Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587, Respondent, v. The State of Washington, Appellant, The $30 License Tab Initiative Calmpaign, Appellant-Intervenor; Vashon-Maury Island Community Council, Respondent, v. The State of Washington, Appellant, The $30 License Tab Initiative Calmpaign, Appellant-Intervenor; The City of Bainbridge Island, Respondent, v. The State of Washington, Appellant, The $30 License Tab Initiative Campaign, Appellant-Intervenor; Tacoma Water, Respondent, v. The State of Washington, Appellant, The $30 License Tab Initiative Calmpaign, Appellant-Intervenor; Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Respondent, v. The State of Washington, Appellant, The $30 License Tab Initiative Calmpaign, Appellant-Intervenor. The Port of Whitman County, Respondent, v. The State of Washington and The $30 License Tab Initiative Calmpaign, Appellants; Puget Sound Clean Air Agency, Respondent, v. The State of Washington, Appellant, 142 Wash. 2d 183

Madsen, J. — The respondents in these consolidated cases raised numerous issues regarding the constitutionality and applicability of Initiative 695 (1-695). The King County Superior Court held the initiative unconstitutional under

article II,

section 1(b);

article II,

section 19; and

article II,

section 37, of the Washington State Constitution. The State of Washington (State) and Intervenor $30 License Tab Initiative Campaign (the Campaign) appeal, contending that 1-695 is constitutional. We affirm the trial court for the following reasons.

(1) Article II,

section 19 has two requirements in its two clauses:

An act must have only one subject, and the subject of the act must be contained in the act’s title. The single subject rule of

article II,

section 19 is intended to prevent legislators, whether the people or the Legislature, from having to vote for a law that they do not favor in order to obtain a law which they do. 1-695 contains two subjects: (1) limiting license tab fees to $30 and (2) requiring voter approval of all future state and local tax increases. These two subjects are contained in both the title and the body of 1-695. 1-695 is therefore unconstitutional in its entirety.

(2) The second clause of

article II,

section 19 requires that the subject of a measure appear in the title. The purpose of this requirement is to notify those voting on the measure of its contents. I-695’s voter approval provision,

section 2, applies to “taxes.” I-695’s express definition of this term establishes that “tax” does not mean “tax” as the term is commonly understood. Instead, “tax” as used in 1-695 has a broader meaning, including fees and charges which are not traditionally considered to be taxes. The title therefore fails to provide notice that I-695’s voter approval provision does not apply only to taxes as that term is commonly understood. Accordingly,

section 2 of 1-695 is unconstitutional under the second clause of

article II,

section 19.

(3) Article II,

section 1 concerns the legislative power in this state.

Article II,

section 1(

a) and

section 1(

b) provide for the initiative and referendum powers, which are the people’s legislative powers. The referendum power of the people has two forms. The people can petition for referendum of legislation that the Legislature has passed. To do so, four percent of the voters must sign a petition. Alternatively, the Legislature may refer a measure to the people.

Section 2 of 1-695 requires voter approval of all future tax legislation passed by the Legislature, but does not require a petition of the voters as to the specific piece of legislation, nor referral by the Legislature.

Section 2 therefore establishes a referendum procedure not allowed under the state constitution and accordingly violates

article II,

section 1(b).

(4) Article II,

section 37 prohibits enactment of legislation that revises or amends other acts without setting them forth at full length. The purposes of this provision are to avoid confusion, ambiguity and uncertainty in the law that would occur if the law existed in separate and disconnected legislative provisions, and to disclose the new law’s impact on existing laws.

Section 2 of 1-695 violates this constitutional provision because it amends a statute already providing for voter approval of a port district’s industrial improvement assessment district without setting forth the existing act and showing how it is amended. Neither the existing statute nor the new enactment, 1-695, discloses the full law respecting such voter approval. FACTS In November 1999, the voters of Washington passed 1-695 by a 56.16 percent vote. Laws of 2000, ch. 1 (effective Jan. 1, 2000).

The ballot title of 1-695 is “Shall voter approval be required for any tax increase, license tab fees be $30 per year for motor vehicles, and existing vehicle taxes be repealed.” State of Washington Voters Pamphlet, General Election (Nov. 2,1999).

Section 1 of 1-695 sets motor vehicle license tab fees at $30. Laws of 2000, ch. 1, § 1(1).

Section 2 provides that “[a]ny tax increase imposed by the state shall require voter approval.” Id. § 2(1). “Tax” is defined and “includes, but is not necessarily limited to, sales and use taxes, property taxes, business and occupation taxes, excise taxes, fuel taxes, impact fees, license fees, permit fees, and any monetary charge by government.” Id. § 2(2). “Tax” does not include “[h]igher education tuition” and “[c]ivil and criminal fines and other charges collected in cases of restitution or violation of law or contract.” Id. § 2(3).

A “ ‘tax increase’ includes, but is not necessarily limited to, a new tax, a monetary increase in an existing tax, a tax rate increase, an expansion in the legal definition of a tax base, and an extension of an expiring tax.” Id. § 2(4). “State” is defined as including, “but is not necessarily limited to, the state itself and all its departments and agencies, any city, county, special district, and other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the state.” Id. § 2(5).

The voter approval provision does not apply to “any specific emergency measure authorized by vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the members of each house of the legislature and expiring not later than twelve (12) months from the effective date of the emergency act.” Id. § 2(6). The provisions of

section 2 of 1-695 are additional to and do not replace, the provisions of Initiative 601. Id. § 2(7).

Section 3 of 1-695 repeals 44 statutes. Id. § 3.1-695 states these are statutes which “impose taxes and fees on vehicles [,]” id., but some of the repealed statutes allocate funds to specific programs such as public transportation. 1-695 is to be liberally construed, id. § 4, and contains a severability provision, id. § 5. Sections 1 and 3 of 1-695 repealed the motor vehicle excise tax (MVET), which many perceived as an unfair tax. Initially the MVET was a tax on vehicles, in lieu of a property tax, of 1.5 percent of the fair market value of the vehicle. Laws of 1937, ch. 228.

In 1999, the MVET was 2.2 percent, and the value of vehicles was not determined according to fair market value, but rather was tied to the manufacturer’s base suggested retail price and the age of the vehicle. RCW 82.44.020; RCW 82.44.041(3)(b). MVET revenues were allocated to specific programs, such as public transportation, criminal justice, fire protection, and public health. Prior to 1-695, most vehicle owners also paid a two dollar clean air excise tax. RCW 82.44.020(3), .110(3). Annual license fee statutes set license fees at under $30 for many vehicles. RCW 46.16.060(1).

Most vehicle owners paid a one dollar license plate fee, RCW 46.16.650, and a 10 cent fee for highway studies, RCW 46.16.061. Owners of travel trailers and campers paid an excise tax of 1.1 percent. RCW 82.50.400, .410. Owners of campers and travel trailers also paid a clean air tax of two dollars and twenty-five cents under RCW 82.50.405. All of these statutes were repealed by 1-695. 1-695 did not repeal county and certain municipality annual license fees of up to $15 for most motor vehicles registered in their jurisdiction. RCW 82.80.020(1).

Municipalities may impose a special excise tax of up to .725 percent of the value of motor vehicles owned by municipal residents. RCW 35.58.273; RCW 82.44.150. The second of these statutes was repealed by 1-695—among other things, it allocated revenues collected under RCW 35.58.273—but the other two were not. Certain cities and counties are authorized to impose an additional excise tax of up to .8 percent to provide for a high capacity transportation system. RCW 81.104.160(1). This statute was not repealed by 1-695.

Further, a three dollar license filing fee, RCW 46.01.140(4)(a), and a three dollar subagent fee, where applicable, RCW 46.01.140(5), were not repealed. Thus, while repealing many statutes imposing vehicle taxes and fees, the .725 percent local vehicle excise tax, the .8 percent local transit excise tax, the $3 filing fee, the $3 subagent fee, and the $15 local vehicle license fee were not repealed by 1-695. In the voters pamphlet for the November 1999 election, the proponents of the measure explained that

section 2 of 1-695, the voter approval provision, was included to prevent imposition of other taxes that would replace lost MVET revenues. Shortly after the voters adopted 1-695, the seven suits in this consolidated case were filed. In Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, individual union members and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 (Amalgamated Transit) alleged that 1-695 violates the single-subject and subject-in-title requirements of

article II,

section 19, that 1-695,

section 2 provides for an automatic referendum on all future tax and fee increases in violation of

article II,

section l(b)’s requirements that any referendum petition must have the signatures of four percent of the voters and that measures providing for the support of government and its public institutions are not subject to referendum, and that 1-695 violates

article II,

section 37, which requires the text of any acts amended or revised by a new enactment be set out in the new act. Amalgamated Transit sought a declaratory judgment that 1-695 violates the state constitution in its entirety and a permanent injunction against enforcement of any of the provisions of 1-695. In Vashon-Maury Island Community Council v. State, Vashon Island Community Council (Vashon Island) alleged the same violations of

article II,

section 1(b) (concerning referenda) and

article II,

section 37 (setting forth amended or revised acts), but as to

article II,

section 19, alleged only that 1-695 violates the single-subject requirement. Vashon-Maury sought injunctive and declaratory relief. In City of Bainbridge Island v. State, cities Bainbridge Island and Bremerton alleged that 1-695,

section 2, violated

article II,

section l(b)’s four percent voter signature requirement,

article II,

section 19’s single-subject and subject-in-title requirements, and

article II,

section 37 (setting forth amended or revised acts). They also alleged that

section 2 violates

article VII,

section 1 and

article II,

section 22 because it restricts the Legislature’s constitutional power to enact laws by majority vote; that

section 2 violates

article I,

section 23 because it will impair contracts between the cities and their bondholders; and that

section 2 violates

article XXIII because it attempts to amend the constitution. The cities of Bainbridge Island, Bremerton, and Lakewood (Cities) asserted that charges made by cities for goods and proprietary services are not subject to the voter approval requirements of

section 2 of 1-695 because they are not taxes within the meaning of1-695. This interpretive issue is the only part of the complaint which Lakewood joined in. The Cities sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In Puget Sound Clean Air Agency v. State, plaintiff Puget Sound Clean Air Agency (Clean Air Agency) is responsible under state and federal law for air quality regulation and management in the region comprised of King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Kitsap Counties. The Clean Air Agency sought a declaratory judgment that

section 2 of 1-695 does not prohibit the agency from recovering full reimbursement for certain operating permit program costs; that 1-695 violates the single-subject rule of

article II,

section 19; that

section 2 violates

article II,

section 1 and

article II,

section 22 (improper amendment of initiative and referendum procedures); that 1-695 improperly repealed statutes in violation of

article II,

section 37; that 1-695 violates

article XXIII (amendment of constitution); that 1-695 improperly restricts municipal taxing authority in violation of

article XI,

section 12; and also sought a declaration as to the application and effect of the voter approval requirement for any charges and fees subject to 1-695. In Tacoma Water v. State, Tacoma Water (a division of Tacoma’s Department of Public Utilities), Covington Water District, Lakehaven Utility District, Seattle Public Utilities (a Seattle city department), and individual E.E. (Ted) Coates (an individual voter paying rates and taxes) sought a declaratory judgment that the voter approval requirements of

section 2 of 1-695 do not apply to water rates or other utility charges (including charges for goods, services, or benefits provided in exchange for monetary or other consideration), to local improvement assessments, to connection or capacity charges, or to intergovernmental and intragovernmental payments and charges. They also sought a declaratory judgment that 1-695 violates

article II, sections 1, 21, and 22 (referendum procedures and procedures for enactment of laws);

article II,

section 19’s requirements of a single subject and the subject in the title;

article II,

section 37’s requirement that amended or revised acts be set forth in full;

article VII,

section l’s prohibition against surrendering, suspending or contracting away taxing power;

article VIII,

section 7’s prohibition against unlawful gifts of public funds (insofar as 1-695 would limit charges to less than fair market value);

article XI,

section 12 (local taxing authority); and

article XXIII (procedures for amending the constitution). In Port of Whitman County v.

State, the Ports of Whitman County, Tacoma, Skagit County, Seattle, Longview, Kennewick, Friday Harbor, and Bellingham (Port Districts) sought a declaratory judgment that 1-695 does not apply to rates, tariffs, fees, rents, assessments, local improvement district and industrial development district assessments, and other charges imposed by port districts in carrying out their functions, including, but not limited to, the operation of harbor and marina improvements, rail and motor vehicle transfer facilities, water transfer and terminal facilities, airports and terminal facilities, industrial development facilities, trade centers, and related commercial facilities.

They asserted that these charges do not fall within the meaning of the term “tax” in

section 2 of 1-695. These parties did not challenge the constitutionality of 1-695. In Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State, Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County (Snohomish PUD) sought a declaratory judgment that

section 2 of 1-695 does not apply to the establishment and collection of rates and charges for electric energy and water; wastewater collection, treatment and disposal; and for other services, facilities, and commodities sold, furnished or supplied by public utility districts in a proprietary capacity; that

section 2 does not apply to other monetary charges by public utility districts which are not commonly understood to be taxes; and that

section 2 does not apply to the levy of special assessments by public utility districts. Snohomish PUD also sought a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of

section 2 as to these items. The Amalgamated Transit and Vashon-Maury cases were consolidated at trial, and all others were linked. The $30 License Tab Initiative Campaign (the Campaign) was a defendant in Port of Whitman County v. State and intervened in all other cases except Puget Sound Clean Air Agency v. State. On March 6, 2000, King County Superior Court Judge Alsdorf heard cross-motions for

summary judgment, and issued a written decision March 14, 2000, granting

summary judgment in favor of respondents. The court held that 1-695 violates the state constitution because

(1) section 2 unconstitutionally mandates universal referenda in violation of

article II,

section l(b)’s requirement that four percent of the registered voters sign a petition for referendum of

an act of the Legislature;

(2) section 2 unconstitutionally mandates universal referenda on laws and acts necessary for the support of state government and its existing institutions in violation of

article II,

section 1(b);

(3) Section 2 is unconstitutional because it seeks to amend the state constitution without compliance with

article XXIII; (4) the initiative as a whole is unconstitutional because it covers more than one subject in violation of

article II,

section 19; (5) sections 2 and 3 violate

article II,

section 19 because not all subjects in their text are identified in the title; and (6) the initiative as a whole violates

article II,

section 37 because it is not a complete act, and it fails to set forth the text of other laws which it amends and fails to explain how those amendments are worded or are to be implemented. The court struck down the initiative in its entirety. The court also issued an injunction against the State and any of its subdivisions from taking any action to implement or enforce

section 2, but declined to issue an injunction as to the remainder of 1-695 because it would be disruptive to enjoin the operation or enforcement of sections 1 and 3. The State and the Campaign appealed directly to this court, which granted review. The League of Women Voters of Washington, the Association of Washington Public Hospital Districts, the Association of Washington Housing Authorities, and individuals Conley “Gene” E. Kincheloe, Josie L. Schindler, and the Washington Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities (Coalition) were granted leave to file briefs as amici curiae.

After the trial court’s decision, on March 31, 2000, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 6865 (Laws of 2000, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 1) repealing the MVET and setting vehicle license tab fees at $30. ANALYSIS I. The Campaign’s Motion to Dismiss The Campaign includes in its opening brief a motion to dismiss all the respondents and all the cases on various grounds. “A party may include in a brief only a motion which, if granted, would preclude hearing the case on the merits.” RAP 17.4(d).

If the Campaign’s motion is granted in whole or in part, it would preclude a hearing on the merits as to one or more of the respondents. Accordingly, we address the motion. 1. Mootness The Campaign first contends that the Amalgamated Transit respondents and Vashon-Maury, and their cases, should be dismissed on the grounds of mootness. The Campaign says these respondents challenged

section 1 of 1-695, reducing vehicle license tab fees to $30, and all of their asserted injuries arose from the reduction of the MVET in sections 1 and 3 of 1-695. The Campaign says these respondents have no standing or particularized interest apart from any other member of the public, citing Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 132 Wn.2d 267, 281-82, 937 P.2d 1082 (1997). As the Campaign points out, the Legislature recently enacted a $30 license tab fee provision which became effective March 31, 2000. See Laws of 2000, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 1 (S.B. 6865, retroactive to Jan. 1, 2000).

The State, however, does not agree that the legislation renders the major issues moot. Respondent Amalgamated Transit maintains that even a technically moot case may be reviewed where it presents issues of continuing and substantial public interest. Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 128 Wn.2d 707, 712, 911 P.2d 389 (1996); Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). We are not convinced that claims based on

section 1 of 1-695, the $30 license tab fee section, come within this exception.

Section 1 of 1-695 involves a limited subject and there is no serious dispute that in general an initiative can repeal, impose, or amend a specific tax. However, for purposes of the single subject and subject-in-title requirements of

article II,

section 19, we must consider 1-695 as a whole in order to determine its validity. Also,

section 1 of 1-695 is relevant to the

article II,

section 37 claims. Therefore, for the

article II,

section 19 claims and the

article II,

section 37 claims, the Legislature’s enactment does not moot the issues. Amalgamated Transit argued to the trial court that 1-695 violates

article II,

section 19 and

article II,

section 37, and is entitled to argue these claims before this court. Vashon-Maury joined in Amalgamated Transit’s arguments. Also, contrary to the Campaign’s claim that Amalgamated Transit challenged only

section 1 of 1-695, Amalgamated Transit argued to the trial court that its members directly depend upon monetary charges levied by state and local governments for their jobs and salaries and under

section 2 of 1-695 these levies are subject to an unconstitutional vote. The Legislature’s new enactment does not affect

section 2 of 1-695. As noted, Vashon-Maury joined in Amalgamated Transit’s arguments. Vashon-Maury says it is a representative organization whose members’ livelihoods and property values depend upon ferry and bus services as well as police protection provided through monetary charges levied by state and local government, which are subject to unconstitutional vote under

section 2. In its reply brief, the Campaign also says that the Legislature’s recently enacted supplemental budget accommodated the people’s initiative decision by restoring some of the funding which repeal of the MVET removed from various programs such as public transportation, police and fire protection, and provided for raising the local sales tax for public transportation with voter approval. The Campaign does not say that this legislation renders the rest of the issues in these cases moot, and clearly it does not. The Legislature’s action providing some relief to local government cannot validate an unconstitutional measure. Moreover,

section 2 of1-695 remains, and will continue to bar any new taxes or tax increases without voter approval—thus the initiative has continuing impact aside from repeal of the MVET and the Legislature’s restoration of some funding. These cases are not moot as a result of the Legislature’s enactment of legislation repealing the MVET and imposition of a $30 license tab fee. 2.

Failure to Cross-Appeal The Campaign also moves to dismiss the Cities, the Tacoma Water respondents, the Snohomish PUD, and the Port Districts on the ground that the trial court entered a declaratory judgment adverse to their interests and none has appealed. The Campaign reasons these respondents had argued for a narrow reading of “tax” in 1-695, but the trial court construed the term broadly. These respondents’ failure to cross-appeal, the Campaign says, precludes consideration of their claims. Failure to cross-appeal an issue generally precludes its review on appeal. See, e.g., Tellevik v. 31641 W.

Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 89, 838 P.2d 111, 845 P.2d 1325 (1992). However, “[a] successful litigant need not cross-appeal in order to urge any additional reasons in support of the judgment, even though rejected by the trial court, but no additional relief will be granted on appeal in the absence of a cross-appeal.” Peterson v. Hagan, 56 Wn.2d 48, 52, 351 P.2d 127 (1960); see City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 685, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).

These respondents prevailed in the trial court, not as a result of a narrow construction of the term “tax,” but because of the trial court’s determination that 1-695 is unconstitutional in its entirety. Having obtained a favorable judgment, the fact that these respondents did not cross-appeal the trial court’s ruling on the meaning of the term “tax” in 1-695 is not a basis to dismiss them, nor does it bar them from challenging the trial court’s construction of the term as an alternative ground to affirm the judgment in their favor. 3.

Standing and Justiciability The Campaign also claims that all respondents lack standing and the cases are nonjusticiable, citing Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402, 879 P.2d 920 (1994). When moving for

summary judgment in the trial court, the Campaign did not raise any issue regarding the standing of the respondents to challenge the constitutionality of 1-695 under

article II, sections 1(b), 19, and 37. The Campaign attempts to raise the standing issue for the first time on appeal. In the past, this court has held that the issues of standing and justiciability under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,

chapter 7.24 RCW, may be raised for the first time on appeal. Wash. Beauty Coll., Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 80 P.2d 403 (1938). However, the Campaign has not provided sufficient argument regarding standing. Its cite to Walker is virtually the whole of its “argument.” We will not consider the issue in the absence of adequate argument. See, e.g., State v. Wheaton, 121 Wn.2d 347, 850 P.2d 507 (1993); Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep’t, 119 Wn.2d 178, 186-87, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992). The same problem exists with regard to the claim that these actions are nonjusticiable.

The Campaign attempts to raise this issue for the first time on appeal, but fails to provide more than conclusory statements and a single cite to Walker. We also note that under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the requirement of standing tends to overlap justiciability requirements. 15 Lewis H. Orland & Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Trial Practice: Civil § 602, at 394 (5th ed. 1996). Thus the inadequacy of briefing respecting standing carries over to the nonjusticiability challenges. We decline to address the Campaign’s claim that none of the actions are justiciable. II.

Constitutionality of 1-695 An exercise of the initiative power is an exercise of the reserved power of the people to legislate. State ex rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 138 Wn.2d 800, 808, 982 P.2d 611 (1999); Belas v. Kiga, 135 Wn.2d 913, 920, 959 P.2d 1037 (1998). In approving an initiative measure, the people exercise the same power of sovereignty as the Legislature does when enacting a statute. Wash. Fed’n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 556, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995).

The fact that the legislative body has the power to achieve a particular result does not necessarily render its action constitutional; it must follow constitutional procedures. State ex rel. Living Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 95 Wn.2d 753, 755, 630 P.2d 925 (1981). The people acting in their legislative capacity are subject to constitutional mandates. State ex rel. Heavey, 138 Wn.2d at 808; Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wn.2d 188, 196, 949 P.2d 1366 (1998); Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 373-74, 25 P.2d 81 (1933). The initiative process cannot be used to amend the constitution. Gerberding, 134 Wn.2d at 210 n.11.

A statute enacted through the initiative process is, as are other statutes, presumed to be constitutional. Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d 44, 52, 969 P.2d 42 (1998); Gerberding, 134 Wn.2d at 196; State ex rel. O’Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn.2d 454, 458, 319 P.2d 828 (1957). A party challenging the statute’s constitutionality bears the heavy burden of establishing its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Heavey, 138 Wn.2d at 808; Gerberding, 134 Wn.2d at 196. This standard is met if argument and research show that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.

Belas, 135 Wn.2d at 920; Island County v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141, 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998). Rules of statutory construction apply to initiatives. Seeber v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 96 Wn.2d 135, 139, 634 P.2d 303 (1981); Gibson v. Dep’t of Licensing, 54 Wn. App. 188, 192, 773 P.2d 110 (1989). Thus, in determining the meaning of a statute enacted through the initiative process, the court’s purpose is to ascertain the collective intent of the voters who, acting in their legislative capacity, enacted the measure. Dep’t of Revenue v. Hoppe, 82 Wn.2d 549, 552, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973).

Where the voters’ intent is clearly expressed in the statute, the court is not required to look further. Senate Republican Campaign Comm. v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 133 Wn.2d 229, 242, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997); City of Tacoma v. State, 117 Wn.2d 348, 356, 816 P.2d 7 (1991); see Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 129, 134, 830 P.2d 350 (1992) (if statutory meaning is clear from plain and unambiguous language, that meaning must be accepted by the court). In determining intent from the language of the statute, the court focuses on the language as the average informed voter voting on the initiative would read it. State v.

Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28, 983 P.2d 608 (1999); Senate Republican Campaign Comm., 133 Wn.2d at 243. Where the language of an initiative enactment is “plain, unambiguous, and well understood according to its natural and ordinary sense and meaning, the enactment is not subject to judicial

interpretation.” State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 762-63, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). However, if there is ambiguity in the enactment, the court may examine the statements in the voters pamphlet in order to determine the voters’ intent. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 763; see Lynch v.

Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 19 Wn.2d 802, 812-13, 145 P.2d 265 (1944); see Biggs, 119 Wn.2d at 134 (if there is ambiguity, extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, may be used to determine legislative intent). “[I]t is not the prerogative nor the function of the judiciary to substitute what they may deem to be their better judgment for that of the electorate in enacting initiatives . . . unless the errors in judgment clearly contravene state or federal constitutional provisions.” Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 287, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).

Nor is it the province of the courts to declare laws passed in violation of the constitution valid based upon considerations of public policy. State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wn.2d 13, 24-25, 200 P.2d 467 (1948). A grant of

summary judgment is reviewed de novo, and the reviewing court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Trimble v. Wash. State Univ., 140 Wn.2d 88, 92, 993 P.2d 259 (2000).

Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). Construction of a statute is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. State v. Ammons, 136 Wn.2d 453, 456, 963 P.2d 812 (1998). 1.

Article II,

section 19

Article II,

section 19 of the Washington State Constitution provides that “[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.”

Article II,

section 19 is to be liberally construed in favor of the legislation. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555; State Fin. Comm. v. O’Brien, 105 Wn.2d 78, 80, 711 P.2d 993 (1986); Wash. State Sch. Dirs. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 82 Wn.2d 367, 371, 510 P.2d 818 (1973).

Article II,

section 19 applies to initiatives. Wash. Fed’n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 551-53, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 328-42, 315-16 (holding of court by six justices in dissenting and concurring opinions). There are two distinct prohibitions in

article II,

section 19. See Patrice v. Murphy, 136 Wn.2d 845, 852, 966 P.2d 1271 (1998). The first is that no bill shall embrace more than one subject. The purpose of this prohibition is to prevent logrolling or pushing legislation through by attaching it to other legislation. Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 198, 235 P.2d 173 (1951); see also State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 124, 942 P.2d 363 (1997); State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 757, 921 P.2d 514 (1996); Flanders v. Morris, 88 Wn.2d 183,187, 558 P.2d 769 (1977). The second prohibition is that no bill shall have a subject which is not expressed in its title.

The purpose of this prohibition is to notify members of the Legislature and the public of the subject matter of the measure. Power, 39 Wn.2d at 198; see also Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 124; Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 757; Flanders, 88 Wn.2d at 187. a. The single-subject rule. In determining whether 1-695 contains more than one subject in violation of

article II,

section 19, we begin with the title of the measure. “The Legislature may, if it chooses, adopt a very broad and comprehensive title in a bill, in which case great liberality will be indulged to hold that any subject reasonably germane to such title may be embraced within the body of the bill.” DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 627, 110 P.2d 627 (1941); accord Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555-56; Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 523, 304 P.2d 676 (1956); State ex rel. Scofield v. Easterday, 182 Wash. 209, 212, 46 P.2d 1052 (1935); Percival v. Cowychee & Wide Hollow Irrig. Dist., 15 Wash. 480, 482, 46 P. 1035 (1896). There is no violation of

article II,

section 19 even if a general subject contains several incidental subjects or subdivisions. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 556; State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 498, 647 P.2d 6 (1982). A general title is one which is broad rather than narrow. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555; O’Brien, 105 Wn.2d at 90; Gruen v. State Tax Comm’n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 22, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. State Fin. Comm’n v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). It may be comprehensive and generic rather than specific. Olympic Motors, Inc. v. McCroskey, 15 Wn.2d 665, 672, 132 P.2d 355 (1942); DeCano, 7 Wn.2d at 627.

Examples of general titles are: “An Act Relating to violence prevention.” In re Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553, 566, 925 P.2d 964, 971 (1996). “An Act Relating to the amendment or repeal of statutes superseded by court rule.” State v. Howard, 106 Wn.2d 39, 45, 722 P.2d 783 (1985). “Shall campaign contributions be limited; public funding of state and local campaigns be prohibited; and campaign related activities be restricted?” Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555, 557. “[A]n act relating to capital projects . . . .” O’Brien, 105 Wn.2d at 79-80. “An Act Relating to tort actions . . . .” Scott v.

Cascade Structures, 100 Wn.2d 537, 546, 673 P.2d 179 (1983). “An Act Relating to Community Colleges . . . .” Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 97 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 652 P.2d 1347 (1982). “An Act Relating to the death penalty . . . .” Grisby, 97 Wn.2d at 498. “An Act Relating to industrial insurance . . . .” Wash. State Sch. Dirs. Ass’n v.

Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 82 Wn.2d 367, 371, 510 P.2d 818 (1973). “An Act to provide an Insurance Code for the State of Washington; to regulate insurance companies and the insurance business; to provide for an Insurance Commissioner; to establish the office of State Fire Marshall; to provide penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act. . . .” Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins.

Co., 69 Wn.2d 392, 402, 418 P.2d 443 (1966). “An Act Relating to revenue and taxation; increasing the motor vehicle fuel tax, the use fuel tax and motor license fees, gross weight fees, fees in lieu of gross weight fees, seating capacity fees, providing for the distribution of said revenue; establishing an urban aid account in the motor vehicle fund; establishing a Puget Sound reserve account; providing for the use of the urban aid account. . . ; authorizing investment of the Puget Sound reserve account. . . .” State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v.

Yelle, 61 Wn.2d 28, 31-33, 377 P.2d 466 (1962). “An Act authorizing the incorporation of mutual savings banks, defining their powers and duties, and prescribing penalties for violations hereof.” In re Peterson’s Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 33, 45 P.2d 45 (1935). In assessing whether a title is general, it is not necessary that the title contain a general statement of the subject of

an act; “[a] few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject stated, is all that is necessary.” State ex rel. Scofield, 182 Wash. at 212; accord Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 554; In re Peterson’s Estate, 182 Wash. at 33. Where a general title is used, all that is required is rational unity between the general subject and the incidental subjects. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 556; Grisby, 97 Wn.2d at 498; Scott, 100 Wn.2d at 545; Kueckelhan, 69 Wn.2d at 403; Gruen, 35 Wn.2d at 22.

This principle has been explained as follows: “Under the true rule of construction, the scope of the general title should be held to embrace any provision of the act, directly or indirectly related to the subject expressed in the title and having a natural connection thereto, and not foreign thereto.

Or, the rule may be stated as follows: Where the title of a legislative act expresses a general subject or purpose which is single, all matters which are naturally and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will, or may, facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose so stated, are properly included in the act and are germane to its title.” Kueckelhan, 69 Wn.2d at 403 (quoting Gruen, 35 Wn.2d at 22).

The requirement of rational unity has also been explained as follows: “[A constitutional single-subject prohibition] does not by restricting the contents of an ‘act’ to one subject, contemplate a metaphysical singleness of idea or thing, but rather that there must be some rational unity between the matters embraced in the act, the unity being found in the general purpose of the act and the practical problems of efficient administration.

It is hardly necessary to suggest that matters which ordinarily would not be thought to have any common features or characteristics might, for purposes of legislative treatment, be grouped together and treated as one subject. For purposes of legislation, ‘subjects’ are not absolute existences to be discovered by some sort of a priori reasoning, but are the result of classification for convenience of treatment and for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose of the particular legislative act.. ..” State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 61 Wn.2d at 33 (quoting State ex rel. Test v.

Steinwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 467, 180 N.E. 865, 868 (1932) (discussing Indiana constitutional provision)). A restrictive title, in contrast to a general title, “ ‘is one where a particular part or branch of a subject is carved out and selected as the subject of the legislation.’ ” Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 127 (quoting Gruen, 35 Wn.2d at 23). A restrictive title will not be regarded as liberally as a general title, “and provisions not fairly within it will not be given force.” Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 127; see Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 758; State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v.

Yelle, 32 Wn.2d 13, 26, 200 P.2d 467 (1948). A restrictive title is “narrow,” as opposed to broad. See [Gruen] at 22; Washington Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555; State Fin. Comm, v. O’Brien, 105 Wn.2d 78, 80, 711 P.2d 993 (1986). It is of specific rather than generic import. Olympic Motors, Inc. v. McCroskey, 15 Wn.2d 665, 672, 132 P.2d 355, 150 A.L.R. 1306 (1942); DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 627, 110 P.2d 627 (1941). A restrictive title expressly limits the scope of the act to that expressed in the title. See . . . Daviscourt v. Peistrup, 40 Wn. App. 433, 439-440, 698 P.2d 1093 (1985). Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 127.

Examples of restrictive titles are: “Shall criminals who are convicted of‘most serious offenses’ on three occasions be sentenced to life in prison without parole?” State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 757, 921 P.2d 514 (1995). “An act relating to the acquisition of property by public agencies . . . .” Daviscourt v. Peistrup, 40 Wn. App. 433, 437, 698 P.2d 1093 (1985). . . . “An act relating to local improvements in cities and towns . . . .” Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wn.2d 326, 329-31, 142 P.2d 488 (1943). “An act relating to the rights and disabilities of aliens with respect to land . . . .” DeCano v.

State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 623, 110 P.2d 627 (1941). “An act relating to the venue of civil actions in justice courts.” National Ass’n of Creditors v. Brown, 147 Wash. 1, 7, 264 P. 1005 (1928). “An act creating and providing for the enforcement of liens for labor and material.” Armour & Co. v. Western Constr. Co., 36 Wash. 529, 537, 78 P 1106 (1905). “An act giving workmen’s compensation benefits to persons engaged in hazardous and extra-hazardous occupations in charitable institutions.” Swedish Hosp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 26 Wn.2d 819, 830-31, 176 P.2d 429 (1947). Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 127 n.2.

In Broadaway, the title of Initiative 159 was held restrictive: “An act relating to increasing penalties for armed crime . . . .” Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 126. In Thorne, the title of Initiative 593 was also held restrictive: “Shall criminals who are convicted of‘most serious offenses’ on three occasions be sentenced to life in prison without parole?” Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 757. Cases where violations of the single-subject requirement have been found have varied. For example,

an act providing criminal penalties for dognapping and the recovery of attorney fees in some civil replevin actions violated

article II,

section 19. Barde v. State, 90 Wn.2d 470, 584 P.2d 390 (1978).

An act which included a civil rights provision and regulation of cemeteries violated

article II,

section 19. Price v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 57 Wn.2d 352, 357 P.2d 702 (1960). In general, violations of the single-subject rule are more readily found where a restrictive title is used. E.g., Potter v. Whatcom County, 138 Wash. 571, 576, 245 P. 11 (1926) (restrictive title “An Act Relating to townships and amending. . . .” held not broad enough to embrace provision placing bridges costing more than $300 under the sole jurisdiction and control of the county); Nat’l Ass’n of Creditors v.

Brown, 147 Wash. 1, 7, 264 P. 1005 (1928) (restrictive title “An Act relating to the venue of civil actions in justice courts” not broad enough to encompass provision that if an action was prosecuted contrary to the venue requirements, no jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained). Where an initiative to the people is concerned, as is the case here, the relevant title for the article. II,

section 19 inquiry is the ballot title, because not all initiatives have legislative titles; because it is the ballot title with which the voters are faced in the voting booth; and because it is the ballot title which can be appealed before an election and which thereafter appears on petitions and the ballot. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555; see Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 757; RCW 29.79.070.

The ballot title of 1-695 is “Shall voter approval be required for any tax increase, license tab fees be $30 per year for motor vehicles, and existing vehicle taxes be repealed?” The State and the Campaign contend that 1-695 has a general title, and the single subject of the measure is limiting taxation. They urge that all of the provisions of 1-695 are rationally related to the general subject of limiting taxation. However, in making this argument, they want the court to consider the Voters Pamphlet and “legislative history” as evidence of rational unity.

In deciding whether a measure contains a single subject, however, the constitutional inquiry is founded on the question whether a measure is drafted in such a way that those voting on it may be required to vote for something of which the voter disapproves in order to obtain approval of an unrelated law. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 552; Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 525, 304 P.2d 676 (1956).

Thus, regardless of what is in the Voters Pamphlet or the history of the initiative, the rational relationship inquiry centers on what is in the measure itself, i.e., whether the measure contains unrelated laws. Amalgamated Transit argues that 1-695 does not concern one subject, limiting taxes. Amalgamated Transit contends that from the plain language of the initiative the voters knew that as a whole the measure concerned more than just taxes.

This is because the title and text expressly distinguish between “taxes” and “fees.” Amalgamated Transit argues that the difference between the two is of constitutional dimension, with a tax being “a levy made for the purpose of raising revenue for a general governmental purpose” and a fee being enacted “principally as an integral part of the regulation of an activity and to cover the cost of regulation.” Franks & Son, Inc. v. State, 136 Wn.2d 737, 750, 966 P.2d 1232 (1998). Amalgamated Transit urges that voters are aware of this fundamental legal distinction.

Because 1-695 concerns both fees and taxes, it does not contain a single subject, “limiting taxation.” Further, this respondent notes, 1-695 had the effect of increasing some annual vehicle renewal fees, and this raising of government revenue is not within the subject of “limiting taxes.” Amalgamated Transit further argues that the ballot title of 1-695 contains three propositions, all of them restrictive.

Amalgamated Transit urges that the ballot title carves out part of the subject of taxes, asking whether voter approval should be required; asks whether the license tab fee should be only $30; and carves out another facet of the general subject of taxes, i.e., whether to repeal existing vehicle taxes. Amalgamated Transit says that three restrictive title parts do not equal one general title. The Tacoma Water respondents maintain that 1-695 has at least two subjects: reducing license tab fees and voter approval of taxes.

They urge that because these two subjects were tied together, the voters were not free to vote for one of the proposals and against the other if they wished. As do the appellants, these respondents also focus on history of the measure, and how the election campaign was conducted, to argue that limiting taxes is not the subject of 1-695.

They say that the stated purpose of the measure was to prevent replacement of MVET revenues by imposition of other taxes, and that given this purpose, there is no rational unity because the measure requires all new taxes and tax increases to be voted upon, not just those that might replace the MVET revenues. However, whether or not there is one subject in 1-695 must be determined from the measure itself. 1-695 does not, anywhere within its text or title, say that only taxes which could replace the MVET revenues are subject to voter approval.

The measure on its face is broader than the Tacoma Water respondents urge is its subject. The Tacoma Water respondents argue that there is no relationship at all between the subjects in 1-695 in regard to Tacoma Water’s water rates and charges. Amicus Curiae Public Hospital Districts similarly argues that there is no rational unity between repeal of the MVET and the voter approval provision if applied to all government fees and charges, including its own charges because, it points out, it never received MVET revenue. The Clean Air Agency offers another argument.

It says that I-695’s voter approval provision does not apply just to traditional taxes, but also applies to all fees or monetary charges by government. Therefore, because more than “taxes” are subject to voter approval, the subject matter of the initiative is not “limiting taxation,” contrary to the State’s argument. (As the Clean Air Agency acknowledges, though, the State argues for a traditional definition of “tax.”) This respondent also maintains that there are two subjects in 1-695: repeal of the MVET and government process, in particular the way in which revenue generating laws can be made in the future.

Amicus Curiae League of Women Voters of Washington urges that I-695’s title is not a general title because all it does is mirror the specific provisions of the initiative rather than identifying general topics on a theme in which the provisions fall. Amicus League of Women Voters cites State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wn.2d 13, 200 P.2d 467 (1948), a case where the court determined the title was restrictive, not general.

As Amicus League of Women Voters points out, there the title of the original act related to toll bridges and tunnels, and the title to an amending act referred to toll bridges and the powers and duties of the toll bridge authority, and also referred to ferry connections. The court concluded that the title of the amendatory act was not a general title concerning a transportation system, but was instead a restrictive title referring to “the specific subject of toll bridges and, at most, highway and ferry connections and approaches thereto.” Id. at 27.

The court reasoned that the body of the act contained more than one subject, toll bridges and ferries, and that its dual subjects did not “comprehend Q any such broad appellation as ‘transportation system.’ ” Id. Amicus League of Women Voters says that, similarly, here the phrase “limiting taxation” is not found anywhere in the title or body of 1-695, and urges that the voter approval provision does not limit taxes, but instead specifies a method of approving tax increases.

These are not the same, the League urges, because specifying a method for approval is a broad procedural provision which directs how future tax increases will occur, not whether they will occur. However, as appellants argue, it is not necessary for the words “limiting taxation” to appear in the title or body of the act in order for I-695’s title to be general. In Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275, 290-91, 517 P.2d 911 (1974), the court identified the “generic subject” of 1-276 as “openness in government,” though those words never appeared in the title. Cf.

Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 758 (though the title was held to be restrictive, the subject matter was found to be “persistent offenders” even where those words did not appear in the title); but see State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wn.2d at 27 (noting that act did not mention “transportation system”). The League distinguishes Fritz on the basis that there the lengthy, detailed title would disclose the topic “openness in government,” while here, it contends, the average voter would not understand “limiting taxation” to be the subject of 1-695.

We conclude that this single-subject issue is controlled by Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 304 P.2d 676 (1956), relied upon by the Cities, Amalgamated Transit, and Amicus League of Women Voters. In that case, a new act was passed which provided procedures for establishing and financing toll roads, and also provided specifically for a toll road from Tacoma to Everett. The title included both of these purposes. The court held this was a general title and adequately expressed the subjects in the act. Id. at 523.

However, the court held that the two were not germane to each other because one purpose of the act was to provide for a specific road which was subject to accomplishment and not continuing in nature, while the second purpose did not pertain to any specific road but was continuing in effect. The act was unconstitutional because it contained two subjects in both the title and the body. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth., 49 Wn.2d at 524. A similar analysis was applied in Power. There, the court noted that

article II,

section 19 prohibits the passage of

an act relating to different subjects expressed in its title, in which case the whole act is void. Power, 39 Wn.2d at 200. The title and the act both contained two unrelated subjects, appropriations and a corporate income tax, and it was accordingly held unconstitutional in its entirety. Here, while the title of 1-695 seems in part restrictive, i.e., the part which says that “[s]hall... license tab fees be $30 per year for motor vehicles [,]” the balance of the title broadens its scope, similarly to the title in Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State. We conclude that 1-695 has a general title.

However, there is no rational unity between the subjects of 1-695. Similar to the act in Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 1-695 also has two purposes: to specifically set license tab fees at $30 and to provide a continuing method of approving all future tax increases. Further, neither subject is necessary to implement the other. 1-695 violates the single-subject requirement of

article II,

section 19 because both its title and the body of the act include two subjects: repeal of the MVET and a voter approval requirement for taxes. b. The subject-in-title rule of

article II,

section 19. The second requirement of

article II,

section 19 is that the subject of

an act must be expressed in its title. The purpose of this requirement is, as noted, provision of notice to legislators and the public of the contents of the measure. This court has recognized the particular importance of this requirement in the context of an initiative, noting that often voters will not reach the text of a measure or the explanatory statement, but may instead cast their votes based upon the ballot title. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 553-54. The title of

an act complies with

article II,

section 19 if it gives notice which would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act or indicates the scope and purpose of the law to an inquiring mind. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555; YMCA v. State, 62 Wn.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963); Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 491, 408 P.2d 269 (1965). However, the title need not be an index to the contents, nor must it provide details of the measure. Wash. Fed’n, 127 Wn.2d at 555; Treffry, 67 Wn.2d at 491; Gruen, 35 Wn.2d at 22; Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wn.2d 326, 330, 142 P.2d 488 (1943); Petroleum Lease Props. Co. v.

Huse, 195 Wash. 254, 260, 80 P.2d 774 (1938); State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 P. 728 (1908); State ex rel. Cole v. City of New Whatcom, 3 Wash. 7, 27 P. 1020 (1891). The trial court held that the word “tax” in the ballot title of 1-695 does not provide the notice which

article II,

section 19 requires because it fails to inform of the scope of the measure. The trial court held that “tax” does not have its traditional meaning in the context of 1-695, and reasoned that because “tax” encompasses a broader range of fees and charges than are commonly referred to as taxes, use of the term “tax” in the title of 1-695 provides insufficient notice of what the contents of the measure might include. Therefore 1-695 is unconstitutional because it violates

article II,

section 19. In order to evaluate this issue, the parties’ considerable arguments on the meaning of the term “tax” must be addressed.

In brief, the trial court held that the term “tax” in 1-695 must be given a broad construction to include specific fees for commercial or proprietary products or services rendered or benefits received, fees, assessments other than taxes, and even utility charges by PUDs, rather than a narrower construction including “traditional taxes.” The State argues that the term “tax” should be construed to mean any compulsory charge for the support of government and to exclude amounts charged for specific goods or services, proprietary or commercial charges, and special assessments, such as local improvement districts (LID) assessments.

The Snohomish PUD generally agrees with the State’s approach. The Campaign does not discuss the issue in its briefing to this court. Amalgamated Transit also does not address the issue, and accordingly neither does Vashon-Maury Island Community Council (since it adopts Amalgamated Transit’s argument on the issues). The Cities accept and argue on appeal the trial court’s construction, but only for purposes of arguing to uphold the trial court’s ruling that 1-695 violates

article II,

section 19. The Tacoma Water respondents argue that “tax” means a charge imposed on people, property, or transactions for the general funding of government without any required connection between the amount charged and the benefit received. The meaning of the term “tax” is to be determined according to the intent of the voters. Dep’t of Revenue, 82 Wn.2d at 552. If this intent can be determined from the language of the initiative, the court’s inquiry ends there. Senate Republican Campaign Comm., 133 Wn.2d at 242. Section 2(1) of 1-695 provides that “[a]ny tax increase imposed by the state shall require voter approval.” Section 2(2), (3) and (4) provide:

(2) For the purposes of this section, “tax” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, sales and use taxes, property taxes, business and occupation taxes, excise taxes, fuel taxes, impact fees, license fees, permit fees, and any monetary charge by government.

(3) For the purposes of this section, “tax” does not include: (

a) Higher education tuition, and (

b) Civil and criminal fines and other charges collected in cases of restitution or violation of law or contract.

(4) For the purposes of this section, “tax increase” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, a new tax, a monetary increase of an existing tax, a tax rate increase, an expansion in the legal definition of a tax base, and an extension of an expiring tax.

Section 2(5) provides that “state” “includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the state itself and all its departments and agencies, any city, county, special district, and other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the state.” Language in an initiative should be construed as the average informed voter voting on the initiative would read it. State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28, 983 P.2d 608 (1999).

As a noun, the term “tax” has as its common meaning a “pecuniary charge imposed by legislative or other public authority upon persons or property for public purposes : a forced contribution of wealth to meet the public needs of a government.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2345 (1986). These

definitions probably accord with the average informed voter’s understanding of the term “tax,” and are consistent with the State’s argument that “tax” means a compulsory charge for the support of government. This definition is also consistent with legal

definitions offered by the Port Districts and Snohomish PUD. “Tax” means “an enforced contribution of money, assessed or charged by authority of sovereign government for the benefit of the state or the legal taxing authorities [and it] is not a debt or contract in the ordinary sense, but it is an exaction in the strictest sense of the word.” State ex rel. City of Seattle v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 33 Wn.2d 896, 902, 207 P.2d 712 (1949). “Tax” is a “pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property to support the government, and is a payment exacted by legislative authority.

Essential characteristics of a tax are that it is not a voluntary payment or donation, but an enforced contribution, exacted pursuant to legislative authority.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1457 (6th ed. 1990). (Citation omitted.) However, the language of 1-695 indicates that “tax” does not have its traditional meaning. 1-695 specifically defines the term “tax.” It would be unnecessary to define the term if it had its common meaning, and, if the term has its common meaning, the definition is superfluous. All language in a piece of legislation should be given effect, so that no provision is rendered superfluous.

See City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19, 25, 992 P.2d 496 (2000); W. Petroleum Importers, Inc. v. Friedt, 127 Wn.2d 420, 428, 899 P.2d 792 (1995). Additionally, an enactment’s definition of a term prevails over a dictionary definition or common understanding of a term. In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 452, 458, 832 P.2d 1303 (1992). Moreover, under section 2(2) “tax” “includes, but is not necessarily limited to .. . [the list of charges], and any monetary charge by government.” (Emphasis added.) This language also suggests that the term “tax” has a broad meaning.

Further, the term “any” in “any monetary charge” (emphasis added) means something other than “similar,” lending further weight to the argument that “tax” is defined expansively. The meaning of language must also be determined from the enactment as a whole, with each provision read in relation to the other provisions. City of Seattle v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 136 Wn.2d 693, 698, 965 P.2d 619 (1998); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 140 Wn.2d 35, 43, 992 P.2d 1002 (2000).

While the parties mainly focus on the term “any monetary charge” and the preceding list of charges in section 2(2) of 1-695, section 2(3)’s exclusions from the term “tax,” i.e., higher education tuition and civil and criminal fines and charges, indicate that “tax” must be given a broad construction. These excluded charges are not compulsory charges for the support of government, or, in the standard dictionary’s terms, a forced contribution of wealth to meet the public needs of government, and there would be no need for their exclusion if “tax” is given its ordinary traditional meaning.

Nor are these items charges which the average informed voter would think are “taxes.” A broad construction of “tax” accords with the specific exclusions and avoids rendering them superfluous. Further, the specific list of charges which are defined as taxes in subsection 2 includes “license fees.” The average informed voter would not conclude that the charge for a state nurse’s license, for example, is a “tax” in its traditional sense. Some respondents and amici, however, rely on certain language in 1-695 for the proposition that a restrictive meaning of “tax” is intended.

The initiative uses the word “imposed.” Section 2(1) says “[a]ny tax increase imposed by the state shall require voter approval.” (Emphasis added.) The Housing Authority says that its charges for rental housing units are not “imposed” on those choosing to rent a unit. “Impose” has as its ordinary meaning “to make, frame, or apply (as a charge, tax, obligation, rule, penalty) as compulsory, obligatory, or enforceable .. .: LEVY. . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1136 (1986). “Levy” means “to impose or collect (as a tax or tribute) by legal process or by authority : EXACT. . . .” Id. at 1301.

These common

definitions are broader than the Housing Authority suggests and do not limit the term “tax” to its common meaning. The Snohomish PUD and the Port Districts point to the word “government” in the phrase “any monetary charge by government,” and argue that because the word “state” is used (and defined) elsewhere in the initiative, “government” must have a different meaning from “state.” See Seeber v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 96 Wn.2d 135, 139-40, 634 P.2d 303 (1981) (where certain language is used in one instance and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent).

These respondents urge that “government” must pertain to governmental power rather than to proprietary power. Therefore, they reason, only charges of a governmental nature, rather than proprietary charges, are “taxes.” The argument is not persuasive. A charge by government is a charge by an entity. The word is used as a noun, not as an adjective. We conclude from the plain language of 1-695 that “tax” does not have a traditional meaning, but instead has a broad meaning.

The State, the Tacoma Water respondents, and Snohomish PUD urge, however, that the term “any monetary charge by government” in section 2(2) is ambiguous, and therefore the court should resort to rules of statutory

interpretation. However, even if one accepts the premise that the term is ambiguous, it does not follow that “tax” has its traditional meaning. These parties first argue that the rule of ejusdem generis applies, contending that the term should take its meanings from the specific taxes and fees preceding it. See City of Seattle, 136 Wn.2d at 699. They disagree, though, as to the result of applying the rule. In the State’s view, traditional taxes and fees like those listed fall within the meaning of “tax,” i.e., those in the nature of a governmental fee or tax, but all charges by government do not.

Thus, the State urges that the term should be construed to mean a compulsory charge for the support of government. The Snohomish PUD’s approach is similar. Its view is that each of the eight listed charges is either a tax in the traditional sense or a regulatory fee that involves the exercise of governmental, not proprietary, power. It says that the eight charges are “compulsory exactions” by the state in the nature of taxes.

In the Tacoma Water respondents’ view, the eight enumerated items in section 2(2) are monetary charges by government that produce general revenue for the general fund, and they urge that the term “any monetary charge” must be similarly limited. These respondents say that the State’s definition is essentially meaningless, because virtually every government charge can be categorized as compulsory because you have to pay it if you wish to obey the law. They also want the court to reject the State’s proprietary-governmental distinction.

They say that, for example, cities supplying some areas of a city with clean, disease-free drinking water do so in their governmental capacity to promote the general health and safety of the citizens, but where that problem does not exist, the cities act in a proprietary capacity. Under the State’s definition, these respondents say, water rates in the first situation are not taxes, while in the second they are. The rule of ejusdem generis does not apply as any of the parties urge.

It is clear that the list of eight charges on its face includes items that are not traditional taxes, such as license fees, impact fees, and permitting fees. Our inquiry here is whether, for purposes of the

article II,

section 19 subject-in-title rule, the term “tax” has a broader meaning than its commonly understood, traditional meaning. Some of the listed items, as well as the exclusions in section 2(3), plainly establish that section 2(2) is not limited to traditional “taxes,” and the rule of ejusdem generis does not lead to a different conclusion. Several of the respondents urge that extrinsic indicators of the voters’ intent show that a broad meaning of “tax” was not intended.

Assuming that, for the sake of the argument, ambiguity exists, looking to the Voters Pamphlet for evidence of the voters’ intent would be appropriate. The Snohomish PUD says that there is nothing in the Voters Pamphlet to indicate that there was any intent to apply the voter approval provision to utility rates, special assessments and other proprietary charges by PUDs. Instead, the intent expressed is that of an antitax measure. The Port Districts similarly say that there is no mention in the ballot title, the ballot

summary, or the statements in the Voters Pamphlet of proprietary charges by a port district. They also urge that only conventional taxes are mentioned in the title and

summary. The Tacoma Water respondents say that water rates and charges are not the type of monetary charge commonly understood to be a tax under Washington common law, and the voters did not intend to include such charges within the term “tax.” The Port Districts and the Tacoma Water respondents say that the purpose of 1-695 was to repeal the MVET and prevent government entities from increasing taxes to make up for the loss. The Port Districts say they never received any MVET funds and have no reason to make such funds up.

The Tacoma Water respondents also say they never received any MVET funds, and the term “tax” should be construed to encompass only charges that could replace those funds. Amicus Housing Authority makes a similar argument. The Voters Pamphlet for the November 2, 1999, general election discloses that the purposes of1-695 are to eliminate “outrageously expensive” vehicle tabs and require voter approval for any other tax increase because “we knew politicians would try to raise other taxes.” Voters Pamphlet at 4.

The rebuttal of the statement against the initiative explains that “[o]nce vehicle tabs were lowered to $30, we knew politicians would try to raise other taxes. 1-695 is carefully written and requires voter approval for tax increases, meaning politicians CAN’T impose property taxes on vehicles, a state income tax, or ANY tax without asking your permission first.” Voters Pamphlet at 4. Two things are apparent from examining the Voters Pamphlet and 1-695.

First, the stated purposes of preventing politicians from replacing MVET revenues by raising other “taxes” does not establish that only traditional taxes were contemplated. For example, a local transit authority might raise the cost of a bus pass to compensate for lost MVET funds allocated to public transportation. Second, to the extent that the Voters Pamphlet indicates that only tax measures which might replace the MVET funds would require approval, such intent is not reflected in 1-695. Nothing in 1-695 restricts the voter approval requirement based upon replacement of MVET revenues.

Section 2 of 1-695 on its face is a broad tax limitation measure. Thus, even if there were ambiguity in the term “any monetary charge by government,” the Voters Pamphlet, when compared to 1-695 itself, cannot support the conclusion that “tax” is limited to its common meaning. Many of the respondents and amici also argue, though, that if the term “tax” is defined to encompass any charge by government, absurd results ensue.

If a statute is ambiguous, and therefore subject to judicial construction, a court must construe the statute to effectuate legislative intent, and in so doing “ ‘avoid a literal reading if it would result in . .. absurd . . . consequences.’ ” City of Seattle, 136 Wn.2d at 697-98 (quoting Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996)). However, because the language of the initiative itself sufficiently resolves the meaning of the term, there is no ambiguity to resolve and this rule does not apply. State v. Azpitarte, 140 Wn.2d 138, 142, 995 P.2d 31 (2000).

The State also argues that by giving the term “tax” a broad construction the trial court failed to apply the principle that a statute will be construed to preserve its constitutionality where possible. See State v. Crediford, 130 Wn.2d 747, 755, 927 P.2d 1129 (1996). The court’s broad

interpretation was a key factor in the trial court’s decision that 1-695 is unconstitutional under

article II,

section 19. However, while legislation should be construed to preserve its constitutionality where possible, given the provisions of 1-695 we do not agree that the measure can be construed to apply only to “traditional” taxes, or that the voters intended a distinction between proprietary and governmental functions. A court should “not strain to interpret [a] statute as constitutional: a plain reading must make the

interpretation reasonable.” Soundgarden v. Eikenberry, 123 Wn.2d 750, 757, 871 P.2d 1050 (1994). We affirm the trial court’s holding that “tax” has a broader meaning than its common, traditional meaning and, given I-695’s exceedingly broad definition including “any monetary charge by government,” includes specific fees for commercial or proprietary products or services rendered or benefits received, fees, assessments other than taxes, and even utility charges by PUDs. It follows that the trial court’s holding that 1-695 violates the subject-in-title rule of

article II,

section 19 must be affirmed. In DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627 (1941), this court addressed an amendatory act which was titled “An Act relating to the rights and disabilities of aliens with respect to land, and amending . . . .” Id. at 623. However, the body of the act specifically defined “alien” in a way “which brings within its purview a whole new class of persons who are not in fact aliens in common understanding . . . .” Id. at 624. The court applied the rule that “ ‘[w]ords in a title must be taken in their common and ordinary meanings, and the legislature cannot in the body of

an act impose another or unusual meaning upon a term used in the title without disclosing such special meaning therein.’ ” Id. at 626 (quoting 59 C.J. 810). The court held that the act violated

article II,

section 19. This court applied the same rule in Petroleum Lease Properties Co., 195 Wash. 254. There, the title of the act was “An Act providing for the regulation and supervision of the issuance and sale of securities to prevent fraud in the sale thereof, amending. . . .” Id. at 257. In the body of this amendatory act the term “securities” was defined to include oil or gas leases.

The court said: “The title gives no notice that there is to be embodied in the amendment the regulation of any matter not embraced within the meaning of the word ‘security’ as that term is commonly understood and defined by standard dictionaries, as well as by the original securities act itself. That a gas or oil lease is not a ‘security’ as ordinarily understood, or as defined in the original act, is self-evident.” Id. at 258. See also Swedish Hosp. v.

Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 26 Wn.2d 819, 822, 830, 832, 176 P.2d 429 (1947) (title “An Act giving workmen’s compensation benefits to persons engaged in hazardous and extrahazardous occupations in charitable institutions” violated

article II,

section 19 because it did not give notice that provisions concerning nonprofit, organizations and institutions were encompassed within the act). The court in DeCano distinguished State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Department of Public Service, 1 Wn.2d 102, 95 P.2d 1007 (1939). There, in a comprehensive title the terms “storage warehouse and warehousemen” were used, which the court in DeCano said were broad enough to embrace all storage warehouses, including those operated by municipal corporations such as port districts.

Moreover, the court noted in DeCano, the title used the phrase “defining the same” following those terms, which called attention to the fact that these terms were defined in the body of the statute. DeCano, 7 Wn.2d at 630. As in DeCano and Petroleum Lease Properties, we affirm the trial court’s holding that 1-695 violates the subject-in-title rule of

article II,

section 19 on the basis that the ballot title of 1-695 states “[s]hall voter approval be required for any tax increase” without any indication in the title that “tax” has a meaning broader than its common meaning. Nothing about this ballot title gives any notice that would indicate to the voters that the contents of the initiative would include voter approval for charges other than taxes or suggest inquiry into the act be made to learn the broad meaning of “tax.” The next question is whether, due to unconstitutionality under the subject-in-title clause of

article II,

section 19, 1-695 is unconstitutional in its entirety. A legislative act is not unconstitutional in its entirety unless invalid provisions are unseverable and it cannot be reasonably be believed that the legislative body would have passed one without the other, or unless elimination of the invalid part would render the remaining part useless to accomplish the legislative purposes. Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wn.2d 188, 197, 949 P.2d 1366 (1998); State v. Crediford, 130 Wn.2d 747, 760, 927 P.2d 1129 (1996).

A severability clause may provide the assurance that the legislative body would have enacted remaining sections even if others are found invalid. Gerberding, 134 Wn.2d at 197. However, a severability clause is not necessarily dispositive on the question of whether the legislative body would have enacted the remainder of the act. Leonard v. City of Spokane, 127 Wn.2d 194, 201, 897 P.2d 358 (1995). 1-695 has a severability clause. In Petroleum Lease Properties, the court said that the act was unconstitutional so far as it attempted to bring oil and gas leases within the scope of the securities act.

In DeCano, the court similarly held that so far as the act tried to bring within its scope individuals not falling within the commonly understood meaning of “alien,” it was unconstitutional. In Swedish Hospital, the court said it would presume the legislators knew that nonprofits were included in the body of the act, but it could not presume that the legislators would have enacted the measure without the invalid portion. Therefore, the act was invalidated in its entirety. Here, we hold that

section 2 of 1-695 is invalid under the subject-in-title clause of

article II,

section 19. The trial court also ruled that

section 3 of 1-695 contains subjects not identified in the ballot title. Where

an act contains provisions not fairly encompassed within the title, such provisions are void. Power, 39 Wn.2d at 200. Although the title of 1-695 refers to “repeal of existing vehicle taxes,” some of the repealed statutes imposed no tax or fee but instead allocated proceeds of the license tab fees to police, fire and other purposes and established accounts and funds for deposit and withdrawal of these moneys. Repeal of these statutes, the trial court ruled, deprived named programs and government agencies of their present share of the funding, a result not identified in the ballot title.

Other repealed statutes removed exemptions from motor vehicle taxes, and their repeal increased taxes. This increase, the trial court said, also was not disclosed in the title. Accordingly, the trial court held, repeal of these statutes was unconstitutional under

article II,

section 19. The State argues, however, that the title need not provide the details contained within the measure; that these subjects are not separate subjects because the title gives notice that “existing vehicle taxes” are repealed and the average informed voter would not require further notice that such repeal would lead to a loss of revenue; and finally, that, where by statute the ballot title is limited in length, to invalidate the initiative on the basis that it does not provide sufficient detail would be contrary to the right of the people to legislate.

In its reply brief, the State adds that the Voters Pamphlet provided adequate notice of these provisions, and the public therefore had sufficient notice. Given I-695’s general title,

section 3 falls within it. The title provides sufficient notice that the initiative repealed taxes, and thus, notice that decreased revenues and loss of funding would result. Removal of exemptions from a tax does not alter the tax itself. The small increase in some license fees as a result of repeal of the MVET is sufficiently related to the repeal to bring them within the general title. While

section 2 of 1-695 violates the subject-in-title rule of

article II,

section 19,

section 3 does not. 2.

Article II,

section 1(

b) The State and the Campaign contend the trial court erred in holding that

section 2 of 1-695 violates

article II,

section l(b)’s requirement that four percent of the voters sign a referendum petition. They argue that under

section 2 of 1-695 any measure imposing increased taxes (as defined in 1-695) becomes conditional legislation subject to voter approval. Amalgamated Transit, the Cities, Tacoma Water, and the Clean Air Agency contend the trial court’s ruling is correct, arguing that

section 2 establishes an unconstitutional referenda process. The Seventh Amendment to the Washington State Constitution, adopted by the voters in 1912, established the initiative and referendum powers. The state constitution provides in part: The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested in the legislature . . . but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature, and also reserve power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of any bill, act, or law passed by the legislature. (

a) Initiative: The first power reserved by the people is the initiative .... (

b) Referendum. The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, and it may be ordered on any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature .. . either by petition signed by the required percentage of the legal voters, or by the legislature as other bills are enacted .... The number of valid signatures of registered voters required on a petition for referendum of

an act of the legislature or any part thereof, shall be equal to or exceeding four percent of the votes cast for the office of governor at the last gubernatorial election preceding the filing of the text of the referendum measure with the secretary of state. Const, art. II, § 1. The filing of a referendum petition suspends the effectiveness of the statute until 30 days after the next general election, if the voters

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