Connie PLYMALE, f/k/a Connie Donnelly, Appellant (Defendant), v. Gavin DONNELLY, Appellee (Plaintiff), 125 P.3d 1022

GOLDEN, Justice. [¶ 1] Connie Plymale, fiVa/ Donnelly (Mother) appeals an order denying her motion to reconsider an order granting abatement of child support in favor of Gavin Don-nelly (Father). We hold that a postjudgment motion to reconsider is a nullity under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Any order ruling on such a motion is therefore void. Having nothing to review, this appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [¶ 2] Mother and Father had two children through marriage. They subsequently divorced. Mother was given primary residential custody of the children during the school year.

Father was given primary residential custody of the children during the summer. Father requested child support abatement from the district court for the time he had residential custody of the children during the summer of 2004. The district court granted an abatement. No appeal was taken from the order granting the abatement. [¶ 3] Four days after the order granting the abatement was filed, Mother filed a motion for the district court to reconsider its order. The district court denied Mother’s motion to reconsider. Mother appeals the order denying her motion to reconsider.

DISCUSSION [¶4] While no party has raised the issue of jurisdiction, this Court has a duty to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719, 721 (Wyo.1997). This Court has jurisdiction to entertain appeals only from final, appealable orders. W.R.A.P. 1.04(a), 1.05; McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶¶ 19-20, 34 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Wyo.2001) (this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain appeal from non-final order).

Under the circumstances of this case, this Court has jurisdiction only if the district court order denying Mother’s postjudgment motion for reconsideration is a final, appealable order. [¶ 5] The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provide various methods to obtain relief from judgment, such as those contained in Rules 50, 59 and 60, along with a direct appeal.

Conspicuously absent is a provision for a stand-alone “motion for reconsideration.” In point of fact, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a “motion for reconsideration.” Motions for reconsideration stem solely from unauthorized local practice. We have held that “[cjourt rules have the force and effect of law and are construed in the same manner as statutes. Compliance with court rules is mandatory.” Paxton Resources, L.L.C. v. Brannaman, 2004 WY 93, ¶ 16, 95 P.3d 796, 801 (Wyo.2004), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 976, 160 L.Ed.2d 901 (2005) (internal quotation omitted).

The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provide no authorization for a motion for reconsideration and none can be inferred therefrom. Strict compliance with the rules requires that motions for reconsideration be considered nullities. [¶ 6] We acknowledge that, in prior appeals, we have reviewed the substance of motions for reconsideration in order to determine whether the motion serves as the functional equivalent of an authorized motion that defers the start of the appeal period. See, e.g., Sherman v.

Rose, 943 P.2d 719 (Wyo.1997) (in order to toll time, a motion to reconsider must be the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend judgment); Morehouse v. Morehouse, 959 P.2d 179 (Wyo.1998) (motion to reconsider that is not the functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend judgment does not toll time). However, in these prior appeals the exact question of the validity of a motion for reconsideration was not before us.

These prior opinions therefore contain no precedential authority on the issue at hand. [II7] In any event, recognition by this Court, or a lower court, of a motion for reconsideration cannot alter the dictates of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has previously adopted the dissent of Justice Clark in Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 389, 84 S.Ct. 397, 400, 11 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964): [TJhe error of the trial judge in entertaining the motions could not be validated by the acquiescence of the Government.

It is elementary that the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court. We have said that untimely motions to amend the findings and for new trial are of no legal significance whatsoever because the limiting language of Rule 6(

b) is “mandatory and jurisdictional and cannot be extended regardless of excuse.” United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 288, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960). In my view we should abide by these rules or amend them, rather than emasculate them. Rules of procedure are a necessary part of an orderly system of justice. Then-efficacy, however, depends upon the willingness of the courts to enforce them according to their terms. Changes in rules whose inflexibility has turned out to work hardship should be effected by the process of amendment, not by ad hoe relaxations by this Court in particular cases.

Such dispensations in the long run actually produce mischievous results, undermining the certainty of the rules and causing confusion among the lower courts and the bar. See Miller v. Murdock, 788 P.2d 614, 616-17 (Wyo.1990) (cited with approval in Paxton Resources, L.L.C., ¶ 16, 95 P.3d at 801). Henceforth, we will enforce the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as written and consider postjudgment motions for reconsideration, so denominated, a nullity.

To the extent any prior opinion suggests otherwise, it is expressly hereby overruled. [¶ 8] In addition to securing enforcement of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, a bright-line rule declaring postjudgment motions to reconsider nullities is supported by policy considerations. The entertainment of motions for reconsideration is a waste of judicial resources. In likewise determining that a motion for reconsideration is a nullity, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained: Practical considerations also mandate and support our determination herein.

Once again, this court as well as the lower courts are left in a procedural quagmire of trying to elevate a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment to the status of a motion for a new trial or as a motion for a directed verdict or the like. The courts have had the arduous task of trying to inspect each and every motion for reconsideration which is filed in the trial court after a final judgment, and try to decipher form over substance. This is a costly procedure, both financially and in manual labor, which, as in the present cause, results in a procedural morass which clouds the merits.

Complications concerning the timeliness of appeal and whether the Court of Appeals is vested with jurisdiction when a motion for reconsideration is filed after a final judgment can and should be avoided. See Judge Krenzler’s concurring opinion in NoHh Royalton Edn. Assn. v. Bd. of Edn. (1974), 41 Ohio App.2d 209, at 218, 325 N.E.2d 901. The application for a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment is simply a legal fiction created by counsel, which has transcended into a confusing, clumsy and “informal local practice.” See Kauder [v.

Kauder (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797], supra, and Kent, Odds & Ends, 49 Cleve. Bar J. 280. Pitts v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (1981). We agree. In the past, this Court has expended great effort in determining with what rule of civil procedure a particular postjudgment motion for reconsideration can be equated.

Such effort can be easily eliminated by simply requiring parties to adhere to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and file a motion authorized under the rules. [¶ 9] Finally, the past practice of recognizing motions for reconsideration, besides being inefficient, has produced inconsistent results, with the right to appeal hanging in the balance. Filing an authorized motion for postjudgment relief will eliminate uncertainty for all involved.

The filing by aggrieved parties of a motion that is properly designated under the rule authorizing the motion, such as Rule 50, 52 or 59, will ensure full appellate rights are preserved. [¶ 10] The obvious consequence of categorizing a motion for reconsideration as a nullity is that “all judgments or final orders from said motion are a nullity.” Pitts, at 1107. See also State ex rel. Pendell v. Adams County Bd. of Elections, 40 Ohio St.3d 58, 531 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1988). We emphasize that this includes not only orders denying motions for reconsideration, but orders granting such motions as well.

Orders granting a motion for reconsideration, and any action taken pursuant to that order, are void. Applying this principle to the present case, the district court’s order denying Mother’s motion to reconsider is void. CONCLUSION [¶ 11] Mother titled her post-judgment motion “Motion to Reconsider Order Allowing Abatement.” This Court will no longer look at the substance of such a motion but rather simply declare it a nullity based upon its denomination. The district court order purportedly denying this motion is void. There being no final appealable order to review, this appeal is dismissed.

GOLDEN, J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a specially concurring opinion, in which BURKE, J., joins. . Federal courts consistently acknowledge that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Board of County Comm’rs, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir.1995) (The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a “motion to reconsider.'') (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828, 113 S.Ct. 89, 121 L.Ed.2d 51 (1992)); Lavespere v.

Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.1990) (same) (partially abrogated on other grounds, see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 n. 14 (5th Cir.l994)(en banc)). Other jurisdictions have also reached the same conclusion under their rules. See, e.g., Fleming v. District of Columbia, 633 A.2d 846, 848 (D.C.1993) ("A motion for reconsideration, by that designation, is unknown to the Superior Court's Civil Rules.”); Hamilton v.

Rybar, 111 Idaho 396, 724 P.2d 132, 133 (1986) ("the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a petition to reconsider”) (partially abrogated on other grounds, see McIntire v. Orr, 122 Idaho 351, 834 P.2d 868 (1992)); Wales v. Wales, 2003 Iowa App., 662 N.W.2d 371, 2003 WL 118235 (Iowa Ct.App.2003) ("motion to reconsider has no authorization in the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure”).