Stark LIGON, Executive Director of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, Petitioner, v. Oscar Amos STILLEY, Respondent, 371 S.W.3d 615

RONALD L. SHEFFIELD, Justice. I, Stark Ligón, Executive Director of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct (“the Committee”), brings this original action to disbar attorney Oscar Amos Stilley, Ark. Bar No. 91096. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1 — 2(a)(5) (2010). We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the special judge and agree that the appropriate sanction is disbarment. I. Procedural History hOn October 29, 2004, then Circuit Judge James R.

Marschewski referred Stilley to the Committee for possible ethics violations (CPC No.2006-067, “the Marschew-ski Complaint”). On December 14, 2007, after hearing the matter, Panel B of the Committee voted to initiate disbarment proceedings against Stilley. The panel members also voted to place him on interim suspension pending the conclusion of such proceedings. An order of suspension was filed with the clerk of this court on December 27, 2007. Ligón subsequently filed a petition for disbarment on January 16, 2008, and alleged twenty-eight violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”).

The petition raised two additional allegations related to Stilley’s “overall fitness” to hold a law license. Stilley responded to the petition on March 3, 2008. By per curiam order on April 15, 2008, we appointed Special Judge John Line-berger to hear the disbarment petition and to provide the court with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of an appropriate sanction. Ligon v. Stilley, 373 Ark. App’x 675, 283 S.W.3d 185 (2008) (per curiam).

On June 20, 2008, Panel B authorized disbarment proceedings related to a subsequent complaint filed against Stilley by Circuit Judge Stephen Tabor (CPC 2007-062, “the Tabor Complaint”). On June 27, 2008, Ligón filed a first amended/supplement petition for disbarment based on the Tabor Complaint. The amended petition raised nine additional counts for disbarment and ten additional allegations related to Stilley’s fitness to hold a law license. Throughout the proceedings before the special judge, Stilley filed numerous motions,_J^which will be addressed in this opinion as they are relevant.

On April 22, 2009, following a three-day hearing on December 8, 9, and 10, 2008, at which he heard testimony and received evidence, the special judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order was one hundred and nineteen pages in length and found that Ligón had met his burden of proof with respect to the thirty-two counts charged in the petition for disbarment and the amended petition for disbarment. On May 21, 2009, the special judge heard testimony and received evidence relevant to a determination of the appropriate sanction. On August 6, 2009, an order recommending disbarment was filed.

We are now considering the recommendation of disbarment. II. Standard of Review The authority to regulate the practice of law arises from the Arkansas Constitution, specifically amendment 28 and amendment 80,

section 4. The power to regulate the practice of law is also an inherent power of the courts. See, e.g., Ligon v. McCullough, 2009 Ark. 165A, 303 S.W.3d 78; see also In re Anderson, 312 Ark. 447, 851 S.W.2d 408 (1993); Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697 (1941); Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149 (1860). The Procedures Regulating Professional Conduct (“Procedures”) were promulgated by this court and govern attorney discipline. See Ark. Sup.Ct. P.

Regulating Profl Conduct § 1(A) (2010) (“These Procedures are promulgated for the purpose of regulating the professional conduct of attorneys at law and shall apply to complaints filed and formal complaints instituted against attorneys.”). Under

section 13 of the Procedures, the process for a disbarment action, as relevant to |4the instant matter, is as follows: (

A) An action for disbarment shall be filed as an original action with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Upon such filing, the Arkansas Supreme Court, pursuant to Amendment 28 of the Arkansas Constitution, shall assign a special judge to preside over the disbarment proceedings .... In disbarment suits, the action shall proceed as an action between the Executive Director and the respondent. Proceedings shall be held in compliance ■with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, and trial shall be had without a jury. (

B) The judge shall first hear all evidence relevant to the alleged misconduct and shall then make a determination as to whether the allegations have been proven. Upon a finding of misconduct, the judge shall then hear all evidence relevant to an appropriate sanction to be imposed, including evidence related to the factors listed in

Section 19 and the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in the American Bar Association’s Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, §§ 9.22 and 9.32 (1992). See Wilson v. Neal, 332 Ark. 148, 964 S.W.2d 199 (1998). (

C) The judge shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the alleged misconduct of the respondent attorney and the imposition of sanctions, including the factors discussed in subsection 13(B).... The judge shall make a recommendation as to the appropriate sanction from those set out in

Section 17(D). ■ (

D) The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of an appropriate sanction shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with a transcript and the record of the proceedings. Upon the filing, the parties shall file briefs as in other cases. The findings of fact shall be accepted by the Supreme Court unless clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court shall impose the appropriate sanction, if any, as the evidence may warrant. In imposing the sanction of suspension, the attorney may be suspended for a period not exceeding five (5) years. There is no appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court except as may be available under federal law. Id. §

Section 1(

C) of the Procedures states that attorney disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal in nature but are sui generis, meaning of their own kind. See id. § 1(C); see also Ligon v. Dunklin, 368 Ark. 443, 247 S.W.3d 498 (2007). We will accept the judge’s | ¡¿findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and we impose the appropriate sanction as warranted by the evidence. Ark. Sup.Ct. P. Regulating Profl Conduct § 1(C); see also McCullough, 2009 Ark. 165A, 303 S.W.3d 78.

A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. McCullough, 2009 Ark. 165A, 303 S.W.3d 78; see also Ligon v. Stewart, 369 Ark. 380, 255 S.W.3d 435 (2007). Because the special judge’s findings are not clearly erroneous, we adopt them in full. Further, we agree with the special judge that disbarment is the appropriate sanction given the serious and widespread nature of Stilley’s professional misconduct. III.

Evidence Supports the Special Judge’s Findings and Recommendation For his first point on appeal, Stilley contends that there was a “complete and total absence of evidence in support of [Ligon’s] claims.” Stilley urges that the special judge erred in recommending disbarment under the circumstances. Ligón responds that Stilley has failed “to address the overwhelming factual evidence in the record against him and the Special Judge’s carefully reasoned and fully-supported findings as to guilt on all thirty-two charges of misconduct.” Ligón argues instead that Stilley’s arguments relate more to procedure. A.

Underlying Facts The facts giving rise to this disbarment proceeding are complex and have been set forth in multiple previous cases.

The essence of the charges is that Stilley attempted to relitigate issues that had previously been decided by filing multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts. | fiIn doing so, it is alleged that Stilley was disrespectful toward the courts and toward individual judges; was repeatedly sanctioned under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 11; threatened to report a circuit judge and opposing counsel to the prosecuting attorney’s office and to the professional misconduct committee if they did not comply with his demands; personally sued various judges and justices after they ruled against him; withheld material information from the court; directly violated court orders; and repeatedly attempted to be admitted to practice before federal courts without disclosing his disciplinary history in Arkansas.

In 2002, Stilley filed a complaint in the Sebastian County Circuit Court on behalf of his client, John Parker, against the following parties: the county judge; the county collector; and the county treasurer; the Fort Smith School District; Westark Community College, a/k/a University of Arkansas-Fort Smith; the City of Fort Smith; and Sebastian County. The complaint alleged that Act 758 of 1995 violated amendment 59 to the Arkansas Constitution and that the defendants were imposing illegal taxes on the plaintiff and other similarly-situated taxpayers. Circuit Judge Marschewski granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on grounds that res judicata barred the lawsuit because the claims raised were litigated in Elzea v. Perry, 340 Ark. 588, 12 S.W.3d 213 (2000). Judge Marschewski also imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Stilley after finding that he was the attorney in the Elzea case and had, therefore, previously filed an identical complaint that resulted in

summary judgment and was affirmed on appeal. Parker appealed, and this court affirmed the grant of

summary judgment and the Rule 11 sanctions in Parker v. Perry, 355 Ark. 97, 131 S.W.3d 338 (2003). In July 2004, the Fort Smith School District, one of the defendants in Parker, filed a 17notice of noncompliance in circuit court, and in August, it filed a motion to enforce Rule 11 sanctions. A hearing was held on September 22, 2004, at which Stil-ley was directed by the court to provide information regarding his finances in order to determine if he was financially able to comply with the Rule 11 sanctions.

Stilley then filed a complaint in federal court against Judge Marschewski, opposing counsel, and the Justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court, alleging that his due-process and equal-protection rights were violated and that Judge Marschewski and the Arkansas Supreme Court Justices were biased against him. In response to a motion for contempt filed in circuit court regarding the sanctions in the Parker v. Perry matter, Stilley sent a letter to Judge Marschewski wherein he alleged that the sanction order was illegal.

Stilley stated that he “would prefer not to report [the judge’s] conduct to the Committee on Professional Conduct or to the judicial authorities,” asked Judge Marschewski to “provide [him] with a basis for not filing a report with the appropriate professional authorities for judges and lawyers,” and concluded that if he did not respond, Stilley would “also file a criminal complaint with the Sebastian County Prosecutor’s office.” [Judge Marschewski forwarded StiHe^s letter to the Committee and asked it to “take whatever action [it] think[s] is necessary.” Judge Marschewski also forwarded the letter to the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission to take any appropriate action against him.

In closing, Judge Marschewski stated: “I do not mind Mr. Stilley filing any complaint against me that he cares to file, but, what I do object to is being threatened with an ethics complaint or a criminal complaint unless I do what he thinks is appropriate.” This letter caused the Committee to open an investigation in the Marschewski Complaint, which led to the filing of the initial petition for disbarment.

Judge Marschewski held another hearing on the motion for contempt on January 14, 2005, after which he found Stilley in contempt and entered an order directing him to serve thirty days in jail and to pay a fine of $50 per day until he complied with the court’s order. On March 2, 2007, Stil-ley filed a motion for stay of the contempt order and for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. On March 14, 2007, Judge Stephen Tabor, as successor to Judge Marschewski, held a hearing on the Parker defendants’ amended motion to enforce sanctions.

Judge Tabor told Stilley that the matters which led to the motion to enforce sanctions would not be relitigated. Judge Tabor also informed Stilley that he would be unavailable for a few |3days due to a family emergency and would issue his ruling on the motion to enforce sanctions at a hearing on March 26, 2007. On March 5, 2007, in violation of Judge Tabor’s directive not to relitigate issues, Stilley issued subpoenas to take the deposition of numerous individuals, including Judge Marschewski.

Judge Tabor then ordered that Stilley be jailed until he complied with Judge Marschewski’s order and subsequently held him in contempt for failing to comply with his directives and sentenced him to thirty additional days in jail. On May 8, 2007, Judge Tabor also referred Stilley to the Committee. His referral was the Tabor Complaint and led to the amended petition for disbarment. Another instance in which Stilley attempted to litigate issues that had been previously decided involved his representation of his client Buck Jones.

In 2002, Stilley entered an appearance on behalf of Jones and filed a pleading styled as a “Cross Claim Complaint,” in which he raised certain constitutional claims. The circuit judge dismissed the pleading, finding that an opinion against Jones had already been entered and that the pleading filed by Stilley was a compulsory counterclaim that should have been raised during the trial. This court affirmed. Jones v. Double “D” Props., Inc., 352 Ark. 39, 98 S.W.3d 405 (2003) (Jones I).

After the mandate issued in Jones I, the prevailing party, Double “D” Properties, Inc., filed a petition asking the circuit court to release funds posted as a supersedeas bond by Jones and his wife, Robbie Jones. Stilley, acting on behalf of the Joneses, responded and filed a motion seeking permission to file an illegal-exaction complaint. The circuit court denied the motion |inin reliance on Jones I, and this court again affirmed. Jones v. Double "D" Props., Inc., 357 Ark. 148, 161 S.W.3d 839 (2004) (Jones II).

On October 5, 2004, the Joneses filed a "pro Se" complaint in federal court, naming Double "D" Properties, Inc.; the Arkansas State Land Commissioner; the Sebastian County Judge; the Sebastian County Collector; the Sebastian County Treasurer, the Fort Smith School Board members; the University of Arkansas at Fort Smith and its attorney; the City of Fort Smith; and each Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court as defendants ("the federal Jones case"). The complaint raised the same claims that had been decided in Jones I and Jones II.

In addition, it alleged that the Justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court deprived the Joneses of due process and "a competent tribunal" as a result of "passion and prejudice ... against Oscar Stilley." In a subsequent deposition, Buck Jones stated that Stilley had been his attorney when the federal Jones complaint was filed and that Stilley typed and otherwise prepared the complaint. At a contempt hearing in the Sebastian County Circuit Court in January 2005, Stilley was asked about his participation in the preparation of the pleadings in the federal Jones case.

He responded that he typed a lot of the documents and that "to his knowledge" Buck Jones did not type any part of the complaint. Stilley finally concluded that he "assisted Mr. Jones materially in the preparation of that complaint." Finally, in a previous proceeding before the Committee, Stiley was found to have violated four provisions of the Rules, and a six-month suspension of his law license was recommended. This court affirmed in Stilley v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 370 Ark. 294, 259 S.W.3d 395 (2007).

The suspension was stayed during the pendency of Stilley's petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was subsequently denied. Stilley v. Supreme Court of Ark. Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 552 U.S. 1184, 128 S.Ct. 1248, 170 L.Ed.2d 67 (2008). Despite this history, Stilley filed multiple petitions for admission to practice pro hac vice in various federal courts without disclosing his disciplinary record in Arkansas.

Furthermore, when his record was brought to the attention of the federal courts, Stilley repeatedly attempted to re-litigate the issues giving rise to his state disciplinary sanctions. B.

Charges In the initial petition for disbarment, Ligon charged Stilley with the following: • One violation of Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that [a] lawyer shall not bring, or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or a respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. • One violation of Rule 3.3(a), which states that (a) [a] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal; or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to 112know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. • Eleven violations of Rule 3.4(c), which states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.” • Ten violations of Rule 8.4(d), which states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The Rule 3.1 violation arose from an allegation that Stilley assisted the Joneses in the federal Jones case in bringing a frivolous claim against the named defendants, including then sitting justices of this court.

The violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) stemmed from a contempt hearing in the Sebastian County Circuit Court wherein Stilley was asked about his role in the preparation of the pleadings in the federal Jones ease. According to Ligón, Stilley’s responses “demonstrated a lack of candor, even a false statement, to the tribunal.” In counts three through thirteen, Ligón cited instances of language included in the federal Jones case pleadings that he alleged were “intemperate, contemptuous, and disrespectful” toward the court. Li-gón argued that this language violated Rule 3.4(

c) because it constituted “a breach of the obligation of [Stilley’s] oath of office as an attorney-at-law, due to his general tone of disrespect for the attorney code of ethics.” Five of the Rule 8.4(

d) violations arose from allegations that Stilley threatened a circuit hajudge and two attorneys with criminal and disciplinary actions in “an attempt to coerce a favorable result in a civil court action.” The petition for disbarment further alleged that Rule 8.4(

d) was violated where Stilley was sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing a complaint that was barred by res judicata; violated Rule 11 where he filed a lawsuit in federal court that was barred by several legal doctrines and for which he had previously been sanctioned; failed to comply with an order for sanctions entered in the Sebastian County Circuit Court; brought a lawsuit personally against various Arkansas judges on frivolous claims; and brought a lawsuit against then circuit judge Marschewski and the University of Arkansas-Fort Smith for an improper purpose.

Finally, Ligon urged that the previously affirmed six-month suspension of Stilley’s law license, see Stilley v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 370 Ark. 294, 259 S.W.3d 395 (2007), and allegations in a pending professional-misconduct case were relevant to his overall fitness to hold a law license.

In the amended petition for disbarment, Ligón brought the following additional nine charges: • One violation of Rule 3.4(c), which states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.” • One violation of Rule 4.4(a), which states that, “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person. • One violation of Rule 8.4(d), which states that “|j]t is professional misconduct for a 114lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” • Three violations of Rule 3.3(a)(1), which states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal; or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.” • Three violations of Rule 8.4(c), which states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” The Rule 3.4(

c) and Rule 4.4(

a) violations arose from an allegation that Stilley had subpoenas and deposition notices issued in direct violation of a circuit judge’s directive. The Rule 8.4(

d) violation resulted from an allegation that Stilley accused Judge Marschewski of lying during a legal proceeding, especially where Stilley made the same accusation in a previous case that was decided against Stilley. According to the amended petition for disbarment, Stil-ley violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) and Rule 8.4(

c) on multiple occasions by filing petitions for admission to practice pro hac vice in federal courts without disclosing his prior disciplinary history in Arkansas. Ligon’s amended petition also included ten specific allegations Stilley had engaged in conduct relevant to his fitness to hold a law license, when he petitioned for admission to practice pro hac vice in federal courts. Ligón asserted that, in these cases,. Stilley attempted to relitigate his Arkansas professional misconduct proceedings in federal courts throughout the country. C.

Special Judge’s Findings In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, the special judge reviewed extensively the factual allegations and charges brought against Stilley. He concluded, after referencing the exhibits introduced in support of the charges, that Ligón had met his burden on all thirty-two lir,charges of misconduct. Following the hearing on sanctions, the special judge concluded that twenty of the counts rose to the level of “serious misconduct,” as defined in

section 17(

B) of the Procedures: Serious misconduct is conduct in violation of the Model Rules that would warrant a sanction terminating or restricting the lawyer’s license to practice law. Conduct will be considered serious misconduct if any of the following considerations apply:

(1) The misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds;

(2) The misconduct results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client or other person;

(3) The misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the lawyer;

(4) The misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct;

(5) The lawyer’s prior record of public sanctions demonstrates a substantial disregard of the lawyer’s professional duties and responsibilities; or

(6) The misconduct constitutes a “Serious Crime” as defined in these Procedures. Ark. Sup.Ct. P. Regulating. Profl Conduct § 17(B). He specifically found that “[f]or more than nine years Stilley has deliberately and without justification engaged in a course of conduct inconsistent with standards of professional conduct required by attorneys practicing in this state.” The special judge noted that “Stil-ley has an extensive track record” and that his “unethical conduct has not been isolated or infrequent.” The judge then looked to the factors to be considered in imposing sanctions, listed in

section 19 of the Procedures: In addition to any other considerations permitted by these Procedures, a panel of the Committee, in imposing any sanctions, shall consider: |mA. The nature and degree of the misconduct for which the lawyer is being sanctioned. B. The seriousness and circumstances surrounding the misconduct. C. The loss or damage to clients. D. The damage to the profession. E. The assurance that those who seek legal services in the future will be protected from the type of misconduct found. F. The profit to the lawyer. G. The avoidance of repetition. H.

Whether the misconduct was deliberate, intentional or negligent. I. The deterrent effect on others. J. The maintenance of respect for the legal profession. K. The conduct of the lawyer during the course of the Committee action. L. The lawyer’s prior disciplinary record, to include warnings. M. Matters offered by the lawyer in mitigation or extenuation except that a claim of disability or impairment resulting from the use of alcohol or drugs may not be considered unless the lawyer demonstrates that he or she is successfully pursuing in good faith a program of recovery. Id. § 19.

The special judge also noted the aggravating and mitigating factors as provided in Wilson v. Neal, 341 Ark. 282, 16 S.W.3d 228 (2000). He concluded that the factors in

section 19(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), and (

L) were relevant to the sanction and that there was evidence of ten aggravating factors. The special judge recommended disbarment “[bjecause of Stilley’s unwillingness or inability to acknowledge that his conduct has not met ethical standards; his failure to disclose his violations when required; and his continued pattern of failing to abide by Court Rules and ethical guidelines.” D.

Stilley’s Argument ||7Before this court, Stilley first seems to argue that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were erroneous because Ligón did not comply with the special judge’s request that he include an introduction or general statement of the facts in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This argument is without merit. We do not review any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as presented to the special judge by Ligón or Stilley. Rather, our review is from the findings of fact and conclusions of law as entered by the special judge. Ark. Sup.Ct. P.

Regulating Prof 1 Conduct § 13(D). As a related argument, Stilley contends that Ligón failed to provide, in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, any “citation to the evidence in the case.” Rather, according to Stilley, Ligón relied on accusations, which were insufficient to meet his burden of proof for disbarment. This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on Stilley’s part about the nature of evidence.

This error is evident in the following sentence from his brief: “[Ligón] did in fact recite various parts of the ‘petition’ and ‘supplemental petition’ for disbarment, along with exhibits to the same.” (Emphasis added.) Later in his brief, Stilley notes that Ligón “presented but one witness in his case in chief on liability, namely Respondent Oscar Stilley.” The implication of these two sentences, taken together, is that Ligón was required to prove the charges brought in his petition for disbarment with live witness testimony. However, there is no such requirement in the Procedures.

Li-gón chose to rely instead on | ^documentary evidence, submitted to the special judge in the form of exhibits. It is clear that evidence includes documents as well as witness testimony. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 635 (9th ed.2009) (defining evidence as “[something (including testimony, documents and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact”). During the evidentiary hearing and the hearing on sanctions, Stilley objected to the introduction of most of the exhibits admitted by the special judge.

However, he does not argue to this court that the special judge erred in admitting the above-referenced exhibits. Therefore, he has abandoned any argument as to the admissibility of the exhibits. Instead, Stil-ley contends that there was a “complete and total absence of evidence in support of [Ligon’s] claims.” However, the special judge’s orders reflect that he relied on the exhibits admitted during the proceedings. It is clear that there was evidence on which the judge based his findings.

Finally, while Stilley may disagree about whether the exhibits admitted by Ligón constitute sufficient evidence to support the special judge’s specific findings, he has not engaged in any meaningful analysis on this issue. In other disbarment cases, we have refused to engage in a comprehensive review of the findings of fact where the respondent failed to specifically challenge or contest them. See, e g., Ligon v. Walker, 2009 Ark. 136, 297 S.W.3d 1. linTherefore, we adopt the special judge’s findings of fact and find that Stilley violated the Rules as set forth in the petition and amended petition for disbarment.

For years Stilley has refused to accept the finality of decisions rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction. Instead, he has consistently engaged in conduct intended to harass opposing counsel and judges with whom he disagrees. In so doing, he has wasted vast amounts of time and judicial resources. He has also been unwilling to obey direct orders of the court and has withheld material information from state and federal courts. We are mindful of the gravity of Stilley’s actions as well as the cumulative nature of his violations.

Thus, we likewise agree with the special judge that Stilley’s actions constitute serious misconduct and that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. IV. Meaningful Adjudication Stilley’s next argument is that the special judge erred because he failed to “meaningfully adjudicate” his legal arguments. As a preliminary matter, in his brief to this court, Stilley purports to “incorporate all the legal arguments presented” to the special judge in eleven specific pleadings, and he cites Jones v.

Ragland, 293 Ark. 320, 737 S.W.2d 641 (1987), for the proposition that, according to Stilley, “incorporation by reference seems to be acceptable so long as the arguments are included in the addendum.” However, in Ragland, we held that it was improper for a party to incorporate by reference a brief presented to the lower court in support of his argument on appeal where it was not abstracted. Id. at 324, 737 S.W.2d at 644.

We do not read Ragland to mean that a party can incorporate arguments made to the 12ptrial court into the appellate brief so long as the lower-court pleading is included in the abstract or addendum. Such a holding would eviscerate our rules regarding briefing length and would render meaningless our holdings that we do not address arguments that are not sufficiently argued or briefed to this court. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-1 (2010); see also Gatzke v. Weiss, 375 Ark. 207, 215, 289 S.W.3d 455, 461 (2008) (This court will not address arguments unless they are sufficiently developed and include citation to authority.).

However, even if we considered the pleadings Stilley submitted to the special judge, his argument fails. Stilley does not specifically argue that the special judge erred in rejecting his legal and constitutional arguments.

Instead, he contends that he “has tried at every turn, from the written response at the Committee on Professional Conduct, to the public hearing, to the disbarment proceedings, to obtain consideration of his constitutional and other legal arguments.” According to Stilley, “[tjhese arguments have received either no consideration or such cursory consideration as to constitute a violation of due process.” The record belies this claim.

The eleven pleadings cited by Stilley in his brief are as follows: • March 3, 2008 — Response to Petition for Disbarment • July 30, 2008 — Stilley’s Motion to Dismiss, for More Definite Statement, and to Strike Immaterial Parts of the Supplemental Petition for Disbarment • August 29, 2005 — Reply to the Response to the Motion to Dismiss, for More Definite Statement, and to Strike Immaterial Parts of the Supplemental Petition for Disbarment • September 30, 2008 — Stilley’s Response to the First Amendment/Supplement to the Petition for Disbarment |⅞1* September 30, 2008 — Stilley’s Motion to Reconsider the Motion to Dismiss, for More Definite Statement, and to Strike Immaterial Parts of the Supplemental Petition for Disbarment (with attached brief) • October 20, 2008 —

(1) Response to Motion to Quash;

(2) First Motion to Extend Time for Discovery;

(3) First Motion to Strike

Section 5(C)(1) of the Procedures as Unconstitutional;

(4) First Motion for Determination of Calculation of Travel Miles;

(5) First Motion to Permit the Deposition of Stark Ligón; and

(6) First Motion to Disqualify Stark Ligón • October 31, 2008, Motion for Reconsideration and Order Commanding Stephen Tabor to Sit for Depositions, with a Continuance and Extensions of Time for All Operative Dates, Alternatively for an Order Concerning Deposition of Judges • November 20, 2008 — Stilley’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, for Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim; for Rulings with Respect to Vague Allegations, and for Disqualification of Judge Lineberger and Stark Ligón • March 18, 2009 — Stilley’s Motion for Directed Verdict or Judgment as a Matter of Law • March 25, 2009 — Rebuttal with Respect to Petitioner’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law • April 20, 2009 — Stilley’s Motion for Directed Verdict or Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Counts 27-32 The record reflects that the special judge carefully considered each of these pleadings and entered written orders denying the relief Stilley sought on each motion.

On September 12, 2008, he held a telephone conference on Stilley’s motion to dismiss, for more definite statement, and to strike immaterial parts of the supplemental petition for disbarment. On September 16, 2008, he entered a ten-page written order, discussing each of Stilley’s | ¡^arguments and denying the motion. The special judge then entered an order denying Stilley’s motion for reconsideration of that motion on October 20, 2008. On October 9, 2008, Circuit Judge Stephen Tabor filed a motion to quash the subpoena issued to him by the Committee at Stilley’s request.

The special judge held a telephone conference on this motion on October 14, 2008, at which both parties were permitted to present their legal arguments. The special judge entered an order granting the motion to quash on October 16, 2008, specifically relying on this court’s holding in Stilley v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 370 Ark. 294, 259 S.W.3d 395 (2007). Stilley filed a motion for reconsideration and order commanding Judge Tabor to sit for depositions on October 31, 2008, and the special judge entered an order denying that request on November 3, 2008.

On October 29, 2008, Stilley filed a motion seeking the following relief:

(1) Response to Motion to Quash;

(2) First Motion to Extend Time for Discovery;

(3) First Motion to Strike

Section 5(C)(1) of the Procedures as Unconstitutional;

(4) First Motion for Determination of Calculation of Travel Miles;

(5) First Motion to Permit the Deposition of Stark Ligón; and

(6) First Motion to Disqualify Stark Ligón. In his motion for reconsideration filed on October 31, 2008, Stilley also sought a continuance and extensions of time for all operative dates, and, alternatively, for an order concerning the deposition of judges. In response to these motions, the special judge entered orders to: (1) deny the motion for a continuance on November 3, 2008; (2) deny the motion to depose Ligón on November |¾¾6, 2008; (3) deny the motion to disqualify Ligón on November 6, 2008; (4) deny the motion to strike

section 5(C)(1) of the Procedures on November 7, 2008; and (5) deny the motion to extend time for discovery on November 7, 2008. On December 1, 2008, the special judge entered an order denying Stilley’s motion to disqualify Ligón and Special Judge Lineberger. The same day, he entered an order denying Stilley’s motion for

summary judgment, specifically finding that the arguments contained in the motion were “more in the nature of a closing argument” and were not “supported by an Affidavit or by relevant facts generated and sworn to in discovery.” He then concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact. The special judge entered an order on April 22, 2009, denying Stilley’s motions for directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law.

And, finally, the arguments raised by Stilley in his response to the petition for disbarment, response to the amended petition for disbarment, and rebuttal with respect to Ligon’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were addressed in the special judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on April 22, 2009. This exhaustive procedural history is included to illustrate that, while Stilley may disagree with the special judge’s decisions in this case, he clearly received consideration of his constitutional and other legal arguments.

We will not second guess the special judge with respect to his findings on the merits of these arguments because Stilley has made no argument as to why the judge was in error. It is well settled that we will not address arguments that are | ^insufficiently developed and lack citation to authority. See, e.g., Gatzke at 215, 289 S.W.3d at 461. V. Deposition of Judge Tabor Stilley also argues that the special judge erred in granting the motion to quash brought by Circuit Judge Stephen Tabor.

He contends that because Judge Tabor referred him to the Committee for possible violations of the Rules, he became an “accuser,” and, as such, was required to sit for depositions. The special judge granted the motion to quash in reliance on precedent from this court. Stilley v. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 370 Ark. 294, 259 S.W.3d 395 (2007). He was correct in doing do. In Stilley v.

Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, we squarely addressed this argument and affirmed our earlier decision to quash subpoenas issued to the then sitting justices of this court. 370 Ark. at 299-300, 259 S.W.3d at 398.

In responding to Stilley’s argument that the justices should recuse from the case, the court noted that he was attempting to “reviv[e] his attempt to have the justices of this court recuse, seemingly, from all cases involving him” based on an argument that, having previously referred him to the Committee, they were his “ ‘accusers’ and have an interest in the outcome of the case.” Id. at 303, 259 S.W.3d at 401.

We held that Stilley was merely “renewing his long-standing argument that he disagrees with this court’s decisions in cases he believes he should have won” and that “recusal is simply not appropriate nor warranted” in the case. Id. Just as the justices of this court were not required to sit for depositions after having referred Stilley to the Committee, | ¡^neither was Judge Tabor. The special judge, therefore, did not err in granting the motion to quash. VI.

Section 5(C)

(1) Finally, Stilley contends that

section 5(C)(1) is unconstitutional because it treats complaints from judges differently from those of other citizens. Ark. Sup.Ct. P. Regulating Profl Conduct § 5(C)(1) (2008) (“It shall be the duty of the Office of Professional Conduct to receive and investigate all complaints against any member of the Bar. Such complaints shall be docketed and assigned a permanent file number. The Office of Professional Conduct and the Committee shall accept and treat as a formal complaint any writing signed by a judge of a court of record in this State regardless of whether such signature is verified.”).

Stilley claims that this provision violates the Arkansas Constitution because “no person has a right to have their complaints treated as more important than the complaints of others solely on the basis of their position.” Stilley specifically contends that

section 5(C)(1) is unconstitutional because “[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Ark. Const, art. 2, § 18. In rejecting this argument, the special judge held that the rules promulgated by this court pursuant to its authority to regulate the practice of law are presumed to be constitutional |2fiand that Stilley failed to cite any authority holding otherwise.

We decline to address Stil-ley5s argument on this point because he has not presented any evidence that he was prejudiced by the Committee’s treatment of the Marschewski and Tabor Complaints. See Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n v. Simes, 2009 Ark. 543, 354 S.W.3d 72 (due-process argument not considered where respondent failed to show prejudice). Since Stilley has failed to show how the Committee would have acted differently if the complaints were filed by nonjudges, we reject his argument. VII.

Conclusion We adopt the special judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and find that Stilley violated the Rules as charged by Ligón in the petition and amended petition for disbarment. Further, given the number of violations, the length of time over which Stilley has incurred such violations, and Stilley’s repeated unwillingness to accept the finality of court decisions, we agree that his actions constitute serious misconduct and that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. .

Order of disbarment entered.' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW [This is an original action under the Arkansas Supreme Court Procedures Regulating Professional Conduct (Procedures) in which Petitioner Stark Ligón (Ligón), as Executive Director of the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct (Committee), seeks disbarment of Respondent, Oscar Amos Stilley (Stilley), an attorney who was licensed to practice law in Arkansas on April 15, 1991. (Arkansas Bar ID # 91096). Arkansas is the only state which has issued Stilley a law license.

An Order of Interim Suspension was entered by Panel B of the Committee on December 27, 2007. At the Committee’s request, Ligón filed his Original Petition for Disbarment of Stilley on January 16, 2008. The Petition sets out 23 counts of alleged 12misconduct with additional allegations addressing the overall fitness of Stil-ley to hold a license to practice law. Stil-ley filed his 53 page Response on March 3, 2008.

In addition, he filed a 26 page Motion for Recusal with Conditional Demand for Hearing on March 5, 2008, in which he seeks recusal of each of the Justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court. .On June 27, 2008, pursuant to a Finding and Order entered by Panel B of the Committee, Ligón filed a First Amendment / Supplement to Petition for Disbarment against Stilley in which he alleged 9 additional rules violations listed as counts 24 through 32. In addition, Ligón set forth 10 additional allegations directed at Stil-ley’s overall fitness to hold a law license.

Stilley filed a Motion to Dismiss, For More Definite Statement, and to Strike Immaterial Parts of the Supplemental Petition for Disbarment on July 31, 2008. By Order dated September 16, 2008, the undersigned directed Ligón not to offer his Exhibit “I” in his casein-chief (alleged misconduct phase) and denied the remainder of Stil-ley’s Motion. Stilley filed his Response to the amended pleading on September 30, 2008. [¿Pursuant to

Section 13(

B) of the Procedures, the undersigned Special Judge heard evidence relevant to the alleged misconduct of Stilley on December 8th through 10th, 2008. At the close of proof, the parties were advised that they could submit Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the undersigned no later than 5:00 P.M., Monday, March 16, 2009. Ligón timely submitted his proposed findings and conclusions by e-mail and hard copy.

Stilley, after first asking for additional time, e-mailed a pleading styled Motion for Directed Verdict or Judgment as a Matter of Law at 4:59 P.M. on March 16, 2009, and later advised that he intended such pleading to serve as his proposed findings and conclusions. Both parties submitted timely rebuttal briefs. On April 6, 2009, Stilley contended that he did not respond to Counts 27 through 32 because he did not know they were still viable. Although his claim was frivolous, he was granted until noon April 13, 2009, to respond to the five counts.

The evidence submitted in this case consists almost entirely of documents received as exhibits, including pleadings, affidavits, letters, motions, transcripts, briefs, court opinions, |4etc., in cases and hearings in which Stilley has been involved as a litigant and/or attorney. While Stilley was on the witness stand for a good part of three days, his testimony consisted primarily of:

(1) His identification and recognition of the various exhibits,

(2) His objections to the admissibility of most of the exhibits, and

(3) His opinion and evaluation of the documentary evidence offered by Ligón, and his view of the overall merits of the allegations made against him. He offered very few relevant facts on his own behalf. THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DISBARMENT (Counts 1-23) PERRY — STILLEY—MARSCHEWSKI STATE COURT CASES The facts leading up to the filing of this action start with a case styled Parker v. Perry, Sebastian County Circuit Case No. CV 2002-276.

There, Stilley filed an illegal exaction suit on behalf of John Parker against City, County, School District, Community College and University officials alleging that Act 758 of 1995 violated Amendment 59 to the Arkansas Constitution and that | fithe defendants were imposing illegal taxes upon Parker and other taxpayers similarly situated. The trial Judge, Honorable James Marschewski, granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants applying the doctrine of res judicata after finding that Parker was attempting to relitigate claims that had previously been fully developed and decided in a case styled Elzea v. Perry, 340 Ark. 588, 12 S.W.3d 213 (2000). Judge Marschewski also granted the defendant’s Motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Stilley because Stilley had filed the identical complaint in a case styled Oxford v. Perry, 340 Ark. 577, 13 S.W.3d 567 (2000) [Oxford II]. Stilley appealed and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed both the grant of

summary judgment and the award of Rule 11 monetary sanctions against Stilley personally. Parker v. Perry, 355 Ark. 97, 131 S.W.3d 338 (2003). On July 29, 2004, the Fort Smith School District (FSSD) filed a notice of noncompliance. On August 4, 2004, the University of Arkansas at Fort Smith (OAFS), filed a motion to enforce the sanctions previously imposed, alleging that Stilley had failed to IfiComply with the Circuit Court order.

A hearing was held on September 22, 2004, resulting in the Court directing Stilley to provide certain information concerning his finances that he alleged prevented him from paying the sanctions. On October 14, 2004, UAFS filed a Motion for citation for contempt contending that Stilley had failed to comply with any of the provisions of the Order of September 22, 2004. On October 26, 2004, Stilley wrote a letter to Judge Marschewski saying, among other things: I have received motions from James Llewellyn and Walton for show cause seeking to hold me in contempt of an order of the court.

The order in question is under appeal at the present time. You acknowledged that I was unable to pay, but nonetheless imposed a cash bond of nearly $16,000.00, the same amount you knew I was unable to pay, and refused to allow a corporate surety bond. I intend to respond by pleading to the motions for contempt. This letter, however deals with certain ethics matters. You have received a complaint that I filed against you and others. Part of this complaint deals with the fact that your order seeks to seize more than 25% of my earnings. This would appear to violate 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1673....

Your order appears to violate the federal and state laws just cited, among others. _L- • It thus appears to me that a crime has been committed in attempting to require me to pay more than 25% of earnings into the registry of the court. The commission of a crime would seem to be professional misconduct. I would prefer not to report your conduct to the Committee on Professional Conduct authorities. If I can find a fair and reasonable basis for concluding that reporting is not mandatory, I have no intention to make a report.

Here are some reasons that I think would justify a conclusion that reporting is not mandatory: 1) A reasonable basis for believing that the criminal conduct was not Intentional; 2) A fair and logical basis whereby a reasonable person could conclude that your acts were not unlawful. I am not suggesting that these two reasons are the only ones that would work. If you have another reason, by all means let me know about it so that I can give it reasonable consideration.

Please provide me with a basis for not filing a report with the appropriate professional authorities for judges and lawyers, no later than 1:30 P.M. on October 29, 2004, if you have such.... If you choose not to respond, I will also file a criminal complaint with the Sebastian County Prosecutor’s office ... I do believe that the investigative and prose-cutorial |spowers of the prosecutor’s office are properly invoked when a judicial officer engages in an apparent criminal activity in an open and notorious manner, and refuses to provide any mitigating circumstances or innocent explanation.

Judge Marsehewski failed to bend to Stilley’s demand but self reported the allegations to the judicial ethics committee. Stilley followed up by filing grievances against Judge Marsehewski with the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct and the Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission. Both complaints were dismissed. In addition, Stilley filled out and filed a Warrant Information sheet with the Sebastian County Prosecuting Attorney contending that Judge Marsehewski had committed a crime in his administration of the case against him. A warrant was not issued.

In Stilley’s Motion for Recusal filed in Parker v. Perry, he alleges in paragraphs 3 and 4: Counsel for the Fort Smith Public School District and others, James M. “Mitch” Llewellyn, Jr. and Walton Maurras, counsel for the University of Arkansas at Fort Smith (UAFS) were both sent a letter informing them of the criminal nature of their attempt to compel the payment of more than 25% of the earnings of undersigned.... Mr. Llewellyn did not respond. The whole of the response |flof Walton Maur-ras was: “I’m disappointed in you. Threats of grievance complaints won’t work.

You do what you think is in your best interests and we’ll see what happens. Stilley had earlier advised Maurras and Llewellyn by letter that he would file ethics complaints against them unless they responded in a particular manner no later than the close of business on October 22, 2004. When Stilley did not receive the responses he demanded, he filed a grievance against both lawyers with the Committee on Professional Conduct. The complaints were dismissed.

Stilley responded to the Motion for Contempt, and on November 19, 2004, he filed a Motion for Judge Marsehewski to recuse alleging, inter alia that the judge committed federal and state criminal offenses by entering the Order in question. His Motion for Recusal was denied by Order dated November 22, 2004. The Court conducted a hearing on the contempt motion on January 14, 2005, found Stilley in contempt; sentenced him to 30 days in jail and assessed a fine of $50 for each day Stilley continued to defy the Order.

The Court agreed to suspend the | infinding of contempt if Stilley complied with the Order within five days of entry. The Order was entered January 18, 2005. Three days later, Stilley filed a document entitled “Submission of Documents Demonstrating the Court’s Advocacy of Westark/UAFS.” In addition, on February 1, 2005, Stilley filed a “Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Law and for Additional Specific Findings and Law Pursuant to Rule 52.” The trial court did not take any action on the Motion. Stilley appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed the action taken by the Circuit Court. Oscar Stilley v.

Fort Smith School District, University of Arkansas at Fort Smith and Jim Perry, et al., 367 Ark. 193, 238 S.W.3d 902 (2006). In its opinion the Court said, at pages 200-202, 238 S.W.3d at 906-907: On November 19, 2004, Stilley filed a motion to recuse. The same day, Stilley filed a motion to continue a Contempt hearing set for November 23, 2004, and in that motion he asserted a right to a hearing on his motion to recuse.

In the motion to recuse, Stilley alleged that Judge Marschewski had a “substantial, direct, pecuniary interest” in the outcome of the litigation, that he had “demonstrated a deep seated personal and deep seated bias and prejudice,” and that Judge Marschewski denied a request to grant full medical expenses in an unrelated case. He further asserted that there were other instances of prejudice that he could cite but did not do so. No significant facts in support of these allegations were provided by Stilley in his motion to recuse.

Inin a November 22, 2004, order, the circuit court granted a continuance as to the contempt hearing to January 14, 2005, but denied the motion to recuse without a hearing. Stilley did not file a motion for reconsideration on his motion to recuse. At the contempt hearing on January 14, 2005, Stilley asserted, for the first time, that Judge Marschewski had been a member of a UAFS committee that sought to obtain passage of the taxes at issue in Parker v. Perry. Stilley did not move for Judge Marschewski to recuse, nor did Stilley move to renew his motion to recuse.

However, at that time, Judge Marschewski stated that he had no recollection of being a member of any such committee and invited Stilley to present any evidence he had on the issue. Stil-ley made no attempt to introduce any evidence on this issue at the hearing, nor did he ask the circuit court to allow the record to remain open so that he could introduce evidence at a later date. Stilley had ample time to secure the evidence, as the circuit court continued the hearing, at Stilley’s request, from November 22, 2004 to January 14, 2005.

At the close of the hearing, Judge Mar-schewski stated that the matter was being taken under advisement, and that a decision would issue by Monday or Tuesday of the following week, or in other words, by Tuesday, January 18, 2005, at the latest. Clearly, Judge Mar-schewski expected Stilley to present any evidence he had prior to taking the matter under submission on January 14, 2005. Even if Stilley believed that Judge Marschewski offered to consider any evidence introduced after the hearing, he certainly knew he had to present it to the court before Tuesday at the latest.

Nevertheless, Stilley made no attempt to offer evidence prior to the judgment issuing on Tuesday, January 18, 2005. _k- • • We note, however, that Stilley attempted yet again to raise the issue of Judge Marschewski’s supposed committee membership on January 21, 2005, by way of a pleading entitled, “submission of Documents Demonstrating the Advocacy for Westark/UAFS.” Attached to the pleading is a June 13, 2001, UAFS web posting listing Judge Marschewski as one of a number of “area leaders” who were to “lead the effort of citizens, students, college faculty and staff in providing information to the voters, who will determine whether Westark College becomes a four-year university.” The

article indicates that a ⅜ cent sales tax would result if voters made Westark a four year college. The second item attached to the pleading is a Wednesday, June 20, 2001, newspaper

article from The Times of Fort Smith regarding ethics and advocacy of Westark supporters. Judge Marschewski is not mentioned in the article. The January 21, 2005, pleading includes no mention, does not seek reconsideration of the order entered on January 21, 2005, and makes no attempt to introduce the attached items into evidence. It asks the circuit court to do nothing with respect to recusal. In that regard, it is a nullity....

JONES — STILLEY STATE COURT CASES On January 16, 2002, two weeks after the trial judge filed his opinion resolving a contested case; Stilley entered his appearance in the case on behalf of Buck Jones (a losing party) by filing a pleading styled “Cross Claim Complaint”, which raised constitutional issues. The trial court dismissed the pleading | ^finding that it was, in reality, a compulsory counterclaim and should have been brought before or during the trial of the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Jones v. Double “D” Properties, Inc., 352 Ark. 39, 98 S.W.3d 405 (2003) [Jones I ].

Following issuance of the mandate in Jones I, the prevailing party, Double “D”, filed a petition asking the trial court for an order releasing funds posted as supersede-as by Buck Jones and his wife, Robbie (who were both parties in the case), as compensation for losses and costs incurred during the appeal. On April 23, 2003, Stilley, acting on behalf of both Joneses, responded to the petition and also filed a motion seeking permission to file an illegal exaction complaint against other parties in the case. The trial court denied Joneses’ motion based on the Supreme Court mandate in Jones I.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed holding that the issue had already been decided in the first appeal and was, therefore, the law of the case. Jones v. Double “D” Props., Inc., 357 Ark. 148, 161 S.W.3d 839 (2004). [Jones II] JONES — STILLEY FEDERAL LAWSUITS |i4On October 5, 2004, Robbie R. and Buck D.

Jones filed what appeared to be a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas naming Double “D” Properties, the State Land Commissioner, State Treasurer, County Assessor, County Judge, County Collector, County Treasurer, Fort Smith School Board Members, UAFS and its attorney, City of Fort Smith and every Justice on the Arkansas Supreme Court as defendants. Robbie R. Jones and Buck D. Jones v. Double “D” Properties, Inc., et al., Case No. Civ. 04-2220. They raised identical or substantially similar claims to those raised in Jones I and Jones II.

In addition they allege: Fort Smith School Board Defendants then conspired with others including one James M. “Mitch” Llewellyn, an attorney, and Benny Gooden, the Superintendent of Schools, to use a judgment known to be issued and supported by an incompetent tribunal, to illegally harass and threaten the attorney who brought the original action for illegal exaction, in the class of which Plaintiffs are members, to make an example of him, and demonstrate that they have no allegiance to the rule of law, and no intention to comply with the rule of law, and every intention to deprive the Plaintiffs of competent counsel by conspiratorial conduct, by threats, and by flagrantly illegal harassment. hfjPlaintiffs’ complaint further alleged that the Arkansas Supreme Court Justices “corruptly and fraudulently refused to consider and fairly adjudicate said claim for the payment of the full amounts of the sale price of the plaintiffs family home, motivated by passion and prejudice against ...

Oscar Stilley”.

Paragraph 86 of the complaint continues: “Despite full knowledge and conscious awareness of federal constitutional law requiring that said defendants recuse and allow the Governor of Arkansas to appoint jurists untainted by the animus ignited by present, pending, substantial actions between said defendants and Oscar Stilley ... said defendants continued to sit on the ease, and perverted judgment against the plaintiffs herein, depriving them of a competent tribunal and an honest and impartial arbiter of the dispute.” It is further alleged that the Justices’ refusal to recuse from Jones I and Jones II, because of a conflict of interest, they “willfully and knowingly” deprived plaintiffs of due process and of the right to a “competent tribunal”.

They ask the Court to order the Arkansas Supreme Court to rescind its decisions against them, to order each 11fiJustice to recuse himself or herself from the rehearing and to award compensatory and punitive damages against each Justice. In a 37 page brief filed by the Joneses, the following is found at page 20 and 21: Judge Marschewski has demonstrated a total disregard of judicial ethics. He has knowingly and willfully entered an illegal order against Oscar Stilley ... presided in cases in which he has a clear conflict of interest, failed to disclose material facts showing a conflict of interest.

Recently, he entered an order refusing Oscar Stilley a hearing and denying a motion to recuse despite the many facts demonstrating that he is an incompetent jurist in litigation involving Parker v. Perry. On page 25 of the brief the following is said: We don’t want to dish the same thing back to them, even though they have had UAFS semi-secret agent Marschew-ski engaged to fight their battles for them. Page 28 of the brief reflects: We would not have sued these justices save for the fact that the justices practically revel in their lawbreaking.

They act in a way that no rational judge could act and still have a fig leaf or an idle thought that they are obeying the law. As to who actually drafted the Joneses’ pleadings, the Joneses said in the aforesaid Brief: We would not deny having received a great deal of professional guidance and drafting assistance from |17a treasured friend. The deposition of Buck Jones was taken on March 1, 2005. Mr. Jones stated that he and Stilley and a girl in Stilley’s office typed the complaint. At page 9 of the deposition, beginning at line 17 and continuing to the next page, the following is reflected: Q. Okay. Mr.

Jones, are you saying at that time Oscar Stilley was your lawyer? Because if at that time he wasn’t your lawyer, there’s no privilege. A. If he’s typing it, he’s working for me. Q. Okay. So at the time— A. So he would be working. Q. So at the time this was typed, he was working for you? A. That’s right. Q. He was your lawyer? A. Right. At page 21 beginning with line 16 and continuing to the next page, the deposition reflect: Q. Did you go to Mr. Stilley’s office and prepare it? A. That’s right. IisQ. And then you signed it and filed it? A. Right Q. Why did Mr. Stilley not sign it if he was representing you? A.

I don’t know. I never even thought about it. Q. Did he ever discuss it with you? A. No. Q. He just asked you to sign it? A. Asked me to sign that? Q. Yes, sir. A. I was right there, yes. Q. Okay. And that’s the same that’s true with all these documents, you were there and he asked you to sign them? A. He didn’t ask me. He just gave them — handed them to me and I signed them and took them to the courthouse. And, at page 24, beginning at line 19: Q. Does Mr. Stilley still represent you today? A. Yes, sir. At page 72, beginning at line 3, the deposition continues: |i9Q. Okay.

Did — at the time that you talked to Oscar, did he tell you that he had filed Complaints similar to the one that he filed for you? Did you know that he had filed Complaints for illegal exaction for violations of Amendment 59? A. Well, I knew he did, yea. Q. You were aware of that? A. Yeah. Q. Did you know what the outcome of those cases was? A. I saw the judge’s ruling up here. And the judge made up the law as he went it looks like. Q.

So before this complaint was filed in this case, did you know that Oscar Stilley had filed a similar Complaint for other people and had lost each ■ of those cases here in Sebastian County? A. Yes. But have you read the ruling by the judge? At a hearing for contempt citation conducted on January 14, 2005, Stilley was asked if he prepared the complaint filed by Buck Jones as USDC case No. CV-04-2220. His answers, beginning on page 48 of the Transcript were: A. I assisted. Q. To what extent did you assist? A. That’s hard to say. boQ- Did you type it? A. I worked on it. Q. Did anybody else type on it? A.

You’d have to ask somebody else. Q. To your knowledge, did anyone else type it? A. Buck and Robbie Jones, they’re the signatories on that. You’d have to ask them about what they did. Q. That’s not my question, Mr. Stilley: Did anybody else type it? A. I don’t have personal knowledge of that. At page 45, beginning at line 10, the Transcript reflects: Q. Did you type it on your computer? A. That was typed on — that was typed on a computer that I use. Q. Did you type it? A. I did a lot of it. Yes, I did. Q. Do you know anybody else that did any part of it? A. I don’t have personal knowledge of that.

Beginning on page 46, line 19: Q. Did Buck Jones type any part of this complaint? A. Not to my knowledge. biQ. Did Robbie Jones type any part of this complaint? A. Not to my knowledge. Q. Did anyone else type any part of this complaint? A. I’ve already answered that question. Beginning at page 48, line 17: Q. Did Mr. Jones come to you and ask you to file this complaint? A. He asked for assistance. Beginning at page 54, line 17: Q. Do you have an attorney/client relationship with Mr. Jones involving that case? A.

I’ve provided attorney/client services — I’ve provided attorney services to Buck Jones on an as-needed basis. Finally, at page 55, beginning at line 16: Q. ... It’s a simple question. You either prepared this Document or you did not. A. I assisted Mr. Jones materially in the preparation of that complaint. Stilley entered an appearance on behalf of the plaintiffs before the case was decided. [)20n April 5, 2005, pursuant to defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for

Summary Judgment, District Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The decision was affirmed by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished Per Curiam filed May 5, 2006, Case No. 05-2242. A Petition for rehearing was denied. While the above named case was pending, Stilley personally filed a lawsuit raising similar claims against some of the same parties, plus Judge Marschewski, in the same United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. Oscar Stilley v. James Marschewski, et al., Case No. CIV-04-2225.

In its Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dismissal, of this case, the Court observed that Stilley had raised the same claims against the Judges in the previous case and that the same analyses applied here. Judge Eisele also observed that Stilley had raised and lost identical illegal exaction claims involving school taxes not once, but several times. He held that Stilley’s attempt to manufacture a RICO action against the school defendants was disturbing and frivolous. The Judge continued: [aThe Court further finds that Mr. Stil-ley violated Fed.R.Civ.P.

Rule 11 when he filed an Amended Complaint contending that UAFS violated his civil rights by attempting to collect sanctions that ‘were without due process.’ UAFS was a party to the state court action in which Judge Marschewski entered sanctions against Mr. Stilley. Mr. Stilley had the opportunity to challenge and did challenge the award of sanctions entered against him. Having lost that battle, he filed suit against UAFS in federal court, contending that UAFS breached federal law, statutory and constitutional, when it attempted to collect the state court judgment. The Court finds it more likely than not that Mr.

Stilley sued UAFS ‘for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation’. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 11(b)(1). The Judge further said: “In light of the entire record in this case and the other ongoing litigation by Mr. Stilley noted above, the Court can only conclude that Mr. Stilley has pursued, and continues to pursue, this lawsuit for improper purposes”.

The Court sanctioned Stilley by directing that he pay the costs and attorney fees incurred by UAFS, and that he be prohibited from filing any complaints, as an individual or attorney, against specifically named parties in both the Eastern and Western District Courts of Arkansas without first receiving the approval of the Court. hiStilley appealed and the Eight Circuit Court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished Per Curiam filed May 26, 2006. Oscar Stilley v. James Marschewski, et al., Case No. 05-2816.

The appellate Court said, in part: We are troubled by Stilley’s mischarac-terization of the record as to the applicability of Rule ll’s safe-harbor provision and Rule 11(c)(1)(B). We reject Stilley’s argument that the limitations the district court imposed on his practice constitute attorney discipline, as opposed to Rule 11 sanctions. See Stilley v.

James, 48 Fed.Appx. 595, 597 (8th Cir.2002) (unpublished per curiam) finding no abuse of discretion in applying appropriately fashioned Rule 11 sanctions enjoining Stilley from filing future cases involving issues that had been litigated or raised in three lawsuits and two appeals; court acted appropriately by helping stop Stilley’s pursuit of fruitless litigation. FIRST AMENDMENT / SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR DISBARMENT (COUNTS 24-32) STILLEY — TABOR STATE COURT CASE A petition for rehearing was denied by the Arkansas Supreme Court on October 26, 2006, in Stilley v.

Fort Smith School District, et al., 367 Ark. 193, 238 S.W.3d 902 (2006). The Mandate issued and Parker v. Perry, (CV-2002-276) was back before the Sebastian County Circuit Court. In the interval, Judge Marschewski was appointed a United States Magistrate Judge for the Western 125Pistrict of Arkansas. Stephen Tabor was appointed in place of Judge Marschewski to serve as a Circuit Judge in Sebastian County.

On February 13, 2007, Judge Tabor entered an Order directing Stilley to surrender to the Sebastian County Detention Center no later than February 15, 2007, to begin serving the 30 day sentence imposed by Judge Marschewski in Parker v. Perry. Stilley surrendered, but was permitted to serve his sentence on a day-time “work release”. That allowed him to spend nights in jail and work in his law office during the daytime. A hearing was set for March 14, 2007, on an Amended Motion to Enforce Sanctions, to Compel Compliance with Previous Orders of the Court, and to Modify the Order of September 22, 2004.

On March 2, 2007, Stilley filed a 51 page Petition for Habeas Corpus, along with 6 volumes and attachments with the federal District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. He also filed a 9 page Motion to Stay his state jail sentence while his federal action was pending. The Motion was denied by the United States | ^Magistrate Judge and then by the District Court Judge on March 13, 2007.

At the commencement of the Perry hearing on March 14, 2007 Judge Tabor overruled a Motion for Continuance filed by Stilley, finding that Stilley had not given a valid reason for a continuance, and in addition, that he (Judge Tabor) had read an

article in the local newspaper quoting Stilly as saying, “I don’t intend for that hearing to take place.” Stilley then orally moved for Judge Tabor to recuse, which motion was denied. During the hearing Stilley admitted that he had not complied with the Order. After Stilley raised numerous issues that had already been settled, Judge Tabor announced: Let me just say, Mr. Stilley, and I will tell everybody, I am not here to reinvent the wheel. I am not going to rehear, matters that have been heard, either in this court or on appeal. This is simply an action to enforce a previously entered order.

I am not going to rule on whether that order was appropriate or not. That Order was made, it has been affirmed by the State Supreme Court and I am not going to rehear that. After each side rested, and after arguments were heard, Judge Tabor stated: Mr. Stilley, you have had two and a half years through 127every Court in the State of Arkansas to address this. It is my intention, once again, not to reliti-gate this matter. My intention is to enforce the orders of this court and that is what I intend to do. Let me tell you what I am going to do.

I am going to set this matter for March 26th at noon, and let me tell you why I am doing that. I have to leave for Houston tomorrow because my father is having surgery there. I will not be back in the office until March 26th. I expect that if things continue as they are there are going to be orders that are going to generate more activity which I think will require my attention, and I do not want to be in Houston when that happens. We are going to appear back here at noon on March 26th at which time, Mr. Stilley, is to fully comply with the order of the Court previously entered in September of 2004.

In addition, by close of business on this Friday, two days from now, Mr. Stilley, I want you to provide to my docket administrator a list of every current court setting you have docketed as of today. You are not to ask for any more settings in the next two days, but by close of business Friday I want a list of every court date that you currently have set.

The purpose of that is to determine what extent, if, any, if this continues to be your position that you are going to refuse to abide by the order of this Court, then, I need to determine if work release is appropriate or necessary in your case, and I need that information to make that decision. The very next day Stilley caused subpoenas to be issued for service upon seven named individuals, including Judge Mar-schewski, to appear at his office at 10:00 a.m. Friday, March 23, 2007, so that he could take their deposition for use in this | gscase. Motions to quash were filed by each of the named individuals.

Circuit Judge Michael Fitzhugh, in Judge Tabor’s absence, granted some of the motions to quash. On March 22, 2007, Circuit Judge James O. Cox, in Judge Tabor’s absence, conducted a hearing on the remainder of the Motions. After some discussion between Judge Cox and the attorneys, Stilley told the Court that “my position on it (subpoenas) is that the legality of the order would be a proper matter to show that a person shouldn’t be incarcerated under that order.” He also told Judge Cox that he understood Judge Tabor “wouldn’t consider anything about the illegality of the Order”.

Judge Cox, after advising Stilley that he could not relitigate settled matters, granted the Motion and quashed the remaining subpoenas. He also directed Stil-ley not to issue subpoenas for the March 26th hearing to individuals he intended to call for the same purpose. Stilley thereupon announced that he was withdrawing the subpoenas. At the March 26, 2007, hearing, Stilley acknowledged that he still had not complied with the Order in question.

Judge Tabor | ^entered a formal Order that same day finding Stilley in contempt and remanding him to the Sebastian County Adult Detention Center until he purged himself by complying with the Order. On April 23, 2007, Stilley filed a Motion to withdraw his federal “habeas” case. The federal court dismissed that case on May 16, 2007. On May 2, 2007, Judge Tabor conducted another hearing in the Parker v. Perry case. Stilley was again found in contempt for disobeying the March 14, 2007, Order directing him not to relitigate matters long since decided at trial and on appeal.

He was sentenced to pay the opposing parties’ attorney fees. Stilley was directed by Order dated May 11, 2007, to pay fines previously imposed, into the registry of the court. Stilley filed a pleading entitled “Brief Regarding Assessment of Penalty, and Interest, for a Final Order” on May 11, 2007. On May 15, 2007, Stilley filed a motion for new trial with supporting brief. After UAFS and FWD responded, the Court entered an order on May 21, 2007, denying Stilley’s motion for new trial. hnStilley filed another brief on May 28, 2007, and an amended motion for new trial on May 23, 2007.

The Court denied the amended motion for new trial on June 5, 2007. On June 19, 2007, Stilley filed a Notice of Appeal from the Orders of the Circuit Court entered May 2, 2007; May 11, 2007; May 21, 2007; and June 5, 2007. On October 19, 2007, Stilley filed a Petition for Prohibition commanding the sifting trial judge to recuse from further participation in the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the Petition without opinion on November 8, 2007.

On December 2, 2007, Stilley filed a 25 page motion asking each justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court to recuse from hearing a motion for reconsideration he filed that same day. He contended that because the Supreme Court had earlier, referred a matter involving him to the professional conduct committee for its assessment and review, the justices became his “accusers”, and were biased and prejudiced against him.

The Court denied that Motion in a Per Curium entered January 31, 2008. (Case No. 07-981) On that same day, the Court granted Stilley’s Motion to reconsider other matters. |¾1 On September 18, 2008, The Supreme Court affirmed the various decisions of the trial court. Stilley v.

UAFS, et al., 374 Ark. 248, 287 S.W.3d 544 (2008). “OVERALL FITNESS” TO HOLD A LAW LICENSE JUDGE BELL/OU-WENGA CASE (Michigan) On October 27, 2003, Stilley filed a Motion for pro hac vice (PHV) admission to be counsel for Karen Ouwenga, who was charged with federal income tax fraud in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. United States of America v. Karen Ouwenga, Case No. CR-03-212.

An Order was entered On November 5, 2003, denying the Motion, the Court finding that Stilley’s past actions were “inconsistent with the standards of professional conduct this Court requires of attorneys practicing in this district, toward clients, counsel and the Court.” Stilley sought review and a three judge panel was appointed to consider the matter (Case No. 04-0009). The panel conducted a hearing on January 12, 2004, and filed its opinion on January 28, 2005.

It observed that Stilley supported his petition for | ^admission with a Certificate of Good Standing from the Arkansas Supreme Court, dated October 2, 2003.

In the Certificate, a deputy court clerk certified that: Oscar Stilley was enrolled as an Attorney at Law and Solicitor in Chancery by the Supreme Court of this State on April 15, 1991; that no disbarment proceedings have been filed against him in this court, that he has not had any adverse disciplinary action whatsoever during the past three year period, and that his private and professional character appears to be good, (emphasis added) The certificate stated that the seal of the Arkansas Supreme Court was affixed, which was not true.

The Court later received a new Certificate from the Arkansas Supreme Court dated January 1212004, which had been obtained by the U.S. Attorney’s office, which did bear the seal of the Court. That Certificate did not contain the words underlined above in the Certificate Stilley furnished. Judge Robert Holmes Bell, writing for the panel, said at page 9 of the Opinion: Upon questioning by

[…]