep him still when she was struck by Defendant.

She testified that “[Defendant] made a terrible animal sound, a terrible animal sound like a wounded animal.” {20} Defendant testified that after his son was impaled by the screwdriver, he knew the child had to be kept still and that he, Defendant, had to keep the screwdriver still so it would not cause additional damage. He also testified that, when Ms. St. Jeor came to help, he thought she was going to move the child, and he pushed her away for that reason. He also testified that he remembered standing up and pushing her out of the way. {21} Dr.

Samuel Roll, a clinical psychologist, testified that the human and parental instinct is such that it would not be unusual for parents to resort to primitive instincts when they perceive their child is in danger. When presented with a hypothetical representing Defendant’s claims of what occurred, Dr.

Roll testified that “anyone approaching the child, if the person felt they were protecting the child and there was some way that they had in their head was important to protect the child, if there was some risk of anyone doing anything to hurt the child, I think that anyone who walked into that context would be at risk for being repelled by any force by this person who felt that he was trying to protect his child from further harm.” Dr. Roll also stated that Defendant’s reaction to the perceived threat was likely to occur among people in general.

The psychologist then testified that Defendant told him that he thought Ms. St. Jeor was going to move the screwdriver and he “moved her out of the way.” Finally, the witness explained that: One of the situations that makes any of us behave about as primitive[ly] as we can behave is when our child is in danger and we think there [is] some way to help [when] someone is endangering the child.

At that point we become primitive and probably call on very basic instincts, not just for human beings, but almost any mammal. [If s]omebody is going to hurt the child, the first step is to make sure that you keep that person away from the child. So that’s very primitive, very predictable____ {22} The sheriffs deputies and emergency personnel who responded to the scene of the incident testified that when they arrived, Defendant would not allow the emergency personnel access to the child. Deputy Ronnie Weller testified that when he arrived, “[Defendant] was in a crouched position on the floor over the child.

Deputy Johnston was attempting to get [Defendant] to let go of the child. [Defendant] was rocking and making some noises, kind of like grunting, also saying things to the nature of if they move him they will kill him.” Deputy Johnston testified that Defendant was adamant about the child not being moved. According to Deputy Johnston, Defendant stated “Don’t pull the screwdriver out[;] you will kill him.” Richard Keamery, a paramedic with the Bernalillo Fire Department testified that Defendant told him not to pull the screwdriver out and that Defendant was growling and showing his teeth. Mr.

Kearney testified as well that normally you do not remove objects that have penetrated someone until the injured person is in an emergency room or operating room. {23} Having reviewed and considered these facts, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Defendant feared his son was put in danger by the actions of Ms. St. Jeor and that those fears were reasonable. See Gallegos, 104 N.M. at 250, 719 P.2d at 1271; see also State v.

Ungarten, 115 N.M. 607, 611, 856 P.2d 569, 573 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that when there is evidence presented in support of a defense, however slight, it is the court’s duty to instruct on the defense). {24} The State claims that the “hybrid test” adopted by our Court in Gallegos, 104 N.M. at 250, 719 P.2d at 1271, precludes the giving of the instruction in this case. We disagree.

Under the hybrid test, there must be “evidence that an objectively reasonable person, [placed in] Defendant’s subjective situation, would have thought that [his son] was threatened with [harm], and that the use of ... force was necessary to prevent the threatened injury.” Duarte, 121 N.M. at 557, 557-58, 915 P.2d at 313, 313-14. The State contends Defendant’s actions were unreasonable per se and consequently an objectively reasonable person would not have acted as Defendant acted. Dr.

Roll, however, essentially testified that it was not unlikely for a person in Defendant’s subjective position to act in that manner. {25} We hold that there was sufficient evidence presented to require the giving of the defense-of-another instruction as a defense to the charge of aggravated battery on a household member. C. Whether Extraneous Material Reached the Jury and, if so Whether the State Rebutted the Presumption that the Extraneous Material Was Prejudicial {26} This subsection of the opinion represents only the dissenting view of the author.

Judge Armijo’s opinion, joined by Judge Wechsler, represents the majority opinion of the Court on Issue 1. {27} I will address Issues 1(

a) and 1(

b) together, rephrasing those issues because I believe the proper inquiry in this ease is whether the State has rebutted any presumption of prejudice that might arise from the introduction of extraneous material. {28} Defendant contends that Juror No. 7 relied on his expertise as an engineer, as well as his background in physics, in performing calculations that discredited Defendant’s expert witness, and as a result, brought extraneous material before the jury. The State disputes that contention.

According to the State, by performing calculations and presenting them to the jury, Juror No. 7 was simply filtering the evidence presented through his engineering experience and sharing that experience with the jury within the context of the deliberation process. I disagree. By filtering the evidence, to use the State’s description, Juror No. 7 was using his “scientific, technical or other specified knowledge [to] assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence.” Shamalon Bird Farm v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 111 N.M. 713, 714, 809 P.2d 627, 628 (1991) (quoting NMRA 2000, § 11-702).

In essence, Juror No. 7 was acting as an expert witness, and it is precisely this “filtering” that I would determine brought extraneous material before the jury. See State v. Steinkraus, 76 N.M. 617, 620, 417 P.2d 431, 432 (1966) (determining that expert testimony is to be considered additional evidence). {29} The jurors were instructed before opening statements that they were to decide the case based solely on the evidence presented at trial. See UJI 14-101 NMRA 1999. At the conclusion of evidence, they were instructed that it was their duty to determine the facts from the evidence produced in court.

See UJI 14-606 NMRA 1999. The jury was properly instructed that it was to consider only the evidence before it and that it was not to consider any extraneous information in reaching a verdict. {30} Extraneous information has been defined as “[c]ommunication of specific knowledge from a particular juror to others.” State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 590, 762 P.2d 250, 252 (1988).

In Sacoman, our Supreme Court recognized the balance that must be drawn between the jury fairly considering the evidence before it and drawing upon its collective life experiences, on the one hand, and considering facts not before it, on the other.

Most certainly jurors are not precluded from drawing on their wisdom and experience and engaging in a free exchange of ideas and subjective opinions during the course of their deliberations---- The point, however, is that such deliberations must take their content from the record facts before them, not from external facts brought into the jury room by a juror and thus not screened through the judicial process. Id. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253 (quoting People v. Huntley, 87 A.D.2d 488, 452 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (1982). {31} The first inquiry, then, is whether extraneous information reached the jury. See State v.

Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 366, 683 P.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App.1983). If the calculations performed by Juror No. 7 and presented to the jury are not extraneous information, the inquiry is over. In its most general sense, extraneous information consists of facts or evidence not elicited during trial that is communicated to the jury. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252. In Sacoman, two jurors provided information to the other jurors concerning procedures relied on by restaurants to pay employees who failed to punch the time clock at the end of their shift.

The Court concluded that this constituted extraneous information. Id. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253. {32} From Sacoman, and the eases on which it relied, I would determine that extraneous information is material that (

a) would not otherwise be available to the other jurors because the information was not presented at trial, and (

b) the information was available to the juror who disseminated it either as a result of his specialized training or his peculiar experiences. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253. Applying these principles to this case, I would examine the information available to the jury at the beginning of deliberations, as well as the information presented to the jury by Juror No. 7. {33} Defendant’s expert, Dr. Alan Watts, testified in depth regarding the mechanics involved when a body falls forward and a screwdriver or other object is dropped on a hard surface.

He also testified in more general terms regarding the probability of a screwdriver being knocked on the floor and bouncing up in such a way as to impale a body falling forward. {34} Juror No. 7, during the trial court’s interview, stated that “[m]y issue was I don’t think they answered the right question.” He then went on to explain in detail what information he presented to the jury. “In my professional judgment ... looking at this from [an] engineering problem, this whole scenario with [a] screwdriver on top of a hamper ultimately impaling a kid, there’s a sequence that has to occur in some form or fashion for that to happen.” The juror then went through his own five-step probability calculations that apparently took about thirty minutes.

By the juror’s own admission, none of that information was presented during the trial and was available to him only because of his background in engineering and physics.

Apparently, Juror No. 7 felt compelled to present his probability calculations to the other jurors because he concluded that the “right question” was not asked. {35} The trial court interviewed only five of the twelve jurors and, although the court did not make an explicit finding that extraneous information was presented to the jury, it did find that at least the five jurors interviewed did not rely upon any extraneous material in reaching their decision.

The trial court stated, “I believe that the jury in this case took the evidence as they saw it in court, made a decision based on their [conscience] and on the evidence presented in court.” (Emphasis added.) It is not clear from the court’s ruling whether it found that extraneous material had actually reached the jury but concluded in any event that Defendant was not prejudiced or whether the court determined that, even assuming such material reached the jury, Defendant was not prejudiced.

Whichever determination on the first prong was made by the trial court, it clearly found no prejudice to Defendant. {36} In my view, whether the trial court actually found the information provided by Juror No. 7 to constitute extraneous material is not controlling. Having reviewed the information presented by Juror No. 7, in view of the principles enunciated by our Supreme Court in Socorrían, I would conclude, as a matter of law, that the information indeed constituted extraneous material.

Specifically, it was information that would not otherwise be available to the jury and constituted a “[c]ommunication of specific knowledge from a particular juror to others.” Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252; see also Shamalon Bird, 111 N.M. at 715, 809 P.2d at 629 (describing what constitutes expert testimony); Steinkraus, 76 N.M. at 620, 417 P.2d at 432 (stating that expert testimony is to be considered evidence). {37} The majority poses the issue as whether a juror’s reliance on his technical background, as well as his communication of this reliance to fellow jurors, constitutes misconduct.

I submit that what transpired in the jury room in this case was beyond communication relying on technical background. What occurred here was the bringing into the jury room of the juror’s oum calculations based on his specialized knowledge, as well as his version of responses to questions that he maintained were never asked of the sole expert witness who testified on the subject at trial. It matters not that Juror No. 7 based his own calculations upon the testimony of Dr. Watts or other facts adduced at trial. See Alford v.

Drum, 68 N.M. 298, 302, 361 P.2d 451, 453 (1961) (acknowledging that expert testimony is often based on facts already in the record). What matters is that, in using these facts, which in themselves were not extrinsic, to perform his own calculations and then proceeding to explain those calculations by using his own five-step process, independent of Dr. Watts’ testimony, Juror No. 7 presented extraneous material. It also is not significant, as maintained by the majority, whether the juror’s own calculations discredited Dr.

Watts’ testimony on the likelihood or probability of the impaling of the young boy occurring in the manner testified to by Defendant. To me, the real issue is whether Juror No. 7’s presentation was equivalent to that of an expert witness. Shamalon Bird held that expert testimony is testimony explaining “steps followed [by the expert witness] in reaching [his] conclusion.” Shamalon Bird, 111 N.M. at 715, 809 P.2d at 629.

That is precisely the role played by Juror No. 7 during jury deliberations. {38} The majority proposes that “it was not improper for Juror No. 7 to have expressed what he felt were the questions Dr. Watt’s testimony did not answer.” In so doing, the majority claims, the juror was only “recognizing and showing his views” concerning the weakness of Defendant’s defense. The record reflects, however, that in making his presentation to his fellow jurors, Juror No. 7 did not argue that Dr.

Watts had not provided certain answers, thus weakening the defense’s theory, but instead claimed that the “right questions” had not been asked. Apparently, in his thirty-minute presentation, Juror No. 7 not only provided the so-called right questions but then proceeded to answer them.

Consequently, to categorize the juror’s statements to his fellow jurors as merely a “common sense” opinion, as the majority terms it, is not a correct characterization of what occurred. {39} The majority also emphasizes that Defendant accepted the possibility that Juror No. 7 would use his expertise during deliberations because Defendant did not challenge Juror No. 7 during voir dire.

Acceptance of Juror No. 7 at voir dire, however, did not give that juror carte blanc permission to inject into jury deliberations evidence (Ms own opinion, his own calculations, his own five-step process, and his own responses to questions he insisted were not asked at trial) that I maintain constituted impermissible and extraneous material.

See Steinkraus, 76 N.M. at 620, 417 P.2d at 432 (“[Observations and conclusions [by an expert witness] are facts [that] ... constitute evidence----”). {40} Juror No. 7, having disclosed his technical and professional background, assured the trial court and the parties during voir dire that, despite that background, he would be able to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial. He later took an oath to that effect. I submit he violated that oath.

To be sure, as the majority observes, Defendant took a calculated risk by not objecting to or challenging Juror No. 7’s selection as a juror, either for cause or by using one of his peremptory challenges. But that risk did not include consenting to a violation of the juror’s duty to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial.

In my view, Juror No. 7 took much more into the jury room then his own life and technical experiences. {41} The majority relies on a California Supreme Court case, In re Malone, 12 Cal.4th 935, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468 (1996), for the proposition that “[i]t is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or employment background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long as the opinion is based on the evidence at trial.” Id. at 486.

Although that quote is a correct statement of the law, the majority fails to recognize the discussion immediately following the quoted passage on what does constitute juror misconduct. “[A] juror’s own claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of a matter at issue is misconduct.” Id. {42} I do not claim, as the majority implies, that “specialized training alone ... render[s] a juror’s active participation in deliberations improper.” I am not concerned that Juror No 7’s general technical background rendered his participation in the jury deliberation as extraneous.

During deliberations, Juror No. 7 could have stated that, based on his experience, Defendant’s theory was virtually impossible. That would not have been improper. What concerns me, however, was the in-depth, 30-minute dissertation concerning probability calculations that he injected into the case. {43} Juror No. 7 claimed he had “expertise or specialized knowledge of a matter at issue” — whether it was possible that the child impaled himself — and that he knew the answers to the right questions that were never asked.

Juror No. 7 did not just use his “educational [and] employment background[ ] to express an opinion on a technical subject,” but presented himself as an expert to the other jurors. Again, I do not suggest that specialized training alone somehow rendered the juror’s participation as extraneous. I instead conclude that his claim of “expertise”, as well as his “expert” presentation, was juror misconduct. See id. (holding such claims as juror misconduct). {44} The trial court interviewed five of the twelve jurors.

There were different versions among the jurors questioned by the court concerning whether Juror No. 7 had brought calculations on a piece of paper into the jury room, which he then transferred onto a board as he explained his own calculations to his fellow jurors. To be sure, questioning of the remaining jurors at an evidentiary hearing could have cleared up once and for all the extent of materials or figures previously calculated that were brought into the jury room. The question of whether Juror No. 7 brought any document into the jury room is inconsequential, however.

What is significant to me is that the juror went through his own calculation process, whether transferred from a piece of paper or whether imprinted mentally in his own mind. Regardless, Juror No. 7 told the trial court that he used his “professional judgment,” approaching the ease much like he would any “engineering problem,” and stated that “this whole scenario with [a] screwdriver ... there’s a sequence that has to occur.” He admitted to performing a “fairly simple five-step probability” calculation that he claimed, to use the majority’s words, “grew out of Dr.

Watts’ testimony.” See Shamalon Bird, 111 N.M. at 715, 809 P.2d at 629 (stating that such five-step probability calculations are methods used by expert witnesses). {45} The majority notes that Juror No. 7 was simply experimenting with the probability of events happening as Defendant claimed. Relying on State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673 (1991), the majority proposes that such experiments are not improper. Id. at 733, 819 P.2d at 683.

Our Supreme Court in that ease, however, did “not consider ... experimentations based on facts [or expert opinion] not properly before the jury.” Id. at 731, 819 P.2d at 684. The Court only determined that “the jury ... did not consider evidence or statements that were not presented to the court.” Id. In this appeal, we are addressing the issue of whether evidence in the form of expert testimony was presented to the jury without first being filtered through the judicial process.

See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253 (holding that all evidence must be “screened through the judicial process”). {46} In Chamberlain, the jury conducted experiments with evidence that was presented at trial. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 731, 819 P.2d at 684. No juror in that case claimed to have “expertise or specialized knowledge of a matter at issue.” In re Malone, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d at 486. Nor did one juror give a thirty-minute presentation based on his or her own calculations.

The Court in Chamberlain determined that experimenting with testimony and evidence from the trial were not improper; however, it acknowledged that “potential error may occur if an experiment creates a new evidentiary fact outside of the record for the jury.” Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 732, 819 P.2d 673. {47} Juror No. 7 did not merely use Dr. Watts’ testimony and the evidence presented at trial but expounded on the evidence and “testified” with answers to questions he contended were never posed to Dr. Watts.

Juror No. 7’s “experiment creat[ed] a new evidentiary fact outside of the record for the jury.” Id In short, Chamberlain did not consider juror misconduct in terms of “a juror’s own claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of a matter at issue.” In re Malone, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d at 486. It only discussed “evidence [and] statements that were presented” at trial.

It thus appears to me that Chamberlain is not relevant to the facts in this appeal. {48} Other cases cited by the majority, when viewed in their entirety, actually support the conclusion that the actions of Juror No. 7 went far beyond the use of his educational and professional background and resulted in juror misconduct. See e.g., United States v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (1970) (“To the greatest extent possible all [evidence, including expert opinion] must pass through the judicial [process], where the fundamental guarantees of procedural law protect the rights of those accused of crimes.”); Ertsgaard v.

Beard 310 Or. 486, 800 P.2d 759, 766 (1990) (holding new trial should be granted when a juror gives “specialized knowledge [to other jurors] concerning one of the disputed facts in the case under consideration”). The majority states that it would be improper to overturn a verdict “the moment a juror passes a fraction of an inch beyond the record evidence.” McMann, 435 F.2d at 817. Juror No. 7’s presentation, however, went far beyond “a fraction of an inch.” {49} I share the majority’s support of the case law protecting and insulating the privacy of our jury system.

That protection disallows inquiries into intrinsic matters. As the majority concedes, however, it does not disallow inquiry into extrinsic matters that may have breached our jury deliberative process. {50} Stripped of its language concerning the sanctity of jury room deliberations, the majority’s opinion, in my view, represents nothing more than a different “judgment call” or “take” on the material presented by Juror No. 7. Was it or was it not extraneous? The majority goes through great lengths to show that it was not. I respectfully disagree with that conclusion.

When all is said and done, I view the material as opinion evidence supporting the State’s theory, independent of the testimony of the only expert at trial. That independent opinion evidence, I submit, was extraneous material as discussed in the case law. See e.g., In re Malone, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d at 486 (“[A] juror’s own claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of a matter at issue is misconduct.”). {51} Because I would conclude that extraneous information was considered by the jury, I next discuss whether that information prejudiced Defendant, a determination required by Sacoman.

Once a determination is made that extraneous information is presented to the jury, there is a presumption of prejudice. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253. This presumption may be rebutted by a showing of no actual prejudice. Id. In State v.

Pierce, 109 N.M. 596, 788 P.2d 352 (1990), Justice Ransom, specially concurring, recognized certain procedures to follow when it is determined that extraneous material has reached the jury: If a defendant makes a preliminary showing of the existence of extraneous prejudicial information ... that implicates a due process violation, the court must conduct a hearing to determine the existence of a taint on the jury deliberation process. The introduction of extraneous prejudicial information ... creates a presumption of prejudice.

If, at the hearing, the trial court finds a reasonable possibility of prejudice, a new trial should be granted. Id. at 605-06, 788 P.2d at 361-62 (Ransom, J., specially concurring) (footnotes omitted). {52} In determining prejudice, the trial court must consider “how the material was received [by the jury], how long it was available to the jury, the extent to which the jury discussed the material, whether [the jurors] considered [the material] before they reached a verdict or after, and, if before, at what point in the deliberations they received the material.” Doe, 101 N.M. at 366-67, 683 P.2d at 48-49.

Additionally, “[t]he strength of the State’s ease has a bearing on the issue of prejudice.” (citation omitted). {53} The jury received the material when Juror No. 7 stood up before the jury, advising his fellow jurors of his expertise as an engineer and telling them that, in his professional judgment, they needed to consider other information not presented by Defendant’s expert or presented by the State. At an easel, the juror gave a discourse to the other jurors in physics and probabilities. As previously noted, it took approximately thirty minutes for the material to be presented.

It was not simply a passing reference made by one juror to another. The presentation was given before the jury took a vote on the intentional child abuse resulting in death charge or the second-degree murder charge.

The material was presented after the first full day of deliberations but only three or four hours into the jury’s verdict consideration. {54} From Juror No. 7’s own words (“I don’t think they answered the right question.”), I believe the extraneous information provided by him was apparently intended to contradict Defendant’s case, for he then gave a thirty-minute discourse of his own five-step probability process. This is a factor the trial court must consider as well.

See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591-92, 762 P.2d at 253-54. (stating that extraneous information contradicting an asserted defense “was identified in [People v. Martinez, 82 Cal.App.3d 1, 147 Cal.Rptr. 208, 220 (1978) ] as a factor constituting prejudice [requiring] that the conviction be reversed”). The information presented was not “screened through the judicial process.” Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253 (quoting Huntley, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

This presents not only possible problems implicating due process, but it also may implicate a defendant’s right to confront the evidence against him pursuant to the U.S. Const. Amend. VI. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966). The information was not subjected to scrutiny by Defendant’s trial counsel.

Any doubt there may be on what effect or prejudice the information provided had on the jury, I submit, should be resolved in favor of Defendant, in light of the existing presumption of prejudice. {55} In Martinez, a case cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Sacoman, the California Court of Appeal set forth three factors that must be considered in deciding whether a defendant was prejudiced by juror misconduct in receiving evidence not presented in court — “[W]hether the jury’s impartiality has been adversely affected, whether the prosecution’s burden of proof has been lightened}, or] whether any asserted defense has been contradicted.” Martinez, 147 Cal.Rptr. at 220. “If the answer to [any one ] of these questions is in the affirmative, the defendant has been prejudiced____” People v.

Castro, 184 Cal.App.3d 849, 856, 229 Cal.Rptr. 280, 284 (1986); see also Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Constr. Co., 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 286 Cal.Rptr. 435, 449 (Ct.App.1991). The California courts, when faced with the issue of extraneous material being presented to the jury, have consistently held that once extraneous material is brought before the jury, there is a presumption that the material prejudiced the complaining party, and unless the presumption is rebutted, the complaining party is entitled to a new trial.

See Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd., 286 Cal.Rptr. at 447. (“In reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial based on jury misconduct, the appellate court has a constitutional obligation to review the entire record, including the evidence, and to determine independently whether the act of misconduct, if it occurred, prevented the complaining party from having a fair trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)). {56} Because extraneous information was presented, the burden shifted to the State to rebut the presumption of prejudice. See Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 591, 762 P.2d at 253.

Additionally, when the factors set forth in our own case of Doe, 101 N.M. at 366, 683 P.2d at 48, and by the California courts in Martinez and Castro are considered, the presumption of prejudice is great. The evidence (1) was presented before the jury reached a decision on the intentional child abuse and seeond-degree-murder charge; (2) contradicted Defendant’s case, due to a great extent on Juror No. 7’s thirty-minute discourse involving a five-step process, based entirely on the premise that he did not “think they answered the right question;” and (3) was before the jury for a substantial period of time.

The fact that there might be “[c]onvineing evidence of guilt does not deprive a defendant of the right to a fair trial.” Martinez, 147 Cal.Rptr. at 220. {57} The trial court interviewed only five of the twelve jurors. Four jurors testified that the information presented by Juror No. 7 was not the determinative factor or even a significant factor in their decision. Juror No. 7 testified that the information he presented was only one of many factors that influenced his decision. Seven of the jurors, however, were not interviewed by the trial court.

For this reason, there is no way of knowing whether those seven jurors were in any way influenced by the extraneous material. I believe this fact raises “a reasonable possibility of prejudice.” Pierce, 109 N.M. at 605-06, 788 P.2d at 361-62 (Ransom, J., specially concurring). {58} It was the State’s burden to show that Defendant was not prejudiced by the extraneous material, not Defendant’s burden to show otherwise. By failing to have those seven jurors interviewed by the trial court, I would hold that the State failed to rebut the presumption that the extraneous material prejudiced Defendant.

For this reason, it cannot be said that Defendant acquiesced or waived the trial court’s “interviews” with the remaining seven jurors. It was not Defendant’s duty to assist the State in rebutting the presumption of prejudice that Defendant was entitled to under our case law. {59} Alternatively, I would hold that due process and fair trial requirements imbedded in our state’s Constitution required the trial court to conduct a full evidentiary hearing.

At that hearing, the parties would be afforded the right to examine and cross-examine all jurors, not only the five jurors interviewed privately and in chambers by the court. {60} In determining a remedy, I considered whether remanding the case for the trial court to interview the other jurors would be feasible. To do so, however, is problematic after the lapse of time in this appeal since trial. The trial ended in February 1998, over two years ago. Consequently, there may be great risk that the juror’s recollections regarding the impact of the extraneous material would be impaired.

Additionally, the trial judge who presided at trial has since retired, therefore requiring a new judge to conduct the interviews. For these reasons, I believe that the State could not meet its burden of showing Defendant was not prejudiced. I would hold, then, that the State had an opportunity to rebut the presumption of prejudice during the initial interviews and failed to do so at that time. This failure, in my view, cannot be corrected by conducting interviews of the remaining jurors on remand.

I therefore would conclude that Defendant’s convictions for both second-degree murder and intentional child abuse resulting in death should be reversed and the ease remanded for a new trial on those two charges. {61} On remand, Defendant could be charged with both second-degree murder and intentional child abuse resulting in death. See Pierce, 110 N.M. at 87, 792 P.2d at 419. In a new trial, however, the State would be permitted to proceed on both theories.

If a jury eventually returned guilty verdicts on both charges, the trial court would then dismiss the second-degree-murder charge, because it is a lesser included offense of child abuse resulting in death. {62} The majority having expressed a different view and holding on this issue, I dissent. III. CONCLUSION {63} We conclude that:

(1) Defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy was violated by his convictions and sentencing for both second-degree murder and intentional child abuse resulting in death; and (2) there was sufficient evidence presented to support an instruction on defense of another to the aggravated battery on a household member charge and the trial court erred by not giving such an instruction. {64} Because second-degree murder is a lesser included offense of intentional child abuse resulting in death and the rule of merger prohibits both a conviction and sentence for the lesser charge, we remand for the entry of an order vacating Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder.

Defendant’s conviction of intentional child abuse resulting in death is affirmed. We reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery of a household member and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion, only on that issue. {65} IT IS SO ORDERED. WECHSLER and ARMIJO, JJ., concurring in part.