JANE DOE-1, Individually and as Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of J.T., a Minor, and W.T., a Minor; John Doe-1, Individually; Jane Doe-2, Individually and as Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of Z.W., a Minor, and A.W., a Minor; Jane Doe-3, Individually and as Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of C.H., a Minor; John Doe-3, Individually; Jane Doe-4, Individually and as Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of A.B., a Minor; Jane Doe-5, Individually and as Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of T.S., a Minor, and M.S., a Minor; John Doe-5, Individually; Jane Doe-6, Individually and as Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of P.C., a Minor; and John Doe-6, Individually, Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners v. CORPORATION OF the PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Steven Grow, Don Fishel, Christopher Michael Jensen, Christopher Jensen, Sandralee Jensen, and Unnamed Defendant-1, Defendants Below, Respondents, 239 W. Va. 428

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice: The petitioners (plaintiffs below) are nine minors and their parents, individually and as parents, guardians, and next friends, in this action alleging various negligence claims, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, and civil conspiracy related to, arising from, and resulting in defendant Michael Jensen’s known and alleged sexual abuse of the minor plaintiffs. Following extensive discovery, the circuit court entered an order on December 4, 2015, through which it granted

summary judgment in favor of the respondent (defendant below), Unidentified Defendant-1 (“UD-1”), against whom conspiracy was the only claim asserted. On December 30, 2015; the circuit court entered an order granting several of the defendants’ motions in limine which eliminated a large portion of the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence in support of their conspiracy claim. The following day, December 31, 2015, the circuit court entered an order granting

summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim in favor of the respondents (defendants below), Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Steven Grow, and Don Fishel (collectively the “Church defendants”), and in favor of the respondents (defendants below), Christopher Jensen and Sandralee Jensen. On January 11, 2016, the circuit court entered an order certifying its interlocutory

summary judgment rulings as final judgments pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). In addition to seeldng a reversal of the

summary judgment orders, the plaintiffs ask this Court to reverse those in limine rulings. They assert these rulings facilitated the circuit court’s issuance of

summary judgment rulings without first evaluating the evidence offered in support of them conspiracy claims under the strictures applicable to

summary judgment. Upon our careful review of the parties’ briefs, the arguments of counsel, the appendix record submitted, and the applicable law, we reverse the

summary judgments and in limine rulings and remand this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Facts and Procedural Background In late 2004, Chris and Sandralee Jensen (collectively the “Jensen parents”) and them children were residing in or near Provo, Utah. Their son Michael Jensen, who was then thirteen years old, was arrested at his middle school and charged with two felony counts of sexual abuse of a child. The incidents occurred in November and December of 2004, and his female victims were twelve and thirteen years old, respectively.

On both occasions, Michael waited for his victim to exit a classroom before pinning her against a wall and grabbing her buttocks and breasts without her consent. One of the victims indi-eated in her statement to the police that during Michael’s attack upon her person, he told her that they needed to have sex; that she was “really scared”; and that she had kneed Michael in the groin to get away. The defendants minimize the severity of the incidents describing them instead as brief groping of two female classmates over them clothes while at school.

The plaintiffs allege that a conspiracy began in Provo when The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Church”) influenced Michael’s criminal proceeding, which resulted in the two felony charges being reduced to misdemeanor sexual offenses. Among other assertions, the plaintiffs state that Michael’s paternal grandfather, Blaine P. Jensen, who has held very high positions within the Church, attended a meeting between Michael and Michael’s attorneys, and was present for Michael’s dispositional hearing in January 2015. Dale Swensen, Michael’s Church bishop in Provo, also attended the dispositional hearing.

During this hearing, the juvenile petition was read and reports were submitted, including a Sexual Behavior Risk Assessment (“SBRA”), which indicated that Michael’s offenses are based primarily on opportunity” and that he “will offend if given the opportunity.” The juvenile court then accepted Michael’s admission to reduced charges of two misdemeanor counts of lewdness involving a child; placed him on probation; ordered his parents to comply with the terms of probation; and ordered him to complete fifty hours of community service and a Sexual Appropriateness Class with the family component with proof of completion to be provided to the court.

The defendants allege the plaintiffs have no evidence the Church influenced Michael’s proceeding in any manner and that affidavits and declarations from the prosecutors involved in Michael’s juvenile proceeding refute the existence of any such influence.

Although the defendants allege Blaine Jensen’s involvement was simply that of a grandfather assisting his grandson, the plaintiffs point to evidence that Michael told his friend, J.C., that he had been in legal trouble in Utah and that his grandfather “was in a leadership position for the church .,. [and] helped take care of whatever needed to be taken care of.” The plaintiffs further allege that although the Church knew that Michael had pled guilty to two sex offenses in Utah, it did nothing to warn or protect, despite the existence of an abuse “prevention and response” procedure, referred to as an “annotation system.” The defendants allege that their evidence demonstrates that the Church “rarely” annotates its records for children, and “even less so where the misconduct does not indicate a danger to much younger children.” During the summer of 2005, the Jensen family moved to Martinsburg, West Virginia.

Soon thereafter, Sandralee Jensen was asked to serve as the Church’s Relief Society President for her new ward, which she accepted. In that role, Mrs. Jensen reported'directly to her ward bishop, who was at that time Matthew Whitcomb. She also oversaw the Sunday class for the women and was responsible for “compassionate service” for all ■ ward members. Shortly thereafter, Chris Jensen was placed on. the Stake High Council, which is an advisory body to the Stake President, who at all relevant times was defendant Stephen Grow.

In their effort to further demonstrate the defendants’ knowledge and awareness of Michael’s history as an abuser, the plaintiffs allege there was a Stake High Council meeting in 2006 or 2007, during which leaders of the Martinsburg Stake discussed Michael Jensen’s abuse .of a younger sister. and possibly another girl, and Chris Jensen’s possible abuse of his son Michael. They further allege that at this same time, Stake President Grow asked UD-1 to “keep an eye” on Chris Jensen, who was UD-l’s close friend, and to report back to him.

UD-1 indicated during a recorded interview that through his position on Church councils, he was aware that Church leaders had been working hard with Michael Jensen to get him the help that he needed in the 2007-2008 time frame. The defendants deny that this 2006-2007 Stake High Council meeting ever took place or. that Stake President. Grow ever made such a monitoring arrangement with UD-1. The plaintiffs allege that by April 2007, through her role as Relief Society President, Sandralee Jensen was arranging for Michael to babysit the children of ward families.

They further allege that because there had been no disclosures concerning Michael’s prior sex offenses in Utah by the Jensens or the Church defendants, the plaintiff Doe-6 parents allowed their four-year-old daughter P.C. to be babysat by Michael, who , sexually and physically abused her by repeatedly laying down in bed with her and making her touch his penis. The plaintiffs further allege that when the Doe-6 parents returned home, P.C. was extremely upset; had a,handprint-shaped bruise on her bottom; and was terrified of Michael.

Whe.n Jane Doe-6 confronted the Jensens parents, who were, both Church officers at the time, they explained that P.C. was upset because Michael had not fed the Doe-6 children properly. Sandralee Jensen' assumed that Michael had spanked P.C., and Chris Jensen believed that Michael needed more “tutelage from his mother” to become a better babysitter. Moving forward to June 2007, the plaintiffs allege that Michael Jensen assaulted J.M., a fourteen-year-old girl. J.M. testified that Michael invited her to go to the movies, telling her there was a “huge group of people” from the church going.

According to J.M., after her mother dropped her off at the movie theater, Michael purchased her ticket and, as they walked through the door of the theater, he grabbed her, pulled her close, and started touching her breasts. She testified that he then pulled her outside the theater, pushed her up against a wall, and continued touching, kissing, and “doing all this other stuff’ as she tried to press him back. Explaining further, she testifíéd that Michael’s older brother, Blaine, came out of the theater, yelled Michael’s name, “dr[agged] him [Michael] inside the theater,” and thereafter kept Michael away from her.

She testified that she was upset; that Michael had made her feel as if she “owed him something just because he paid for [her], ticket”; and that she did not report the incident to the police because she was humiliated. She further recounted' subsequent contact with Mrs. Jensen, who approached her and asked whether She .was okay and “do we have a problem?” The plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Jensen “linked in her mind” the incident with .J.M. to Michael’s Provo sex offenses, which prompted her to confer with Bishop Whitcomb about the matters. Mrs.

Jensen testified that the only “link” in her mind was her concern, as a religious woman, with Michael’s “pre-marital displays of sexuality[,]” and that her conversation with Bishop Whitcomb was along those lines with only a passing reference to Michael’s offenses in Utah. During the fall of 2007, the plaintiffs allege that Church leaders discussed Jane and John Doe-l’s marital difficulties and'that Sandra-lee Jensen, as Relief Society President, offered Michael as a babysitter if the Doe-1 parents needed some time alone, Mrs.

Jensen testified that she did not disclose Michael’s sex offenses in Utah or the injury he had inflicted on P.C. to Jane Doe-1. The plaintiffs allege Mrs. Jensen also failed to mention that Michael was no longer allowed to babysit his siblings, Michael’s assault of J.M., or her conclusion that he should not babysit unsupervised. Jane Doe-1 accepted Mrs. Jensen’s offer of child care, and Michael babysat J.T., then aged three, and W.T., then aged four.

These children would later disclose to them parents that the evening Michael babysat them,' he blindfolded them, put ketchup on his penis, and forced them to perform oral sex on him. Criminal charges for these offenses were brought against Michael in 2012. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to thirty-five to seventy-five years in the penitentiary, and he has been designated a “violent sexual predator.” In early 2008, UD-l’s two-year-old son, C.P., was cared for in the Jensen home and came home with a swollen penis and abrasions on the inner part of his upper thighs.

Neither UD-1 nor his wife, S.P., who was at that time a neonatal intensive care nurse, sought medical treatment for C.P., which the plaintiffs allege was because they knew it would result in mandatory reporting to state authorities. UD-1 and his wife knew C.P.’s injuries could not have been self-inflicted because of his physical disabilities. When interviewed by the plaintiffs’ counsel, UD-1 stated that Sandralee suggested to his wife that C.P.’s injuries might be diaper rash, which his wife, who was a nurse, knew it was not.

UD-1 also stated during this interview, as did S.P. during her deposition, that C.P., who had been potty-trained, thereafter began wetting the bed again. The plaintiffs allege that sometime between February through April of 2008, Jane Doe-2 approached Sandralee • Jensen, who was still serving as Relief Society President, about her need for after-school child care for her sons, four-year-old Z.W. and six-year-old A.W. According to Mrs. Jensen’s testimony, she proposed Michael to babysit the children in the Jensen home, indicating she would be there, as well.

She did not disclose any information to Jane Doe-2 about Michael’s prior offenses, as discussed above, or his fitness as a babysitter. Over the following weeks, the plaintiffs allege that Michael forced Z.W. to perform oral sex on him and forced A.W. to watch. Z.W. testified that on one occasion ■when he told Sandralee that Michael was abusing him, she said, “okay and just ignored it.” In April 2008, Z.W. told his mother about the abuse. Jane Doe-2 testified that she saw the fear in her son’s eyes and never doubted his truthfulness about what had happened.

She told Sandralee what Michael had done and, a day or two later, Michael and his father Chris appeared at her home, denying the abuse ever happened in an aggressive manner that caused her to feel intimidated. Jane Doe-2 further testified that she and her husband arranged a meeting with defendant Bishop Fishel during which they disclosed Michael’s sexual abuse of Z.W,, and Bishop Fishel indicated he would look into the matter.

According to Jane Doe-2, when she saw Bishop Fishel at church approximately one week later, he told her that he had spoken to Michael; that he did not believe that Michael had abused Z.W.; and that Z.W. might have been exposed to pornography. John Doe-2 testified to a separate but similar conversation with Bishop Fishel. When Bishop Fishel was deposed, he denied ever speaking to Jane Doe-2 about Michael’s alleged sexual abuse of her son, and asserted any-conversation he had with John Doe-2 did not involve sexual abuse.

Bishop Fishel’s testimony reflects that a few weeks later, he selected Michael Jensen and his brother Blaine Jensen to be First and Second Assistant to the Bishop, an honor within the Church.

The defendants allege that neither of Z.W.’s parents “believed Z.W.’s account enough to report the abuse to the authorities” and John Doe-2 never disclosed any abuse of his son “by anybody.” Conversely, Jane Doe-2 testified she and her husband considered reporting the abuse to authorities but after speaking to Bishop Fishel, they decided that Z.W. had been through enough; that his allegation would be questioned; that there would be persons who would not believe him because it would have been Z.W.’s word against Michael Jensen’s denial; and that she did not want Z.W. to be ostracized.

By early 2009, Sandralee Jensen was no longer the Relief Society President but had assumed oversight of the Church’s Cub Scout program. When Jane and John Doe-3 indicated their inability to attend her Cub Scout training one evening because someone would need to watch their young children, Sandra-lee offered to have her children babysit the Doe-3 children.

Jane Doe-3 testified that Michael and a Jensen daughter babysat her children in the Jensen home, including her three-year-old son, C.H., who later disclosed Michael followed him into the bathroom, shut the door, and when he pulled down his pants to use the toilet, Michael touched his penis. Although the defendants state C.H. denied Michael had ever abused him, the plaintiffs point to contrary .evidence in the appendix record and to the circuit court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the claims of C.H. and his parents. The record reflects that around this same time in 2009, Sandralee emailed her former bishop, Matt Whitcomb, expressing her concern that Michael posed a risk to her other children. She advised Mr. Whitcomb that she and her husband were “trying to think[ ] of different options to help protect [Michael] from himself’ and asking whether there were any farmers in his area who would be willing to take in Michael. She also expressed to Mr.

Whitcomb her comfort in seeking his help because he “knew some of the history.” In early 2010, Chris Jensen found eighteen-year-old Michael in the bedroom of his twelve-year-old sister K.J., who was lying on her bed. Mr. Jensen testified that he had Michael leave the room after which his daughter told him that Michael had lain on top of her and tried to Mss her. During her deposition, K.J. described this incident as Michael first lying down beside her on her bed, then “climbfing] on top” of her after which he Mssed her for what seemed like ten to twenty minutes, and also “possibly” moving his pelvis against her.

She stated that she was terrified. Prom that point forward, the Jensens banned Michael .from their home, although he stayed in a tent in their backyard at .various times. The Jensens met with Bishop Chris Vincent, who was a bishop in their Stake but was not théir ward bishop, and reported Michael’s abuse of K. J. Bishop Vincent testified that during this meeting, K. J. told him about a court case in another state where Michael was tried for hitting a girl.

Bishop Vincent testified that he told no one else -within the Church about his meeting with the Jensens; that he agreed to counsel Michael; that he did not ask Michael about his abuse of K.J. or his earlier case that she had referenced; and that he gave Michael keys to the church building so he would have a safe place to sleep. Between 2010 and June of 2011, Michael sometimes lived with Church families, including the Doe-4 family, who took him on a family trip to South Carolina. Jane Doe-4’s son, J.C., who was Michael’s friend, testified the only concern he was aware of Mrs.

Jensen expressing was her worry that Michael would “mess[ ] up or hook[ ]up” with a girl at the beach. Michael went on that trip during which he allegedly abused the Doe-4s’ eight-year-old daughter, A.B., touching her genitals over her clothing. Sandralee Jensen testified that she knew Michael was living with the Doe-4 family, but she did not disclose anything to them about Michael’s history of abuse, including his recent abuse of his sister K.J. As Sandralee explained, she did not feel any need to warn the Doe-4 parents because K.J. was more “developed” than the Doe-4s’ daughter who was about the same age.

During this same time, the plaintiffs allege that the Church continued to hold Michael out as a trustworthy member of the community and, in early 2011, he was asked to serve as- a substitute teacher in the Church’s primary program and taught a class of four-year-old children. In June 2011, Michael was approved for a Church mission, which UD-1 indicated had been ■ delayed while Bishop Fishel worked with Michael on his various, issues. , In January of 2012, while Michael was on his mission, J;T. and W.T. disclosed to their parents, John and Jane Doe-1, that Michael had abused them five years earlier.

Jane Doe-1 reported the abuse to the West Virginia State Police. Bishop Vincent informed President Grow about these allegations against Michael involving the Doe-1 children, including that he had called the Church’s Helpline to advise Church officials in Utah of the West Virginia State Police investigation and that the State Police wanted to interview Michael. Although the Church brought Michael back to West Virginia early from his mission in Arizona, the plaintiffs allege that the Jensens; and Church leaders met and agreed to not disclose his return to the police.

The plaintiffs further allege Michael fabricated a story that he returned early from his mission due to a bicycle accident, and that Stake President Grow did nothing to correct the fabrication. The Jensens state that Chris Jensen was deployed when Michael returned early from his mission, and because Mrs. Jensen did not want Michael living at home without his father there, Mr. Whitcomb, who was then a Stake High Councilor, agreed to let Michael live with him and his wife. Mr.

Whitcomb testified that when his daughter and grandchildren planned a visit, he told Michael to find another place to live because there was not enough room in his home for everyone. Mr. Whitcomb asked John Doe-5 if Michael could live with his family. Although the Doe-5s had young children, the plaintiffs allege that neither Mr. Whitcomb, nor any Church official or defendant, told the Doe-5s the reason for Michael’s early return from his mission, or about Michael’s history of sexual abuse. Mr.

Whitcomb testified that he believed John Doe-5 was aware of the allegations against Michael based on conversations he had with John Doe-5, but he could not specifically recall the dates of those conversations. John Doe-5 testified that both Stake President Grow and Bishop Fishel encouraged him to allow Michael to live in his home. Michael Jensen lived with the Doe-5s from May 2012 until August 2012. John and Jane Doe-5’s son M.S. testified that Stake President Grow told him it was good that Michael was living with the Doe-5 family; that Michael was a “good guy;” and that he would be a “good role model” for M.S.

The plaintiffs allege that during this same time, Stake President Grow was “counseling” Michael on a regular basis.' The plaintiffs further allege that while Michael lived with the Doe-5 family, he touched the genitals of the Doe-5 boys, six-year-old T.S. and ten-year-old M.S., on several occasions. .During therapy with a psychologist, T.S. described looking into the living room at his home on one occasion and seeing Michael holding his brother’s head down to Jensen’s crotch and “humping” his brother M.S.’s face; he drew a picture of what he had observed.

The defendants allege the Doe-5 boys thought Michael’s touching of them was accidental, while they were “wrestling,” until their father suggested it was not. They add it was the Doe-5’s oldest son, M.S.-2, who originally suggested that Michael live with their family. In February of 2013, Michael Jensen was tried and convicted of the sexual abuse of the Doe-1 children, J.T. and W.T. During Michael’s criminal trial, the Doe-2’s son, Z.W., testified under Rule 404(

b) about his own sexual abuse by Michael. After additional children came forward, alleging they had been sexually abused by Michael, the Church organized a support group meeting for their families in March 2013 in which some of the.plaintiff families participated. UD-1 attended this support meeting, after which he reported on the meeting to Stake President Grow. The plaintiffs allege UD-1 continued to keep President Grow informed of what he learned from the plaintiff families and of the conversations he had with John Doe-5’s lawyer.

The appendix record contains an email from UD-1 to Grow that begins, “As promised here is what we [he and John Doe-5] talked about last night.” On September 16, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the circuit court against the Church defendants and the' Jensens (Chris, Saridralee, and Michael) alleging civil conspiracy, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and various negligence claims; they also asserted an assault and a battery claim solely against Michael Jensen.

On February 3, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming UD-1 as a defendant on their claim of civil conspiracy, Following extensive discovery, multiple motions for

summary judgment were filed, as well as numerous motions in limine. During a status conference held on. August 31, 2015, the circuit judge, expressing his concern regarding the impact that a six-week trial would have on his docket, identified a need to find ways to .shorten the trial’s duration. On December 4, 2015, prior to its in limine rulings, the circuit court ■ entered an order granting UD-l’s motion for

summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs could not prove the elements of conspiracy against him. Through its order entered on December 30, 2015, the circuit court granted several of the defendants’ motions in limine, effectively eliminating much of the plaintiffs’ evidence offered in opposition to the defendants’ motions for

summary judgment on the conspiracy claim. Although the • circuit court had previously indicated its intent to allow the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim against the remaining defendants to go to trial, the following day, December 31, 2015, the court entered an order granting

summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants on that claim. After observing in this order that it had “eliminated much of the circumstantial evidence that Plaintiffs intended to use in support of their conspiracy claim,” the circuit court found the plaintiffs had no direct evidence of a conspiracy and no evidence of a “concerted action by the alleged conspirators,” a “common plan or mutual agreement by the alleged conspirators,” or any evidence that “the alleged conspirators combined and agreed to violate a duty owed to the Plaintiffs.” On January 11, 2016, the circuit court entered an order of final judgment pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 54(

b) concerning its

summary judgment orders. The circuit court ruled these orders were final because they entirely disposed of all claims against UD-1 and all conspiracy claims against all 'defendants. No party objected to the entry of this order. This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review The plaintiffs have appealed two

summary judgment orders. Our review is plenary. Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court’s entry of

summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”). To the extent other standards apply to our review of the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) certification and its evidentiary rulings, those standards are set forth below. III. Discussion The circuit court certified its

summary judgment orders under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Following our consideration of the Rule 54(

b) certification, we will then address the circuit court’s in limine rulings and conclude with our review of the

summary judgment decisions. A. Rule 54(

b) certification In its Rule 54(

b) order, the circuit court found that its

summary judgment orders had disposed of the only claim (conspiracy) asserted against UD-1, as well as the conspiracy claim against all other defendants, and that there was no just reason for delaying entry of final judgment with respect to those claims. As the circuit court explained: (

a) appellate review of those orders and any necessary evidentiary rulings will promote judicial efficiency by maximizing the chance that this lengthy and complex case is tried only once, with the benefit of definitive rulings on the admissibility of certain evidence and the viability of certain claims; and (

b) the special nature of this case, where sexually abused children will be called upon to testify, strongly supports appellate review of these matters before trial. Testifying, and reliving their abuse, is re-traumatizing, and whatever appropriate steps are available should be taken to ensure that this happens only once. All parties assented to the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) ruling as being proper and meeting the criteria of Rule 54(

b) at the time it was made. Notwithstanding the defendants’ agreement to entry of the Rule 54(

b) order below, and the fact they did not file a motion to dismiss this appeal or cross-assign as error the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) certification, they now argue that this interlocutory appeal under Rule 54(

b) is improper because civil conspiracy merely extends liability for an underlying tort, which makes it inseparable from the merits of the underlying torts that remain pending below. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. Our review of the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) certification is guided by the following test: In reviewing a circuit court’s certification under Rule 54(

b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court applies a two-prong test. First, we scrutinize de novo the circuit court’s evaluation of the interrelationship of the claims, in order to decide whether the circuit court completely disposed of one or more claims, which is a prerequisite for an appeal under this rule. As to the second prong of the inquiry under the rale—whether there is any just reason for delay—-this Court accords the circuit court’s determination considerably more deference than-its first-prong determination.

The circuit court’s assessment that there is “no just reason for delay” will not be disturbed unless the circuit court’s conclusion was clearly unreasonable, because the task of balancing the contending factors is peculiarly one for the trial judge, who can explore all the facets of a case. Syl. Pt. 1, Province v. Province, 196 W.Va. 473, 473 S.E.2d 894 (1996). Regarding the first Province prong, the circuit court found that its

summary judgment rulings had disposed of the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim against UD-1, which was the only cause of action asserted against him, and their conspiracy claim against all other defendants. We have previously recognized conspiracy as a separate claim. As we stated in Dunn v. Rockwell, 225 W.Va. 43, 689 S.E.2d 255 (2009), “‘[t[he law of this State recognizes a cause of action sounding in civil conspiracy.’ ” Id. at 56, 689 S.E.2d at 268 (quoting Kessel v. Leavitt, 204 W.Va. 95, 128, 511 S.E.2d 720, 753 (1998)).

The fact that a civil conspiracy claim requires an underlying tort or harm resulting from the conspiracy does not make it any less a claim that can be disposed of separately from the remaining causes of action. The defendants assert that civil conspiracy is inseparable from the merits of the underlying torts, is based on the same facts, and seeks the same recovery. While the same facts might be relevant to the conspiracy claim, as well as the negligent and intentional tort claims that remain pending below, this does not preclude the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) certification of its final ruling on the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim. Indeed, “[w]hen the mischief is accomplished, the conspiracy becomes important, as it affects that means and measure of redress; for the party wronged may look beyond the actual participants in committing the injury, and join with them as defendants all who conspired to accomplish it. The significance of the conspiracy consists, therefore, in this: That it gives the person injured a remedy against parties not otherwise connected with the wrong.

It is also significant as constituting [a] matter of aggravation, and as such tending to increase the plaintiffs recovery.” Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App.3d 195, 687 N.E.2d 481, 497 (1996) (citation omitted). Further, a conspiracy claim “enlarge[sj the pool of potential defendants from whom a plaintiff may recover damages and, possibly, an increase in the amount of those damages[.]” Id. at 498; see also Premier Therapy, L.L.C. v. Childs, — Ohio St.3d —, 75 N.E.3d 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (observing that where additional damages are awarded on conspiracy claim there must be evidence to support damages award).

In the case at bar, the plaintiffs argue that “conduct that establishes conspiracy liability, but not separate tort liability, could cause harms not recoverable on the separate tort claims.” We have previously recognized the possibility of separate damages for conspiracy. In Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 188 W.Va. 144, 423 S.E.2d 547 (1992), after ordering the reinstatement of the verdict for the plaintiffs emotional injuries awarded on her invasion of privacy claim, we addressed the errors the plaintiff asserted concerning her conspiracy claim.

In Slack, “the only damages the plaintiff proved ... were damages for emotional distress and mental anguish.” Id. at 155, 423 S.E.2d at 558. We recognized the “identicality of the damage claim asserted under the civil conspiracy theory,” but declined to address “whether, from a substantive standpoint, there was sufficient evidence to prove such a theory.” Id. at 156, 423 S.E.2d at 559.

On remand, we instructed that “the plaintiff is free to develop the claim for civil conspiracy, but unless the damages are separate and distinct from those already obtained on the invasion of privacy verdict, there can be no recovery under Harless.” Slack, 188 W.Va. at 156, 423 S.E.2d at 559; see also Wells v. Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 105-06, 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (1982) (overruled on other grounds in Games v.

Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991) (finding that had “jury been properly instructed on the appellants’ 'conspiracy theory they may well have returned a verdict for compensatory damages against Settimio by virtue of the evidence of his participation in the conspiracy”). While the deference this Court affords to a circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) certification under the first prong of Province is' clear, we afford' even greater deference to the circuit court’s1 decision under the second prong of Province.

As indicated above, the circuit court found no just reason for delay because appellate review of its orders would “promote judicial efficiency by maximizing the chance that this lengthy and complex case is tried only once, with the benefit of definitive rulings on the admissibility of certain evidence and the viability of certain claims[.]” These findings “will not be disturbed unless the circuit court’s conclusion was clearly unreasonable[.]” Province, 196 W.Va. at 475, 473 S.E.2d at 896, syl. pt. 1, in part.

Under the authority set forth above, and upon giving the requisite deference to the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) ruling, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in its determination that the

summary judgment rulings completely disposed of the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims. Further, we give substantial deference to and concur in the circuit court’s conclusion that “the special nature of this case, where sexually abused children will be called upon to testify, strongly supports appellate review of these matters before trial.” Accordingly, we find-no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) certification, and we will exercise our appellate jurisdiction in this matter. B. In limine rulings Having upheld the circuit court’s Rule 54(

b) certification, we observe that “ ‘[wjhere an appeal is-properly obtained from an appealable decree either final or interlocutory, such appeal will bring with it for review all preceding non-appealable decrees or orders, from which have arisen any of the errors complained of in -the decree appealed from, no' matter how long they may have been rendered before the appeal was taken.’ Point 2, syllabus, Lloyd v. Kyle, 26 W.Va. 534 [1885].” Syllabus point 5, State ex rel. Davis v. Iman Mining Co., 144 W.Va. 46, 106 S.E.2d 97 (1958). Syl. Pt. 6, Riffe v. Armstrong, 197 W.Va. 626, 477 S.E.2d 535 (1996). Necessarily intertwined with the . circuit court’s

summary judgment rulings entered in favor of the Church defendants and the Jensen parents are its antecedent in limine rulings. Notwithstanding our holding in Riffe, the Church defendants strongly urge this Court to refuse consideration of the' circuit court’s in limine rulings. Citing our “finality rule,” they argue that the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the ih limine rulings “were so integral to the conspiracy order as to ‘give rise’ to the purported errors contained therein”; that “[n]othing in the circuit court’s expressed reasons for granting

summary judgment suggests that the outcome would have been different if some or all of the excluded evidence had not been excluded”; and that “[t]here is no meaningful way for this .Court to determine that any excluded evidence, much less which evidence, resulted in the alleged error in the conspiracy ruling.” The Jensen parents take a somewhat different stance. They first argue that this Court should not review the in limine rulings, but then acknowledge that the instant appeal is “tied up with the evidentiary rulings that have been decided,” adding that any review of those rulings should be limited “to the extent they impact the outcome of the

summary judgment ruling on the conspiracy cause of action.” Rejecting the notion that the in limine rulings are distinct from the'summary judgment rulings, the plaintiffs maintain that this Court can properly review’these evidentiary rulings under Riffe. They highlight the circuit court’s statement in its

summary judgment order that it had “eliminated much of the circumstantial evidence that Plaintiffs intended to use in support of their conspiracy claim” through its in limine rulings. Although the defendants argue' that any alleged error in the

summary judgment ruling did not arise from the prior in limine rulings, we find that the circuit judge’s comments made during the Rule 54(

b) hearing indicate otherwise: “I don’t know how you get around the motions in limine .... aren’t you going to have to look at those as part of the appeal? ... I don’t know how you cut that out of it.” It is clear to this Court, as well, that the in limine rulings and the

summary judgment rulings are inextricably entwined. Typically, a motion in limine is “a pre-trial request .., that the court not permit certain anticipated evidence to be admitted in the trial and not be seen or heard by the jury.” While the circuit court’s in limine rulings may have been made, in part, for such purposes, it is equally clear that these in limine rulings allowed the circuit court to evade review of that evidence and the attendant duty to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as is required of a court in ruling upon a motion for ■

summary’ judgment. Other courts have cautioned against proceeding in such a manner. In C & E Services, Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F.Supp.2d 316 (D. D.C. 2008), the court found that “a motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes of weigh evidenee[;]” rather,' such should be accomplished through “a motion for

summary judgment, with its accompanying and crucial procedural safeguards.” Id. at 323. Similarly, in Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d 1353 (7th Cir. 1996), the court determined that the sufficiency of evidence concerning lost profits was for

summary judgment of judgment as matter of law, not a motion in limine. Id. at 1363; see also Meyer Intellectual Prop.’s. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (observing that “motion in’limine is not the appropriate vehicle for weighing the sufficiency of the evidence”); Williams v. Johnson, 747 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D. D.C. 2010) (“Motions in limine are designed to narrow the evidentiary issues at trial. * '* * In light of their limited purpose, motións in limine ‘should not be used to resolve factual disputes,’ which remain the ‘function of a motion for

summary judgment’ ”) (citation omitted); Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc., 745 A.2d 147, 150-51 (R.I. 2000) (finding trial judge had improperly used motion in limine to effectively make

summary judgment ruling). While not expressly considering the propriety of utilizing in limine rulings to resolve factual disputes, this Court has addressed the effects of a circuit court’s elimination of evidence through an in limine ruling to facilitate

summary judgment. In San Francisco v. Wendy’s International, Inc., 221 W.Va. 734, 656 S.E.2d 485 (2007), the circuit court excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs’ causation experts through an in limine ruling after which it “went on to grant

summary judgment to.the defendant, on the basis that the plaintiffs did not have sufficient evidence to support their claim.” Id. at 738, 656 S.E.2d at 489. This Court concluded that [hjaving found that the circuit court erred ■in excluding both of the appellants’ causation experts, we now find that the appellants made a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that they had the burden to prove. Accordingly, because it now appears from the record that genuine issues of fact exist to be tried, we find that the circuit court erred in granting

summary judgment. Id. at 751, 656 S.E.2d at 502. Similarly, in Buckhannon Sales Co., Inc. v. Appalantic Corp., 175 W.Va. 742, 338 S.E.2d 222 (1985), the circuit court first granted the defendant’s motion in limine “to prevent the introduction of parol testimony concerning the various documents, contending that the court should not admit parol evidence and that the terms of the various contracts were unambiguous.” Id. at 744, 338 S.E.2d at 224. The court later granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendant. After analyzing the parol evidence rule, this Court reversed the award of

summary judgment after determining that “the motion in limine was erroneously sustained” and that “the parties should have the opportunity to explain the agreements.” Id. at 745, 338 S.E.2d at 224. Although the defendants contend there is nothing in the circuit court’s reasoning for granting

summary judgment that would suggest a different outcome had some or all of the excluded evidence not been eliminated, we disagree. The fact that the circuit court first eliminated a large portion of the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence offered in support of their conspiracy claim before it granted the Church defendants’ and the Jensen parents’

summary judgment motions on that claim strongly suggests otherwise. While the defendants afford little significance to the circuit. court’s pronouncement that it had eliminated much of the'plaintiffs’ evidence through its prior in limine rulings, we find the statement reveals precisely what the circuit court hoped to accomplish. Turning to the circuit court’s in li-mine rulings, we first observe that “[a] tidal court’s ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” Syl. Pt. 1, McKenzie v. Carroll Intern. Corp., 216 W.Va. 686, 610 S.E.2d 341 (2004).

Our consideration necessarily begins with a review of the evidentiary rules applicable to the circuit court’s rulings. Although the circuit court’s in limine rulings are sparse in terms of any factual or legal analysis, the order does reflect a cursory application of Rules.401 and 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 401, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (

a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (

b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” W.Va. R. Evid. 403, in part. In all but one of the in limine rulings being challenged, the circuit court found, inter alia, that the evidence would be “wasting time” and would cause “undue delay,” which are Rule 403 considerations.

The circuit court did not explain in its order why this evidence would be a waste of time or cause undue delay, nor did it offer any analysis as to why this evidence is unfairly prejudicial or how that unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Importantly, however, “wasting time” and “undue delay” should not be employed to exclude relevant evidence whose probative value substantially outweighs the risk presented by these concerns.

Indeed, notwithstanding the circuit court’s stated desire to find ways to shorten what will clearly be a lengthy trial in this matter, care must be taken to ensure that efficiency considerations do not lead to the exclusion of highly probative evidence. See U.S. v.

Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 320 (4th Cir. 2008) (“sympathizing] with the district court’s concern about the length and complexity of the trial”; agreeing that “the district court excluded the Other Crime Evidence without sufficiently considering the importance of the evidence to the government’s case”; and finding that the district court had “other tools available to it to ensure that the trial proceeds as expeditiously as possible”); Johnson v.

Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1987) (recognizing trial court’s need to control length of trial but also observing that “it may be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to exclude probative, non-cumulative evidence simply because its introduction will cause delay”). We bear these cautions in mind as we consider the circuit court’s in limine rulings that have been challenged in this appeal. 1.

Exclusion of Utah Sex Offense Evidence The circuit court ruled that the allegations of the Church’s influence in the juvenile criminal proceedings in Utah were based on “Michael’s cryptic boast to a friénd” and other circumstantial evidence of similarly “limited probative value,” which was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants, as well as concerns rooted in confusing the issues, wasting time, and undue delay.

The circuit court found a dissimilarity in conduct between Michael’s criminal offenses in Utah and the instant abuse allegations, adding that the Utah court records contained more information than either the Jensen parents, Michael’s paternal grandfather, or Bishop Swensen would have contemporaneously been aware of.

Regarding the SBRA, which was part of the Utah proceeding, the circuit court found there was no evidence that the Jensen parents or Church leaders ever saw the SBRA; therefore, it had low probative value that was substantially outweighed by its potential for confusing the issues, undue delay, and wasting time. The plaintiffs assert that these rulings are in error because the events in Utah marked the inception of the concerted action they have alleged.

They insist that the direct evidence concerning Michael’s early history of sex offenses in Utah is intrinsic to them claims, particularly where “disputes abound” regarding when the defendants had notice that Michael was a risk to children, whether they concealed both the abuse and the risk, and whether Michael should have been sponsored as a fit babysitter for Church families in West Virginia, or as a boarder in their homes.

Regarding the circuit court’s finding that this evidence, would be a “waste of time” bepause the Utah offenses were too “dissimilar” to Michael’s later abuse of children, the plaintiffs posit the question: What parent would not want to know that the person being proffered to babysit his or her child or board in his or her home had prior sexual offenses, and what parent would not think that persons with knowledge of those offenses had a. duty to disclose that knowledge before urging unsuspecting parents to allow that person into their home and/or to babysit their children?

Regarding the circuit court’s acceptance of the Jensens’ denial they never saw the SBRA or knew of its contents, the plaintiffs assert this was a credibility determination made by the circuit court in the face of contrary circumstantial evidence that calls into question the velocity of the Jensens’ denial.

The plaintiffs further argue that it should be for a jury, not the circuit court, to decide whether thére'is a connection between Michael’s Utah sex offenses and his later abuse of the minor plaintiffs and whether the Church influenced the outcome of the proceeding in Utah through the involvement of Michael’s paternal grandfather, who held powerful positions within the Church.

Maintaining that the contested facts concerning what happened in Utah, whether the conduct was serious, and whether -it was predictive of Michael being a threat to re-offend were all disputed, the plaintiffs assert the circuit court erred in resolving these disputed facts in favor of the defendants before also finding that this evidence had limited probative value and would be a waste of time.- Rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments, the defendants contend the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiffs have no evidence that Michael, his parents, or any Church leaders ever saw the SBRA or knew of its contents and that the plaintiffs have distorted the record when they claim the Jensen parents knew Michael was a danger to children because they no longer allowed him to babysit his younger siblings.

Arguing further, the defendants state that the circuit court properly excluded the SBRA, which has low probative value given the dissimilarities between Michael’s Utah conduct and the instant, abuse allegations, and which value was substantially outweighed by its potential for issue confusion, undue delay, and wasting time.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have no evidence of Church influence in Michael’s Utah proceedings; that those persons involved in that proceeding, including the prosecutors, have testified they were not influenced in their handling of Michael’s prosecution; and that Michael’s parents and grandfather participated in the proceeding as any parent or grandparent would in such circumstances. Based on our review of this evidence, we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Michael Jensen’s juvenile criminal proceeding in Utah.

Evidence of the Utah offenses, including the SBRA, are clearly relevant and probative of who knew what and when, which is at the heart of the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim, and is probative of notice of Micháel’s risk to re-offend sexually. Moreover, it is neither speculative nor unreasonable to conclude that a jury might infer'that Michael’s parents had access to information associated with their minor son’s criminal proceeding,. including the SBRA, which cautioned that Michael should' be supervised with any. female, including his young sisters, until'his therapy was completed and the risk reduced.

What purpose would such a warning serve if it were not shared with the very-persons intended to implement the protections addressed by the caution? Moreover, the parties’ experts have relied, in part, on the SBRA in rendering their opinions.

Further, regarding the Church’s alleged influence in that proceeding, it is difficult to ignore Michael’s friend J.C., who testified that Michael said he had been in legal trouble with a girl in Utah before moving to West Virginia, but his grandfather “was in a leadership position for the church ... [and] helped take care of whatever needed to be taken care of.” While the circuit court found this statement to be merely a “boast,”.

Michael has declined to testify in this matter; thus, there is no basis for such conclusion, Just because highly probative evidence may prejudice the opposing .party, that basis alone does not warrant the exclusion of such evidence which is the case here. Moreover, concerns about the length of trial do not warrant the exclusion of this evidence based on w;aste of time, undue .delay or confusion for a jury.

It will be for a jury to.resolve-any factual disputes associated with this evidence, draw .reasonable inferences from this evidence, as it.may,.and determine whether this evidence, supports the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim. ⅝ .. 2.

Exclusion of evidence of Michael • Jensen’s alleged assault of J.M. in 2007 The circuit court found the evidence of Michael Jensen’s alleged assault upon J.M. in 2007 to be of limited probative, value for purposes of establishing notice that Michael was a danger to young children, and that any probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its potential for issue confusion, undue delay,, and “wasting time during what is expected to be a long trial.” The plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred by rejecting their argument that whether this evidence provides notice that Michael was a risk to a range of potential victims is a jury question.

Arguing further, the plaintiffs maintain that Sandralee Jensen, who was.a Church officer at the time, connected the J.M. assault with Michael’s offenses in Utah, bringing both-matters to the attention of Bishop Whitcomb—all of which occurred be*fore Michael was “placed as a babysitter for the Doe-1 family in November 2007, the Doe-2 family in.

February/Mareh, 2008, and into the homes of the other plaintiffs thereafter.” The defendant’s respond that no local Church leader knew anything about the J.M. incident and that, at most, Sandralee Jensen may have mentioned this incident in a “passing comment” to Bishop Whitcomb. They further argue it was not until J.M.’s deposition in May of 2014 that either the Jensens or anyone else learned that the incident had been anything but consensual.

Finally, they contend that regardless of what they knew about this incident, it “would not act as a predictor that Michael might abuse young children.” ’ We .find the relevancy, and probity of this evidence outweighs any ’ concern for issue confusion, undue delay, or wasting time. This is simply another piece , of evidence from which a jury could infer a conspiracy to conceal incidents of Michael’s sexual abuse of others, including J.M., and to suppress information of the ongoing danger and threat that he posed.

Certainly, Sandralee Jensen, who is alleged to be part of the conspiracy and who was then serving as Relief Society President, had concerns at the time, prompting her to ask J.M. whether she was okay and “do we have a problem?” Mrs. Jensen also reported the incident to Bishop Whitcomb during a conversation in which she raised the topic of Michael’s offenses in Utah. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. 3.

Exclusion of any reference to an alleged 2006-2007 Stake High Council meeting The plaintiffs have circumstantial evidence that a Stake High Council meeting occurred in either 2006 or 2007 during which, inter alia, Michael Jensen’s abuse of a younger sister was allegedly discussed, and Stake President Grow asked UD-1 to monitor Chris Jensen and report back to him, which UD-1 agreed to do.

The circuit court excluded this evidence, finding the plaintiffs had no “firsthand evidence of such a meeting” and the probative value of the plaintiffs’ hearsay evidence, even if the court were to find it admissible, was substantially outweighed by a danger of undue delay and a waste of time. In making this particular in limine ruling, the circuit court referenced, without discussion, its earlier order granting

summary judgment in favor of UD-1.

The circuit court found in its prior order that UD-1 was indisputably not a member of the Stake High Council until 2008; that the transcript of plaintiffs’ counsel’s interview of UD-1 reflected that UD-1 did not specify a date for this Stake High Council meeting; that everyone who was indisputably a member of the Stake High Council at that time had denied that any such meeting took place; that the plaintiffs’ assertion that the meeting was prompted by Michael’s abuse of a younger sister was not supported by the record; and that the only record evidence of a sexual incident between Michael and a younger sister was the subsequent incident that occurred in 2010 with his then twelve-year-old sister, K.J.

The plaintiffs argue there is extensive evidence that this meeting took place within the time frame they allege, including separate conversations that John Doe-6 had with Stake President Grow; President Grov/s executive secretary at the time, Tony Naegle; and UD-1. They allege UD-1 told multiple plaintiffs about these Stake discussions during a parent support group meeting in 2013, referencing the 2007 time frame both then and when he was interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel.

Rejecting these arguments, the defendants essentially echo the circuit court’s findings, including that persons who served on the Stake High Council during that time frame have all denied that such discussion regarding the Jensens ever took place. We find the circuit court abused its discretion by crediting the defendants’ denials that this meeting took place when the record contains circumstantial evidence to the contrary.

While the evidence is clearly conflicting, it will be for the jury to assess the credibility of witnesses, to determine whether this Stake High Council meeting took place and, if so, whether concerns regarding Michael’s abuse of others was discussed. A jury’s resolution of this conflicting, but relevant and probative evidence, will necessarily bear on who knew what and when, whether Church leaders were on notice of the risk that Michael posed, and whether the evidence supports the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim. 4.

Exclusion of any reference to Michael Jensen’s sister, R.J., allegedly exhibiting signs of sexual abuse The circuit court found there is no direct evidence that abuse of R.J. was “discussed at a high council meeting” or that Michael was the abuser, even if R.J. had been abused.

It then concluded that the “very low probative value of Plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence of the alleged abuse of R.J. is substantially outweighed by its potential for confusing the issues, undue delay, and wasting time.” The plaintiffs contend the circuit court misunderstood their intended use for this evidence, which is not to argue that R.J. was abused; rather, they contend that she “exhibited well-accepted signs of abuse” at a time when both Jensen parents held high positions within the Church; were aware of their son’s history of sexual offenses; and when Sandralee Jensen, who was aware of this incident, was offering- Michael’s babysitting services to Church families in her róle as Relief Society President.

The defendants counter that even if R.J.’s behavior were suggestive of prior sexual abuse, this evidence has limited, if any, probative value because the plaintiffs do not allege that any Church leader was aware of the incident; there was no attempt to conceal the event; and the Jensen parents never interpreted R.J.’s behavior as being indicative of sexual abuse by anyone, including Michael. 'We find the probative value of this evidence outweighs any concern for issue confusion, undue delay, or wasting time.

Having previously found that the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence concerning the Stake High Council meeting in the 2006-2007 time frame was improperly excluded by the circuit court, the relevancy and probative value of the evidence concerning R.J. becomes more clear.

Although the defendants argue the plaintiffs have concocted this theory of sexual abuse of R.J., if a jury finds there was a 2006-2007 Stake High Council meeting during which the abuse of a Jensen daughter was discussed, the jury could conclude that-R.J. was that daughter, and that related concerns prompted Stake President Grow to ask UD-1 to monitor Chris Jensen. Accordingly, we find the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding this evidence. 5.

Exclusion of 1999 purported Helpline form document As part of the evidence supporting their conspiracy claim, the plaintiffs planned to offer at trial a Helpline form document to show how the Church’s abuse prevention and response systems are intended to protect the Church from liability rather than to prevent abuse, as the Church proclaims.

The plaintiffs state this • document was provided to their counsel by Unnamed Witness-1, who has averred that she telephoned the Church’s Helpline in 1999 concerning an abusive situation and that when the documents she had forwarded were later returned to her, this particular form document was included. Although the form appears on its face to be an instruction sheet for Helpline workers taking calls, the circuit court excluded the form, observing that the only Helpline call made in the instant matter was made by Bishop Vincent more than twelve years after the date on the form.

The lower court further found the document to be- unauthenticated hearsay and irrelevant.

While this form is very much in dispute, the Church defendants assert “[e]ven the purported Helpline form produced by Plaintiffs” supports their position that the purpose of the .Church’s Helpline is “to . assist [Church] bishops and stake presidents in ministering to victims and affected families in abuse situations, and to ensure that they comply with all applicable reporting laws.” Although the defendants champion the exclusion of this form at trial as being irrelevant and 'unauthenticated, they also claim' it reflects the Church’s vigorous policy of protecting and helping abuse victims.

Conversely, the plaintiffs contend they can authenticate this form, which is relevant and supportive of their conspiracy claim. This alleged Helpline form warns that Helpline-“PERSONNEL SHOULD NEVER ADVISE A PRIESTHOOD LEADER TO REPORT ABUSE.

COUNSEL OF THIS NATURE SHOULD COME ONLY FROM LEGAL COUNSEL^]” The plaintiffs argue their intent is not to show that this form was used when Bishop Vincent' telephoned • the Helpline in 2012, but to support their claim of institutional concealment and their position that the Helpline was implemented to protect the Church from civil liability rather than simply to protect victims from sexual abuse. They add the form is indicative of a “general strategy in responding to assertions of sexual abuse in the Mormon community,” which is as true today as it was when the Helpline was first implemented in the 1990s.

The Church defendants refute this assertion, arguing that any notion that its Helpline procedure has not changed since 1995 is “flatly contradicted by the record” and that “[witnesses familiar with the Helpline procedure testified that no such form is used today; [and that] they have no knowledge of the purported Helpline form or any written protocol.” While this particular evidence, as well as other evidence in the appendix record, would support the inference, urged by the plaintiffs, it also arguably supports the Church defendants’ position that this form is indicative of the Church’s purported laudatory policy and goal of preventing and protecting abuse victims.

Although the defendants contend this form document has no bearing on the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim, we find a jury could reasonably infer that the defendants’ silence in the face of repeated reports of alleged abuse by Michael Jensen, while simultaneously holding him out as a suitable babysitter and boarder to Church families, was consistent with this form document’s warning to “never advise a priesthood leader to report abuse.” Accordingly, we find this document to be relevant and probative of the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim.

With that said, this Court does not know by what means the plaintiffs will seek to admit this evidence at trial. In other words, the circuit court must determine at trial whether the plaintiffs can authenticate the document, as they aver they can, and whether they can overcome the defendants’ evidentiary objections in that regard. 6.

Church’s Annotation System In essentially two sentences, the circuit court excluded evidence relating to the Church’s annotation system, finding that “using an internal recordkeeping mechanism ... against the Church ... would create First Amendment concerns,” without offering any further explanation or analysis as to what that concern might be. The annotation system is part of the Church’s abuse “prevention and response” procedure for annotating records of members who commit child abuse or might otherwise pose a threat.

The circuit court concluded that because the Church did not use its annotation system to annotate Michael Jensen’s Church membership record, any probative value was substantially outweighed by “the potential for confusing the issues, undue delay, and wasting time.” The plaintiffs assert the circuit court erred in this regard, notwithstanding its further ruling that the Church defendants could not use the annotation system in their defense.

The plaintiffs argue the Church has “touted its abuse response and ■ prevention procedures as the gold standard,” which in the opinion of the Church defendants’ expert, exceeds the secular standard of care for youth-serving institutions. A part of these procedures is the Church’s .Helpline, as discussed above, as well as its annotation system.

The plaintiffs planned to offer evidence at trial that Bishop Swensen did not annotate Michael Jensen’s Church membership record following his .admission to sex offenses in Utah and, had he done so, Church leaders in West Virginia would have received earlier notice of Michael’s sex offenses, which could possibly have prevented the abuse of the minor plaintiffs through the Church’s secular duty to warn. Arguing further, the plaintiffs state this evidence is relevant and is not a “waste of time” when they have alleged 'the Church’s failure to warn is part of the alleged conspiracy.

Rather than substantively challenging the Church’s failure to annotate Michael’s record following his Utah offenses as a matter of Church doctrine, the plaintiffs assert their intent to simply show that the Church did not use its system to warn and protect.

Although the defendants argue the annotation system is irrelevant to Michael Jensen because it only restricts the types of church callings a congregant can have, and Michael’s abusive conduct was “out-of-church” conduct, the plaintiffs counter that Church leaders placed him as a babysitter in several homes, as a boarder in others, and as an unsupervised substitute teacher in the Church’s primary class of four-year-old children. Regarding the defendants’ argument that their evidence ■ demonstrates that only adult records are annotated, the plaintiffs point to contrary evidence in the appendix record.

In response to the defendant’s assertion that annotating Michael’s record would have made no difference because it would only have been seen ■ by his bishop and Stake president, the plaintiffs point to the Church’s Rule 30(b)(7) witness who testified that the purpose of notifying the bishop and Stake president is so that they can,, in theory, take steps to protect potential victims. . We find the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the existence of a system that the defendants have described as meeting, if not exceeding, the Church’s secular duty as a youth-serving organization.

This evidence is not only relevant and probative of the Church defendants’ defense, it is equally relevant and probative to the plaintiffs’ claims, particularly when notice and the Church’s failure to warn is part of the conspiracy claim. Any factual disputes presented by the evidence at trial may be resolved by a jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the probative value- of this evidence is not outweighed by any potential for confusion of the issues, undue delay, and wasting time, and it was error for the circuit court to have excluded this evidence. C. Partial

Summary Judgment in Favor of Church Defendants and the Jensen Parents on Conspiracy Claim In its order entered on December 31, 2015, the circuit court awarded partial

summary judgment in favor of these defendants pursuant to Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this rule, a party is entitled to

summary judgment if it can show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id., in part. Specifically, the circuit court granted

summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim after observing that it had “eliminated much of the circumstantial evidence that Plaintiffs intended to use in support of their conspiracy claim[,]” and that the plaintiffs had no direct evidence of a conspiracy.

In its rather cursory five-page order, the circuit court found that the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim was based on speculation, conjecture, cumulative inferences, and was so implausible that no reasonable juror could conclude that local Church leaders in two different states conspired with Michael Jensen and his parents over a number of years to conceal his abuse, or to “actively facilitate his pedophilia by trumpeting his moral worthiness to the congregation and obstructing a criminal investigation.” The circuit court concluded it was “insufficient for Plaintiffs to show that multiple people happened to do the same thing, or refrained from doing the same thing, particularly when they all deny knowing that Michael Jensen was an abuser, and when the Church condemns child sexual abuse.” In seeking a reversal of the circuit court’s ruling, the plaintiffs assert the lower court engaged in impermissible fact-finding by weighing conflicting evidence, resolving credibility disputes, dismissing and resolving doubts and drawing- inferences in favor of defendants, when those inferences should have been drawn in their favor, as the non-moving party.

Arguing further, the plaintiffs assert that the lower court substituted its judgment for that of a jury on the weight, existence, and sufficiency of plaintiffs’ évi-dence through its in limine rulings.

Maintaining that whether there was sufficient evidence for trial should have been evaluated under the procedural requirements and guidelines for deciding a Rule 56 motion— not as a motion in limine—the plaintiffs state that their conspiracy claim is based on intentional acts and intentional torts and that the defendants conspired with Michael Jensen to: promote and create opportunities for Michael Jensen to babysit and live in homes with small children; cover up incidents of sexual abuse of minors by Michael Jensen; prevent disclosure of Michael Jensen’s sexual abuse of young children; thwart and/or hinder enforcement actions by civil and criminal authorities to prevent further abuse and protect minor children; and to engage in the other conduct alleged herein.

Based on these actions, the Defendants conspired for the unlawful purpose of facilitating Michael Jensen’s criminal and tor-tious acts against the minor Plaintiffs, and for the further unlawful purpose of concealing and suppressing information on the danger and threat that Michael Jensen posed to unsuspecting children. The plaintiffs assert that when a conspiracy produces a tort, “ ‘every conspirator is liable for that tort, including a conspirator who promoted but did not commit the tort[.]’ ” Dunn, 225 W.Va. at 57, 689 S.E.2d at 269 (citations omitted).

They further argue that “once the conspiracy is formed, all of its members are liable for injuries caused, by any unlawful acts performed pursuant to and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id.

Although a principal cannot conspire with its agent, the plaintiffs assert “a corporation can act only through its agents or employees”; therefore, when th$ Jensen parents “were not acting as Church agents ... they were members of the conspiracy imtheir own right, and ... could conspire with the Church[,]” and when they were “acting as agents of the Church, then their acts were on behalf of the Church and [the Church’s] participation in the conspiracy.” The plaintiffs add that even if the Jensens are considered to have been agents of the Church at all times, which no one claims, a civil conspiracy requires only two members, and Michael Jensen was always a member of the conspiracy.

Dunn, 225 W.Va. at 56, 689 S.E.2d at 268 (“[A] civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons[.]”) (citation omitted). Discounting the plaintiffs’ arguments, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs have built their conspiracy claim on “layers of unreasonable inferenees[,]” which are so implausible that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. They maintain there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer a preconceived common agreement to cover up or minimize any abuse or identify any concerted action in furtherance of a conspiracy.

Arguing further, they state that, “[a]t worst, there were unrelated incidents of ordinary negligence by individual actors” which, if proven, would allow the plaintiffs to recover on their remaining negligence and fraud claims. The Church defendants insist, • with the possibility of a single exception, they were not involved with the babysitting and living arrangements that resulted in the abuse.

They contend the plaintiffs’ theory that the conspirators “facilitated” and “created opportunities” for Michael to have access to children that he could then sexually abuse lacks any evidentiary support and is “utterly unreasonable and unbelievable on its face.” In addition to echoing many of the Church defendants’ arguments, the Jensen parents add that there was no conspiracy of silence because their alleged co-conspirators had no reason to believe Michael had sexually abused any children, and they were unaware of Michael’s babysitting activities.

They further argue that R.J. was never abused by anyone; that Bishop Whitcomb assigned San-dralee Jensen as the Relief Society President and advanced Michael in the Church’s Aaronic Priesthood at a time when he had no knowledge of Michael’s offenses in Utah; and that even if the alleged 2006-2007 Stake High Council meeting occurred, such event does not prove they were part of a conspiracy.

In addition, they assert there is no evidence that the alleged co-conspirators were aware of any sexual abuse committed by Michael, except the possible abuse of Z.W. that was allegedly disclosed to them and to Bishop Fishel in 2008. They add that there is no evidence of a conspiracy of silence related to Michael’s abuse of his younger sister, K.J., when they “immediately ldek[ed] Michael out of the house, which would have raised questions,” and given that they also spoke to Bishop Vincent about the incident, asking him to help Michael.

The Jensens state that, at worst, the evidence shows that different people conceivably knew “bits and pieces of alleged misconduct by Michael, but there is no evidence of some grand scheme to conceal this misconduct—no evidence of any agreement to cover up, not to report, or to prevent disclosure.” It is axiomatic that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party[.]” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

Further, as we held long ago, “summary judgment ... must be denied if there is a genuine issue as to a material fact[,]” and that “[t]he question to be decided on a motion for

summary judgment is whether there is a genuine issue of fact and not how that issue should be determined.” Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Syl. Pt. 5, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). We previously articulated guidelines for evaluating a motion for

summary júdgment, as follows:. The circuit court’s function at the

summary judgment stage is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Consequently, we must draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the most favorable light to the party opposing the motion.

In assessing the factual record, we must grant the nonmoving party the benefit of inferences, as “[c]redibility determinations,' the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the, facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]” Williams, 194 W.Va. at 59, 459 S.E.2d at 336 (internal citations omitted). Applying these guidelines and precepts to a review of the circumstantial evidence previously excluded by the circuit court, as well as all other evidence, readily demonstrates the existence of a myriad of genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded entry of

summary judgment. Indeed,, other than the parties’ identities and Michael Jensen’s convictions in West Virginia, there appear to be very few facts upon which the parties agree. Nearly every factual allegation is contested in some fashion, whether by inconsistencies between interviews, depositions, and affidavits, often from the same individuals, or

interpretations of the evidence, or the inferences . to be drawn from that evidence. For instance, the- plaintiffs contend the conspiracy to protect Michael Jensen and to conceal his offenses began after he was charged with félony sex offenses in Provo, Utah, as a teenager. They discuss various facts in support of their theory, including the involvement in that proceeding by Michael’s paternal grandfather, who held a powerful position within the Church in Provo.

They also cite the testimony of defense expert Frank Yannelli who testified that the charges against Michael in Utah were reduced more than commonly done; that there were numerous other atypical factors in the proceeding; and that Michael received a lenient punishment without follow up consequences. Conversely, the defendants point to Mr.

Yannel-li’s April 3, 2015, witness statement in which he stated that the outcome of Michael’s case in Utah ■ “was typical for such a case.” Another disputed issue of material fact involves the parties’ basic disagreement regarding the precise nature of Michael’s offenses in Utah and whether they provided notice of his risk to re-offend sexually.

The plaintiffs describe Michael’s offenses, which resulted in his arrest at his middle school and being charged with two felony sex offenses, as him waiting for each victim, pinning her against a wall, and grabbing her breasts and buttocks against her will, a de-. scription that is consistent with victim statements in the appendix record.

Conversely, the defendants describe the incident as Michael briefly groping two peer-aged girls over their clothes, which the Jensen parents contend were “offenses that were not atypical for a male of his age.” Additional disputed facts in the alleged conspiracy time line include Sandralee Jensen’s report of the J.M. incident to Bishop Whitcomb, whether there was a “linkup” in her mind between that incident and Michael’s offenses in Utah and whether she conveyed the same to Bishop Whitcomb, and the concern she expressed to J.M. asking if she was all right and whether they had a problem.

Michael’s alleged assault of J.M. is described above and will not be repeated here. It will be for a jury to make credibility determinations in this regard. There are also disputed issues of material fact concerning the alleged Stake High Council meeting during which the plaintiffs contend that Church leaders discussed the issue of sexual abuse and the Jensens in the 2006-2007 time frame.

The defendants assert that all those who would have participated in such a meeting have denied it ever occurred; that UD-1 could not have participated because he was not placed on the Stake High Council until 2008; that John Doe'-5’s testimony that Stake President Grow told him that such a meeting took place is self-serving hearsay; and that no such discussion could have happened because no Church leader learned of Michael’s abuse until after his arrest in 2012.

The plaintiffs counter that John Doe-5 testified during his deposition that Stake President Grow confirmed to him such discussions about the Jensens had taken place in the time frame in question and that he had asked UD-1 to keep an eye on Chris Jensen and report back to him; .and that President Crow's executive secretary also confirmed that these Stake discussions concerning the Jensens took place.

The plaintiffs also point to UD-l’s interview by their counsel during which he stated, “I was on councils,” referring to Stake High Councils, where the issue of sexual abuse by Michael was discussed during the relevant time frame, as contrasted with the conflicting statements made by UD-1 during his subsequent deposition. They also point to the depositions of those adult plaintiffs who testified to having similar disclosures made to them by UD-1. These and many other genuine issues of material fact arise out of the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence.

Although the circuit court stated the plaintiffs’ have no direct evidence, none is required to prove their conspiracy claim. As we previously explained: “Circumstantial evidence is information that tends directly to prove or disprove not a fact in issue bu

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